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ABSTRACT 
The early history of South African industrial develop-
ment has been approached from essentially two angles. One body of 
thought has concentrated on the adverse effect colour bars have had 
on the development of South Africa . It is argued that racial 
discrimination in industry originated from the racial prejudice 
of white workers and from state intervention in the econom·y. 
Opposed to that view is the interpretation that the colour bar 
originated out of the specific character and subsequent development 
of South African capitalism. This study approaches the debates 
and arguments through an analysis of the Wage Act of 1925 . 
The industrial relations system which operates in South 
Africa has its origins in the legislation of the 1920s. It is 
based on the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act 
of 1925. 
Very few systematic analyses of the Wage Act have been 
produced hitherto. Most commentators have focussed on single 
aspects of the Act, but very few have attempted an examination of 
the operation of the Wage Board which was established by the Act. 
The Wage Board was instituted as an element to promote 
the civilised labour policy in the private sector. Whereas the 
viii 
Industrial Conciliation Act operated to protect organised labour, 
the Wage Act concentrated on unorganised trades and sections of 
trades. Although empowered to investigate conditions in the mining 
industry, the Wage Board was never used to regulate wages in that 
industry under the Wage Act due to opposition from the industry. 
It was concerned solely with secondary industrial and manufacturing 
establishments because agriculture and domestic service were excluded 
from the Wage Act. 
The Wage Act was based on the principal of compulsory 
regulation. Determinations in~ of the Board's recommendations 
were binding on employees and employers alike. Complex procedures 
hampered the activity of the Board until 1930 when the Act was 
amended and simplified. The Board faced a great deal of opposition 
from manufacturers in its early years. But a cautious approach 
and the gradual implementation of determinations ensured that 
employers' ~ition sxn changed to support when it became clear 
the RArrd was not an arbitrary one. 
The Board had to take a number of strict considerations 
into account. It could not recommend wages if its recommendation 
would affect the particular trade concerned adversely. It concerned 
itself with the promotion of efficiency in business, production costs, 
consumerism , the wasteful employment of labour, the l~ of the 
working day and the productivity of employees. As such it was used 
as a means to assist the necessary rationalis-ation and reorganisation 
of South African industry. 
ix 
It could not recommend wages without the Minister's 
express instructions if all the employees covered by a reference 
could not receive a civilised wage . Civilised wages were 
classified as wages at which employees could enjoy white standards 
of living. This clause effectively introduced a colour bar into 
wage determinations. It operated before 1930 to buttress Industrial 
Council Agreements to prevent the displacement of whites by Africans 
at lower rates. 
The Wage Board also considered investigations from 
unskilled, African workers. The Board was not permitted by law to 
discriminate against people of colour. 
colour bar of wage regulation in general in 
Apart from the potential 
South Africa, the Board 
was instructed in 1930 to refrain from issuing recommendations for 
African workers. Regulations were also altered to exclude Africans. 
The Wage Act declined in importance after the Great Depres-
sion as white workers were drawn closer to the wider-reaching Industrial 
Conciliation Act. The need to regulate African wages and to control 
African labour became more evident during the period of economic 
expansion in the 1930s. The Act was replaced in 1937 and the 
restrictions formerly placed on Africans were removed. The work-
force had finally been separated with the provision of different 
industrial relations appartuses. 
• 
••• Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses 
a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians 
and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish 
worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation 
to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation 
and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists 
of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination 
over himself. He cherishes religious J social, and national 
prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is 
much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the 
former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with 
interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once 
the accomplice and the stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. 
This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by 
the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short, by all the means 
at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the 
secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its 
organisation. It is the secret by which the capitalist class 
maintains its power. • And that class is fully aware of it. 
Marx to Siegfried Meyer and August Vogt April 9 1870 
Marx and Engels Ireland and the Irish Question pp 407-408 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the occasion of the Union of South Africa's golden jubilee in 
1960, the government of the day claimed that the "sympathetic 
labour policy pursued by all Governments" had spared the country from 
1 
revolutionary industrial unrest . The strike wave of 1973 and the 
re-emergence of an organised, increasingly militant black working class 
forced the state onto the defensive. Intense attention was focussed 
on the industrial relations apparatus, with an eye to its modification, 
during the 19705 and beyond. In 1979, Professor Nic Wiehahn, 
government labour advisor and propagandist, accredited industrial peace 
in the country to the statutory structure of industrial relations 
introduced after 1924 . The present system had its roots in the 
Hertzog era at a time when South Africa set out on its "industrial 
trek" in earnest. 2 
This study is an attempt to unravel a number of the .features of the 
labour policies of early governments - as exemplified by the Wage 
Act between 1925 and 1937. It proceeds from a general analysis of 
some important historiographical frameworks which have sought to 
explain South Africa's industrial development, to a particular 
1. Union of South Africa, Our First Half Century, pp 92-98 
2. Wiehahn, N "South Africa: The Historical Development of Labour 
and Industrial Relations ll • 
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examination of how the Wage Act itself has been treated in the 
literature. The questions which form the essence of this study's 
concern are identified next and the method of inquiry mapped out. 
The following section focuses on five analysts whose contri-
butions are considered to be representative of attempts to explain 
industrial tlevelopment in South Africa by a large and growing 
number of students of different persuasions and disciplines. 
W H Hutt represents the conservative wing of laissez-faire 
economists. Sheila van der Horst's work has inspired many liberal 
historians and economists. Frederick Johnstone brought a mature 
marxism to the study of mining. His work was developed and 
extended by a group best represented by Rob Davies . The reaction 
to Davies within radical circles produced a more encompassing 
analysis which thrust the role and development of ideology and 
hegemony to the fore. This group is examined here through the 
recent work of Belinda Bozzoli. 
Hutt ' s Economics of the Colour Bar began with a quotation from 
Milton Friedman which stated that 
3. 
the pressures of discrimination in any society are 
the areas that are most monopolistic in character, 
whereas discrimination against groups of particular 
colour or religion is least in those areas where 
there is the greatest freedom of competition. 3 
Hutt, W H Economics of the Colour Bar, p7 
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Friedman thus set the tone for Hutt's analysis of "the economic 
origins and consequences of racial segregation in South Africa." 
Discrimination was to be found in economic fields where a group 
exercised a monopoly over certain resources. It was not to be 
found where ~ompetitionJfree from restraints, existed. Hutt 
noted that his was a twofold task. He identified,first,the 
liberating forces which operated against colour prejudice and second, 
"the opposing forces - constitut.ing the injust.ice - that have tended, 
deliberately or otherwise, to perpetuate" the inferiority and subord-
ination of the "non-white classes,,4_ Injustice was attributed to 
"any policy or action which is intended to perpetuate the inferiority 
of material standards or status of any racial group." An inherited 
status of "inferiorityn or subordination could not be construed as 
'unjust' 
except to the extent which developed countries or 
colonising powers can be shown to be deliberately 
witholding opportunities from underdeveloped areas 
or colonial powers. 5 
6 Colour prejudice, that "manifestation of powerful custom" was 
forced into the background because Hutt initially found that it 
was not "the chief incentive for legislative or collusively enforced 
4. ibid, P 12 
5. ibid, pp' 9-10 
6. ibid, P 12 
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colour bars. II Rather, tithe consequences of economic exclusiveness" 
caused the perpetuation of "irrational racial prejudice".7 
explained: 
I have been led to believethat colour prejudice has 
persisted through economic factors - through the 
perpetuation of t .he economic inferiority of the non-
white peoples. In the pages which follow, I shall 
try to explain why I regard the economic colour 
discriminations 1n the Republic as an independent 
cause rather than a symptom of colour injustices. 8 
Hutt 
Johnstone acknowledged that Hutt realised that the source of the 
colour bar lay in lithe preservation of 'certain economic relationships 
9 between the races'" But Hutt himself reversed his position. After 
starting 'out from the assumption that colour prejudice was rooted in 
economic discrimination, he ended up by ascribing economic injustice 
to. colour prejudice. Hutt was anxious to explain the solution to 
the poor white problem during the boom of the 1930s. His conclusion 
had direct bearing on his final interpretation of the relationship 
between colour prejudice and economic injustice. He noted that, 
after the gold standard crisis and the end of the depression in 1932/3, 
enbrepreneurial ingenuities under the profit incentive had 
broken through some of the barriers of custom and law 
which had been restraining the more effective economic 
7. ibid, P 29 
8. ibid, pp 30-1, emphasis added 
9. Johnstone, F A "Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa,"p232. 
Hutt, ibid, p 27 
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integration of the white and non-white races. In so 
doing, successful profit-seekers created - almost 
miraculously - opportunities for the absorption of the 
Poor Whites into relatively well-paid industrial or 
commercial occupations. The barriers had had their 
origins in tradition and prejudice, but they had 
survived through labour union pressures and measures 
such as the Wage Act, the Apprenticeship Act, and the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. 10 
The above passage marked the real beginning of Hutt's analysis. 
His volte face can be attributed to the limits of his definition of 
injustice, which in turn lead on to the definition of the two 
betes noires of South Africa industrial development. Injustice 
was defined within the parameters of the economic order itself, hence 
the exclusion of structural injustice or prejudice from the definition. 
Injustice resulted from deliberate policies or actions within the parti-
cular capitalist system. Since the economic system itself was not 
responsible for injustice, its source had to be sought within the 
parameters of that system, among its constituent actors. Thus, 
state intervention through industrial legislation represented the 
curtailment of free competition, and white union pressures caused the 
monopoly of the job colour bars. These two created the barriers which 
had restrained lithe more effective economic integration of the white 
and non-white races. II Hutt concluded that "ent::reP.reneurial ingenuities 
under the profit incentive" destroyed the barriers set up by the state 
and white labour, and "s uccessful profit seekers'· solved the poor 
10. Hutt, ibid, pp 35-36, emphasis added 
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white problem en route. 
Johnstone correctly noted that Hutt's "perspective on the colour 
bar is too restricted". 11 Hutt's argument led him to believe that 
the "mines never exploited African labour in the bad sense, as 
legislation •.• certainly did.,,12 He failed to consider what 
Johnstone called the wage or exploitation colour bars which operated 
13 
coterminously with the job colour bar. In short, Hutt did not 
consider that the peculiar structure of the mining industry demanded 
economies which could only have been realised through the purposeful, 
deliberate coercion and subordination of the African miners by mine 
owners themselves. Among the coercive instruments used were the 
maximum average system whereby wages were regulated at low rates 
to prevent competition between mines,14 and the loafer ticket which 
operated to deny African miners any remuneration if set drilling 
minima were not carried out in the set time,15 neither of which 
received Hutt's attention. Similarly the crucial role the 
mining companies played to create the pass laws in the 18905 in the 
16 Transvaal to regulate their labour intake was neglected. . Hutt's 
11. Johnstone, R A "Industrial Colour Bars in south Africa," p 230 
12. Hutt, ibid, p 54. Johnstone, ibid, pp 233-4 
13. The difference between these types of colour bar is discussed 
in more detail below, pp 14-20 
14 . van der Horst, S T Native Labour in South Africa, p 192 and 
Johnstone, F A "Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa" pp 53-58 
and Class, Race and Gold, pp 42-45, 286-8 provide details of this 
system 
15. Johnstone, FA Class, Race and Gold pp 43-4, 186-7 provides more details 
of how this system worked 
16. van der Horst , S T "The Effects of Industrialisation on Race 
Relations in South Africa" p 114 and Levy, N The Foundation of the 
South African Cheap Labour System p 76-9, provides further details 
\ 
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analysis of the recruiting monopsony. compound system. migrant 
labour. the reserves and cheap labour generally was restricted by 
his approach . His contention that neither "the shareholders nor the 
administrators of the mines were responsible for colour bars" or indeed 
of "witholding .• • opportunities of advancement from Africans:17 must 
fall in the light of the comparatively more recent work of. among 
others. Johnstone and Levy. Hutt concluded that "had the mining 
magnates been free to insist on their interests as investors .. . they 
would have opened the door. by slow degrees. to African advancement".18 
In fact. mine owners played a decisive role in the creation of the 
1 b th · 19 co our ar on e rn1nes. They also failed to eradicate the 
colour bar after the Rand strike. 20 Finally. a consideration of 
state policy towards the poor white problem clearly indicates that 
their employment was not merely the almost miraculous result of 
activities by "successful profit-seekers". Hutt's view that entrep-
reneurs as a class battled furiously against the irrational prejudices 
of both government and labour unions was oversimplified. As will 
become evident in the course of this study. employers and employeers 
were divided amonst themselves about the merits or otherwise of colour 
bars from time to time. 
The conservatism of Hutt's approach was contrasted to the liberal 
reformist stance of Sheila van der Horst . She recognised that group 
17 . Hutt. ibid. pp 53-4. For his discussion of the topics mentioned 
earlier. cf pp 47-54 
18. ibid. p 54 
19. Levy. N 
pp 222-6 
The Foundation of the South African Cheap Labour System 
is particularly useful on this. 
20. These questions are further examined in chapter 
-8-
behaviour was important for~uate analyses of South Africa's 
industrial development. The divisions within society resulted from 
the interplay of "cultural differences between the racial groups and 
t · 1 h' . 1 d' t' 21 par l.CU ar l.storl.ca con 1. l.ons .. 11 The mining industry was 
hampered by the continued existence of the colour bar, instituted 
by white labour, and government policy.22 The industry's problem of 
profitability could be solved by allowing "the mines to maximise their 
taxable output, by adopting freely. every cost-reducing . . 23 1nnovatl.on.1I 
Van der Horst was aware of the action of 'internal administrative 
1 b . th . th .. . d t 24 co our ars' WI. 1.n e rnlnl.ng 1.n us rye Furthermore, she 
acknowledgal. the occasional interdependence of "relatively low wages, 
25 the compound system and the colour bar" as well as the operation of 
the maximum average system to prevent rises in wages through inter-
. . . 26 
m1ne competl.tl.on. The differences between job colour bars and 
exploitation barriers created by capital~ not clearly demarcated. 
21 . van der Horst, S T IILabour" p 105; liThe Economic Implications of 
Political Democracy" p 4; "The Effects of Industrialisation on 
Race Relations in South Africa" pp 99-100 
22. van der Horst, S T "Equal Pay for Equal Work" p 191 
23. van der Horst, S T Native Labour in South Africa, p 185 
24. "Labour ll p 111 
25. "The Effects of Industrialisation on Race Relations in South Africa" 
p 129 
26. ibid, p 132; "Equal Pay for Equal Work" p 201; "Labour" p 130; 
Native Labour in South Africa p 193 
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Van der Horst foresaw Johnstone~s statement that the wage colour 
bar was both more serious and harmful than job colour bars as far 
27 
as blacks were concerned. Similarly, she was aware of the 
relationship between the (artificial) labour shortage and the low 
wages African , mineworkers received,28 and realised the impcrtance 
to capital of the employment of foreign labour. 29 
Van der Horst argued that the employment of whites in preference 
to blacks, resultant of white labour pressure and government policy, 
30 
adversely affected industrial productivity and growth. Industrial 
develcpment had been built "upcn the joint efforts of black and white" 
and "despite areas of competition, complementarity £wasJ the 
31 
overriding condition" of that development. State policies of 
discrimination had created impediments on productivity which were 
~ 
notllin the interests of labour, let alone the whole of/ country .. " 
Industrial growth had taken place "despite the impediment of the 
colour barJ and not because of it . 11 32 Such policies prevented 
33 lithe more effective and productive use of labour II and retarded 
the fruitful "combination of white capital and enterprise with 
African labour.,,34 
27. Johnstone, Class Race and Gold--p214; "Industrial Colour Bars in 
South Africa" p 222 and van der Horst, "The Effects of Industriali-
sation on Race Relations in South Africa" pp 132-3 
28 . "Equal pay for equal work" p 191 
29 .. "Labour" p 129 
30. Native Labour in South Africa pp 319-325 
31. "The Effects of Industrialisation on Race Relationsin South Africa" 
pp 100-1 
32. "Equal Pay for Equal Work" p 198, emphasis added 
33 . "The Economic Implications of Democracy" p 43 . 
34. ibid, P 1 4 
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In short, the argument was that progressive economic 
development had been and was imcompatible with racial discriminatory 
policies as evidenced in colour bars. The question addressed elicited 
a reply which focused on the dysfunctional features of the total 
system and did not attempt to ask why industrial growth occurred at all. 
Van der Horst concentrated a good deal more than Hutt did on secondary 
industry and manufacture . Evidence of the greater flexibility of the 
colour bars in industry compared to mining was clear to both of them. 
Van der Horst went further than Hutt with the acknowledgement that in 
some instances mine owners purposefully implemented racially discrimina-
tory policies for the sake of the profit motive. Essentially both 
analysts carne to similar conclusions about the manufacturing sector. 
The subordinate position of blacks in general and Africans in 
particular arose from the dysfunctional intrusion of politics and 
ideology into an otherwise rationally organised and progressive 
economic system, capitalism. The preservation of political and 
;cteological dominance, encapsulated in white employment preference 
policies, perpetuated the subordination of blacks and retarded further 
economic growth. A "lack of sufficient integration into and 
participation" by blacks in the system was the cause of the injustice 
to people and the retrogression of the economy . 35 
An essential consideration remained . To what extent was the 
economic boom of the 1930s the cause or the result of the higher 
level of integration within the economic framework which the liberals 
35. Johnstone, F A Class, Race and Gold p 205 
-11 -
identified? Because their argument was predicated on a belief 
in the dysfunctional ;n ~I"","c . o~ / 01;6;0$ on economics and the consequent 
waste af (black) labour power, their conclusions remained inadequate. 
Johnstone noted that the 
long established and still predominant preoccupation-vith 
job colour bars and the more productive employment of 
non-white labour may be said to be a preoccupation with the 
interests not of the non-white workers but of employers, a 
preoccupation not with social justice but with capital 
accumulation. 36 
Translated into methodological terms, what neo-classical analysts 
lacked was a more thorough investigation of "who was doing what to 
whom and why? What social groups were making and benefitting from 
what arrangements, and why and how?,,37 A different approach to the 
problem of race and capitalist development was needed. That approach 
would be based on an interrogation of the actions and policies of 
groups within society, as they actually operated, and not in terms of 
what those actions or policies might have been, or, indeed, should have been. 
Frederick Johnstone's work opened up a number of avenues, based 
as it was on a different approach. He adopted "a marxist structuralist 
approach" which explained lithe system of racial discrimination as a 
36. ibid, P 214 
37. Johnstone, FA'" Most Painful to our Hearts': South Africa 
through the eyes of the New School." p 6. Johnstone expanded 
the questions in a later passage: "Who owns what? Who does what? 
Who gets what? Who does what to whom? Who does what for whom? 
How are who does what and who gets what linked to who owns what and 
controls what? How is all this linked to what is going on in 
society and history?" p 8 
-12-
product of the system of production of which it formed a part .. 11 
The capitalist system of production actually determined the racial 
discriminatory systerris "specific forms, functions and nature .. 11 38 
The difference between Johnstone's line of attack and that of the 
neo-classicists was not in a denial of uthe existence and importance of 
racist ideology and racial prejudice." Rather, because racism arose 
out of class struggle, it required explanation itself and could not 
be construed as "the ' self-evident' starting point of all 'analysis' 
and 'explanation l1l39 As already noted in the discussion of Hutt, the 
formulation of the question in this way was not new. Johnstone, and 
marxists in general, advanced beyond Hutt's limitations by following 
their argument through. Johnstone was quick to point out that his 
approach was "not perfect or infallible"~O It forced an examination of 
the development of a racially structured capitalism, in 
which the exploitability and exploitation of the bulk of 
the labour force were intensified by a system of racial 
discrimination which secured the economic and political 
powerlessness of the bulk of the popUlation. 41 
The rnarxists thus tended to examine colour discrimination and economic 
development as a positively interdependent system of relationships 
38. Class, Race and Gold p 2 
39 . Davies, R capital, state and White Labour p 3 
40. Class, Race and Gold, p 218 
41. Johnstone, F A "Most Painful to our Hearts" p 12 
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rather than as rational mutually exclusive components of the system. 
Johnstone wanted to 
develop a valid account and explanation of the system of 
racial discrimination in the gold mines, and of historical 
developments concerning this system during and following the 
war. 42 
He criticized the "idealist tendency " for its "neglect" or 
. d .. f th . 1 d . f' 1 1 . 43 lI1.na equate recogn1t10n 0 e rnaterl.a eterml.nants 0 SOCl.a rea l.ty. II 
As noted, Hutt ~OfY\O\i ~~ the former, and van der Horst of the 
latter type of oversimplification. Johnstone attempted to rectify 
the situation by providing an analysis of the operation of the gold 
mines against the background of the structures of society in general. 
In his early study Johnstone failed to provide a clear exposition 
of the ' system of racial discrimination within which the mining industry 
44 
operated. This tended to confuse issues somewhat, but his approach 
was not wholly different from the far tighter, close-knit analysis he 
presented in Class, Race and Gold. In contrast to van der Horst's 
attempts to reconstruct the historical background, Johnstone's discussion 
of the developments which split the races along their respective 
45 
occupational lines within the division of labour was far better. 
42. Class, Race and Gold pp 3 - 4 
43. ibid, P 8 
44. nIndustrial Colour Bars in South Africa ," 
He was 
45. van der Horst IS "Labour lt J p 109. Johnstone, F A Class J Race and 
Gold PP 20 -25. Chapter 1 below briefly sketches the historical 
background 
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more concerned with the operation of the gold mining companies than 
industry in general within the system thus created: 
Such a situation was just what the gold mining companie s 
needed. Their most imperative requirment was a large 
supply of ultra-cheap labour. And the ultra-exploi tability 
of non-white labour in the system of production estab-
lished by the white property owners in South Africa provided 
the companies with the means of realising this requirement . 46 
In other words, contrary to what some critics might think, Johnstone 
accepted that the mining companies did not create the system of 
" 1 d" " " t" 47 raC1a 1scr1m1na 1on . All that he attempted to do wasshow how 
they adapted the system to suit their own particular needs. The most 
importan t of their needs were the reprro.:"<"'"o>1 of a cheap labour force 
in the reserves, and its continued cheapness or exploitability on 
the mines themselves . 
Johnstone's discussion of the colour bar in South Africa 
formed a central and most important contribution to the extant work 
on the subject. The concept as used by Johnstone was also the most 
significant aspect which developed in his own writing . 
In effect Johnstone redefined the concept of the colour bar. 
It is essential to outline what Johnstone perceived t he ' colour bar' 
46. Johnstone, F A Class , Race and Gold p 24 
47. eg Yudelman, D "The Quest for a Neo-Marxist Approach to 
Contemporary South Africa" p 203 
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to be before examining the validity or otherwise of his definition. 
Johnstone's thinking on the subject began within very narrow confines. 
"Two main colour bars" existed for Johnstone: "the job colour bar, 
which reserved jobs to whites, and the wage colour bar, or 
wage exploitation of African labour, which secured cheap labour to the 
. . . 48 
m1n1ng compan1es." Put more succinctly, the job colour bar IIwas a 
barrier to keep Africans out of skilled occupations, the wage colour 
49 bar was a barrier to keep African wages low.1I The most important 
of the two for Johnstone's initial purposes was the wage colour bar . 
At first this comprised both wage-rate standardisation policies and 
the maximum average system. The wage colour bar was later subsumed 
under the concept "exploitation colour bar" which, along with the 
"employment colour baril, was a specific part of the general concept 
"class colour bars. II Class colour bars were defined as "racially 
d · .. 1· . t 1 · t 50 1scr1m1natory c ass 1nstruments serv1ng 0 secure C ass 1n erests. 1I 
The exploitation colour bar benefitted the mining companies; the 
employment colour bar benefitted the white working class. Johnstone 
indentified the specific interest of the mining companies as "the 
ultra- minimisation , of labour costs." To achieve that objective 
they firstly had to secure a large supply of "ultra-exploitable 
labour", and secondly, to maintain the lIultra-cheapness" of that 
51 labour. The 'voluntary , labour supply from the reserves was not 
nearly adequate for the mines needs. Cheap labour had to be forced 
48. Johnstone, F A IIIndustrial Colour Bars in South Africa,"p ii 
49. ibid, P 6 note 1 
50 . Class, Race and Gold, p 49 
51. ibid, P 26 
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to the mines. This was accomplished in three ways. First, 
the companies introduced a "system of loan advancement and debt 
inducement" to complement the taxation system which operated in an 
haphazard way.52 Second, labour recruitment was mxopsonised 
53 in an attempt to regulate the supply. Third., they organised 
the recruitment of foreign labour which effectively cut out internal 
54 
competition for this particular source of cheap labour. The 
ultra-cheapness of that African labour was . secured through "extra-
economic compulsion: the contract system, the pass system and the 
55 
compound system. 1I Whereas wage minimisation was secured by the 
eli"mination of competition between mines through the various recruit-
ment arrangements, it was secured and maintained underground in at least 
three ways. Time and piece wages for Africans were set at very low 
levels. A "maximum average system" set low upper limits on the rate 
of pay for African workers engaged in piece work. This meant that 
even if output exceeded what was normally construed as sufficient 
for the wage, that extra output went unacknowledged in the worker~ 
pay packet. The operation of the loafer ticket system was the third 
arrangement used by mine owners to reap more benefits from unpaid work. 
It was lIa system of unpaid and extra-contractual labour . " Workers 
would have to perform two or more duties but receive remuneration for 
only one, that for which they were contracted. Furthermore, all the 
52. ibid, pp 26-28. Beinart, W The Political Economy of Pondoland 
pp 54-69 provides the most useful account of the system's opera-
tion and consequences. 
53. ibid, pp 29-32. Jeeves, A "The control of Migratory Labour" 
further examines this particular topic 
54. ibid pp 32-34 
55. ibid, pp 35-9 
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work was performed during set shifts and if the worker failed to 
fulfill the minimum quota of his contractual work for the shift, he 
56 
received no pay whatever. 
The class colour bars of the white workers were embodied in the 
employment colour bars. At issue here were the different interests 
of skilled and unskilled white workers. Johnstone wrote that 
L1~r the skilled white workers,{the employment colour bail 
meant the control and restriction of the supply and distri-
bution of skilled labour. For the unskilled white workers, 
it meant the creation and improvement of employment oppor-
tunities in unskilled work. 57 
These ' different interests came to be represented in their racially 
discriminatory form in different ways. For the skilled workers, 
in a " job colour bar in skilled work " , and for the unskilled in 
"a specific form of system, known as the 'white labour policy! . ,, 58 
This view was not in itself new. Both Hutt and van der Horst saw the 
problem. Johnstone went further. 
Johnstone's initial break with the conventional interpretation 
rested, then, not on the idea that the employment colour bar secured 
the position of white workers. The break occurred with Hutt and to 
a l~ ectEnt with van der Horst in his identification of the mine 
owners interests in the continuation and reproduction of the systemic 
obstructions to African advancement, namely the exploitation colour 
bars_ ra\., I\~"'·'\e'\ final break occurred when he moved away from negative to 
56. ibid, pp 39-48 
57. ibid , P 65 
58. ibid, pp 65-6 
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positive analysis. The colour bars of each group affected the 
other group as well. Liberals had argued that mineowners, for example, 
had nothing to gain from the job colour bar. Johnstone proposed 
that the evident contradictions were mediated in particular ways 
to benefit the parties involved. In other words, the job colour 
bar benefitted the mineowners in certain ways, and the exploitation 
colour bars benefitted white labour. 
The mining companies' need for absolute profit maximisation 
was contradicted by the employment colour bar which involved the 
payment of high wages to white workers. Johnstone followed Blumer59 
by arguing that employers were prepared to accomodate white worker 
benefits in order to maintain stability. The contradiction was 
mediated in three ways. The actual costs of the contradiction were 
offset by the extremely low wages of African miners. The potential 
cost of white worker action was removed by protecting their place in 
the occupational hierarchy. The actual benefit was ultimately 
that the labour force was stabilised. 60 
For their part, white workers were threatened by the increased 
possibility of African employment at lower wages in areas presumed 
to be white preserves. The super-exploitation of African labour 
59. Blumer, G "Industrialisation and Race Relations" in Hunter, G 
Industrialisation and Race Relations 
60. Johnstone, FA Class, Race and Gold, pp 76-81, 86 
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threatened the security of white workers. The economic benefit 
which accrued to white workers rested solidly on the super-
exploitation of African miners. White workers inclined towards a 
conservative economism which further pushed them towards monitoring 
61 
and maximising their benefits within the status quo. 
Johnstone concluded that 
lilt was the involvement of the employers - notably 
t~e mining capitalist - in racial discrimination which 
generated the involvement of the white workers -
notably the white mine workers - in racial discrimination. 62 
This statement must be examined against the larger background of 
Johnstone's analysis. Yudelman incorrectly read into Johnstone's 
analysis the notion that race prejudice was ultimately "the invention 
of the mineowners 11.63 Johnstone included "property colour bars", which 
seemed lito secure and maintain the separation of non-whites from 
ownership of property in the means of production". Exploitation 
colour bars and property colour bars were the class colour bars of 
h . I 64 t e property own1ng c ass. The existence, perpetuation and modifi-
cation of property colour bars, enabled the exploitation colour 
bars to operate. Johnstone was fully aware of the importance of "racial 
65 ideology and status" ,but refused to accept them as primary causal 
phenonema. 
61. ibid, pp 86-88 
62. ibid, P 75 
63. Yudelman, D "The Quest for a Neo-Marxist Approach to Contemporary 
South Africa" pp 203 
64. Johnstone, Cloass, Race and Gold pp 49, 23-24 
65. ibid, pp 87- 88 
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To summarize briefly. Society in late nineteenth century 
southern Africa was organised in particular ways to ensure the 
dominance of whites over blacks. Property colour bars were defined 
as a set of instruments which restricted the rights of blacks in 
general and Africans in partic~lar to own property. They struc-
tured society in a way that split the region roughly along racial 
lines Uto perpetuate the economic dependence II of blacks on white 
66 property owners. The peculiar problems of the mining industry 
demanded that costs be kept as low as possible. This was achieved 
largely by the adoption of the discriminatory property system to suit 
the needs of the industry. Exploitation colour bars, the system 
which ensured the ultra-exploitation and exploitability of black 
workers, rested on the property colour bars. Attempts to intensify 
the utilisation of cheap black labour in place of more expensive, 
politically free and skilled white workers forced these white workers 
to demand protection. This they achieved through occupational or 
job colour bars which provided them with a measure of security. 
Although the mines were aware of the higher costs of white workers, they 
were prepared to accept the system in return for the possibility of 
greater stability subsequent to the pacification of white, worker 
conscious, employees. For their part, white workers' security 
66. ibid, P 23 
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rested firmly on the adoption of exploitation colour bars. 
Yudelman has stated that Johnstone's use of the term exploita-
tion colour bar was lIa mere play of words" and as such not very useful : 
I-t 7he discriminatory measures were exclusively imposed 
~n blacks; but they were not an exclusion (or bar)-
rather the opposite. The concept of "exploitation colour 
bars U is confusing and mistaken because the (racial) 
coercion encouraged by the rnineowners was not an act of 
(racial) exclusion. 67 
It is clear that Johnstone expanded his original notion that the 
wage colour bar involved wage minimisation. He redefined the colour 
bar. The colour bar was not restricted to the status of an 
exclusionary bar within South Africa's social structure. It was 
extended to cover all measures, both of and within the social 
structure, which obstructed groups' advancement. Colour bars J as 
a concept, covered the whole system of discrimination, through an 
examination of the organisation of that system in society as a 
whole. Hence the triad of property, exploitation and employment 
colour bars. Property relations set the scene for worker subordina-
tion; coercive instruments prevented the acquisition by Africans of 
higher wages; and exclusion instruments were enforced to ensure their 
inability to rise up the hierarchical ladder. Yudelman neglected 
Johnstone's property colour bars, and thus mistook the interaction of 
the different class colour bars as ahistorical, mono-causal phenomena. 
67. Yudelman, "The Quest for a Neo-Marxist Approach to Contemporary 
South Africa" p 203, emphasis added 
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Johnstone, finally, through his reformation of the basic questions 
redefined the issue and turned the subject on its head. 
Even if .kXm.stone' s schema was logic·ally structured, he tended 
to overlook and simplify a number of issues. We have seen that 
Johnstone concluded that the involvement of employers generally 
68 prompted white workers to establish employment colour bars. 
In Class, Race and Gold Johnstone did not allude to non-mining industries 
as h h d d . h . 1 . k 69 e a one In 15 ear 1er war . Thus there was no basis for 
Johnstone to conclude the general case from the particular. Similarly, 
he did not argue in the later work to what extent white workers felt 
threatened in the 1890s, although he was clearly aware of this. 70 
The larger question which poses itself is, simply, when, how and why, 
did the economic or class interests of the white workers give way to 
the ideological racist component in response to the position of 
blacks in the labouring hierarchy . 
Johnstone's period terminated in 1926 with the passage of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act and the consequent legalisation of the 
colour bar in industry. 71 He noted the origins and introduction of the 
ci vilised labouqi>licy rut did not analyse its inplerentation in arrj great 
68. cf above, p 19 
69. Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa, pp 142-3 
70 . ibid, pp 132-3. Class, Race and Gold, p 66 
71. These points are dealt with in greater detail in chapter 1 
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detail. Furthermore, the emphasis on gold-mining meant that 
secondary industrial development was neglected. Johnstone in effect 
admitted that his class analysis of the Pact as an alliance between 
white workers and small property owners was not exhaustive . Indeed, 
the alliance required "further systematic exploration" which could 
72 
not be embodied in his own work. Other marxist analysts turned 
" h " " d"l 73 to exam1ne t ese p01nts 1n greater eta1 . It was left to 
Rob Davies and the fractionalists to extend the marxist perspective . 
Davies attempted an "historical materialist analysis of class 
formation and class relations"in South Africa for the period 1910- 60. 
It is perhaps the boldest attempt yet made by a marxist theorist 
influenced to a large degree by Poulantzas. Conventional analyses 
saw the state apparatus an essent~y separate from society, and 
its actions in society as interventionist and hence contrary to full 
economic growth. Davies focussed on the relation of the state to 
society as a whole . The Poulantzians considered .the state 
"as an integral part of South African capitalist development". 
Hence the state could be seen as a F" ,bye. actor in society which not 
only organised and ran society but actually established the rules of 
74 
the game as well. The analysis which flowed out of that definition 
72 . Class, Race and Gold, p 153 
73. For a brief overview of this literature, cf Davies Capital, State 
and White Labour, pp 4-5 
74. ibid pp 25-32 for an exposition of the theory of the state in 
capitalist society 
-24-
of the state's role was pitched at "the system level". For Mason, 
its importance lay "in its identification of limited policy options 
open to the state, given the necessity of maintaining the viability 
- - 75 
of the economic system which underpinL nedJ' it". Solomons 
summarised the foundations of the fractionalist analysis in these terms: 
1) Firstly it is agreed that social classes are not just 
to be analysed in terms of production relations, rather they 
have to be shown to exist in terms of a definite articulation 
of economic, political and ideological factors. 
2) Secondly it is agreed that the positions of classes and 
fractions in definite class struggles cannot be immediately 
determined from the relation of production. 76 
Davies was concerned with the nature of the white working class, the 
division of the capitalist class into 'fractions' representative of 
different dominant interests, and the interrelation of these elements 
within society as a whole. His study was nei ther one of synthesis nor 
a general st~dy of the period. He wanted to remove "a particular 
lacuna in the analysis of the South African social formation . " 
Translated into the terms of his analysis, Davies sought 
to make some contribution towards an understanding of social 
relations in the South African social formation by examining 
in detail how and why the South African state as a capitalist 
state in a capitalist social framework should have become 
involved in intervening during the major formative period between 
1900 and the early 1960s 
1) to work out particular places in the division of labour 
75. Mason,D "Industrialisation, race and class conflict in South 
Africa" p 150 
76. Solomons, J "The Marxist Theory of the state and the Problem 
of Fractiol>s" p 143 
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exclusively for whites and 
2) to incorporate white wage-earners into a particularly 
racially discriminatory 'industrial relations' system. 77 
Davies' fractions were defined "in concrete class struggle and/ wereJ 
. d "t 1" b . f" ft' ,,78 recogn1se , 1n er a 1a, y a spec1 1C presence as .•. rae 10ns . 
The state operated as an organiser of the dominant classes, but because 
conflicting interest existed between the different fractions, "their 
political organisation ..• L-was_1 feasible only through the formation 
of a particular contradictory unit ... This latter unit was called 
79 
a "power bloc". An essential feature of the power bloc was the 
dominance in it of roe of the fractions. The hegemonic fraction, 
elevated to that status "through struggle within the power bloc," 
was first, lithe most dominant of all the dominant classes and fractions," 
and second, was the one able to "set up its own particular interests 
as the general interest of the body politic." More specifically, the 
politically hegemonic fraction. which need not necessarily be the 
economically dominant fraction, is thus the class which in the 
last analysis holds political power. But it need not 
necessarily be either the 'governing class' (the class whose 
political representatives form the regime) or the 'class in 
charge of the state' (the class from which the personnel who 
occupy the heights of the state are drawn) 80 
Clearly, the power bloc needed some props from within the social 
framework to keep it in power. Classes which supported the power 
77. Davies Capital. State and White Labour, p 6 
78. ibid. P 25 
79. ibid, P 27 
80. ibid, P 28 
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bloc on its own terms without receiving any "specific political 
concessionsL-sJ in L-their_1 favour" were called "supportive 
classes." Contrasted to that group were "allied classes." 
The support of an allied class was based largely on its ability to gain 
"some particular concessions, usually a political concession, in its 
81 favour". The last actor within the scenario was the state which 
was 
I . 
not some omnipotent entity existing above society but a 
particular level of the class relations in a social 
formation, and it cannot therefore transcend the 
limitations of the basic social relationships of which 
it is a part. 82 
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the fractionalist 
approach as a whole. We turn, first, to look at the position· of the 
state and the role of fractions, and second, to Davies' utilisation 
of hegemony as an analytical concept. 
In general terms, the critics concentrated on two points. 
First, the role of the state in the actual studies themselves, 
ie divorced from their theoretical mould; and second the general con-
clusions which the fractionalists reach . As Mason put it, the 
81. ibid , pp 30-1 
82. ibid , P 31 
, 
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problem now became "the explanation of the course taken by 
83 the state" within the parameters as outlined above. The state 
was 
too often treated (implicitly or explicitly) as an 
agency (having a greater or lesser degree of autonomy) 
rather than as an aspect of the structures of inter-
dependency in which ~rouEings are bound up. As a 
result there appearL ed-f considerable difficulties in 
determining the nature of the relationships among such 
groups and the state. 84 
Or, as Simon Clarke indicated, contra the view expressed by Solomons 
above, 
Instead of showing how political conflicts arise as 
developed forms of class struggles constituted at the level 
of the relations of production by showing how various 
political and semi-political institutions developed on the 
basis of struggles centred on specific barriers to the 
valorisation of capital in South Africa, the process is 
reversed and simplified and the key to the class struggle 
is sought immediately in the relation between political 
organisations. The analyses therefore degenerate into an 
account of pressure group activities interpreted in terms 
of a theory of class. 85 
Classes were no longer analysed as IIpurposive social actors," but 
became npassive recipients of state action. na6 
83. Mason, D Ulndustrialisation, Race and Class Conflict in South 
Africa" p 150 
84. ibid, P 141 
85. Clarke, S IICapital, 'Fractions' of Capital, and the statel! p 36 
86. Mason, D "Industrialisation, Race and Class Conflict in South 
Africa, p 151. Forsmular criticisms, see Innes, D and Plaut,M 
"Class Struggle and Economic Development in South Africa"):" 87 
and Clarke, S "Capital, 'Fractions' of Capital, and the state" 
pp 50-1 
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Innes and Plaut cited one instance which had serious implications 
for the fractionalist approach. In his discussion of the component 
elements of the Pact government, Davies insisted that it was the 
"political manifestation of an alliance between national capital 
and white wage-earners. II In terms of the allied class definition 
which he provided concessions must then have been granted to the 
white wage-earners, but at the same time the state was acting in 
the interests of capital as a whole. How, asked Innes and Plaut, 
was this contradiction to be resolved? It could only be resolved if 
they assume that there is no contradiction between the 
interest of capital and labour. It is partly because the 
Poulantzians recognise this conflict between Marxist 
theory and the analysis which they actually present that 
they introduce the notion of white workers being a part of 
the 'new petit bourgeoisie' rather than the working class. 
For it is only by severing white workers from their own 
class that the Poulantzians are able to maintain the 
contradiction between capital and labour. 87 
Innes and Plaut do not point out that this type of analysis leol 
the fractionalists to underestimate the essentially working class re-
actions of white labour which Johnstone so ably described. Davies 
redefined the working class in terms of "the role of political and 
ideological relationsll~8 White workers qua workers were effectively 
defined out of the class struggle which the fractionalists had held to 
be the ":motor of history". 89 Their analysis of the interaction 
87. Innes, D and Plaut, M "Class Struggle and Economic Develop-
ment in South Africa" p 93 
88. Davies , R Capital, State and White Labour, p 21 
89. Davies, Ri Kaplan, Mi Morris, Hi O'Meara, D "Class Struggle 
and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa" p 4 
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between classes was approached from the perspective of the various 
intra-class struggles of the 'fractions of capital,.90 
Another problem was Davies' 5 use of the concept "hegemony". 
The power bloc, in his terms, could only materialise if one fraction 
assumed "leadership, L-or_1 hegemony in it. ,,91 Davies's notion of 
92 hegemony, as outlined already suggested a conflict between 
economic and political factors. That conflict was not clearly resolved 
in Capital, State and White Labour. His analysis of the Pact, for 
example, was instructive. It was an "alliance between national capital 
and white wage earners which enabled national capital to displace 
. . . t I h . " t' 93 m1n1ng capl. a as egemon1c I:rac 1.0n .. " National capital was only 
later described as the "politically hegemonic fraction,,?4 The analysis 
bordered on tautology when Davies stated that "national capital remained 
capital and its hegemony was therefore the hegemony of a capitalist 
95 fraction in a capitalist state." The suggestion that the hegemony 
90. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, for example, p 79 
(poor whitism ), pp 231-2 (dissolution of the Pact). See also 
Clarke, S "Capital, tFractions' of Capital, and the statel! 
pp50-1; Innes D and Plaut, M "Class Struggle and Economic 
Development in South Africa" p 87 
91. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, p 28 
92. cf, above, p 25 
93 . Davies, R Capital, St.ate and White Labour, p 34 
94 . ibid, P 179, emphasis added 
95. ibid, p 181 
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(<t\i"~t.~;'1",,b.k ") 
exercised was also economic was based on the;(eVidence that agriculture 
and industry were bath subsidised to. a far greater degree fram mining 
taxes after the 1924 Pact victary. 96 The explanatian af histarical 
develapment in terms af fractians af capital and the need far ane 
fractian to. assert its hegemany aver ather fractians pravided same 
insights but clauded ather factars . The impartance af the divisians 
within the capitalist class was vigarausly asserted, indicating that 
capital was nat necessarily monalithic in itself. The danger was 
that an understanding af the interests af Capital as a whale cauld 
be retarded by the emphasis an the particularities af different capitals 
or fractions. Further, working class fractions or divisions tended 
to. be neglected. Davies' cammitment to. the analysis af the struggles 
between capitalist fractians aver against the warking class as 
defined by him accurred despite his reliance an the wark af H J and 
. 97 R E Sl.mans. Critics tended to. cancentrate mare an the difficulties 
af the fraction"list analysis at the level af the capitalist class. 
The rigidity which that analysis reintraduced (after Jahnstane) has 
since been challenged. Belinda Bazzali attempted "an explanatian af 
the connection between capitalism itself, as an economic system, and 
the palitical and idealagical farms that accampany it.,,98 She thus 
did nat differ fram earlier analysts in her identificatian af the 
prablem. The impartance af her cantributian lay in its unusual and 
96. ibid, pp 169, 252 
97. Siman, HJ and RE Class and Calaur in Sauth Africa. Davies,Capital 
State and White Labaur pp 7, 37 nate 23 
98 . Bozzoli, B The Palitical Nature af a Ruling Class p 2 
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remarkable nature. Bozzoli set out to present an alternative marxist 
analysis of class formation and historical development to that presented 
by the fractionalists. She clarified their conception of the state, 
expanded but tightened the concept of hegemony, and questioned the 
validity of 'fractions of capital' as a heuristic device. 
The state was defined in both a narrow and a wide sense. The narrow 
sense meant "the inunediate system of government" which included actors 
like parliament, political parties, the civil service, law and order, 
and "other recognisable and central institutions." At the more general 
level, the state represented "the entire system through which the ruling 
class's dominance is exercised. It That system included the "class 
structures {-of society-1 as moulded by capital, the ideology propagated 
by capital, and its manifestation in a variety of structural forms.,,99 
Just as Bozzoli's definition of the state echoed Gramsci, so did 
her definition of hegemony. Hegemony for Gramsci ·~ted class 
rule: the system in which a particular world view is dominant, where 
one concept of reality is diffused through society 
in all its institutional, and private manifestations, -informing 
with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religions and 
political principles and all social relations, particularly in 
their intellectual and moral O7IDOtations. 100 
99. ibid, p 215 
1 00. ibid, P 1 8 
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Hegemony is not exercised in isolation, but is located in "the 
struggle between and within classes." Its exercise involved "the 
'acquiescence' of workers, L-rather-1 than ... the exercise of force 
101 
over them .. II Bozzoli nevertheless correctly stressed that "it 
would be incorrect and ahistorical to treat the concept of 'hegemony' 
as a holistic, all-embracing, reified 'thing'.11 Thus her study 
attempted to 
seek out the ways in which the development of a system of 
hegemonic domination by capitalists both succeeds and 
fails, and the relationships between repression, force 
and acquiescence. 102 
Bozzoli argued that "political and ideological forces must be combined 
with economic factors in an interpretation which must be as multi-
f d h . If 103 acete as egemony l.tse .. " Bozzoli broke with the tendency 
within fractionalist analysis to reify hegemony by rooting it in a 
reductionist analysis based on the rise and fall of groups or fractions 
. d t ' f' d . f .. t t 104 ]. en ]. 1e 1n terms 0 economl.c].n eres .. The term class referred 
101. 
102. 
103. 
not only to the relationship of particular groups 
of people to the means and the process of economic 
production under capitalism, but also to their 
political, cultural and ideological characteristics 
and their relationship in a range of economic and 
non-economic sphere, to other classes and to the 
state . 105 
ibid, pp 18-19 
ibid, p 19 
ibid, P 143 
104. Bozzoli, B "History, Experience and Culture" in Bozzoli, B (ed) 
Town and Countryside in the Transvaal pp 18-19 
105. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class pp 5 - 6 
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She argued that that definition indicated the existence of two 
b . . t 106 ourgeo151es, no one. Bozzoli argued against the idea that 
change occurred "within a single capitalist class." as well as the 
notion that a change occurred "~ imperial capital to national 
capital, / inJ a unilinear progression." Instead, . simultaneOll5 
change took place in the respective natures of the two different 
classes of- the bourgeoisie. A process of give and take occurred. 
The effects of war, depression, unemployment, labour struggles and 
the like reacted differently on the two classes. Imperial capital's 
107 influence waned whilst national capital's waxed. But the classes 
were not wholly different. At least two common interests prevailed. 
First, the "exclusion of blacks from the legitimate state" and, 
second, "the unacceptability of any unity between the black working 
108 
class and the white working class." Furthermore, Bozzoli argued 
that in the 1920s and 1930s the once clear demarcation between national 
and imperial capital with manufacturing and mining respectively became 
blurred. The split became in fact "far more complex. ,,109 
Bozzoli used her redefinitions of state, class and hegemony to 
answer what she classified as her "basic historical question" : 
106. ibid, pp 171, 260-2 
107. ibid, P 171 
108. ibid, pp 129, 138 
109. ibid, P 154 
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how did capitalists themselves in South Africa bridge the 
gap between their more or less abstract economic needs, 
and the concrete social implications thereof? 110 
Her answer represents one of the boldest attempts yet to suggest a 
solution to the problem. A thorough analysis of capitalist media, 
defined largely as commercial, mining and manufacturing magazines, 
was conducted with four factors in mind. First, Gramsci's notion 
f . . 11 1 111 o "organ1c 1nte ectua 5 " was used to classify members of the 
aspirant bourgeoisie who addressed themselves, as strategists and 
policy initiators, directly to that class of people through the pages 
of their journals. Second, Bozzoli examined the "audience", the 
bourgeoisie as such divided into its different sections, in order to 
ascertain why organic intellectuals were needed at all. Third, the 
actual ideas of the ideologies were examined in relation to what 
particular world-view and/or vision they propqgated. Fourth, the 
first three factors were placed against the background of the general 
historical context of the period. 112 The interrelation of intellec-
tuals, audience, ideas and historical context showed that different 
classes were at different stages of class formation . Differences 
between 'advanced' and 'retrogressive ' capitalists were identified . 
Some capitalists clearly saw themselves as members of a class for itself, 
whilst others did not . Organic intellectuals became the link between 
the individual actors themselves and the general class itself . 
110. 
111. 
112. 
ibid, P 8 
Gramsci, A "The Intellectuals" ! n Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, pp ,-'~ 
Bozzoli J B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class, pp 10-17 
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Notwithstanding the hope that the work "makes up in 
theoretical and comparative insights what it lacks in detail,,,113 
Bozzoli contributed an excellent guide into the minds of the leading 
ideological protaganists of the bourgeois classes she identified. 
It represents the first real attempt to show that capitalists did 
at times act rationally, did plan policies and did participate 
willingly - for a variety of reasons - in state interventionist politics. 
Bozzoli's work is representative of recent attempts to break 
"the strong hold over radical scholarship in this country of an 
Althusserian, and/or structuralist method of analysis. ,,114 As such 
it remains firmly within a general marxist framework which produces a 
more vibrant, less mechanical perspective to the study of South African 
history. 
To summarize: the different approaches outlined in the preceding 
pages present different problems and produce different parameters of 
analysis .. W H Hutt represented a group of conservative analysts who 
ascribed the subordinate position of blacks in South Africa to state 
intervention and the racist prejudices of white workers. Economic 
development was seriously hampered by state policies. He argued that 
employers, if left to themselves, would have removed the customary 
barriers and in that way contributed to the establishment of a just 
state. Justice was a concept analysed in terms of the capitalist 
economic system. Sheila van der Horst, one of Hutt's contemporaries, 
113. ibid, P 24 
114. Bozzoli, B "History, Experience and CUlturellin Bozzoli, B (ed) 
Town and Countryside in the Transvaal p 2 
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recognised that some features of the racist system had benefited 
employers. Ultimately though, the intrusion of government and worker 
prejudice would ensure the continued subordination of blacks generally 
and affect adversely future economic growth. Hutt and van der Horst 
were first and foremost economists. The question they asked was not 
why economic growth had taken place given the presumed dysfunctional 
system, but was rather to what extent "f:t\<t iJ~e"" hAA operated against 
economic growth . 
Radical scholars also approached the larger ·problem of IIrace ll 
. and "capi talisrn". They were more concerned with the lengthy dominance 
of a racist system in South Africa given the rapid and remarkable 
economic growth which had taken place. Thus the positive, and in 
the long run more useful, question was posed : 
dysfunctional as the neo-classicists thought? 
was the system as 
Marxist analysts have corne to dominate South African historiography. 
They questioned the so-called neutrality of the capitalist economic 
system and the innocence of capitalism, and concluded that direct 
beneficial links in the chain of causation existed between economy 
and racist structures . It was shown how, in fact, different groups 
withi the capitalist class had different sectional interests,and that 
development depended on which group was in power at a particular time. 
Thus, what at first appeared to be irrational or dysfunctional, was 
in fact the opposite. The racism of white labour was rooted in their 
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position of structural insecurity and subsequent cooption by the 
capitalist state. Similarly, the difference in organisation between 
national and imperial capital resulted in different approaches to 
the problems of capital cumulation. Johnstone analysed the 
structural parameters of the gold mining industry, Davies examined 
different 'fractions' in the capitalist class, and Bozzoli, in 
response to the fractionalists, produce a less sterile and richer 
analysis based on the articulation of ideas, policies and ideology 
by capitalist themselves. 
Such different approaches nat~rally led to different inter-
pretations of specific events and phenomena. The position of 
industrial legislation in general and the Wage Act in particular is 
a case in point. 
Commentators are generally agreed on a number of points 
concerning the Wage Act. It was not the first law to provide for the 
regulation of the payment of wages and working conditions . It. operated 
in conjunct.ion wit.h such Acts as the 1922 Apprenticeship Act and the 
1924 Industrial Conciliation Act . It formed part of the cluster of 
laws through which the government attempted to implement its 
' civilised labour policy'. That policy ostensibly entailed the 
extension of employment opportunities for whites in the economy generally . 
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Differences between analysts, of emphasis, nuance and interpretation. 
arise concerning the effects of the civilized labour policy on the 
body politic itself. But whilst most commentators . whether they 
be historians. economists or sociologists . mention the Wage Act 
in passing. few have attempted to make a systematic analysis of 
its origins. operation and role in South African history. In the 
following section. attention is turned first to a select number of 
analysts who have mentioned the Wage Act but who failed to look at it 
in any real depth. Second. three unpublished works which dealt 
directly with the Act are analysed. 
Hutt admitted that his concern was 'solely" with the relationship 
of civilised labour legislation "to . injustice'. real or imagined. 
115 between one race or colour and another". The Wage Act was responsible 
f k . Af' t 1 116 or eep1ng r1can wage ra es ow. This was dcoe partly because it 
was applied to occupations where "the entrepreneurial search for cheap 
labour was tending most directly to raise relative non- white standards" 
because "no labour unions had then been formed,,117. and partly because 
. . 1 . b hI k h 11' 118 po11t1ca actl0n y ac s was lOW 0 Y lmpotent tl. The Act was 
introduced to ease the poor white problem and to preserve "white 
115. Economics of the Colour Bar . p 74 
116. ibid. P 29 
117 . ibid. P 75 
118. ibid. P 81 
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ci vilisation by restricting competition from non· whi tes " ~ 19 The 
arguments that wage regulation was instituted to prevent sweating120 
in industry as well as to improve efficiency he sweepingly dismissed 
as "red-herrings II. 121 Hutt argued that the Wage Board did not 
concern itself with "the remuneration of work performed by non · whites 
in which there was virtually no competition with whites" until after 
1937 . He correctly noted that the Act was not overtly discriminatory 
122 but that later amendments made it more so. On the other hand, the 
Wage Act entrenched the principle of the rate for the job Which operated to 
119. ibid. P 75 
120 . The term "sweating II or "sweated labour" is used in two ways in 
this thesis. The first, or general and most common · usage 
refers to the production of goods by workers working under poor 
conditions (bad lighting, ventilation, overcrowding, long hours 
etc.) for starvation wages. Presumably, this was how Hutt 
121. 
used the term. The second, or technical , sense refers to the 
system whereby a IIsweater" interposed himself between worker and 
buyer. This system was well illustrated by Marx , "A· sweater 
is someone who undertakes to deliver a certain quantity of work 
at normal prices to an entrepreneur) but who then has it carried 
out for a lower price by others . The difference) which goes 
to make up his profit, is sweated out of the workers who actually 
perform the labour and represents nothing but the difference 
between the value of the labour-power that is paid by the first 
entrepreneur and the price which is equivalent~less than the 
value of that labour .· power and which is paid by the sweater to 
the actual workers." Marx, K'L Results of the Immediate Process 
of Production .' p 1071 in Marx, K Capital vo, 1; cf. also 
Cap1tal vo, 1 p 695 
Hutt. W Economics of the Colour Bar . p 75 
122. ibid 
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create "the most powerful yet most subtle colour bar that has 
eJer operated. " The system of equal pay for equal work. Hutt argued. 
is a result of the neutrality of the free non··discriminatory 
market. It is no method of achieving such a market . When 
the standard wage-rate is forced above the free market level 
(whether through legal enactment or the strike threat). 
thereby reducing the output which can be produced profitably. 
it must have the effect of preventing the entry of subordinate 
races or classes into the protected field or of actually 
excluding them from it. 123 
Once again Hutt·s essentially intra- system assumptions protrude. 
Hutt · s reasons for calling the Wage Act a colour bar instrument - in 
the sense that it operated against "subordinate races or classes!!, 
ie largely unskilled Africans ... were based on theoretical assumptions 
and not rooted in material life . He merely suggested that only 
white workers and the state supported it and that entrepreneurs resisted 
it . Because entrepreneurs could not be blamed . the possibility of 
sweating and managerial and business inefficiency had to be denied . 
Van der Horst on the other hand provided a brief outline of the Act 
which acknowledged the practical racism of the measure. that the Wage 
Board was concerned with an apparent lack of business efficiency . and 
that determinations markedly affected the racial composition of the 
. d . I f 124 1n ustr1a work oree. Her main concern was the effective exclusion 
of . or discrimination agains t workers who fell into lower wage brackets 
than those prescribed by determinations . Those workers were affected . 
123 . ibid. P 72 
124. Native Labour in South Africa pp 252-259 
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it was argued, _because their value to the employer was less than the 
prescribed rates. Similarly, the decrease in profitability 
resultant from increased wage costs meant the restriction of employ-
, , d ,,125 
ment pos1t10ns an opportun1t1es. Van der Horst did not examine 
" ' 
the motivations, support or otherwise, to the Act, nor was the Act 
examined beyond the terrain of employment patterns. 
For Bozzoli, the Wage Act played but a very small part, but her 
comments are suggestive . The Act was a "symbol of state autonomy" 
during the 1920s. By this she meant that although the Pact had 
received significant electoral support from national capital it was 
not bound to it. The Pact soon showed its independence from 
national capital - through the Wage Act, an act which had the potential 
126 to upset the wage-scale applecart. The appointment of the 
personnel for the first Board and their first reports caused initial 
, , 127 I' 
manufacturing and commercial support to turn into Oppos1t10n. Bozzo 1 
appeared to accept the view that determinations laid down high wages 
during the 1920s.128 Her identification of the Act as symbolic 
restricted her terms of reference; the activities of the Wage 
Board during the depression and the Fusion period were not mentioned. 
Instead, the analysis turned to the next "symbol of state autonomy", 
125. ibid, pp 255-6, 259 
126. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class pp 225, 245 
127. ibid, pp 178, 226 
128. ibid, P 192 
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the gold standard crisis. 129 Bozzoli succeeded, nevertheless, 
in shedding some light on the nature of at least one section of 
capital's support for the Wage Act. She also suggested that one 
reason why white workers were favoured during the civilised labour 
period of the 19205 and 19305 was their potential as an internal 
130 
consumer market. A rational argument for what for a long time 
was considered a racial phenomenon was thus proposed as one 
explanation for the civilized labour policy. 
With closer regard to African workers, Roux suggested 
that the Wage Board, through its ability to take evidence from any 
quarters it wished, contributed towards the organisation of African 
131 trade unions in the late 19205. Lewis extended Roux's point to 
declare that the effective restrictions placed on African access 
to the Board perhaps contributed to the decline of African trade unions 
132 during the early 1930s . hTickins 's analysis of the Industrial and 
Cornercial Workers' Union indicated that at least within the rcu itself 
the Wage Act's existence led to the retention of faith in beth Hertzog 
and Creswell as "fine fellow{ sJ. ,,133 A determination at Bloemfontein 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
ibid, P 245 
ibid, pp 198-203 
Roux, E Time Longer Than Rope, p 209 
Lewis J J tl t The New Unionism I: Industrialisation and Industrial 
Unions in South Africa 1925-1930" in Webster , E (ed) Essays in 
Southern · African Labour History p 130 
Wickins, P The rcu of Africa, p 83 
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for unskilled workers further encouraged Africans to seek redress 
134 through the medium of the Wage Board. Wickins was able to 
135 
conclude that the "Wage Act was used on behalf of Black workers". 
Because the Wage Act itself was peripheral to the larger concerns 
of Roux, I,ewis and Wickins, their interesting points were not 
pursued. 
· Davies attempted a more thorough analysis of the Wage Act as an 
element of the civilised labour policy. He claimed that mining and 
manufacturing were united in their opposition to the Wage Act, but also 
noted that that opposition disappeared. Mining capital's fears were 
allayed before 1930 when the Wage Board itself practically washed its 
h d f d · t . th . d try 136 an s 0 a wage 1SpU e 1n e 1n us • Larger capitals in 
manufacturing were soon won over because the Wage Board operated within 
the l::a.J.nds of their "existing wage structures. II The state used wage 
regulation to promote mechanisation by determining wage levels acceptable 
to the most advanced capitals in industry.137 After dealing with the 
groups who either benefitted or were not affected by the determination, 
Davies turned his attention to those who suffered . Two groups were 
involved: small, manufacturing capital and unskilled workers who were 
134. ibid, pp 99, 133, 172, 182-3 
135. ibid, P 207 
136. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, pp 183-7, 213 
137. ibid, pp 213-4 
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predominantly Africans. Small capitalists were forced out of 
operation because of higher costs, and unskilled workers were 
h d b th h d b t ,138 retrenc e ecause ey a ecorne 00 expens1ve. Davies 
noted that the increase in wages for Africans who remained in 
employment was offset by the containment of "the heightened class 
139 
struggle by African workers . " He attributed the decline in 
Wage Board activity after the depression to two factors. The number 
!>eh;~~ 
of semi-skilled places in the job market trailed~the rate of general 
industrial growth, and the increased influx of Africans into urban areas 
caused problems for white workers and the industrial relations system. 
Industrial courts which operated under the Industrial Conciliation Act 
were then used to protect whites . The 1937 Wage Act, Davies argued, 
was introduced to control African wages in the face of African worker 
, t ' 140, L h ' d' , f h th A t ff t d Af ' organ1sa 10n, ~~ 15 1ScUSS10n 0 ow e C a ec e r1cans 
was d f ' , t 141 e 1Cl.en • Whilst Davies focussed attention on who 
benefitted and who did not benefit from Wage Board determinations, he 
neglected to consider how the Act itself was administered after 
the depression. 
At least three unpublished dissertations paid closer attention 
h 'If 142 to t e Wage Act 1tse . Pursell was anxious to trace the development 
138. ibid, P 216 
139. ibid. P 217 
140. ibid, pp 264-5 
141. Davies partly admits to this criticism, cf. ibid p 218 
142. Pursell. D "Minimum Wage Regulations Under the South African Wage 
Act; Bolitho, J "The South African Wage Board, 1925-1945"; 
Budlender, D "Labour Legislation in South Africa 1924-1945" 
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of the Wage Act from its inception in 1925 to the 1960s. He noted 
that the Wage Board supplemented the Industrial Conciliation Act,143that it 
concerned itself with promoting efficiency in industry,144 and that 
it ~ttempted to improve and regulate conditions of labour during the 
1920s. 145 The regulation of wages also provided means to control white 
unorganised labour in a climate which recalled the general strike of 
1922. 146 He did not provide any specific details in support of the 
147 
argument that the system operated to promote white employment. 
He further urged that the shift in emphasis from whites to Africans 
occurred after the introduction of the 1937 Act,148 and he suggested 
that the Bloemfontein unskilled wage determination "was probably more 
the result of the Bloemfontein riots than a desire to regulate unskilled 
149 
wages. It He attributed the support which the Board received from 
the business community after the depression to a change from principle 
(involving employee upliftment, wages, hours, conditions, etc., for 
their own sake) to pragmatism (raising wages piecemeal and not deter-
mining general conditions of labour) on the Board's part. 150 This 
143. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulations under the South African 
Wage Act" pp 9; 95- 6; 237 
1 44 • ibid, pp 57, 64 
145. ibid, P 8 
146. ibid, P 52 
147. ibid, P 55 
148. ibid, p iii 
1 49 . ibid, P 65 
150. ibid, P 254 
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suggestive proposition was not pursued in any great depth. Pursell 
was mainly concerned to identify the changes which took place in the 
nature of the differentiation between skilled and unskilled wages after 
1937. 151 The wage board's period from 1926 to 1937 he treated more as 
as aberration than as a period worthy of study in its own right. 
Bolitho covered the same ground as previous analysts. The 
strength of her contribution lay in her treatment of the role of the 
Wage Act vis-a-vis African workers~ The state dithered over whether 
to apply the Act to Africans even while the Bloemfontein investigation 
was progressing. She cautiously concluded that the State decided to 
deny Africans their rights under the Act by amending the 
regulations. The decision "to resist further wage increases for 
unskilled labour" after 1930 was not actually pinpointed. 152 On the 
other hand her fuller treatment of the relationship between the Wage 
Board and African trade unions prior to 1930 clearly indicated that the 
f d th .. of th 1 153 ormer promote e organ1sation e atter . 
Budlender placed the Wage Act in the context of industrial 
legislation generally. Moreover, the Riotous Assemblies Act and 
related measures were linked to labour laws in an attempt to show that 
coercion and control were implemented through overt and covert means. 
UnfortUnately, Budlender transposed trends she identified in the period 
1 51. ibid, pp 11 0 -111 
152. Bolitho, J "The South African Wage Board 1925-1945" pp 11-14 
153. ibid, pp 20-23 
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after 1937 back into the 1920s and 1930s. This occurred largely 
because she erroneously thought that it was 
only after the 1935 Industrial Legislation Commission 
officially 'recognised' the importance of L-the~ 
colour aspect that any colour breakdown is given in the 
statistical information on the overall operation of the 
Act. 154 
The result was that Budlender partly misread the period from 1926 to 
1937. Her general statement that changing "economic and political 
conditions occasioned amendments, and resulted in blacks being included 
to an increasing extent ,,155 needs further examination, even in the 
light of secondary source material. The 1929 restrictions on Africans 
were referred to only with regard to their removal in 1937 which made 
, t ' f f' t '1' th B d 156 1 eaSler or A rlcans 0 Utl lse e Wage oar. She pointed out 
that the general division of labour merited attention, but failed to 
focus on it "because of its importance and the lengthy treatment 
157 
needed" . Similarly, the argument that higher wages were necessary 
in order to create a market which could consume commodities was only 
158 touched on. In general terms, Budlender's treatment of the Wage Act 
was seriously marred by the inadequate basis on which she built. 
154. 
155. 
156. 
157. 
158. 
Budlender, D "Labour Legislation in South Africa 1924-1945" p 110 
Budlender depended on the summarised reports of the Wage Board 
which were published as part of the annual reports of the Depart-
ment of Labour (Budlender, p294). As can be seen from the 
Bibliography (p "1i-1 below), these reports were included from 1932. 
Thus, the activities of the Board were not covered from 1926 to 1932. 
This shortooming compounded the weakness of some parts of her analysis. 
ibid, p 110 
ibid, pp 116-7 
ibid, P 127 note 4 
ibid, p117 
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It is quite clear from the foregoing that South African historical 
development in general and the Wage Act as an instrv_ment of the 
civilised labour policy in particular have been variously treated. 
A perspective, characterised in the most general terms as one which 
consciously approaches the subject in terms of class conflict has become 
dominant. Similarly, the one dimensional view which saw the Wage Act 
as an instrument of state intervention acting against rules of economic 
rationali ty has been supers.eded. There has appeared in its place a 
view which suggests that the Act as state intervention meant different 
things for different classes and sections of classes. did not necessarily 
act dysfunctionally within the economy , and in fact materially affected many 
aspects of industrial and social life . 
This thesis attempts to examine the Wage Act's operation generally 
during the period 1925 to 1937. 
Chapter one addresses itself to the question of context. It 
outlines briefly the backdrop created by the mining revolution, the rise 
of manufacturing and commerce , the poor white problem and salient politi-
cal events. A more detailed section attempts a descriptive analysis of 
South Africa's secondary industrial world during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
sector in which the Wage Act was implemented. Lastly. a brief sketch 
of the history of the labour movements identifies the people whom the Act 
affected in the factories and workhouses described in the previous section. 
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Chapter two examines the origins of the civilised labour policy itself 
and attempts to define what that policy entailed, given the number of 
fluctuations and changes that took place during the period. It also 
plots the history of wage regulation , with specific reference to 
wage board style legislation,down to the enactment of the Wage Act 
in 1925. The next four chapters address themselves directly to the 
issues raised by the critics. Chapter three considers the general 
features. development and administration of the Act. This includes 
identifying which groups were ultimately affected by the legislation 
and how they reacted. The discussion revolves around such issues 
as evasion of determinations. the role of courts of law, delays , the 
Acesrelation to the Industrial Conciliation Act . and labour reactions. 
Chapter four 'o~'.""(~ on the effects of wage board determinations 
in industry. It examines how these determinations were linked to 
questions like consumerism, efficiency. production costs~ unemploy· · 
ment. competition, hours and the effects on employers generally. 
Chapter five looks at the Wage Act in its specific role as an 
instrument of the civilised labour policy. It sets out to detail 
precisely what the Board saw itself as doing. and second, how it went 
about its task. The chapter deals with case studies to show how 
it supplemented the Industrial Conciliation Act, and how the determina .. 
tion of specified minimum wages affected the racial composition of the 
work force. The manner in which the Wage Act was applied specifi-
cally to Africans as unskilled labourers is dealt with in chapter six. 
Here we not only examine investigations into unskilled work, but also 
attempt to pinpoint and explain why Africans were at first included, 
-50-
then excluded and later brought back under the aegis of the Act. 
The Conclusion draws all the pieces together and attempts to explain 
the role of the Wage Act as a whole in the context of South African 
development generally . 
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CHAPTER 1 South Africa: the period c1900-1939, a general 
background 
This chapter attempts three tasks. ' " i b .... llj. it traces, in very 
general terms, developments in south Africa from about the turn of 
the century to the collapse of the Fusion Government in 1939. 
N~~t · , it examines in greater detail the nature of working conditions, 
labour processes and industrial development in manufacture generally 
but more particularly in some trades and industries which fell under 
the scrutiny of the Wage Board. The task here is more descriptive 
than analytical, partly because of the paucity of readily available 
evidence on the individual industries and partly from choice so as 
to provide a general picture of a number of South African industries 
during the period under review. \:i" .. II~ " the chapter provides a 
summary of developments within the labour movements during the period. 
First, labour ostensibly was supposed to benefit from labour legis-
lation. Second, until fairly recently much of the literature has 
tended to restrict its careful attention to the bourgeois classes 
and the differences between sections of the bourgeoisie. The 
working classes for their part have tended with few exceptions to 
be the victims of harsh generalisation, have been seen more as 
reacted upon than as actors in their own right, or alternatively have 
been ignored completely. 
Prior to the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and the major gold 
discoveries on the Witwatersrand some nineteen years later, South 
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Africa was largely a pastoral, agricultural region. Industries 
as such appear to have been restricted to small-scale endeavours 
such as sugar-refining, carriage building, leather, tanning, milling, 
soap-making, building and printing. 1 Such trades were undertaken 
throughout the country where pockets of people lived but the main 
areas of activity were naturally situated at coastal centres or 
towns adjacent to them. 
The discovery of diamonds and the rapid development of the 
Kimberley diamond mines, initially for a short time i" the hands 
of many individual diggers, but ultimately of a small group of 
capitalists, provided South Africa with "groups of entrepreneurs 
wi th g:x:d connections in the international capital markets, and a 
supply of investible capital. ,,2 The early development of small-
time diamond mining encouraged the migration of white fortune-
seekers, many of whom were later to become white proletarians. 
As the diamond mines grew the heightened demand for cheap 
labour ensured the entrenchment of African migrant labour. 
Admittedly, in the case of Africans, labour migrancy had existed 
amongst certain groups such as the Sotho and the Pedi but it 
became somewhat more generalised after the discovery of diamonds and 
1. Van der Horst, S Native Labour in South Africa, p 235 
2. Johnstone, F Class, Race and Gold, p 13 
-53-
3 later, of gold. But even after the discovery of gold and the 
development of deep-level mining, migrant labour had to be forced 
from certain areas like Pondoland and Mocambique to work the mines. 4 
The rudiments of the compound system and the forced migrant labour 
system became established after the diamond discoveries of the last 
century. 
It is clear that the recruitment of African labour was not an 
easy task. At first, a certain amount of voluntary migrancy took 
place but was not sufficient to supply the growing needs of the 
industry. A process of recruitment was devised. The Olamber of 
Mines only really established its monopsony in this field well 
after Union with state assistance. The activities of independent 
recruiters, who were mainly traders in the reserve areas, surpassed 
attempts by mining company representatives to get labourers,partly 
because they were in closer contact with the population and partly 
because they could control potential migrants through systems of 
advancement or debt inducement. 
The recruitment of contractual labour was organised in many 
different ways. The Olamber of Mines for its part attempted to 
3. Delius, P "Migrant Labour and the Pedi, 1840-80" in Marks and 
Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa 
pp 292-312; Kimble, J "Labour Migration in Basutoland, c 1870-
1885" in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Olange 
in South Africa pp 119-141 
4 . Beinart, W The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930 pp 54-
63; Harries, P "Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial 
migration" in Marks and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social 
Olange in South Africa, pp 142-166 
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control recruitment through the creation of co-operative 
companies like the Rand Native Labour Association in the 1890sJ 
its successor, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, in 1900J 
and then in 1912 the Native Recruiting Corporation which eventually 
became the instrument through which the Chamber established its 
monosony. The Chamber's task was difficult to undertake and labour 
recruitment remained unstable and expensive. 5 
Once recruited or engaged on the mines, the African men had to be 
a Ullmcdat..(.ot .• At first, workers on the diamond mines were housed 
on their employerd property but later, ostensibly because of illicit 
diamond buying and theft but mainly through the need for adequate 
control and organisation of the labour force, the African diggers' 
compounds and camps on the outskirts of Kimberley developed into 
closed compounds. White workers successfully resisted mineowner 
attempts to compound them, and the incarceration of Africans in 
5. These points are elaborated in Beinart, W The Political Economy 
of Pondoland, pp 54-69, and Jeeves, A "The Control of Migratory 
Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and 
Milner" and IIMigrant Labour and the Colour Bar on the South 
African Gold Mines". Examples of Contracts are housed in the 
Cory Library for Historical Research: 1. Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Companhia do Nyassa, registered in Lisbon, and WNLA 
dated 1903, for recruitment by WNLA in the "Territories of the 
Company"; 2. Agreement between Simmer Deep Ltd and Andrew 
Mauritz Mostert, an independent contractor who was to supply not 
less than 1 000 Africans, dated 1909; and 3. the Agreement 
between Rand Mines Ltd., H Eckstein and Co., Consolidated Gold 
Fields of S A Ltd., and H M Taberer, formerly an official of 
the Transvaal Native Affairs Department)who was now appointed 
as sole recruiter, dated 6 January 1909. Gold Fields Collection, 
MS 14 948 (folder) 
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barracks behind fences "determined the maintenance of an African 
migrant labour policy and the development of a labour aristocracy 
of supervisory and skilled white workers. ,,6 The compound system 
as it developed in Kimberley was later extended and refined on the 
gold mines. 7 The white mine workers ' for their part were housed 
largely in boarding houses, or mining company single quarters 
establishments. The authorities' concern for their living condi-
tions, sparked by anxiety at the political menace of a white working 
class movement, ensured that white working class housing projects 
were undertaken . The result rapidly extended the growth of 
8 
working class suburbs in 'Johannesburg like Jeppe and Fordsburg. 
The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand "brought to an end 
a distinct period in the economic history of southern Africa ,,9 and 
ushered in a new one which has given rise to much debate. The 
industry was plagued from its very inception with various problems 
related to geological features on the Rand. It was soon noticed 
6. Turrell, R "Kimberley: Labour and Compounds, 1871-88" in Marks 
and Rathbone, Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa 
p 64 
7. Van Onselen, C Chibaro, although dealing with the structures of 
control in the Rhodesian context,provides a pioneering analysis 
of compound life and its role in the gold mining industry 
8. Van Onselen, C liThe world the mine-owners made" in studies in the 
Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914 
vol 1, pp 24-40 
9. Richardson and van Hel ten, "Labour in the South African gold mining 
industry, 1886-1914" in Marks and Rathbone Industrialisation and 
Social Change in South Africa, p 77 
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that the outcrop or surface reef of gold dipped away to the south. 
When the mine owners attempted to reach the deeper gold fields the 
hazards of deep-level mining came to the fore. Not only did the 
mine owners need the services of shaft diggers but also men with the 
necessary skills of underground mining. Skilled miners were 
obtained mainly from Britain and Australia. They brought with them 
trade union experience and realised that the mine owners were de-
pendent on them for their skills. As such they were able to demand 
and receive higher wages than those they had received back home. 
Furthermore, although some good ore was extracted, a lot was of a 
poorer quality than that mined in Australia and Canada, and was not 
always consistent in quality. Chemical processes had to be devised 
to extract ore from the pyritic rock in which deep-level gold was 
deposited. South African gold, like other gold, was sold at a 
fixed price on world markets which were themselves susceptible to 
depression. All heavy machinery needed for mining operations was 
initially imported, the administrative structure and the economy 
of the South African Republic was built to suit a pastoral country, 
not one which could support advanced mining technology. Although 
the capital accumulated in the diamond industry assisted the initial 
development of the gold mines, the industry did not benefit from a 
reliable, constant inflow of capital. All these factors together 
made mining financially precarious, and mine owners sought to 
reduce costs internally. 
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The high cost of irreplaceable skilled labour forced the mine 
magnates to organise the labour structure of mining in such a way 
as to minimise that costa The solution lay in the development of 
"a production process which satisfactorily exploited the growing 
reservoirs of cheap unskilled African labour whilst restricting the 
scope and extent of white employment in a manner consistent with the 
difficulties of Witwatersrand production".10 White, skilled workers 
were increasingly concentrated on the surface, especially after the 
mid-1890s when the deep-level mines developed. 
11 labour increasingly moved underground. 
Conversely, African 
An important part of the story of gold-mining in south Africa 
is capital's attempts to reduce production costs wherever possible, 
the most important area being the employment of cheaper labour, and 
the opposition of workers who felt threatened by the employment of 
lower valued workers. In other words it revolves essentially 
around the issue of the colour bar in the mining industry and the 
fragmentation of skilled jobs. 
The colour bar was first introduced in 1893. Law No 3, 1893, 
restricted blasting work to whites. A number of amendments . 
were made and were consolidated in 1898. After the South African 
War, the British administration in the Transvaal maintained and 
10. ibid, p 81. Richardson and Van Helten have produced what must 
rate as the best, succinct analysis to date of the labour 
structure of mining between 1886 and 1914. A lot of their 
material is drawn from Johnstone, Davies, et al., and the analysis 
presented here owes much to their synthesis. 
11. ibid, P 83 
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extended the colour bar in 1903 and again in 1906. The colour 
bars contained in the regulations were not statutory and the 
Chamber of Mines objected, not to the principle of the colour bar, 
b 1 t f ' t tr 1" 12 ut on y 0 some 0 ~ 5 more ex erne app 1cat10ns. Levy has 
noted that the extension of the colour bar under Milner's admin-
istration was used to reduce white commercial, agricultural and 
"miners I fears that the introduction of indentured, poorly 
paid Chinese labour (to offset the shortage of African wages 
resulting from wage reductions) would jeopardize their commercial, 
farming and mining occupations. Furthermore, he indicated that 
the incorporation of the restrictions against Chinese labour imposed 
by the Transvaal Labour Importation Ordinance of 1904 under the 
1903 Min es, Works and Machinery Ordinance by government notices 
from time to time actually extended the bar against Chinese workers 
to cover 1\ fricans as well. The latter ordinance in effect "removed 
the colour bar legislation of the old republican laws and cemented 
the Chamber's wage structure by enabling the goverment to frame 
regulations where necessary under the Ordinance. ,,13 
Johnstone considered the early colour bar from two angles. 
First, the colour bars on the mines were well-established before 
1910. Second, "their history reveals that the idea that skilled 
12. Johnstone, F A "Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa 1910-26" 
pp 130-144 provides an excellent overview of the regulations, 
ordinances and statutes from 1893-1926 which established colour 
bars. 
13. Levy, N The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour 
System p 225 
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work had always been the exclusive preserve of whites while 
Africans had always been restricted to unskilled work is false. ,,14 
In 1907 ~he Transvaal Mining Industry Commission was informed that 
Africans and Chinese workers performed skilled tasks. They drove 
air winches, were in charge of "pumping machinery, sorting tables, 
waste rock and tailing elevators, ,mechanical haulages, shop boilers 
and engines, motors and machinery." Africans also worked as drill 
h b ' kmak d ' h' , 11 1 5 s arpeners, r1C ers an ~n crus 1ng m~ s. As Johnstone 
indicated, all the above jobs with the exception of drill sharpening 
"became, but had not always been, the exclusive preserve of whites.,,16 
Africans were displaced by whites in 'such a way as to ensure that 
the "white monopoly over most skilled occupations was not a tradi-
tional but an acquired monopoly . " The 1904 Ordinance was the "first 
explicit legal expression of the conventional division of skilled 
and unskilled labour on a racial basis.,,17 
The Mines and Works Act of 1911 did not decree a colour bar. 
The Governor-General was only empowered to issue regulations under 
the Act and the colour bar was institutionalised in regulations which 
dealt with certificates of competency. Thirty five occupations 
were reserved for whites in terms of the regulations. The colour 
bar in the regulations was hlttressed in 1918 by the Status QUo 
14. Johnstone, F A "The Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa, 
1910-1926" p 132 
15 . Cited by Alexander, R Job Reservation and the Trade Unions, p 4, 
Johnstone, F A "The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa, 
1910-1926" p 132 
16. Johnstone, F A "The Industrial Colour Bars in South Africa, 
1910_1926" p 133 
17. ibid, P 133 
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Agreement, which was reached between the Chamber of Mines and 
white workers at the end of the war to safeguard the white workers 
from the threat of redundancy as a result of rising costs. This 
agreement was a voluntary accord between white miners and mine owners 
which in effect extended the colour bar to another 19 occupations. 
The agreement stipulated that 
the status quO as existing in each mine with regard to the 
relative scope of employment of European and coloured 
employees should be maintained,that is to say that no 
billets which are held by European workmen should be 
given to coloured workmen and vice versa. 18 
The Rand Revolt of 1922 was not the first time that white 
miners had struck. The outbreaks in 1902, 1907, 1913 and 1914 
over wages and attempts by mine owners to reorganise the labour 
process at the expense of the white workers' privileged position 
19 
were the forerunners of 1922. Discontent had simmered for a 
while but matters came to a head when the Chamber of Mines, more 
mindful of high costs during the economic recession which followed 
the end of the war and the drop in the price of gold, finally 
announced wage reduction for higher paid workers ,would be reduced, 
the abolition of the status QUo Agreement and the reorganisation of 
underground work. The revolt was savagely put down by Smuts's 
18. Quoted in Johnstone, ibid, p 136. The list of occupations, 
both prescribed and not prescribed for whites on the mines is 
reproduced as Appendix B pp U~~ below 
19. For the 1907 strike, cf Yudelman, D "Lord Rothschild, Afrikaner 
Scabs and the 1907 Strike"; Davies, R Capital, State and White 
Labour, pp 67-71, 115-116; 1902, 1913: Katz, E A Trade Union 
AristocracYJ passim. 
-61-
government. Smuts's action came to be seen as evidence of a 
strong association between the Chamber of Mines and the SAP 
20 Government. 
The routing of the white trade unionists preceded the decision 
b t he Supreme Court to rule that the colour bar in the mining 
regulations was ultra vires. The manager of the Eastern Section of 
the Crown Mines, Gavin Hildick-Smith had failed to carry our Regulation 
179 which stipulated that only competent whites should operate 
electric locomotives when he allowed an African, known to the court 
only as Stephen, to drive an engine underground. The court found 
that the Mines and Works Act did not permit discrimination and as 
such the Regulations which were discriminatory were declared invalid. 21 
Although white miners feared that they would now be ousted from 
their privileged positions , their fears were largely unfounded. The 
Chamber successfully reorganised work underground by extending the 
responsibilities of individual white miners without extra remuneration, 
the voluntary semi-skilled colour bar contained in the Status QUo 
Agreement was annulled and the South African Mine Workers Union was 
in disarray following the 1922 Revolt. From the workers I point of 
view, the importance of the events of 1922-23 lay rather in the defeat 
;1\ 1<1;1.;.;, 
of an arrogant Prime Minister and his partyLand their replacement by 
20. Johnstone, FA Class, Race and Gold, pp 119-136; Simons and 
Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa ch 13, deal with 1922 
in fair detail. Hessian, V "In Investigation into the causes 
of the labour agitation on the Witwatersrand January - March 
1922" and Auld, C R "General Smuts' attitude to White Labour 
Disputes between 1907 and 1922" provide interesting synopses if 
somewhat restricted because of lack of access to sources. 
21. R vs Hildick-Smith (1923 TPD 69) 
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a deceptively congenial coalition government, 
Ever since Botha' s and Smuts's flirtation with the Chamber 
of Mines in the Transvaal prior to Union/they, and the party they 
represented, increasingly became identified as supporters of mining 
interests. As a result, their political fortunes were directly 
linked to the strength of the various constituencies ranged against 
them. Smuts's defeat in 1924 was the culmination of a slow 
process and was triggered by the cohesion of contradictory elements 
against his party and his policies. These elements arose essentially 
from within the social framework itself: The South African Party 
and mining capital failed to come to terms with a growing, union-
based industrial/manufacturing sector, the challenge of working 
class organisation and rural ~"'IDpl"'''~(;S that accompanied the growth 
of the Union's economy. We examine each in turn. 
It was noted above that secondary industries did exist before 
the discovery of minerals. The development of mining industry and 
the free trade status of the colonies in South Africa which were 
closely linked with Britain even after they received responsible 
government ensured that South African manufacture was subordinated to 
foreign, mainly British, interests. As often occurs, manufacturing 
industries in South Africa received a boost during wartime. The 
artificial markets created during the South African War assisted 
the small, struggling industries which were dotted around the country 
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but most notably in the Transvaal and the Cape. Bozzoli places 
the origins of the national bourgeoisie as a class in the first 
~~ decade of the century. It was during this time that ideologists 
first attempted to build up a collective interest among individual 
manufacturers by playing down differences between different groups 
of manufacturers, working out arguments against 'enemies' and the 
l 'k 23 1 e. 
From an early stage the merits or otherwise of 'free trade' 
and 'protectionism' were hotly debated. It was from this crucible 
that manufacturing came to be aligned against mining and commerce 
when they claimed to uphold the interests of South Africa above their 
own particular interests. Bozzoli clearly shows that most sections 
of the economy, including agriculture, and 'the white working class, 
were themselves divided over the issue of protection. 24 
But manufacturing capital did not form the only section of the 
so-called national bourgeoisie, nor was it the largest or most 
22. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 110; 
P 312, n B provides a table derived from the 1904 census. 
The summary provided in this section is based largely on 
Bozzoli's analysis of early manufacturing, except where 
otherwise stated. Bozzoli defined national capital as a 
class comprised o f "industrialists, traders, certain mining 
companies, and farmers", with manufacturers taking the lead, 
at the end of the period,; ie, c1933. ibid pp 170-171. 
23. ibid, pp 116-117 
24. ibid, pp 116-125 
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powerful. Agricultural interests were divided into two branches . 
Landowners as such were contrasted to agriculturalists proper. 
The difference between the two lay in their attitude towards agri-
cultural expansion: ~~ ~j landowners owned large stretches of 
ol~e~ 
land and were conservative economically whilst/ agriculturalists were 
interested in markets and the capitalisation of farming. This 
latter group was a potential ally for an increasingly important 
f . to 25 manu actur1ng s~c r. The outbreak of war did much to alter the 
situation. South African industries boomed, and regional differences 
between manufacturers were appeased. The trend .was highlighted when 
the Federated Chamber of Industries was formed in 1917. Depression 
followed the war and gains made during the war had to be maintained 
or, at tbe very least, not lost completely. The falling off of 
imports during the war had seriously affected the position of 
commerce based on imports, but the increase in domestic manufacturing 
had boosted commercial enterprises linked to the internal market. 
strident agricultural calls for the provision of some kind of 
protection for South African goods were now joined by important 
voices within the Association of Chambers of commerce. 26 
The calls for protection were based on the correct notion that 
South African goods could not compete in the internal market with 
goods imported from the more highly capitalised United Kingdom which 
could produce cheaper products. The argument that tariff protection 
25 . ibid, pp 120-122 
26. ibid, pp 145-6 
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would also provide jobs for whites was also heard,and the 1914 
CUstoms Tariff Act made the specific provision that the "not very 
• expensive tariff protection accorded employers was dependent upon 
the employment of a 'fair amount of white labour,·.27 
The 1914 Act was based on pre-Union colonial tariffs which were 
aimed chiefly at increasing State revenues. Only a certain measure 
of protection was granted to "some classes of boots and shoes, biscuits, 
blankets and rugs, confectionery, soap, sugar, the printing industry, 
28 harness and saddlery, and animal drawn vehicles" in the Cape, 
whilst customs tariffs in the Transvaal Republic were aimed at a 
umb f 1 1 · d· h·· · d t 29 n er 0 oca 1n ustr1es or t e m1n1ng 1n us ry. Although 
Botha's .government introduced the CUstoms Tariff Act of 1914, it did 
not indicate a shift in emphasis away from imperial interests in 
favour of South African industrial undertakings, small as they were in 
1914. The 1914 tariff had a "revenue bias" for "out of some 193 
items of that tariff at least 120 items were for admission free of 
duty or at the low rate of 3 per cent, but free from the United 
Kingdom. ,,30 The tariff was amended piecemeal after 19f4 and was 
supervised after 1921 by the Board of Trade and Industries, established 
31 in July 1921, for that purpose. Largely ignored at first by 
government, the Beard did not produce many recommendations for 
"effective tariff duties and even fewer duties were actually intro-
27. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, pp 107, 129 
28. Board of Trade and In du stries, Investigation into Manufacturing 
Industries in the Union of South Africa, hereafter Report No 282 , p101 
29. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class pp 43-5 
30. Report No 282, p 102 
31 . ibid. Davies, R. Capital, State and White Labour, incorrectly 
insists that the BTl was established in 1922, ibid, p 148, 162 
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duced as a result of its deliberations.,,32 
A further reason exists to explain why manufacturers were not 
appeased by the introduction of minimal tariff protection and the 
constitution of a Board of Trade and Industries. The Board itself 
was ex l:.:rernely conservative. The tariff structure was examined 
industry by industry and never in tems of general policy. The 
Board endorsed a report shortly after its creation that effectively 
"condemned protection as . a means of fostering local industries." 
Again, in 1924 the Board condemned a suggestion that a new tariff 
should be implemented which incorporated greater protection . Manu-
facturer's discontent was summed up by L Serocold Skeets, President 
·'0 
of the' Transvaal Manufacturer's Association, when he wrote~ a member 
of the Board: 
Manufacturers are utterly tired of a Government that promises 
so much in respect of the support of local industries and 
performs so little. 33 
One of the first actions of the new Nationalist-Labour Party Pact 
government which was supported by large sections of agriculture and 
industrial manufacturers, was to recast the Board of Trade and Industries 
and to instruct it to revise the tariff. Some industries previously 
refused protection were now granted i~ and others were granted 
additional protection. The Board of Trade and Industries later 
32. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour p 148; Kaplan, D 
liThe Politics of Industrial Protection in South Africa" provides 
a somewhat rigid, fractionalist account of the protection issue. 
33. Quoted in Kaplan, D "The Politics of Industrial Protection in 
South Africa" p 75 
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remarked that the Tariff and Excise Duties Amendment Act of 1925 
marked a definite change in state policy. The change lay not in 
that the revenue aspect of the tariff was henceforth neglected, but 
rather that "Government had made up its mind to encourage the 
development of local industries through the aid of the CUstoms Tariff.,,35 
Whereas, in 1921 the customs tariff, motivated by 
revenue considerations was described as "accidental and haphazard", 
th h . 1 . h d ff th Af' . d t 36 e c ange 1n po 1CY a a great e ect on Sou r1can 1n us ry. 
The Board noted the extreme difficulty of working out the cost/benefit 
aspects of tariff protection but it was of the opinion that "the 
policy of moderate protection brought into operation in the Union has 
37 
enhanced the real net welfare of the country." The United Kingdom's 
senior trade commissioner in South AfTica at the height of the depression) 
N Emslie, was able to claim that tariff protection had been of "immense 
advantage to certain productive industries .. II He singled out the 
sugar, wheat and dairy industries as being wholly dependent for their 
development on the tariff system and added that 
many of the secondary industries could not have been built 
up to their present size and could not now continue to 
exist in face of competition from more highly industrialised 
countries with lower .. production costs and longer scale 
production. 38 
35. Report No 282, p 102 
36. United Kingdom Department of OVerseas Trade, Report on the 
Economic and Financial Conditions in South Africa, June 1921/ p16 
37. Report No 282, p 104 
38. United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa, July 1931, p 42 
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Emslie also indicated that protection was widely popular in the 
Union "even at the cost of some sacrifice on the part of other 
't t 39 l.n eres 5." Bozzoli concluded that the Tariff Act of 1925 "made it 
40 possible for the industrialisation of South Africa to get under way." 
In 1935, the British trade commission in the Union complained that the 
self-sufficiency of the Union's economy had caused the failure of over-
41 
seas trade to expand. It will be argued below that although this 
assertion is correct, it neglects the role, of wage regulation 
machinery, which also played an important role in preparlng and coaxing 
manufacturers and industrialists to improve economic efficiency in the 
, 42 Unl.on. 
To what extent the Tariff Act promoted the employment of whites is 
difficult to gauge . One of the considerations which underlay the 
customs tariff in 1925 was 
the creation of a wider field of employment for civilized 
labour, tariff assistance to indus tries being partly 
conditional on good labour conditions and on the under-
standing that wherever possible a larger proportion of 
civilized labour would be employed. 43 
39. United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa, June 1928,p 34 
40. Bozzoli B, The Political Nature of a Ruling CLass p 158 
41 . United Kingdom Department of Cverseas Trade Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa, October 1935, p 2 
42. cf ch 4 below 
43. Report No 282, p 105 
The Board of Trade and Industries later claimed that "it was 
definitely expected that efforts to promote the employment of 
44 
civilized labour would not be relaxed." 'Civilized labour' was a 
term introduced into official jargon to mean essentially white labour, 
but included coloured labour, and was based on the economic criteria 
necessary for subsistence at white standards of living. The 
development of the concept is traced in detail in chapter two below. 
Davies noted that industrial expansion brought about by protection 
led to greater white employment rather than to the actual implementa-
tion of the civilised or fair labour clauses of the tariff. 45 That 
trend had been identified as early as 1935 by the United . Kingdom 
46 Department of OVerseas Trade. The operation of the Tariff Act, in 
conjunction with other civilised labour style legislation such as the 
Wage Act which forms the major concern of this study, contributed to 
the promotion of white employment and industrial expansion through the 
protection of South African industrial undertakings. Agriculture 
supported the policy because many of the industries afforded protection, 
such as the sugar and dairy industries) were involved with processing 
agricultural products and the tariff ensured farmers a market. 
Commercial interests came more and more to support protectionist 
tariffs as they became more involved with the industries which established 
themselves as a result of protection. White labour came to support the 
policy largely because of the promise of job security. 
44. ibid 
45. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, p 208-9 
46. United Kingdom Department of OVerseas Trade, Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa, October 1935, p 3 
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The protection the Pact Government bestowed upon industry 
involved, then, a number of issues. One of the arguments used to 
promote the idea of protection and the necessity of industrial expan-
sion was the provision of jobs for white work-seekers . These arguments 
rested on experiments to solve and to find solutions to what was known 
as the 'poor white problem'. The problem can be defined simply as the 
social challenge or threat presented to an industrialising state of 
the rapid growth in the number of indigent people, who were generally 
classified as white,in that society's midst. That governing authorities 
expressed increasing concern with the phenomenon is evidenced by the 
number of state-sponsored investigations into the problem. These 
47 included a number of Commissions and select committee reports . 
A mixture of traditional customs within the Afrikaner community and 
the problems of developing agriculture in the region gave rise to the 
poor white problem. 
The development of the system of private ownership of land in 
the independent Republics in the nineteenth century led to 
"rapid accumulation among Afrikaner notables" and the dispossession or 
47. Van der Horst, S Native Labour in South Africa, p 238, provides 
a short list: a Cape Select Committee on the Poor Whites (SC10-
1906), Transvaal Indigency Commission Report (1906-8), Select 
Committee on European Employment and Labour Conditions (SC9-
1913); Economic Commission Report (UG 12-1914) and the Relief 
and Grants-in-Aid Commission (1916) . The Carnegi e Commission 
report into the poor white problem in the early 'thirties was 
a private affair, as were the various conferences organised 
by the Dutch Reformed Church 
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48 loss of land among poorer farmers. Pressure on landowners was 
exacerbated by the Roman-Dutch law of inheritance "whereby every son 
was entitled to a legitimate share of his father's land." The 
increasing sub-division of farms into equal parts eventually resulted 
in the creation of sub-economic units. Very often these units were 
purchased from people who could not operate viably. The relative 
improverishment of white farmers in this way steadily increased. 
Natural disasters such as drought and disease, almost endemic to 
certain areas of southern Africa, combined . with the ravages of the 
South African war to force more whites with hardly any skills off the 
land. Many had their farms seized by African chiefs, only to get 
them back after the war, and many had their land bought up both by 
Africans and whites. With nowhere to invest whatever agricultural 
skills they had, the impoverished families moved to the towns. Their 
numbers were increased as the capitalisation of agriculture led to the 
creation of large, mechanised farms. The Transvaal countryside was 
the most affected area in the early part of the century, but the 
49 problem was not exclusively a rural one . 
It has long been assumed that the poor white problem was essentially 
caused by an involuntary drift of whites from rural impoverishment to 
the hope of urban employment. Recent work by Van Onselen focussed 
48. Trapido, S "Reflections on L.and, office and wealth in the South 
African Republic, 1850-1900" in Marks and Atmore, Economy and 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, p 350 
49. Grosskopf, J Rural Impoverishment and Rural Exodus: Economic 
Report of the Carnegie Commission into the Poor White Problem in 
South Africa, passim; and De Kiewiet, C A History of South Africa, 
pp 178-197, provide useful accounts of the origins of the problem. 
Johnstone, F A Class, Race and Gold pp 49-57 provides a concise 
radical examination of the question 
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attention on the development of the working class in Johannesburg . 
It is clear that as towns developed in South Africa, the accumulation 
and centralisation of capital in fewer hands proceeded apace. 
A proportion of the self-employed were forced into the working class 
and some into the ranks of the poor whites and unemployed by being 
forced out of numerous occupations, the most notable being the 
provision of urban transport, clothing, cabinet-making and the like. SO 
Many of the unemployed in the towns were semi-skilled workers, the 
majority of whom were white men, and skilled tradesmen . Sl It is 
possible that a great deal of the mili~ · of white labour in the 
early years of the century was directly linked to the harsh experience 
of many workers who had descended in the scale of privilege. 
At first attempts were made to alleviate the lot of many poor 
whites by establishing relief works in rural areas, introducing 
afforestation schemes and promoting a back-to-the-land scheme. 
Conditions, generally, left much to be desired. The back-to-the~land 
scheme was buttressed by the 1912 Land Settlements Act and its various 
amendments which made provision for whites to take out interest free 
loans to purchase land and equipment. , The drought in 1916, as well as 
the distraction of the industries which attracted more workers because 
of the war, put an effectual end to the scheme . Rapid urbanisation 
increased to the extent that in 1926 the white popultion living in the 
50. cf especially van Onselen, C "The Main Reef Road into the working 
class : proletarianisation, unemployment and class consciousness 
amongst Johannesburg's Afrikaner Poor, 1890-1914" in Studies in the 
Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand pp 111-170 
51. Department of Mines and Industries, Factories Division Annual 
Reports:UG 8-1922,p 109,and UG 14-1923,p 117 
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52 
urban areas had risen by 23% to 58% compared to 1891. The fact 
of urbanisation, linked to the question of the poor white problem 
had to be faced. 
We have seen that most white mine workers either lived in 
boarding houses, single-quarter residences or moved into the working 
class areas of Jeppe, Fordsburg and the like . Slums developed on 
the outskirts ofand in tanns as overcrowding and unsanitary living 
conditions became commonplace. Many workers engaged S3 in outwork 
worked, ate and slept in the same room which often was the sole living 
space ","':for entire families. Boarding houses blossomed in cape Town 
along the railway line, workers' shanties erupted in the North End of 
Port Elizabeth,and very often black and white mixed freely . During 
the 'twenties a few attempts were made to establish hostels for white 
girls, the most successful being in Port Elizabeth which had an 
uruJsnally high proportion of young girls who had been sent to work in 
town to eke out a living because no prospects existed at home in the 
rural areas surrounding the town. Further attempts to provide 
hostels in other towns did not meet with much success and practically 
no hostels for men were contemplated. 'Ire late 'twenties and the 
'thirties witnessed an improvement in working class living conditions 
and a number of recreation clubs which sported libraries, card-rooms 
52. Johnstone, F A Class, Race and Gold, p 53 
53. "outwork" was work performed away from the factory, normally at 
the outworkers home, and commissioned by the factory owner or 
trader. It was badly paid, promoted inefficiency and was generally 
a social hazard. cf Department of Mines and Industries, Factories 
Division, Annual Report,UG 14-1923.p 137 
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54 
and cheap eating facilities sprang up. Apart from Cbh!C 
charitable comment, the Department of Labour commented approvingly on 
these attempts to provide workers with better accomodation and 
recreation facilites as they all contributed to the creation of a 
healthier type of worker . 
Work for poor whites was sought through a variety of channels . 
The various schemes in rural areas do not concern us here, but the 
entry of poor whites and other unskilled or semi-skilled whites into 
industry does. The mines, as already noted, had no need nor desire 
to employ more whites than they had to. Apart from municipal and state 
enterprises like ISCOR, which began production in 1934 with an all-
white workforce55 , the State attempted to facilitate the entry of 
whites into private industry. 
Juveniles in industry were eventually controlled in at least 
two ways . Juvenile Affairs Boards or Juvenile Advisory Boards were 
established uring the war years in a number of towns. By 1921, 
54. cf Department of Mines and Indus.tries, Factories Division, Annual 
Reports:UG 8-1922,pp 156-157; UG 9-1924,p 107; UG 15-1925, 
pp 430-432; Department of Labour Factories Div~sion, Annual Reports, 
UG 21-1926, pp511-512; UG6-1927 P 436; Department of Labour Chief 
Inspector of Factories Annual Reports:UG 31-1927.pp 18-19; 
UG 38-1928.pp 16-17; UG 47-1929.p 14; UG 33-1930, P 19; UG 24-1931, 
pp 15-16; UG 25-1932,pp 17-18; Department of Labour Annual Reports: 
UG37-1933,p 26; UG43-1934.p 32; UG 11-1936,p 38; UG4-1937,p 55 
UG44-1937,p 47 ; UG 30-1938,p 80 
55. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour p 258 
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56 10 centres boasted 11 Boards. The state argued that it had become 
commonly accepted that school leavers should be "safeguarded and guided 
in a systematic and properly organised manner" because the citizenry 
recognized "the immense importance to the future of South Africa of the 
maintenance of a white civilisation based on the competence, efficiency 
and character of its white citizens". The Boards evolved Ita system 
of juvenile control"; prospects for apprenticeship training; they ran 
57 juvenile labour employment bureaux and other general matters. One 
of their , dlairmen claimed that their function was "to gain 'industrial 
benefits from them (the poor whites)' by giving them training which 
would 'make men and women of them, and not the kind of industrial half 
breeds we have tended to produce (hitherto)'. ,,58 
The other way in which juveniles, amongst others, were controlled 
was through the Apprenticeship Act which, although initiated in 1921 
at the behest of Juvenile Affairs Boards, only became law in 1922. 
It was justified in terms of the close relations between apprenticeship 
56. Pretoria, Johannesburg, Germiston, Krugersdorp, Durban, Port Eliza-
beth, Grahamstown, Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg each had one, 
and the Cape Peninsula two. Department of Mines and Industries 
Factories Division, Annual Report UG 8-1922 P 125 
57. ibid, pp 124-125 
58. quoted in Davies R Capital, State and White Labour, p 111 
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and training in industry as "essential partL-sJ of the education 
system", the necessity of state control, and was bent on producing 
skilled South African labcur instead of relying on imported labour from 
59 
overseas. Apprenticeship was to be used not only to promote the 
employment of whites - the Act stipulated that apprentices had to 
achieve Standard 6 before the age of 18, an easy enough qualification 
for whites with compulsory education60 - but to protect operatives 
who risked retrenchment through the use of child-labour or badly paid 
adul t labour . By the end of 1932, for example, some 6 900 white 
th d ' tr " t b t ' 61 you s were un ergo1ng a~n1ng 0 ecome ar 1sans. 
The colour bar operated on the mines and in engineering works, 
building, certain areas of woodwork and metal working even after it 
was declared ultra vires. One of the first actions of the Pact was to 
legislate the necessary amendment to the 1911 Mines and Works Act. 
The Bill eventually became law, after two stormy sessions of Parlia-
emnt, in 1926 . 62 Parliamentary opposition to the measure revolved 
59. Department of' Mines and Industries, Factories Division, Annual 
Report, UG 8-1922,p 125-6 . De Kiewiet, C A History of South Africa, 
p 271 
60. De Kiewiet, C A Historv of South Africa, p 229. Davies, R 
Capital, State and White Labour, p 162 
61. Department of Labcur, Annual Report, for 1932,UG 37-1933, p 44 
62. Johnstone, F A Class, Race and Gold, pp 157-167 provides a 
useful summary of the background to the Act and the subsequent 
parliamentary debates. 
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around the issue of naked discrimination. The SAP, responsible 
for the original Regulations upset in 1923, was opposed to having 
the preservation of jobs for whites, coloureds, malays, Mauritian 
Creoles or st Helenes placed in a statute. In practice the Act did 
not acutally extend the job colour bar. It stabilised the status quo 
as far as some classes of white workers were concerned, but it did not 
represent a rebuff as such either to mining in particular or capital in 
general. The Colour Bar Act followed in the wake of attempts by 
white mine workers to restore their pre-1922 wage levels and to 
secure a Mineworkers' (Minimum Rates of Pay) Act which directly 
affected the cost structure of the mining labour hierarchy. Their 
defeat in this attempt was of more significance to the mining industry 
than the concession of the job colour bar. This particular struggle 
within the mining industry is examined in detail in chapter three 
63 below. 
White labour's job security was also vested in the Industrial 
Conciliation Act . This piece of legislation dated from the end of 
Smuts's period in office and was promulgated with an eye to preventing 
strike activity among workers. This Act laid out an elaborate scheme 
for the registration of trade unions and procedures for conciliation 
which severely curtailed the right to strike. Not all workers were 
included. The definition 
Africans, ie. J Africans in 
of employee in the Act excluded pass-bearing 
O"S 
Transvaal,j and Natal until such time as 
passes were introduced in the other provinces and were also extended 
63 . cf ppn"~below 
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to women, as well as indentured Indians. The right to organise in 
trade unions was General unions could not 
register under the Act because "trade union II was defined as an assoc-
iation of persons 
for the purpose of regulating relations between 
themselves and their employers or for protecting 
or furthering the interests of employees in any 
particular undertaking, trade ~r occupation in 
relation to their employers . L Emphasis added. IP-1 64 
Thus an organisation like the Industrial and Commercial Workers' 
Union, comprised of farm workers, factory workers, intellectuals and 
bureaucrats, could not be registered. This Union is dealt with 
in more detail below. 
The Conciliation Act provided for the establishment of, amongst 
other bodies, industrial councils made up of equal numbers of 
employees and employers as defined. They had authority to enter 
into agreements under a system of home rule in industry. In this 
way the state and industry hoped to prevent the type of impasse which 
marked mining labour relations. The strike weapon could only be 
used once all other measures had failed, but subsequent amendments to 
the Act operated practically to forbid strike activity. One such 
amendment for example, extended the definition of essential services 
65 in which strikes were illegal, to cover public transport. The 
amendment purposefully followed a lengthy strike by Cape Town bus 
64. Act 11-1924 section 24 
65. Act 7-1933 section 1 
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drivers over the non-enforcement of a wage determination which 
ended in 1932. 66 
The Conciliation Act also empowered industrial councils to 
regulate wages for employees in the trade. Wage regulation in this 
way not only protected the skilled artisan who was largely represented 
in the trade unions (dealt with below) from the challenge of African 
skilled workers who received lower wages for the same work. The 
semi-skilled operative, whether black or white, was also snubbed 
because the higher price of the artisan's labour protected his 
occupation from encroachment by unskilled laboorers. The system did not 
operate smoothly and other methods were soon found not only to protect 
the skilled labourer, who increasingly suffered from deskilling from 
the early 1930s due to the rapid mechanisation of South African industry 
generally which took place, but also the unskilled white worker who, 
at the bottom of the economic efficiency ladder, was not able to enter 
the labour market because of the presence of better qualified black 
labour. The process by which white labour came to replace large 
sections of black, and especially African, labour, known euphemis-
tically as the civilised labour policy, is dealt with below. 
The question arises as to why it was that white workers were 
preferred to African workers in certain fields. Bozzoli has 
suggested that manufacturers saw the mining company concept of the 
66 . The Report of the wage Board, Passenger Transportation, 26 
January 1933, An 24S-1933}traces the progress of the strike 
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working class in general and white workers in particular as "caste-like, 
- 1 - d f - 1- t 67 manl.pu atl.ve an con rontatl.ona l.8 ". This definition was proved 
time and time again through the Chamber's refusal to negotiate with 
white miners, their arrogant treatment of strikers, their unilateral 
demands and their blatant attempts to force _.as much out of the miners 
as possible. The "petty-bourgeois manufacturer" on the other hand 
was closer in class terms to white workers as he himself possibly 
started as a skilled artisan. More important, the market for mining 
capital did not lie in the country. The absolute necessity for 
manufacturing to circulate goods meant that workers were not only 
producers, but were also consumers of products. What was more, 
white workers were "voters and potential allies." It was from this 
standpoint that manufacturers were able to develop a qualified role 
for conciliation within the state. 68 Manufacturing interests sought 
to promote those interests of white workers which would bring them onto 
their side: conciliation machinery end minimum wages to prevent 
undercutting. 
It appears that another crucial reason why white workers were 
focussed on as potential allies by manufacturing and the Pact with- its 
civilised labour policy was the promotion of nationally based capital 
through the operation of the market. Here Bozzolils work is ins truc-
tive • South Africa in the'twenties was not an 
67. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 123 
68. ibid, pp 124-5 
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exporting country. The African reserves were already showing 
signs of dire impoverishment and the earning power of African 
workers was too low to ensure market expansion to any great degree. 
National capital turned its full attention on the "already privi-
leged, relatively well-paid and 'incorporated' part of the white 
working class" to turn it into the main consumer class. 69 
Higher wages, the better organisation of industry and increased 
mechanisation went hand in hand with a policy that favoured white 
employment. 
The initial years of the Pact government's administration 
compared very favourably with the last years of Smuts's tenure in 
office. The economy moved out of stagnation and expanued. 
The war in Europe from 1914-1918 caused a general paralysis of 
trade which in turn stimulated the insecure and hesitant industries 
established in the Union. 70 The rapid expansion which occurred 
brought with it problems of its own. Industries were established 
in unsuitable buildings, new premises were unobtainable and building 
69. ibid, pp 213. This point is developed further in ch 4, ppUfS below 
70. Department of Mines and Industries, Factories Division, Annual -
Report; for 1920, UG 8-1922, P 105. Department of Labour, Chi~f 
Inspector Factories Annual Report, for 1929, UG 33-1930, P 5 
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71 
materials rose in price and became increasingly scarce. The 
post war years witnessed further expansion as numerous new factories 
appeared allover the country. Factories could hardly keep up 
supp~ies and were working full time. The close of 1920 saw the onset 
of depression and the immediate closure of a number of establishments. 72 
The economic climate improved towards the end of 1921, only to be 
thwarted by the widespread unrest which became concentrated on the Rand 
in the first few months of 1922. 73 A large number of establishments 
did not survive the period 1920-1922 merely because they could not 
compete with imported goods" lacked capital or were just badly 
organised. The industrial unrest of 1922 led industrialists to 
74 
curtail capital outlay. Confidence returned towards the end of 
75 1923 and a few new establishments were built and old ones extended . 
By the time Hertzog's government took office in June 1924, the upswing 
which had started at the end of the previous year was fully in evidence. 
More factories were built, many of them of a better quality than 
before. The Department of Labour refused to re-register factories 
unless suitable renovations were undertaken. Many of the closures 
from 1924 onwards included "dilapidated and unsuitable places which 
were reluctantly tolerated in accordance with the Department's policy 
71. Department of Labour, Chief Inspectorof~ies, Annual Report 
for 1929) UG 33-1930,p 5 
72. Department of Mines and Industries,Factories Division,Annual 
Report for 1920,UG 8-1922,p 113; Department of Labou~ Chief 
Inspector of Factories,Annual Report for 192~UG 33-1930,p 6 
73 . Department Mines and Industries, Factories Division, Annual Re-
port for 1922, UG 9-1924,p 91, Department of Labou~ Chief Inspector 
of Factories,Annual Report for 1929, UG 33-1930,p 6 
74. ibid 
75. Department of Mines and Industries,Factories Division,Annual Report 
for 1923,UG 15-1925)p 424 
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of leniency in administering the L-Factories-f Act during its 
76 first years.!! The period from 1924 to 1929 was one of general 
. d' 77 1mprovement an expans10n. Social problems followed in the 
wake of industrial expansion. As already noted, the rapid urbanisation 
of the white population occurred when industry could not as yet absorb 
them "with the result that slum areas are increasing rapidly, leading 
to squalor, disease and rnisery.1I 78 
The greater part of 1929 was no different from the early period 
as industrial expansion continued apace. The British trade commissioner 
to South Africa commented on the economic situation in September 
1929 in these terms. 
The financial position of the Government is enviable, the 
revenue has been unexpectedly bua/ant, a further large 
surplus was obtained for the year ended March 31st last 
L-1929-1, and the revenue has corne in so well since, that 
there seems every probability of a further surplus accruing 
in the current financial year . The unexpected bOQyancy of 
of revenue together with the inflow of funds from the gold 
and diamond industries, which are paid to capital account, 
have ~ the government to provide for the financing of 
large development works without the necessity of raising 
large loans and increasing indebtedness. There has, 
however, been some comment on the rapidly rising scale of 
Government expenditure and on the policy of committing 
76. Department of Labour, Factories Division,Annual Report for 1924, 
UG 21-1926,p 500 
77. Department of Labour, Factories Division, Annual Report for 1925, 
UG 6-1927, pp 422-4; Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories 
Annual Report for 1926,UG 31-1927, p 5; Department of Labour) Chief 
Inspector of Factories,Annual Report for 1927, UG 38-1938, p 5; 
Department of Labour,Chief Inspector of Factories,Annual Report 
for 1928, UG 47-1929, p 5 
. 78. Department of Labour,Chief Inspector of Factories,Annual Report 
for 1926, UG 31-1927, p 7 
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the country to large re~ 
be easily borne in a period of 
may create serous difficulties 
of depression. 79 
expenditure which may 
prosperity but which 
in a subsequent period 
A similar sense of unease to that expressed above seeped into the 
manufacturing sector towards the ,e~~ of 1929. The prices of the main 
exports fell which "curtailed the purchasing power of a large section 
of the population, with the result that merchants have found themselves 
with stocks on their hands and the uncertainty as to how long a period 
will lapse before their value can be realised. ,,80 The effects of 
the economic crisis of the late twenties, highlighted by the collapse 
of the Wall street stock-exchange in October 1929, began to be felt 
in South Africa from the end of 1929. 
Many factories and businesses inaugurated short-time systems, 
retrenched many of their workers. or closed down completely. There was 
a marked decline in the construction of new factories, and alter a-
Manufacturers reduced tions to existing premises came to a halt. 
their costs to the absolute minimum. 81 The depression intensified 
during 1931. 82 ,The country's financial problems were intensified 
79. United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa, September 1929, p 5 
80. Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories,Annual Report 
for 1929, UG 33-1930,p 7 
81. Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories,Annual Report 
for 1930, UG 24-1931, P 5 
82. Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories/Annual Report 
for 1931,UG 25-1932,pp 5-6 
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after Australia and Britain left the gold standard during 1931 
and devalued their currencies. The South African ~ was hopelessly 
overvalued and South African exports overpriced, but the government 
83 
refUSErl to leave the gold standard. At first both the SAP and 
mining interests supported the decision to remain on gold. 
That support dissolved and was replaca:iby "vigorous opposition as 
heavy state subsidies to agriculture offset the expected cheaper 
imports and low internal price structure induced by remaining on 
"84 gold. 
Prospects seemed brighter at the beginning of 1932 but came to 
naught, partly as a result of the flight of capital from the country 
as a result of the retention of the gold standard . The situation in 
many factories became worse, and "many struggling concerns, which had 
successfully withstood the strain of recent years, were forced into 
liquidation." Operations were restricted further and thousands 
more workers were forced onto the streets . Agriculture itself was 
in a perilous position as it still could not compete on international 
markets. The failure of government policy to curb the fall in prices 
that continued to spiral led to a reorganisation of political groupings. 
Both the Nationalists and the SAP lost support from rural areas, whilst 
Creswell's faction of the SALP lost even more ground. A series of 
83. Davenport, T R H South Africa : A Modern History pp 212-213 
84. O'Meara, D Volkskapitalisme, p 41 
by-elections J one at Colesberg where ~e tJCl!.tio...~lj<;, Is ""'iI ', narrowly and 
another at Germiston which Creswell's party lost to the SAP in a 
stunning defeat, precipitated the return of Tielman Roos, a 
maverick politician who re-entered politics after a period of 
back-door politicking against Hertzog. Roos made a strong appeal 
for the abandonment of the gold standard. Within three days "£3 m 
flowed out of South AFrica" and South African commercial banks were 
faced with ruin. On 28 December 1932, 6 days after Roos launched his 
85 
anti-gold campaign, the government left the Gold Standard. The 
economic crisis was soon over as the South African pound dropped 
in value and was brought into line with sterling. 
South African industrial undertakings recovered slowly. Expan-
sion was most notable in the southern Transvaal where the gold mining 
industry's brighter prospects "encouraged increased expenditure which 
in due course resulted in a greater demand for the products of the 
secondary industries .. 11 Drought had wracked most of the country since 
1930 and had contributed greatly to the economic distress in rural 
areas which in turn precipitated a greater influx of whites and blacks 
to towns. The economic recovery of the country gradually spread further 
south. By the end of 1933 most of the ravages of the depression had 
86 been overcome a The economic recovery in the next couple of years 
was most marked in .the southern Transvaal where the increased 
demands of the mining industry stimulated general expansion. 87 The 
expansion of the mid-thirties only began to slow down in 1937 and 
85. ibid, pp 41-42 
86. Department of Labour Annual Report for 1933, UG 43-1934, P 24 
87. Department of Labour Annual Reports:for 1934, UG 11-1934, P 30; 
for 1935, UG 4-1937, P 48; for 1936, UG 44-1937, p 39 
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conditions became more settled. 88 
The period from the early part of the century was marked by 
rapid industrial expansion. South Africa by 1936/7 was fairly 
well-developed industrially. The shift that took place saw 
agriculture decline in importance, mining remain fairly constant 
and manufacturing boom. Thus, the agricultural percentage of the 
total national income declined from 21.6% in 1917/18 to 13 . 3% in 
1936/7 and mining dropped slightly from 20.3% in 1917/18 to 19.7%.89 
The value of manufactured goods exceeded mining and agriculture 
after the Pact Government got into power, down to 1939/40. 90 
Industries generally became conCentrated in the larger population 
centres, with the southern Transvaal attracting most of them at a 
91 
remarkable rate compared to the rest of the country down to 1938/9. 
88. Department of Labour Annual Report for 1937, UG 30-1938, pp 70-71 
89. Board of Trade and Industries,Report No 282, Figures derived 
from Table iv, p 11 
90. ibid, P 12 
91. The percentage of Union total distribution of industries in the 
different regions was as follows: 
1916/17 1928/29 1938/39 
Cape Western Area 20.9 19.6 16.5 
Port Elizabeth 3.4 5.0 4.6 
Durban/Pinetown 11. 1 11.5 10.9_ 
Southern Transvaal 28.2 34.1 43.9 
Rest of Union 36.4 30.0 24.7 
ibid, Table xv, p 21 
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Although manufacturing clearly became far more important during the 
period after the First World War, conditions within industries 
remained deplorable. 
F A W Lucas, advocate, Labourite, and Chairman of the Wage Board 
for ten years from 1926 stated in 1927 that two types of business 
establishment existed in the Union. One type was "well-managed, up-to-
date and in every way satisfactory", but there were others that were 
"filthy, badly managed, and badly housed" and served "no useful 
th . 92 purpose to e communl. ty. " A clear indication of conditions in 
factories and trades can be gle~ed from the annual reports of the 
chief Inspectors of Factories through the years. 
The reports concerned themselves with a number of issues. 
These included employment, cleanliness, sanitation, ventilation, 
lighting, safety, welfare, etc. The Factories Act of 1918 controlled 
the worst excesses of factory organisation ..ru.chaffected productivity 
like bad light, use of dangerous construction and machinery, bad 
ventilation, long hours and other related problems. Throughout our 
~od, conditions generally improved but in a somewhat haphazard way. 
> 
This section deals very briefly with each of the issues identified by 
the factories ' inspectors . 
Large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled white men were without 
employment during the 1920s. The ranks of the unemployed were normally 
swollen during times of depression. A large number of women were 
92. Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 27 
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employed in industries like the boots and shoes trade, chemicals, 
candles and soap, sweets, tobacco, clothing, printing and sugar 
production. Unemployment of both black and white workers was a 
notable feature of the period until - the general expansion after 
the depression began to reduce the number. Although many women 
were discharged during the Great Depression, many were continued in 
employment on short_time. 93 One feature of the depression years 
was the tendency for women to become the chief family breadwinners 
since "severe unemployment amongst men has reversed the old state of 
affairsa" 94 The proportion of female employees increased slightly 
during the depression and the Department of Labour noted "a growing 
tendency for women to remain in or return to factory work after 
marriage .. 95 Employment rose after the depression with marked . 
increases in female employment in such trades as clothing and textiles, 
fruit canning and packing, sweet and biscuit manufacturing, and 
I dr , 96 aun ~es. 
Factory inspectors constantly complained about the indifference 
with which employers and employees alike approached the question of 
cleanliness in factories. Flies in food factories, dust in engineering 
93. ego Department of Mines and Industries, Factories Division, 
Annual Reports for 1920, UG 8-1922, pp 109-113; for 1921, 
UG 14-1923, pp 117,130 
94. Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories, Annual Reports; 
for 1931, UG 25-1932, P 8; Department of Labour, Annual Report-
for 1932, UG 37-1933, P 25 
95. Department of Labour, Annual Report for 1932, UG 37-1933,p 25 
96. Department of Labou~Annual Reports:for 1934, UG 11-1936, P 37; 
for 1936, UG 44-1937, P 46 
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shops, the general absence of proper ventilation facilities and 
poor lighting caused partly .1:hrou;Jh the poor architectural design 
of many establishments, were common-place phenomena. The slow 
extension of water-borne sewerage through the country, especially 
marked in the burgeoning industrial sites of cities like Port 
Elizabeth, presented numerous problems. The rural areas were 
practically devoid of any sewerage removal schemes and sweat-shops 
were conunon .. Safety precautions were almost non-existent, and 
inspectors reported first-aid boxes comprised of old medicines, dirty 
bandages or rags. First-aid classes were the exception and not the 
rule until after the depression . A large proportion of the number of 
industrial accidents was caused by carelessness or ignorance. A 
great many serious accidents occurred because of inadequate lighting, 
faulty machinery, the overcrowding of workplaces with overhead revolving 
shafts and machinery, dirty floors and disregard for safety measures 
where these existed. Very few factories provided facilities for eating, 
drinking water, ablutions or for leaving clothing, .d~ing the early 1920s. 
Slow advances were made in all areas, but the onset of the depression 
put back welfare work and the rennovation of premises to provide rest-
rooms by a number of years . 
By the end of the period under review, the Factory Inspectors were 
reporting vast improvements in conditions. Wood and iron factory 
buildings were no longer common, industrial sites had developed on 
the outskirts of most towns although the centres of established cities 
like Johannesburg were more congested. The adverse affect of conges-
tion on lighting and ventilation was set aside with better light fittings 
and modern equipment. Mechanisation proceeded apace and avenues of 
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employment had opened up.· Whereas conditions had been "better 
imagined than described", there was general improvement in all 
areas by 1937.97 
When the Wage Board first investigated the baking and 
confectionery trade in 1926 it described conditions as "very bad." 
It remarked on the predominance of dirty clothing, dirty - in some 
cases filthy - floors and unclean tables." Africans were employed 
mainly on the production side of baking and whites on the distribu-
tive side. The Board ascribed the division in terms of public 
opinion. It claimed that many housewives "refused to take bread from 
·natives. ,,98 Besides that reason, employers benefitted from the 
arrangement . Bread was produced at night behind closed doors by 
lew paid Africans, whilst the loaves were delivered curing 
day-light by fewer numbers of whites than Africans employed on production. 
More and more whites were employed in the trade as the years passed 
97. The above section has been drawn ~sively from the following 
sources: Department of Mines and Industries) Factories Division} 
Annual Reports for 1920-1923, UG 8-1922; UG 14-1923, UG 9-1924 
and UG 15-1925, passim; Department of Labour, Factories Division, 
Annual Reports, 1924-192~ UG 21-1926 and UG 6-1927, passim; 
Department of Labour, Chief Inspector of Factories,Annual Reports, 
1926-1931, UG 31-1927; UG 38-1928; UG 47-19?9; UG 33-1930; UG 24-
1931 and UG 25-1932, passim; and Department of Labour, Annual 
Reports, 1932-1937, UG 37-1933, pp .. 14-27; UG 43-1934, pp 24-32; 
UG 11-1936, pp 30-38; UG 4-1937, pp 48-55; UG 44-1937, pp 39-
47; and UG 30-1938 , pp 70-80 
98. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition),September 1928,p68 
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whereas the number of Africans remained fairly constant. 99 African 
employees in the baking trade generally were provided with meagre board 
and lodging. Max Gordon, a prominent trade unionist involved with 
the organisation of African workers in the late thirties, correctly 
remarked that the "living-in" system enabled employers to keep their 
workers at their beck and call. African workers normally received 
a loaf of stale bread daily at some establishments whilst other firms 
sometimes provided meat and sugar. 100 
Conditions in the tailoring trade varied greatly, with larger 
establishments generally better organised than smaller ones. 
Outworkers formed a fairly large proportion of the work-force but 
thei)C numbers decreased as the industry carne under wage regulation and 
the more streamlined observation of the Department of Labour. 
Similarly, a large number of piece-workers were employed but they too 
soon fell foul of wage determinations. The tailoring trade 
pr<rlll:ed outer garnents made to individual measurements and was 
conducted in two ways. The wholesale besj::cke trade prcxJuced garments 
.according to set patterns and meamrements provided 
by the shop owners. The retail trade was more varied. Merchant 
tailors and master journeyrn en who were practical tailors, 
middlemen or contractors were the most common. Sometimes they 
ld b h I d b Ot t 101 wou e e pe y aSS1S an s. 
99 . An 67-1933ii 
100. An 56-1938ii 
101 . Social and Industrial Rariew (Epecial Edition), 22 June 1928, 
pp 370-371 
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The Wage Board conducted two investigations into the building 
trade in Port Elizabeth during 1934. It found that conditions in 
the trade were bad, largely because . employers either entered the 
trade as speculators or because they had no experience of building. 
The Board remarked that many contractors were "formerly Ministers 
of religion, school teachers and bookmakers' clerks." Some of the 
problems faced by the trade were directly linked to the depression, 
but matters improved with the building boom of the 1930s. 102 
The clothing trade made great headway during the period. 
Competition from overseas manufacturers was severe but the trade 
held its own, assisted as it was by the customs tariff. The Rand 
trade was better off than the coastal areas because of the larger 
market. One f ea ture of clio ;"I,,~ was the high turnover of labour at 
the beginning of the period under review, but this was soon reduced 
as more settled conditions were introduced as a result of wage 
determinations. Another feature ofl the trade was the large 
number of women employed in the trade. The expansion of the ;"".{\I,dr.)l 
even during the depression years provided avenues of employment for 
h · 1 d ' 1 103 many W 1te and co cure g1r s. 
The dyeing, cleaning and laundry trade relied largely on black 
workers. Van Onselen traced the early history of the trade on the 
102. An 108-1931/2 
103. cf P fi\ above 
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Witwatersrand to show how one group of workers, the Zulu AmaWasha, 
originally controlled the laundry trade because of the lack ofa white 
female working class on the Rand, but~di~ by the time of 
Union by steam laund rfeS .. Control was wrested from the African into 
104 the hands of white entrepreneurs. Evidence exists to indicate that 
a prolific informal trade existed during the 'twenties. Small 
Chinese and Indian laundries operated seven days a week because 
they did not fall under the Factories Act as they employed less 
than three people. Coloured washer-women, Durban dhobies or Indian 
washermen all operated in competition with established laundries. 
Pretoria and Cape Town had municipal workhouses where I ndians and 
Coloureds washed and dyed clothes. The workhouses were established 
in an attempt to stop the practise of washing clothes in open 
streams, waterholes or the effluent from laundries themselves. 
Some of the smaller laundries were "deplorably unhygienic." Clean 
and dirty articles were stored together in rooms where children 
played amongst them. Occasionally , food, wood and vegetables were 
kept there as well. Similarly the Board complained that in some 
instances the "persons and clothing of some of the operators appeared 
to need washing more than the articles that were being dealt with . ,,105 
Laundries usually comprised six departments . Dirty linen was 
unpacked by women in sorting rooms. Men were employed to do the 
washing because of the small number of machines used in the trade 
104. 
105. 
Van Onselen, C "AmaWasha: the Zulu Workmen's Guild of the 
Witwatersrand, 1890-1914" in Van Onselen, C Studies in the 
Social and Economic History of theWitwa~ , vol 2 pp 74-110 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition), 1 June 1928, 
pp 258-261 
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before the 1930s. Sheets, table-linen and other large cloths were 
pressed in the calendar department by both men and women. Collars 
were steamed, moulded and curled in the collar department and ironing 
was done by women who stood for long hours. Women packed the clean 
clothes in the packing department. Old fashioned machinery was 
th d h ' h f ' t f I d' 106 e norm an 19 temperatures a common ea ure 0 aun r1es. 
The furniture making industry was one of the oldest established 
trades in the Union. Many of the employees in the trade during the 
'twenties were described as semi-skilled and inefficient. The place 
of the original handicraftsmen had been steadily threatened due to 
the introduction of machinery for such tasks as tenoning, morticing, 
planing and other processes. Wicker-work and the production of 
basketware was still done entirely by hand. Wire weaving, described 
by some as semi-skilled work but regarded as skilled by the Wage 
d f ed 'I b f' 107 Boar was per orm ma1n y y A r1cans. Mechanisation advanced 
rapidly in the furniture trade and contributed to the tendency of 
employers to keep wages as low as possible. A great deal of competi-
tion existed between the Cape and the Transvaal. The former accused 
the latter of unfair competition because Johannesburg manufacturers 
employed larger proportions of lower paid African labour than the 
Cape could. The depression severely affected the industry as 
factories went onto short-time and the Rhodesian market was cut off 
106. , 
107. 
"Special Survey: Laundry Trade" in Department of Labour, Chief 
Inspector of Factories, Annual Report, for 1927, UG38-1928,pp17-21 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition), December 1926, 
pp 25-26 
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because of the difference in value between sterling and the South 
African pound. Many retrenched employees started up backyard 
businesses and the number of small, dirty workshops where 
employees produced furniture at minimal wages - d~tively known 
t h I , f d 108 as lira -5 ops" - pro 1 erate . But the furniture trade, like 
most other trades, improved with the onset of greater economic 
expansion after 1933 . 
The glass-bevelling and silvering trade was conducted at Durban, 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. More than 50% of the 115 
employees in the trade were Africans. Glass-bevelling was a multi-
faceted occupation which required different amounts of skill. 109 
South African prodUcts were very poor. The bevelling was "frequently 
irregular", am the silvering often became patchy and cloudy. The Board 
attributed the poor productivity of the trade to the low degree of 
108. 
109. 
An 113-1931; An 247-1933 
Glass-bevelling involved "grinding the edge of the glass -
plate-glass - against wheels which revolve horizontally and on 
which a supply of sand and water is constantly being dropped. 
There is a considerable amount of splashing of the sand and 
water, but this does not spoil the clothes or injure the hands 
or bodies of the worker. Four wheels are used in the process, 
a rougher, a stone, a polisher and a ranger. The first stage 
requires the least skill; in some establishments the second and 
in others the third and fourth are regarded as involving the 
exercise of the greatest amount of skill." Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition)lDecernber 1926, p 2 
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skill employed in the Union. The Board ear-marked the trade for 
white and coloured employment and blamed the very poor wages workers 
110 
received for the lack of incentive that plagued the trade . 
the introduction of a determination to regulate conditions the 
industry did not thrive and could not compete against overseas 
111 products. 
After 
The Board issued ·one of its more informative reports on the textile 
industry . The first blanket factory in South Africa was formed prior 
to 1900 at Kingwilliamstown with the object of supplying woollen 
. 
blankets to the African reserves in the area. The South African War 
led to that factory's virtual collapse, but factories were opened 
at Wolseley (1912) and Harrismith(1922). Tariff protection of the 
industry was extended in 1925 and the production of cotton blankets 
and heavy sheeting for the African market immediately followed. 
Mechanical looms were introduced and an array of cotton blankets , 
cotton and woollen blankets, rugs and shawls were produced . . About 
80% of the cotton products manufactured were sold to Africans. The 
increasing urbanisation of Africans during the 1930s was marked by a 
greater de pendence on western styles of dress. The trade encountered 
difficulties with its trade in blankets. Different tribes , customs 
and taste dictated that certain groups preferred specific colours, 
patterns or styles. An inadequate knowledge of the needs of the 
African market often led to overproduction . The Wage Board even 
suggested the employment of an anthropologist"to conduct a study of 
11 O. ibid, pp 2-3 
111 . An 708-1931; An 253-1931/2 
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the influence of custom and habit on the demand for native blankets ..• " 
The trade expanded rapidly after 1931 but slowed down after 1935. A 
clear demarcation between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
prevailed. For all that, the Board reported that dust levels, 
drinking water, cloak and rest room facilities were inadequate . 
Many employers were of the opinion that employees of any race-group 
could fulfill the duties expected of them in the textile trade. 112 
Perhaps the worst conditions reported by the Board were found in 
the tobacco-twisting workshops in the Oustshoorn district . The shops 
produced small quantities of cigars and some cut tobacco, but the 
main product was low-grade roll tobacco, or what was and is known as 
"chew tobacco. II The task of preparing, packing and rolling the 
tobacco leaves was dirty, unhygienic and extremely tiring. 113 
Coloured men, women and children lIof the farm labourer typel! were 
112. An 46-1937 
113. "The dry tobacco leaves are steeped in water, to which has been 
added a quantity of ash obtained by burning a certain bush 
known as as bes, which grows in the Oudtshoorn and surrounding 
districts. This mixture of ash and water is termed loog (lye), 
and the persons who steep the leaves therein are known as looers. 
The process is a wet and dirty one. Some of the looers had 
sores on their hands, which they declared to be due to the 
action of the loog. They are, however, supplied with vaseline, 
to be rubbed on their hands in order to neutralize the action 
of the loog. 
"After being taken from the loog the wet leaves are packed in 
large bins where they are allowed to remain for some time. 
This process is known as sweating. The leaves are then ready for 
twisting into roll tobacco. Seeing that they are in a crumpled 
state, the leaves require to be opened out by leaf sorters and 
op.eners, the better quality leaves being used for twisting around 
an inner filling of poorer quality leaf . The leaves are twisted 
on wooden spindles into long ropes of varying thickness, known as 
thick, medium and thin. These ropes are made up with rolls of 
different weights by rollmakers. Vaseline is used in twisting for 
the purpose of protecting the hands, but also for giving the 
tobacco a gloss, and has doubtless the further effect of keeping 
the tobacco moist for a longer period. " Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition), December 1926,pp 10-11 
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engaged in the trade. Children worked mainly as leaf openers; 
men sweated and rolled the leaves; and all three categories twisted 
it. Employment was seasonal because the shelf life of chew tobacco 
was very short. It soon dried out, became brittle and was "unfit to 
chew" . As a result, no stocks were carried. Rollmakers and twisters 
were employed as pieceworkers and earned a maximum of 2s and 10s per 
100 lb roll respectively. The workers received lower wages during 
the winter because they started late and had to interrupt their work 
to warm themselves periodically at outside fires. They received a 
pittance, were IImiserably clad and underfed II and it was conunon "to 
find a whole family, parents and children, having to work to eke out 
a very poor living. II Most of the employees had to sit flat on the 
floor with legs outstretched. The posture led to sore backs, legs, 
chest pains and acute constipation. Worst of all, the workers 
inhaled strong, noxious nicotine fumes which caused "temporary nausea, 
smarting of the eyes, nostrils and throat , with L-a_7 feeling of 
suffocation ... " Most workers suffered from a loss of appetite and 
sleep and one twister told the Board that ". As soon as we get out of 
the factory and start moving about we start spitting, and this goes 
on practically right through the night •.. It is then impossible to 
sleep, and have no appetite either'." The housing conditions of 
114 tobacco workers were also deplorable. 
The sweet trade was organised along lines similar to the clothing 
factories. Some factories boasted excellent conditions whilst 
114. ibid, pp 10-13 
-100-
others were deplorable. A large number of women were employed as 
packers and wrappers. Seats were provided in some establishments, 
whilst excluded in others. Some employers recognised the value of 
short tea-breaks whilst others did not. 115 
The Union's industries varied considerably . In many the 
conditions were appalling, whilst in others they were somewhat better. 
Variations also occurred within different trades. The Wage Board 
expressed concern that poor conditions affected efficiency and the 
general productivity of labour. The areas in which the Board functioned 
displayed some of the worst excesses of capitalist production. By the 
end of the period under review the conditions in most industries appear 
to have improved, partly as a result of reformed thinking by employers 
but partly as a result of the voices of labour which were raised in the 
work place. 
The labour movement in South Africa has had a chequered career . 
The first white unions in industrial undertakings arose towards the 
end of the last century. Initially the trade unions formed in the 
country were branches of British Unions, but before the end of the 
century locally formed unions developed. They were organised along 
craft lines, ie., according to particular occupations like tailors or 
115. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition), September, 1926 
pp 4-19; Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition), 
13 July 1928, pp 25-29; An 113-1931 
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carpenters or joiners. The early history of trade unionism 
h b d d b · d' 116 as een ocumente y S1mons an S1mons. By the time of the 1922 
strike, the white labcur force was essentially divided between three 
political groups. Afrikaner workers, who first entered the mines 
in 1907 as scabs, 117 were linked at first to Het Yolk and later to the NP, 
though a number found refuge within the predominantly English speaking 
artisan dominated SALP which was formed in 1910 from a host of labour 
orientated groups whose origins stretched back into the 1880s. The 
SALP rapidly became the 'official' voice of white labour: racist, 
intolerant and largely reformist. The party's decision to join the 
war effort in 1914 caused a rupture with the left. A number of left 
d() , .... '"$+,·~ 
wing socialist groups eventually settled their~differences and, in 
the wake of the 1917 Revolution in Russia and the post-war crisis in 
South Africa officially formed the Communist Part of South Africa in 
July 1921. 118 
The Transvaal and the Cape both produced labour federations of 
their own. The Witwatersrand Trades and Labour Council was formed in 
116. Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, passim 
117. cf Yudelman, D "Lord Rothschild, Afrikaner Scabs and the 1907 
Strike" 
118. On the SALP cf Tick tin, D "Origins of the South African Labour 
Party 1888-1910", passim; Simons and Simons Class and Colour in 
South Africa, pp 149-186. On the formation of the CPSA see 
especially, Johns, S "The Birth of the Communist Party of South 
Africa. " 
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1903, and its foundation members were "the societies of boiler 
makers, bricklayers, carpenters, engine drivers, engineers, iron 
119 
moulders, musicians, printers, shop assistants and stonemasons." 
By 1911 trade unionism amongst all sections of white workers was 
firmly established. The Transvaal Federation of Trades took over 
from the Trades and Labour Council in that year, and it was this or-
120 ganisation that officiated in the strike-torn year of 1913. . The 
South African Industrial Federation rose from the ashes of the abortive 
general strike of 1914, but its attempts to woo the Cape Federation of 
Labour Unions, formed in 1913, to join it,failed. Personal differences 
between Bob Stuart, the CFLU's secretary, "a stubborn Scot" and 
Archie Crawford, a "right-wing bureaucrat" who had once been an ardent 
radical, and leader of the SAIF, as well as the cape's rejection of 
the 'white labour policy' of the northern union, proved insurmountable~21 
The SAIF was finally discredited with the failure of the 1922 strike. 
A period of disunity, defections and disillusion permeated white 
trade union ranks in the Transvaal in the years that followed. The 
Ccmmunists had participated in the Rand strike and struggled to rid 
themselves of the infamy of marching under the white South Africa 
banner. From within the. ranks of the CPSA, Eddie Roux and W Kalk, 
"probably the first whi te communists born in the country", urged the 
Young Ccmmunist League to embark on a non-segregationist policy 
119. Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South l£rica, p 98 
120. cf Katz, E A Trade Union Aristocracy, passim. Simons and 
Simons, Class and Colour in South_~fric~ pp 157-68 
121. Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South ~frica, p 187 
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towards Africans, and to recruit them into the party. The 
democratic wing of the CPSA was bitterly attacked by older 
. t b h 11 h d 122 commun~s s, ut t ey eventua y won t e ay. 
The South African Association of Employees' Associations 
succeeded the SAlF in 1925, but changed its name to the South African 
Trade Union Congress the next year. Animosity still raged between the 
Cape and the Transvaal and even .the rapprochement of 1930 which 
produca:l. the SATLC barely lasted a year. The colour question 
dealt with the position of Coloured workers. · Many of the Cape 
Unions had Coloured members whomthey could not afford to ignore. 
The Transvaal imposed a strict colour bar. 123 They basically agreed 
on the rights of African workers. African workers were encouraged 
to organise, but in their own unions. Attempts by the lCU to 
affiliate to SATUC were rejected in early 1928. Stuart) and Andrews.> 
the Communist Secretary of the SATUC and leading radicaljissued a 
joint memorandum which finally put the seal on Kadalie's attempt 
to join with white workers. Simons and Simons commented that) 
having IIconceded Kadalie's case in principle, the authors rejected 
it on ground of expediency .. !! The tragedy for the workers' movement 
was that "the two most powerful leaders in the {-white trade unionJ 
movement rejected inter-racial solidarity at a crucial stage, when 
Africans were demonstrating their capacity for large-scale industrial 
122. ibid, pp 324-5 
123. cf CFLU FEC Minutes, 24 January 1919, 5 March 1919, CFLU papers 
Aa 1.1; CFLU FEC Minutes, 19 September 1929, 20 March 1930, 
CFLU papers Aa 1.4; CPLU FEC Special Emergency Minutes, 30 
July 1931,29 October 1931, CFLU papers Aa 1.5. SATUC NEC 
Report to 3rd Annual Congress, 15-17 April 1927.SATUC papers, 
Ca 1.3; SATUC 5th Annual Conference,30-31 March 1929, Minutes 
p 8, SATUC papers, Ca 1.4 
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. . 124 
organl.Sat10n .. " 
The ICU in the interim had gone from strength to strength 
from its formati on in the early twenties . It was a general 
union made up mainly of Coloureds and Africans drawn from all walks 
of life . It applied for wage determinations, assisted farm 
labourers who had trouble with their employers and organised strikes. 
Its membership grew rapidly and reached about 85 000 in 1928. 
Kadalie, a flamboyant leader, expelled communists from leadership 
positions on the advice of white liberals, and his attempt to 
affiliate to SATUC represented his desire for constitutional 
activity . The ICU reached its zenith in 1928 but rapidly declined 
124. Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, pp 
368-370. The CFL¥ first agreed to investigate the activities, 
attitudes and objects of the ICU in June 1927, CFLU FEC Minutes 
16 July 1927, CFLU papers,Aa 1.3. SATUC received an appli-
cation from the ICU for affiliation in November 1927 . The 
meeting of the NEC (29 November 1927) agreed to consult the 
CFLU in an attempt to gain support if the application was 
rejected. A special meeting was held on 8 December 1927, 
SATUC NEC Minutes, 8 December 1927. SATUC papers, Ca 1.3 
The Memorandum on affiliation was presented to a joint 
meeting of the CFLU and SATUC Executives on 15 January 
1928. All but two of the 60 delegates endorsed the rejec-
tion. SATUC papers, Cb2 and Ca 1.3 
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thereafter. Financial troubles, personal bickering between 
Kadalie and his Natal ,.lleAj"es ., A W G Champion, linked to struc-
tural problems within the organisation, a lack of direction and a 
failure to achieve much after the Bloemfontein wage award,led to 
the breakup of the Union, with leaders forming their own branches . 125 
The communist Party for its part began to focus more and more 
on the organisation of African workers. Night schools were started 
to spread education but these were soon forced to close. After 
1926, a number of African trade unions appeared, largely as a result 
of CPSA initiatives. A Federation of Non-European Trade Unions was 
formed in March 1928 by unions representing laundry workers, engineering 
trade workers, clothing, baking, motor-driving and garage workers. 
The number of unions increased in 1928 and 1929. 126 
The 'swing to the masses' after 1928 by the CPSA was high-
lighted by the acceptance of the Black Republic. slogan. Bunting, 
veteran trade unionist and Chairman of the Party from 1924, initially 
rejected the COmintern instruction. He thought that "socialism lay 
through working-class unity under white leadership" whilst the 
apostles of the Black Republic argued that socialism could only 
125. cf Wickins, P .The Industrial and COmmercial Workers' Union 
passim; Bradford, H "'A Taste of Freedom': Capitalist 
Development and Response to the ICU in the Transvaal COuntry-
side" in Bozzoli, B (ed) ~own and Countryside in the Transvaa~. 
pp 128-150,provides a suggestive regional survey. The ICU's 
role in wage negotiation is dealt within ch 6, po"".", below 
J 
126. Lewis I J .. I The New Unionism I: Industrialisation and Industrial 
Unions in South Africa 1925-1930" in Webster, E .~ssays in 
Southern African Labou_r_H_i_'!.t~'::Y-, pp121-141, deals with the new 
unions in a concise manner 
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follow the national liberation of Africans . The slogan won the 
day and Bunting agreed to implement it . Its importance lay in the 
fact that "it jolted the party into awareness of its new role, and 
inspired in Africans a determination to reject the unquestioned 
assumption of perpetual white domination. ,,127 The CPSA began to 
crumble. The process was hastened from 1930 when the first 
expulsions of alleged right-wing deviationists from the party occurred. 
The Federation of Non-European Trade Unions built up a founda-
tion during the early part of the depression. Although essentially 
a trade union it also expressed political opinions. In 1928 it 
adopted a resolution to affiliate to the League against Imperialism, 
. 128 
which was a socialist organisation based in Europe. By August 
1930 the Federation was in trouble, it could not hold out and plans 
to get African miners to join failed. An attempt was made to 
affiliate with the SATLC in October. 129 Expulsiomand defections 
paralysed the Party and the Federation collapsed. Its place was 
taken by the African Federation of Trade Unions in January 1931. By 
1932 the AFTU I:oasted about 4 000 African, Coloured and white workers 
in light industry. It too faced problems of retaining its member-
ship during the depression and its leadership had great difficulty 
in radicalising the membership. The de . ,r;~ e of the CP in the early 
127. Simons and Simons .Class ~~ .. S ()l'pur in South Africa, ch 17 ; 
Legassick, M Class and Nationalism in South Africa, passim, 
both analyse the development of the new policy . Haywood, H 
Black Bolshevik, pp 218-240 traces the Comintern's line on 
self-determination, and at pp 256-278 analyses the 6th World 
Congress in July 1928 where the issue was thrashed out and 
places it in its international context . Bunting, S P Imperialism ~~~ 
. ~ool::l.. M,i<p;" ch viii, presents Bunting's analysis of the slogan 
128. Umseben~i, 24 October 1928 
129. ibid, 29 August, and 10 October 1930 
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1930s coincided with the demise of African trade unionism. 130 
Many of the problems faced by radical trade unionism during 
the thirties were precipitated by state action. In 1929 the 
nationalists were swept back into power. The SALP had eventually 
spli t in 1 928 . Problems with the reformist policies of Creswell 
and the Party leadership existed. Apart from an initial boost in 
, 
1925 the Party had been unable to exert any real influence in the 
Cabinet. Creswell successfully prevented the rank-and-file from 
establishing greater control over the parliamentary party and split 
the party between COuncillites and Creswellites. The official 
voice of labour became more concerted with its internal bickering 
, h ' f ' b l ' f 131 than w~t even 1tS own re orm1st e ~e s . 
The Government passed an amendment to the Riotous Assemblies 
Act in 1930. Oswald Pirow, the new Minister of Justice and right 
wing sympathiser, urged the introduction of legislation to combat 
the Ired menace'. At the final vote SAP members voted with the 
government and 3 SALP members voted against them. Pirow had 
managed to place an Act on the statute book which gave him arbitrary 
power to "banish, ban or prohibit any person, public meeting or book 
if in his opinion there was reason to suppose that they would cause 
"132 hostility between whites and other people . The Act inaugurated 
131. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, pp 230-2. 
Maud, P "The Labour Party"_~nd _ the Pact Government~' passim 
132. Simons and Simons Class and Colour in South Africa, p 430; 
Act 19-1930 
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a campaign that has been styled the "white terror. ,,133 The wave 
of repression that swept the country during the early thirties was 
not restricted to whites. Anti-semi tism also came ?o <:~e fore . 
During the 1920s the Union had provided a haven for . Jewish 
refugees from Eastern Europe as immigration controls were weaker 
than those in other countries like the USA. More Jews entered 
the ranks of the artisan class, "particularly carpenters, tailors, 
shoemakers and bakers. II The post-war depression and drought 
infringed upon the security of workers and the fear that Bolshevik 
agents might have entered the Union ensured that Jewish immigration 
came to the fore both as a political and economic issue. The 1922 
revolt was seen by many as the manifestation of a Jewish Bolshevik 
revolution. Voices were raised within the SAP to amend immigra-
tion regulations to keep undesirable aliens out. 134 The Pact 
relaxed the immigraticrl )"ws at a time when immigration into the 
countries had been curtailed. The Harding administration in the 
USA had passed the Emergency Quota, or Johnson, Act in 1921 to 
restrict East European llmn9""'tion and Australia had also tightened 
up controls. The overall result was that Jewish immigration to 
the Union, especially of East European Jews, increased remarkably. 
133. 
134. 
Simons and Simon~Class and Colour in South Africa ch 18 
Bradlow, E "Immigraticrl into the Union 1910- 1948" pp 195-214 
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The cry to restrict Jewish immigration to South Africa was taken 
up in many quarters until in 1930 a surprise bill was introduced 
which aimed at regulating the flow of East Europeans, most of whom 
were Jewish, into the country. Comments had been passed during 
the years which referred to the stupidity of permitting unskilled 
foreigners into the country when the poor white problem was bad 
enough. Support for the bill came fran trade unionists who 
objected to undercutting from whichever quarter it came. Working 
class xenophobia recurred from time to time. A significant 
gentile boycott of Jewish businesses in 1932 for alleged dismissals 
of non-Jewish workers provided an example of repugnance of unfair 
employment practice as well as endorsed notions of Jewish unassimala-
tibility which were rampant at the time. 135 The Quota Bill 
aroused a great deal of interest and support136 but did not satisfy 
h tr · t 137 t e ex eml.S s. They were satisfied in 1937. This last 
piece of legislation carried sinister overtones which were to 
directly affect the labour movement. Ballinger pointed to the 
increasing attention which was being paid to the "activities of 
Jewish men and women, becoming established as officials of Native 
and Non-European industrial organisations " and urged Government to 
discount notions of ulterior motives but to look to economic pressure 
and genuine altruism as the cause of that interest. 138 Many trade 
unionists, like Weinbren, Solly Sachs, Willy Kalk, Berman, Dr Benis-
135. 
136. 
137. 
CFLU FEC Minutes 12 May, 26 May, 9 June, 23 June 1932, 
CFLU papers,Aa 1.5 
Bradlow, E "Immigration into the Union 1910-1948" ch XI 
Walker, E History of Southern Afr0a, p 627 
138. Ballinger-Tobias, Registrar of Department of Labour, 9 May 1936, 
Ballinger Papers, University of Witwatersrand, A410.F2 . 2 file1 
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owitz, were of Jewish descent and had played an important role in 
° dOl ° t o 139 ~n ustr1a organlsa lon . Jewish members of Parliament like 
Morris Alexander and Kentridge had their hands full trying to 
ward off the anti-semitic diaribes of various politicians. 140 
They appear not to have had time, even if they had wanted to, to 
turn their attention to their fellow South Africans' plight. 
White South Africa once again tack precedence. 
In March 1933, after a period of fairly tortuous wrangling, 
Smuts and Hertzog settled their differences and formed a coalition 
government. The parties agreed to fusion and both jettisoned the 
more intolerant wings that did not favour fusion. The united 
Party was formed in 1934, and only split again over the war issue 
in 1939. During its first period of office the goverment 
continued its civilised labour policy and managed to. remove Africans 
from the common voters role in 1936 . The rise of African trade 
unionism in the latter half of the period encouraged the government 
to accomodate them in industrial legislation more completely. 
A vociferous minority within the white labour movement hotly argued 
against incorporation into the industrial relations system but the 
reformists won the day. 
The history of South Africa in the early part of the century 
was marked by rapid industrial growth and violence . White and 
black workers were separated and the rift between the two grew 
139. 
140. 
cf Simons and Simons Class and Colour in SouthAfrica~ various) 
for biographical details. 
Bradlow, E "Immigration into the Union, 1910-1948" 
-111-
deeper and deeper. The state for its part strengthened its position 
through legislation, either by encouraging the burgeoning industries 
of the country or by . controlling the reformist trade union .IDove-
ment and repressing the militants. The Wage Act played a 
specific role in contributing to the state of industry and control 
within the country. We turn now to analyse its role in detail. 
CIAPTER 2 Origins of the Civilised Labour Policy and the History 
of Wage Regulation in South Africa 
The civilised labour policy adopted by the Pact government 
after 1924 was drawn from a number of different sources. In inunediate 
terms, it resulted from the amalgamation of the policies of the South 
African Labour Party and the National Party, with the emphasis more 
on the former than on the latter. At first it appeared to be in direct 
contrast to the policy of the South African Party. But as the contra-
diction of interests between classes and sections of classes developed, 
the National Party and the SAP were able to draw closer together and 
to compromise in the creation of the coalition government in 1933 
and to fuse their interests in a conunon party in 1934. All Union 
governments had viewed the employment of poor whites as a problem. 
The parties differed in their responses to the problem. There were 
at least three related but different conceptions of the proper role of 
white labour in the social framework of the Union. The first was the 
white labour policy associated most often with Col F H P Creswell . 
. Second, the South African Party professed a cautious labour policy 
which attempted to provide some avenues for white employment in 
particular ways. That policy perhaps is best described as a white 
preference policy. Third, the civilised labour policy promoted by 
the Pact and Fusion governments was a more ambitious scheme to advance 
white employment. It is important to note that the civilised 
labour policy was not an extension of Creswell's white labour 
1 policy per se. 
1. Johnstone, for example, tends to aquate Creswell's white labour 
policy of providing work for white miners with state encouragement 
of white employment in state enterprises and the civilised labour 
policy of the Pact period. It will become clear below why this 
equation tends to cloud the issue. Johnstone, FA Class,Race and 
Gold pp 70-71, 82-86, 156 
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Creswell's white labour policy was restricted to mining operations. 
He was appointed manager of the Durban Deep Mine in 1893 and it was 
here that he first employed whites. in 1898. to do shovelling and 
clearing work. This was work which until then had been the sole 
preserve of poorly paid African labour. The outbreak of war in 
October 1899 interrupted Creswell's career and hence his experiments . 
He returned to the mines as general manager of the larger Village 
Reef Mine after the capture of Johannesburg in November 1900 . 
He continued his experiments with the initial approval of his superiors. 2 
Creswell ' s experiments publicly received support from Lord Kitchener. 
3 The local Board of the Village Main carne out in support in May 1902. 
Differences of opinion concerning the viability of further white em-
ployment surfaced within the Chamber of Mines itself. 4 The success 
of the project depended, in Creswell's terms,on two things. First, 
the industry would have to become more mechanised to make unskilled 
operatives redundant and to increase productivity to offset the 
higher costs which would eventuate . Second. the white workers 
employed would have to be of a fairly high calibre. The first 
element depended on the greater investment of capital in the industry. 
2. 
3 . 
4. 
Walker. E.A History of Southern Africa pp 509-510; Davenport. T 
South Afr1ca: A Modern History p 357; Davies. R Capital. State 
and Wh1te Labour. p 62; Creswell. M An Epoch of the History of 
South Africa. pp 33-34 -
R H 
Ticktin. D "The Origins of the South African Labour Party" pp 136-37 
Levy. N The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System 
p 324. note 99 
The second depended on the success of his plan to recruit the 
better quality tommy wh6 remained in the country after the 
cessation of hostilities. 5 Both elements were mutually depen-
dent. If one failed, the whole scheme would collapse. 
Levy noted that the Chamber of Mines tolerated Creswell's 
antics partly because of the shortage of African labour and partly to 
"placate Milner ll • He suggested that 
Milner's regime, ... insisted on a period of experimenta-
tion before acce~ i "g to the request for Chinese labour. 
In fact the final decision had to be made in London -
and it was partly on Chamberlain's (rather than Milner'S) 
insistence that the mine-owners were required to make out 
a convincing case, outlining their reasons for rejecting 
the extended use of white unskilled labour on the Rand. 6 
The shortage of African labour was caused partly through the Chamber 
of Mines wage reduction policy and partly because of the dislocation 
7 
caused by the war. The recruitment of African labour had always 
been problematic, and the problem in the post-war era was all the 
more acute. Thus Creswell suggested as one solution the employment 
of whites "'throughout all the gold mines' on the Witwatersrand. ,,8 
5. ibid, pp 180-187; Ticktin, D "The Origins of the South Af,rican 
Labour Party" p 137. Johnstone, F Class, Race and Gold pp 82-4 and 
Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" p 3 both fail to 
recognise the important mechanisation element in Creswell's plan. 
6. Levy, N The Foundationsnf the South African Cheap Labour System 
p 324, note 100 
7. ibid, pp 128-157 for the fullest treatment to date of this phenomenon. 
8. ibid, P 183 
II' 
In July 1902, R W Sdrurecher of the Corner House which controlled 
Creswell's mine stressed that the employment of whites was only a 
d . 9 temporary expe l.ent. P Tarbut, chairman of the London Board of 
Directors of Village ~ain wrote Creswell to express his fears that 
if a large number of white men are employed on the 
Rand in the position of labourers • .. the combination 
of the labouring classes will become so strong as to be 
able to more or less dictate, not only on the question 
of wages, but also on political questions, by the power 
of their votes . 10 
The Majority Report of the Transvaal Government's 1903 Labour Commission 
exposed the flaws in Creswell's white labour policy and their arguments 
11 
carried the day. Creswell in the interim had struggled on until his 
rejection of Fitzpatrick's offer of a transfer back to Durban Deep at 
the same rate of pay ensured his enforced resignation. 12 The Chamber 
turned its attention to the recruitment of ~tured Chinese labour . 
The political furore which erupted over the Chinese labour question 
in South Africa13 from 1904 initially widened Creswell's support base . 
W F Monypenny, editor of the Star,and Wilfred Wybergh, the commissioner 
9 . Ticktin , D "The Origins of the South African Labour Party" p 137 
10 . Quoted by Johnstone, FA Class, Race and Gold, pp 83-4 
11 • Levy, N The Foundations of the South .African Cheap Labour System 
ch 12, provides an in depth analysis of ~oth the majority and the 
minority Commission reports . 
12. Ticktin, D "The Origins of the South African Labour Party" p 137 
13. Levy, N The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System 
ch 13 passim; Johnstone, F Class, Race and Gold pp 32-3, or 
Davenport , T R H South Africa: a Modern History pp 357-9 
14 
mines. were among those who lent Creswell's ideas support. 
Het Yolk. and in particular Smuts. watched Creswell's experiments 
. 15 
closely. Their association was brief but it did indicate that Het 
Yolk considered a white labour policy as a possible solution to the 
poor white problem. In the end. Het Yolk turned away from 
Creswell and fell in line with the mining magnates who in turn had 
drawn closer to the Afrikaner agrarian party after 1906. 16 Het 
Yolk's electoral victory in 1906 did not result in the implementation 
of a white labour policy on the mines. This was to have important 
consequences for the later history of the Union: the mines never 
employed more whites than they were forced tQ. either for economic 
considerations or from white working class pressure. although they 
subsidised the employment of whites in other sectors through increased 
taxation~ 
The labour policy of the first Union governments involved the 
creation of employment opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled 
whites. This policy was a reaction to a number of occurrences. The 
South African War had intensified the migration of poor whites to 
urban areas, and the increased capitalisation of agriculture forced 
small-time farmers off the land. The ranks of proletarianised 
urban dwellers were swelled by the influx of rural poor and the 
14. Walker. E A History of Southern Africa p 511; Maud. P "The Labour 
Party and the Pact Government" p 2 
15. Jeeves. A "Migrant Labour and the Colour Bar" p 16 
16. cf Yudelman. D "Lord Rothschild. Afrikaner Scabs and the 1907 
strike ll ; Davies, R "Mining Capital, The state and Unskilled White 
Workers in South Africa. 1901-1913" and Jeeves. A "Migrant Labour 
and the Colour Bar" pp 16-19 
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radicalisation of working class political action further encouraged 
the state to turn its attention to the "poor white problem". 
The South African Party opted for a white preference policy. 
It was not as exclusivist as was the white labour policy. It 
offered whites better chances of employment than it did Coloureds) 
Asians and Africans in that order. Johnstone described it as 
A policy pursued by the state as an employer, of giving 
preferential treatment in the public sector, notably the 
railways, harbours and postal services, to unskilled 
white workers by providing and restricting certain 
unskilled employment to such workers, at higher than 
prevailing unskilled wages . 17 
Public sector employment placed the burden of remuneration on the 
state as tax-collector. Relief works , irrigation schemes and work 
- 18 
colonies were established . A major land resettlement scheme was 
inaugurated with the passage of the 1912 Land Settlement Act through 
1 0 19 Par l.ament. The Land Settlement Act and its numerous amendments 
provided penniless whites with 
the opportu~ity to lease land for a five year probationary 
period, rent free for the first year and a minimal rent 
thereafter with the further option of purchasing on the 
same terms as other settlers or of extending their lease . 20 
17. Johnstone, FA Class , Race and Gold, pp 70-71 
18 . ibid 
19 . Davies , R Capital, State and White Labour pp 107-109 
20 . ibid, p 108 
"' 
Farmers were encouraged to employ whites on their farms instead 
of blacks, and labour bureaux were established. 21 After the drought 
of 1916 had destroyed the agricultural ventures of many whites, the govern-
ment had to find other avenues of employment. It extended the relief 
k ff t t " " t d dr h " t " th "I 22 wor s, a ores a 10n proJec s an ew more w 1 es 1nto e ra1 ways . 
The South African Party government was reluctant to interfere with 
the private sector and thus their policies necessarily scratched 
the surface . The introduction of minimal tariff protection in 1914, 
the Factories Act and the Regulation of Wages Act of 1918 and the 
Apprenticeship Act of 1922 represented the growing concern of the state 
in the field of labour relations . The Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1924 formed the pinnacle of labour legislation prior to Smuts's defeat 
in the same year. 
The developments which led to the victory of the Pact in 1924 
were outlined in chapter one. The new government quickly set itself 
the task of implementing its "civilised labour policy. " TheSALP 
brought with it a white labour policy broader in its conception than 
the Creswellian policy . All the arguments that rocked the white 
labour movements ove r the question of discrimination in the economy do 
not concern us here. It is important to note 
21 . ibid, pp 109-10 
22. ibid pp 110-113 
11 '/ 
though, that socialist elements during the first years of the century 
, th ' 1" 23 compromIsed wi raclst po lCles. The leaders in the SALP "knew 
that their political bread was buttered on the side of white privilege. ,,24 
The left wing of the Labour Party lost ground to the rightwing which 
consolidated behind Creswell. The split in the Party in 1915 
over the war issue spurred on the move towards reformism and a more 
overt racism. The socialist element within the party's programme was 
"watered down" in 1923,25 and a more segregationist policy adopted. 
White employment was hence to be secured within a system of 
"socialised means of production . " Coloureds would perhaps be incorporated 
at a later stage if they attained the necessary standard of living. 
Africans would be provided for in segregated areas of the Union and 
ideally would have no place in the white state. In short, Creswell's 
mining industry policy was extended to mean African exclusion from the 
26 
economy in general. 
The Nationalists for their part promoted the employment of whites 
in the public sector to a greater extent. Soon after the new 
government had assumed power) the Minister of the Interior , Dr D F 
23. Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, p 155 
24. ibid, p 128 
25 . Touyz , B "White Labour and the 'Social Democratic ' Movement 
in the Transvaal" pp 243-244 
26 . Ticktin, D "The Origins of the South African Labour Party" p 142 
states that Creswell himself "did not propose ••• the active 
substitution of native labour by white labour, although he may 
have cherished this as a long term ideal . " 
12.0 
Malan informed the public "that the Government was considering the 
further extension of the policy of 'civilised labour'" to 
encompass both coloured people and whites. C W Malan , the new 
Minister of Railways gave notice that the employment of whites, on a 
larger scale in his department was under consideration. 27 Pressure 
from the Labour Party - and the maverick Tielman Roos - within the 
Pact resulted in attempts to force the policy upon the private sector, 
which included both mining and secondary industries. 28 ,The Labour 
Party, although represented in the cabinet, was not able to produce 
the goods in the quantities its supporters wanted. 
after the 1926 session, the last in which any legislation sponsored 
by them was passed, opened the way for the future rapprochement 
between Smuts and Hertzog at a time of economic crisis. When the 
Labour Party split in 1929, Labour's loss of influence was made 
obvious to all. The depression and gold standard crisis provided 
the catalyst which pushed the Nationalists and the SAP together. 
The civilised labour policy accepted by the coalition government 
became more of a pragmatic attempt to solve the socio-economic problems 
27. Maud~ P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" pp 45-46 
28. ibid, P 48 
, 1-- I 
which beset the Union than its predecessor which depended in large 
part on a healthy dose of Labour Party ' principle,.29 
An understanding of the legislative instruments - of which 
the Wage Act was but one - within the broad definition of 
'civilised labour' is bound up with the confusion that existed in the 
minds of contemporary protagonists of the policy as to what the policy 
was. The classic definition was provided by the Prime Minister's 
circular to all government departments in October 1924. It read: 
The Prime Minister desires it to be understood by all 
Departments of State that it has been decided as a 
matter of definite policy that, wherever practicable, 
civilised labour shall be substituted in all employ-
ment by the government for that which may be classified as 
uncivilised. Civilised labour is to be considered as 
the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living 
conforms to the standard generally recognised as tolerable 
from the usual European standpoint. Uncivilised labour 
is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons 
whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the 
necessities of life as understood among barbarians and 
undeveloped peoples. 30 
At first glance the Prime Minister's circular appeared to be a 
colour blind statement. Even in 1934 Jan Hofmeyr, Minister of the 
Interior J Education and Public Health in the Fusion Government was able 
to wri te that 
there is not intended to be any variation in the 
29 . Turrell, A "The South African Party 1932-34: The Movement Toward 
Fusion" pp 102-103 outlina:1 the principle accepted by both parties 
30. Prime Minister's Circular No 5, 31 October 1924. Official Year 
Book of the Union of South Africa, 1926-7, p 203 Quoted by 
Johnstone, FA Class, Race and Gold pp 247-8 fn 17 
conception of that term / civilised labour 7 as 
defined in the Prime Minister's Circular of 1924, 
in other words, that the term 'civilised labour' 
does not imply race and colour discrimination. 31 
The circular of 1924 was produced in response to rumblings around 
the country that civilised labour meant white labour. There appears 
to be no reason to dispute Simons' and Simons' suggestion that though 
"carefully worded to avoid criticism at the ILO in Geneva, the defini-
tions were generally understood to distinguish all whites from all other 
32 persons .. " In early August 1924 C W Malan had stated that "the policy 
of the government is to employ European youths in replacement of natives 
or Indians in unskilled work wherever possible. ,,33 At the 1924 National 
Party Congress, Tielman Roos urged the mines to replace Africans with 
whites. A resolution was passed at the congress which called for the 
I f f ' b h't 34 rep acernent 0 A r1can postmen y w 1 es . The Labour Party at 
their annual Transvaal provincial conference proposed to replace all 
Africans employed in either the manufacturing or selling of liquor, 
as well as those involved on the production of food consumed by 
whites, with whites. This latter definition included industries 
35 
where "foodstuffs for the use of Europeans are handled," 
, 
31. Hofmeyr - Rheinalt Jones. 23 June 1934. Copy in Rheinalt Jones 
Papers 
32 . Simons and Simons Class and Colour in South Africa p 339 
33. House of Assembly Debates 1924, c 138 
34. Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" p 69 
35. ibid P 72 
\ Y 
Hertzog's circular did not clear the air or settle doubts 
in people's minds. The issue was to blow up again in 1934 when the 
Department of Labour and Social Welfare initiated a campaign for the 
increased employment of civilised labour in secondary industries which 
benefitted from the customs tariff scheme. In 1933 A P J Fourie, 
Nationalist Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in the coalition 
government visited the sugar industries of Natal and "expressed the 
hope that a fair complement of civilised labour would be employed 
by the industry. ,,36 The Institute of Race Relations, formed in 
1929, stated that 
the L-sugar-1 industry believes it has been asked, in fact, 
if not to discharge its Indian and ot~er non-European 
employees to make room for Europeans, at any rate not to 
employ any more Non-Europeans. 37 
In May 1934 the Department of Labour and Social Welfare stated that 
the term civilised labour was "not regarded as including Native 
workers" although no differentiation was "made on the basis of 
race" for employees of other races. For example, Mauritians, or 
St Helenas and "members of the Cape Coloured community and Indians" 
were either civilised or uncivilised according to their standard of 
1 .' 38 l.vl.ng. The District Inspector of Labour in Durban confirmed the 
above view and the Department replied in the following manner to an 
36. Department of Labour Memorandum. Reference Cl144, Pretoria, 
12 June 1934 . Copy in Rheinalt Jones Papers 
37 . SAIRR "The Civilised Labour Policy and the Displacement of Non-
European Labour". October 1935, p 14. SAIRR Archives, AD 843, 
• B71 .2 
38. ibid, P 4 Memorandum ref Cl144 Ivan Walker - Secretary, Johannes-
burg Joint Council of Europeans and African, 20 September 1934 
Rheinalt Jones Papers. 
114 
39 Institute request for clarification, 
Generally Native labourers do not come within the 
definition of civilised labour, but it is certain 
that there are Natives whose standards of living do 
conform to the standard generally recognised as 
tolerable from the usual European standpoint, and 
such persons would be regarded by this Depart-
ment as civilised. 40 
Fourie complicated the issue in a speech delivered before the 
Annual Meeting of the South African Federated Chambers of Industry 
in October of the same year, when he referred to the solution of the 
poor white problem, but went on to say that they should strive 
to secure a more satisfactory relationship in the 
numbers of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
white workers in all branches of trade and industry. 41 
The Department of Labour and Social Welfare replied to the 
Institute's query about the racial aspect of the civilised labour 
policy in ambiguous terms .. Ivan Walker, Secretary for Labour, 
attempted to argue that no colour bar existed in the 1924 Circular. 
The aim of the civilised labour policy was to "ensure that sufficient 
openings are created" in the expanding economy of the Union to absorb 
"those workers who, being principally unskilled workers, are unable 
to obtain regular employment owing to the competition of other persons 
39 . Secretary, Johannesburg Joint Council - Minister of Labour 
27 June, 1934. Rheinalt Jones Papers 
40 . SAIRR "The Civilised Labour Policy" p 5 . SAIRR Archive, AD843,B71-2 
41. Department of Labour Memorandum. Reference C1144, Pretoria, 12 
June 1934. Copy in Rheinalt Jones Papers. 
\ ' .• \ . 
• 
accustomed to lower standards." The "class which this policy is 
designed to assist consists largely of European unskilled workers, 
numbering approximately 25 000 to 30 000 for whom the Government has 
in the past been expected to provide relief measures." He concluded 
that the "policy is in no way associated with any question of racial 
segregation ,142 
That such confusion existed over the interpretation of the 
circular which the Department claimed it had adhered to throughout was 
not unnatural. The circular had differentiated between civilised and 
uncivilised workers on the basis of their standards of living, and this 
generally meant racial differentiation in practice. 
The legislation which determined the pattern of industrial re-
lations in South Africa did not have its origins in the ideology 
of the white or civilised labour policies. It originated out of 
the realities of a developing economy linked to the growth of a 
differentiated, radicalised labour movement in the Union. The 
ideologies provided legislators and businessmen with the 
overall plan or picture of how to control that movement. 
42 . Ivan Walker - J D Rheinalt Jones, 14 November 1935 . Attached to 
SAIRR "The Civilised Labour Policy" SAIRR Archive AD843B71 .2 
The South African industrial relations system comprised both 
conciliation and wage regulation apparatus. It was based on the 
models of existing systems in the world at the time. 43 The major 
industrial powers themselves did not have a long history of industrial 
legislation. Industrial legislation in Australia first appeared 
in 1873 and developed slowly until 1896 when the Shop and Factories 
Act was passed and placed industrial conciliation machinery on a firm 
footing for the first time. Minimum wages were established by a 
similar Act of 1893, and the 1896 Act provided machinery in the form 
special boards organised on an ad hoc basis to regulate wages in 
certain specified trades. 44 New Zealand's more sophisticated 
system was established in 1894. The fundamental principle behind 
the Victoria State and New Zealand systems was that of voluntary 
45 
conciliation and compulsory award. If the parties could not 
of 
agree then either party, whether trade union or employers's organisation J 
could appeal to the arbitration court whose judgement on the issue was 
binding on the parties involved. The French system operated along 
similar lines, except that no basis was provided for the settlement of 
disputes in the event of deadlock. The last system of note was the 
Canadian one. The 1907 Lemieux Act introduced the compulsory con-
43. This is clear from a collection of papers in the Department of 
Labour archive which include copies and notes from the following: 
New Zealand Official Year Book, 1919 on the Factories Act, Shops 
and Offices Act, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 
and statistics from the State of Tasmania Wages Board Act, 1920 . 
Other documents include the variously named wage acts of New 
South Wales and Victoria in Australia, Alberta and British 
Columbia in Canada, and various states of the United States of 
America. Department of Labcur Archive 1427: 1069 Lc 180 
44. Reeves, W P State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand p 57-8 
45. ibid, passim; Davies, Capital,State and White Labour p 116 
\ ~I 
ciliation principle and arose directly out of the strikes which hit 
h th t " 46 t e country at e ~me. 
Rob Davies correctly suggested that the South African Labour 
Party largely supported the Australian system. Strike leaders in 
1907 called upon Botha to introduce legislation along Australian 
47 lines but their calls went unheeded. The Transvaal Industrial 
Disputes Prevention Act of 1907 was instead modelled along lines 
set dorn by the Canadian Act of the same year. This was hardly 
surprising as it had to deal with the strike situation in the 
Union on a basis which found favour with the monied interests who 
had come to woo the Het Volk party. The other systems which they 
could have turned to did not effectively control strike activity 
and were thus rejected by Botha's Government in the Transvaal. 48 
Davies noted two distinct differences between the Transvaal Act and 
the Canadian Act : first, the introduction of a colour bar in the 
definition of employee; and second, the failure to recognise trade 
unions as the legitimate representatives of the labouring classes. 
This latter ~ was to recur over time during the next few years. 49 
46. Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, pp 116-117 
47. ibid, p 116 
48. ibid, p 118 
49. For example, Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd - J Collie, 
Secretary) Mining Industry Advisory Board 11 August 1922 laid down 
the areas of trade union competency, namely rates of pay and 
hours of work, and rejected any question of establishing concilia-
tion machinery within the company itself. SAIF papers , Bc 1.2 
From 1907 onwards calls for the establishment of some system of 
statutorily recognised apparatus for the regulation of wages became 
fairly widespread in the Union. The South African Commerce and 
Manufacturers Record, mouthpiece of one sector of the South African 
50 
commercial world , . called in April for the establishment of a 
, 51 
Department for Labour. This sentiment was echoed in the Constitu-
tion and Platform of the South African Labour Party which was formed 
in 1910. 52 A rail strike in Natal, for example, also highlighted 
the necessity of introducing arbitration and conciliation machinery. 53 
In 1911, another columnist referred to the Australian system of wage 
regulation with approval as it had "proved a most effective means for 
the prevention of strikes," and advocated the establishment of a wages 
board in the Union. 54 In the same year the South African Manufacturers' 
Association suggested at their annual meeting that conciliation and 
wages boards were the best means of lI avoiding future industrial dis-
55 putes." The South African Labour Party advocated wages boards as 
well, but their appeals for a Department of Labour and r-., wage boards 
differed in essence from that of the South African Commerce and Manu-
facturers Record's columnists. They were to be used, inter alia, as 
50. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class, p 14 
51 . ibid, P 1 28 
52. Maud, "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" p 9 
53. Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 128; 319 fn 74 
54. ibid P 128. The example of New Zealand is perhaps a better one. 
Between 1896 and 1906 there were no strikes as a result of the 
conciliation machinery in force at the time. Davies, Capital, 
State and White Labcur, p 137, fn 64 
55. ibid, P 319, fn 75 
a means to develop a "free white population" in the sense of benefitting 
h · t k . 11 56 w ~ e war ers econom1ca y. 
The Union's legislators, in the meantime , had not been lax 
in turning their attention to worker pressure . The miners ' strike 
of 1907 occurred as a result of white miners' fears for the security 
of their positions within the labour structure . This arose as a 
result of the infiltration of African workers into areas traditionally 
occupied by white miners. In 1911 the Mines and Works Act was passed. 
The Act covered general conditions of employment and made provision 
57 for safety enforcement. The Native Labour Regulation Act of the 
same year restricted the negotiation of African's economic grievances 
through the channels of labour inspectors. 58 
The Union Parliament turned its attention to the question of 
wage boards in May 1913. Tension was rising in the mining 
industry over the question of trade union recognition. C H Haggar, 
although expelled from the Labour Party in 1911,59 led the ba ttle for 
the introduction of some sort of wage regulation in the Union in 1913. 
He initially desired the Assembly to debate the possibility that 
"legislation should be introduced at an early date, with a view to the 
56. Maud,p"The Labour Party and the Pact Government"p 9 
57. Act 12-1911, Jones, R A and Griffiths, H R Labour Legislation in 
South Africa p 3 
58. Act 15-1911, ibid, P 4 
59. Haggar was involved in a scandal about his private life both · 
before his departure to South Africa from Australia and in the 
Union. The question of his expUlsion was fully debated at the 1911 
Annual Conference of the Labour Party. Minutes of the 1911 
Annual Conference SALP Archive, Cabinet 1, Draw- 3, file KK 
'30 
d °th ° th 0 '60 establishment of Wages Boar s W1 1n e Un10n. Supported by 
H W Sampson, he later amended this notice of motion and substituted 
one which merely "requested /-the goverrurent 7 to take into considera-
- -- . 
61 
tion at an early date the formation of wages boards." Arguments 
in favour of the motion drew attention to the inadequate provisions 
of the 1907 Transvaal Act which proved more effective for employers 
to use against employees than was warranted. The motion was 
agreed to with no dissentients. The question of wages boards and 
minimum wages was simultaneously under consideration in trade unions. 
Andrews was in the minority when he suggested that minimum wages should 
apply to all workers, irrespective of colour or race. But all "trade 
unionists .•• were adamant that minimum wages should be fixed according 
62 to white standards only." In July, the mine wcrkers included a 
request for the establishment of wages boards in their demands to 
63 Botha's government. In February the nextoyear H W Sampson 
inquired of the Minister of Mines and Industries, F S Malan (Malmes-
bury~ whether any legislation concerning wages boards was likely to 
be introduced that session. He was told that the question was 
d Od 0 64 un er conS1 erat10n. This query followed the motion introduced by 
60. Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly no 81 of 1913, 
27 May 1913, p 925 
61. Votes and Proceedings, 82 of 1913, 27 May 1913, p 933. House of 
Assembly Debates, 1913, c 2798 
62. Katz, E A Trade Union Aristocracy pp 354-355 
63. clause 8 of the "Workers Charter" reproduced as Appendix C in 
Katz, ibid, pp 487-493 
64. House of Assembly Debates 1914 c 438 
I 3, 
Haggar on 3 February 1914 which asked for a national minimum wage. 
He, Haggar, had expressed the belief that wages boards, comprised 
of equal numbers of employers and employees, would be necessary to 
implement a national minimum wage. After discussion, the motion was 
. thdr 65 d ' th f th . .. f E . 66 W1 awn pen 1ng e report 0 e Econom1C Co~ss1on a nqu1ry. 
In the event, the Chapman Commission declined to support the idea of 
a national minimum wage on the grounds that "native and coloured labour 
67 
would be excluded . " The commission failed to see the necessity of 
wages boards. It gave an indication of what type of boards were 
envisaged when it stated that 
there are people in South Africa who would like to 
see wages boards set up ... on a State basis, with 
obligations to fix wages for whites and possibly 
wages for non-whites, also possibly on a lower 
level when it becomes needful, and with powers of 
enforcing their award. 68 
The Commission would only recommend the establishment of conciliation 
boards to provide for mediation, or, "in the last resort" the estab-
lishment of disputes' boards which would report on strikes and lock-
69 
outs. 
Other attempts during the early years to secure wage regulation 
also failed. In 1912 a motion which called for the inclusion of fair . 
wage clauses in "all contracts entered into between the goverrunent of 
65. Votes and Proceedings, No 3 of 1914, 3 February 1914, p 20 
66. House of Assembly Debates 1914 c 58-60 
67. Economic Commission Report, UG 12-1914 P 42 
68. ibid, P 45 
69 . ibid P 70 
the Union of South Africa, and any other person, persons, corporation 
or company" for all skilled workers based on a minimum standard· 
wage was withdrawn 70 A further attempt was made by Haggar and 
Boydell (Greyville to ensure that a fair wage clause be introduced 
into all Public Works Department contracts regardless of the pro-
visions thereof but that "no determination should be made on the 
ground of the colour of the ··.workmen engaged." Sampson (Commissioner 
Street) and Madeley (Springs) proposed an amendment which in effect 
introduced discrimination by substituting the non-discriminatory 
clause for one that stated that "the standard wage of the district for 
standard work should be secured for every workman, whether white of 
71 
coloured." The underlying racist implications of their sub-
stitution was to become clear later. Neither the motion nor the 
amendment drew discussion. The Speaker of the House ruled them 
both inadmissable on the grounds that, if adopted, an increase of 
expenditure would be incurred and this would be "in conflict with the 
t f t · . t t f h th f· 72 errns 0 sec 10n S1X y- wo 0 t e Sou A r1ca Act . " 
The 1914 session did produce . two acts which served to 
70. Votes and Proceedings, No 60 of 1912) 23 April 1912, p 705 
71. ibid, No 8 of 1913,4 February 1913 p 78 
72. Section 62 of the South Africa Act, 1909, stated: "The House of Assatbly 
shall not originate or pass any vote, resolution, address or 
Bill for the appropriation of any part of the public revenue or 
of any tax or impost to any purpose unless such appropriation 
has been recommended by message from the Governor-General during 
the Session in which such vote, resolution, address or Bill is 
proposed." Eybers, G Select Constitutional Documents p 534 
'r 
"( 
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ameliorate conditions; the Workmen's Wages Protection Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. The former inaugurated a system "to 
make better provision for securing the payment of workmen's wages" 
to all workers regardless of race. It covered contracts between indi-
vidual parties, ie, between contractor and employee, and not groups 
like trade unions or industrial ~ls as was the case under the 
legislation of the 1920s period, and was only repealed in 1956. 73 
The Labour Party Executive reported to the Annual Conference at 
East London in December of the same. year that the Act was merely "a 
baIrn II to the "outrages on the freedom and the status of the worker", 
perpetrated through the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act of. 1914. 74 The Wages Protection Act, they declared, secured 
75 
to the worker "the terms of his serfdom." The Labour Party thus 
recognised this legislation as an attempt to mollify labour. The 
Protection Act was as narrow in its scope as the Cape Labourers' 
Wages Regulation Act of 1887. That Act stipulated that wages could 
76 
only be paid in the "current coin of the Colony." The Workmen I 5 
Compensation Act attempted to improve conditions and granted compen-
sation for injury to white workers. Africans were covered by the 1911 
73. Jones and Griffiths, Labour Legislation in South Africa, pp 11-12 
74. Act 27-1914 
75. SALP Executive Report to Annual Conference p 3, 28 December 1914. 
SALP Archive, cabinet 1, Draw 3, file KJ 
76. Act 23-1887 
, J <I-
Native Labour Regulation Act. 77 
The question of wages boards was squashed with the outbreak of 
war and the tightening up of the war economy. Patrick Duncan, 
Unionist representative for the labour stronghold of Fordsburg until 
1920, raised the issue again in February 1917. · He privately moved the 
Regulation of Wages (Specified Trades) Bill, because, he claimed, it 
78 
was clear that the Government was not prepared to do so. The Bill 
was tentative in the extreme, it was not an "attempt to do much, but 
it did attempt to make a beginning." It would cover only specified 
trades which would be registered under certain regulations. Women 
and children involved in sweated industries would be covered by the 
Act if it became law. Trade Boards, appointed by the Government, 
'would concentrate on their specific trades. The Bill was supported 
by all parties during the debate. C G Fichardt, (Ladybrand)and a 
founding member of the National Party, expressed fear that those 
protected by the bill would lose their jobs; whilst Sampson (Siemert) 
argued . that it did not go far enough. Duncan accepted the Minister 
of Mines and Industries' amendment that the Bill be sent to Select 
Committee for clarification. When the Committee reported back on 
77. Jones and Griffiths, Labour Legislation in South Africa pp 11-12 
78. Debates of the Union of South Africa as reported in the Cape 
Times 20 November 1915 - 25 June 1923. vol 11 7 March 1917 as 
reported on 8 March 1917. First reading was on 17 February 1917 
, . 
r 
24 May, the session was too far advanced for it to have any chance 
of going through. It was subsequently discharged from the House 
79 in July. 
In October 1917 the Cape Town tailors went on strike. In 
December a South African Commerce and Manufacturers Record columnist 
suggested that the strike "has hastened the introduction of Wages 
Boards ., . (a)nd there is not the slightest objection to it on the 
80 part of the employers." F S Malan introduced the Regulation of 
Wages, Apprentices and Improvers Bill at the end of January 1918 in the 
form that the 1917 Bill had come from Select Committee. Notwith-
standing the immediate effect of the strike, the Women's Enfranchisement 
Association- of the Union of South Africa claimed that the Billwas 
- . . d b th ff . - 81 1n~ t~ate y II e Women I s Su rage SOc1et1es " .. The terms of the 
Act would appear to support their contention, although the influence 
of the tailors strike and the urgency of the problem cannot be ignored. 
It provided for the establishment of wages boards in specific sweated 
industries to look after the interests of women and juveniles. The 
Minister rejected calls from Sampson for the extension of the Bill to 
cover male workers, for the establishment of one wage board for the 
whole union, and the suggestion that the boards should have juris-
79. ibid 
80. Hastings, E "The Tailors Strike in Cape Town: sOme industrial 
lessons resulting from the dispute." South African Commerce and 
Manufacturers' Record 11 (128) December 1917. Quoted by Bozzoli,B 
The Political Nature of a Ruling Class, p 178 
81. Lucy Johnstone-Scott, Honourary Parliamentary Secretary, Women's 
Enfranchisement Association of the Union of South Africa -
F H P Creswe~l. 29 December 1924 Department of Labour Archive 
1427: 1069 Lc 810 
" 
diction to regulate the hours of work. 82 
The Act soon encountered difficulties . Not much use was made 
of it and by 1925 it had fallen into desuetude in some parts of the 
83 
country where it had previously operated. The jurisdiction of the 
boards was challenged by the courts. The Natal Division held that the 
prescription of scales of wages over and above the minimum wage was 
84 
ultra vires, whilst the Free State Division declared to the contrary . 
A number of comments were made by the Economic and wage Commission 
with regard to defects within the administrative apparatus of the Act . 
The Act presumed a degree of organisation on the part of both employers 
and employees which was difficult to achieve given the nature of the 
trades concerned. The Minority Report of the Commission pointed out 
that the Act was meant for unskilled and semi-skilled people; but at 
th t ' 1 1 1 ' t' 11 ' h ' ' bl 85 ese occupa 10na eve s organ1sa 10n was we n1g 1mposs1 e. 
The building workers, for example, had suffered from lack of 
organisation when the Master Builders Federation had established a 
82 . House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times vol 111 
p 90. 21 February 1918 reported 22 February 1918 p 265, 29-30 
April 1918 
83. Economic and Wage Commission Report,UG 14-'26, Majority Report para 77a 
84. ibid, para 76 
85. ibid, Minority Report , para 53, p 287 . Lucas, 'F "The Determina-
tion of Wages in South Africa . " p 49 
Wage Board in 1922. The Master Builders were "very emphatic about 
refusing to deal with sectional organisations" and threatened to 
"reduce wages periodically" if the workers did not organise. 86 
1 1 f d th f " " " " 87 Emp oyees a so eare e consequences 0 v~ct~m~sat~on. The 
v"alidi ty of some determinations was questioned by the courts, and the 
high rate of minimum wages led to dismissals. Another problem was 
that deadlocks could be broken through further discussion between the 
t " " 1 d 88 par 1es 1nvo ve . The multiplicity of boards meant that wage 
levels could not be effectively co-ordinated between specific trades 
89 
and between different areas of the country. 
The Majority Report stated that there 
would seem to be a lack of seriousness in protests 
against evils, which are not backed up by vigorous 
use of existing legislative remedies for these evils. 90 
This sentiment was echoed by the Executive of the Cape Federation of 
Labour Unions in their report to the 1919 annual conference. They 
86. CFLU Building Section Minutes, 21 April 1922 CFLU papers Aa 1.2 
87. Economic and Wage Commission,UG 14-'26,Majority Report para 77a. 
Minority Report para 53 
88. for ego see the comments in CFLU Minutes, Aggregate Meeting of 
Building Trade 18 July 1921 and Building Section Minutes 29 August 1921 
CFLU papers Aa 1.2 
89 . Lucas J F liThe Determinations of Wages in South AFrica" p 49 
90. UG 14-'26 para 77a 
accused workers of apathy. and stressed the need for "education and 
91 thought" for the successful operation of the wages boards. 
De Kiewiet had indicated why. in a general way. the Act failed: 
It stepped into that confused and controversial field that 
lay outside the boundaries of skilled labour. It was the 
field of unskilled and semi-skilled labour. the field in which 
Cape Coloured folk. Natal Indians. Kafirs [-sic_7. white 
women and youths. and poor whites struggled for employ-
ment and preferment. 
The Act only drew attention to "the great complexity of these 
problems; otherwise its history was a record of neglect. hostility 
and indifference . 1I92 Wi th no precedents in either South Africa or the 
industrial world at large of any long standing value. 93 it was not 
surprising that the Act failed and people turned to examine other 
pcssibili ties. The urgency of the matter became even more evident 
after the economic recession after 1919 and the subsequent labour 
upheavals of 1922. 
91. CFLU NEC 6th Annual Conference Report. CFLU papers Ab 2 
92. De Kiewiet. C A History of South Africa p 270 
93. Britain established wage regulation in 1909. the United States 
between 1912 and 1919 in sixteen states. cf Fordham's speech 
House of Assembly Debates 1925 c 1710 
'3 '1 
In 1920 J X Merriman proposed the removal of the colour bar from 
the Transvaal mining regulations under the 1922 Mines and Works Act. 
Creswell moved a counter motion that before the idea should be contem-
plated, an Act should be paseed - in conjunction with a few other 
matters - which provided for the 
equal payment of such wages for the classes of work 
likely to be performed as will enable those doing the work, 
whether coloured or European, to maintain standards of 
life necessary for civilised men in a civilised country. 94 
During debate Creswell (Denver) was ordered from the House for calling 
Alexander (cape Town Hanover street) a liar,95 but the matter never 
reached a conclusion. After countless adjournments the business was 
dropped in consequence of the prorogation of parliament. 96 
Two attempts were made in 1921 to modify the existing wage 
regulating instruments . The Regulation of Wages Bill .. was first 
read on 21 March. It was referred to a Select Committee before the 
second reading and withdrawn in mid-June. The details of the 
94. House of Assembly Debates 1925 c 1714 Marwick's speech. Merriman's 
motion was "):hat in one opinion of this House it is desirable that 
the Government should. take the necessary steps for the early 
removal of those provisions contained in the Mines and Works Act, 
1911, and regulations thereunder, imposing certain disabilities, 
generally known as the colour bar. II Votes and Proceedings J 
No 33 of 1920, 18 May 1920, p 384 
95. Votes and Proceedings, No 44 of 1920, 3 June 1920, pp 521-22 
96. ibid, Nos 53-55 of 1920; 17, 18 and 21 June 1920 pp 628, 639 
and 649 respectively 
debate on this Bill were not reported in the Cape Times~7 The 
Bill was reintroduced in a different form as the Wages Board Bill on 
the same day as the first was withdrawn. 98 Contrary to previous 
practice, the compulsory arbitration principle embodied in the Trans-
vaal Prevention of Industrial Disputes Act was watered down as this 
Bill was meant to provide not only for the regulation of wages but also 
for 
the registration of voluntary agreements 
employees as to conditions of employment 
in connection with any of these matters. 
between 
and for 
99 
employers and 
other purposes 
The main principle of the Bill was the prevention of strikes and the 
100 
second its voluntary nature. 
F S Malan outlined the provisions of the Bill during the second 
reading on 11 July.l01 It was to regulate wages by establishing a 
minimum which could then be increased or decreased "according to the 
circumstances of each industry." Government officials, all people 
in Government employ, agricultural and domestic services were excluded 
from the provisions of the Bill. Parliament was the effective wage 
board for the former group, and agriculture and domestic service 
!ldid not lend themselves to the operation of a measure of this kind. II 
97. House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times vol VI 
98. June 17 1921 ibid 
99. Senate Debates 1921 vol III P 1875 13 July 1921 
100. ibid, P 1948 
101. RDM 12 July 1921 
, u- I 
Wages Boards were to be set up allover the Union for particular trades. They 
were to consist of five representatives of employers and employees 
respectively, selected by their representatives. The impartial 
chairman was to have no casting vote, and this was acclaimed by the 
Government as the "outstanding feature" of the Bill. Malan 
recognised this break with international examples in his address to 
102 the Senate. The fact that there was no administrative way out of 
a deadlock situation was admitted by the Minister, but 
it was felt that it was much better to start in this way 
than to attempt to put up machinery which would do away 
with strikes and disputes between employers and employees. 
In the event of an impasse . 
the matter would be referred to the Minister, and he would 
act in the same way as he acted now when a strike was 
threatened. 
He reserved the right to ask the Board for recommendations on how to 
ttl d · t 103 se e l.SpU es. 
102. Senate Debates 1921 vol III p 194.7 
103. ibid, as reported 12 July 1921; RDM 12 July 1921 
\ 
The measure was seen as a means whereby industrial disputes could 
be settled. The "fair and square" employer would be protected from 
104 the unscrupulous employee. Dr Malan supported the principle of 
the Bill as he saw it as a means for "bringing Capital and Labour 
together" " as it embodied the idea of a "standard wage for standard 
k ,,105 wor . Confusion arose over the question of the institution of 
a colour bar. Malan initially stated the measure would serve to 
protect white labourers from economic competition by lower paid 
black workers. Merriman, Member of the Assembly for Stellenbosch, 
expressed concern at the effect that the Bill would have on the 
coloured people. Alexander, Independent Member for Cape Town 
Castle replied that coloureds did come within the ambit of the Bill, 
and Malan judiciously corrected himself by substituting the term 
"skilled labourer" for "white labourer.,,106 
There can be no doubt that the notion of the overt protection of 
white labour at the expense of coloureds - not to mention Africans 
104. Speeches by Malan; Close; Alexander reported in Cape Times and 
RDM 12 July .1921 
105. ~ 12 July 1921 
106. House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times vol VI 
pp 312-3 
and Asians - was present in the thinking of some members of the 
Assembly and of the country at large. This was borne out during 
the Committee stage of the Bill . O'Brien, SAP Member for Pieter-
maritzburg South proposed a motion to include "natives and coloureds" 
in the definitions clause. His motion was heavily defeated, with only 
nine members voting for it. Opponents of this definitive non-racial 
principle stated that wage scales would be determined by the racial 
composition of the work force involved. The wages boards would 
attempt to set minimum wages in line with the predominantly racial 
107 group within the ranks of the employees. 
Some participants expressed doubt as to how long agriculture and 
domestic service would remain outside the purview of the Bill , 10B 
while others asserted that the Bill would have a negative effect on 
the employment patterns of the Union as workers would be dismissed who 
107. 
1 DB. 
House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times vol VI 
p 320 
Speeches by Cilliers, Van Niekerk,Van der Merwe all opposed 
the bill, the latter even claiming that agitators from the 
towns would stir up the workers. ibid 
operated at the higher 109 levels of the wage scale, and the IIpoor 
man who could not afford to pay the high wages" would be ruined. 110 
Seven South African Party members voted against the Bill at the 
d d · 111 secon rea 1ng. Six SAP and nine Nats had voted together 
during Committee on a motion introduced by the Nationalist De Waal. 
He wished to make provision for the exclusion from the terms of the 
Bill of those workers who voluntarily contracted to work for wages 
which were lower than the determined wages. The motion was lost 
b . h f' ft 112 Y twenty e1g t votes to 1 een. At the third reading capt 
Cilliers, SAP representative for Hopetown, raised his voice in a 
final protest against the Bill. F S Malan, he stated, was the father 
and Dr Malan the godfather of this Bill which was biased in favour of 
the workers. They would "rue the day it had been introduced." 
Merriman complained about debating an amended bill which had not as 
yet been printed. Nonetheless, the ten SAP and De Waal were in the 
113 
minority and the Bill passed through to the Senate. 
109. Speeches: Merriman, contradicted by Close and Malan. ibid 
HO. Speech by Van Eeden. ibid 
111. Geldenhuys, Jordaan, Merriman J OIBrien, Sephton, J van der Merwe, 
van Eeden. House of Assembly Debates 1925, speech by Alexandes c 1667 . 
De Burger 11 July 1921, Library of Parliament Scrapbooks, p 233 
112. House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times, 14 June1921 
113. ibid. The House of Assembly Debates as reported in the Cape Times 
p 322 state that one Nationalist and ten SAP voted against the 
Bill. This is corroborated by the RDM of 14 July 1921. Thus 
Alexander incorrectly stated that eight were SAP and three were 
Nats. (House of Assembly Debates, 1925, c 1667). The 11 dissenters . 
were Merriman (Stellenbosch . SAP) , T S Cilliers (Hopetown SAP), 
A A Cilliers (Harrismith NP), Geldenhuys (Johannesburg ~orth SAP), 
Jordaan (Ladismith SAP), H S Grobler (Bethal SAP), De Waal 
(Piquetberg), Sephton (Albert-Aliwal SAP), O'Brien (Pieter-
maritzburg South SAP), Heatlie (Worcester SAP) van Eeden 
(SWellendam SAP). cf De Burger 13 July 1921, Library of 
Parliament Scrapbook, p 238 and Ons Land, Library of Parliament 
Scrapbook, 13 July 1921, P 211 
_ The Wages Boards Bill w<>-!. 
rejected by the Senate. On the last day of Parliament ,I,c ~"'-s 
thrown out by the Senate by thirteen votes to seven, and twelve votes 
t - 1 114 to seven respec 1ve y. Of the thirteen who voted against the 
former Bill, ten were SAP and one was a Nat; of the seven who 
voted for the latter, four were SAP, two Labour and one was Nat. 115 
The Senate complained that it cou~d not allow important legislation 
of this kind to pass through without serious consideration. As 
Senator Watkins (SAP) expressed their indignation, their job was to 
"deal with Philip drunk and Philip sober" but did not 
want to suggest that the Philips who had anything to do 
with this Bill were drunk, but they were certainly in a hurry, 
and it is our business - one of our essential functions -
to check hasty legislation. 116 
The Bill was thrown out despite Malan's complaint that a similar Bill 
had been published "twelve months ago", that Senatpr Watkins was IIquite 
wrong" to think that the underlying principle of the act was "the 
betterment of the working classes" and that even the Chamber of 
Mines had apparently "accepted the {-voluntary or strike preventionJ 
principles of this measure . " Malan had not been over enthusiastic 
about the Bill's successful passage through the Senate and promptly 
114 . Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Working Class erroneously 
though that it became law. pp 219, 362 _ A" A:t,..."b;u.~'» ~II, i~<,o.t""..,(. 
V',th- 10k\!. INlj1.'$ l!.llL v.A.~ ,",-Isc: v.£.I"(.LKi i~ t-4i,s w~. 
115. House of Assembly Debates 1925 c 1597, 1667 
116 . Senate Debates 1921 vol III P 1597 
blamed them for future industrial strife, and if the Senate rejected 
the Bill, that would be "their trouble, and not mine.,,117 In 1925 
Boydell accused Smuts of purposefully killing the Bill in the 
118 Senate. Sampson I)lentioned that "there were rumblings in the lobby" 
before the Bill had passed the. third reading that it would not leave 
119 the Senate. The Rand Daily Mail suggested that 
No doubt there had percolated into the Senate some of the 
fears expressed in the Assembly that the Wages Bill would 
injuriously affect poor whites and coloured people and 
might even in the end be extended to agricultural labourers. 120 
The rejection of the two Bills was a "matter for regret", especially 
as they were considered highly by the trade unions. The Mail accused 
the Government of bad managment and suggested it should make "some 
amends by introducing them ,gain in the early part of the next session." 
The Ministry's reputation was understandably tarnished as a result of 
its behaviour. 
The Wages Bill did not achieve the same success as the Appren-
121 ticeship Bill which became law the next year. 
117. ibid pp 1946-1958 
118. House of Assembly Debates 1925 c 1597 
119. ibid c 1653 
120. RDM 16 July 1921 
In 1925 Alexander 
121. The 1921 Wages Boards Bill is erroneously referred to by a 
number of speakers, including Smuts, during the 1925 debates 
who classified it as the 1922 Bill; House of Assembly Debates, 
1925, Boydell c 1597; Smuts cs 1597-8; Chaplin c 1658; Alexander 
c 1597. 
questioned the honesty and sincerity of the SAP over the wage 
question. He wondered why they had not reintroduced the Bill in 
later sessions J pressed as they were "on all sides to do 806,,122 
Indeed, a deputation to the Minister of Mines from the Cape Federa-
tion of Labour Unions in May 1922 was referred to Patrick Duncan, 
the Minister of the Interior who 
had stated that everything possible would be done 
to get the Wage Bill through that session but 
expressed little hope that it would go through. 123 
In October, McWilliam, an executive member of the Cape Federation, 
complained that apathetic trade unionists were not doing enough to 
"secure the introduction of the Wage Bill" by failing to circulate 
" " f t th " mb 124 pet~t~ons 0 pro est amongst e~r me ers. In 1923, Thomas 
Str?chan, Labour member for Pietermaritzburg North, was told that a 
special wages Bill was redundant because of the proposed Industrial Con-
ciliation Bill which the Government had introduced that session. 125 
As it happened th.e Conciliation Bill was dropped after it had returned 
f 1 " 126 rom Se ect Comm~ttee . . 
122. ibid c 1667 
123. CFLU FEC Minutes, 12 May 1922 . CFLU papers Aa 1.2 
124. CFLU FEC Minutes 26 October 1922. CFLU papers Aa 1.2 
125. The Cape Times reports carry no trace of the exchange but cf 
speech by Dr van der Merwe who quoted the incident. He mentioned 
that ~ was informed on 26 June 1923 which is odd because 
Parliament rose on the 21 June. House of Assembly Debates 1925 
c 1670 • 
126. House of Assembly Debates as reported in ".the Cape Times v VIII 1923 
It appears that Smuts permitted the Wages Bills to be 
intrQduced in 1921 in partial fulfillment of his electoral promises. 
His party had returned to power in February 1921 with an increased 
majority. from four to twenty two. This had resulted partly from the 
dissolution of the Unionist Party and the merger of some of their 
members with the SAP. and partly at the expense of the Labour Party. 
The latter's numbers had dropped from twenty one to nine. 127 Smuts 
could thus afford to tUrn away from introducing measures which had so 
clearly caused divisions within the SAP ranks. Whether he was against 
the principle of the Bills or nQt is difficult to gauge. He left 
F S Malan the task of piloting them through the Assembly and was not 
. th H f th th o d d · t 128 even 1n e Quse or e 1r rea 1ng vo e. It is clear that 
he had to contend with rebellious members within his party and .thus 
sacrificed what remaining labouring class support he had. Senators 
also turned against him. the ranks of whom had been increased in 1921 
• b . d· . . t· 129 
, Y JU l.Cl.OUS noml.na l.ons" . 
The South African Party Government had succeeded in further 
smearing its tarnished image. Emotions were already running high 
over the way in which Smuts had dealt with the 1922 strike. The SAP 
127. Davenport. South Africa: A Modern History. Table 2. p 410 
128. House of Assembly Debates. 1925. Alexander's speech c 1667 
129. Walker p 573 
star was rapidly fading. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 did 
not prevent his defeat at the hands of the Pact in the same year. 
The organised white labour movement welcomed the Pact victory. 
The secretary of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions expressed a 
general sentiment when he wrote that they had "good reason to 
believe that the new Government will deal sympathetically with our 
problems" and would "lend an attentive ear to our representations ... 130 
Trade Union representatives were thus quite keen to accept Creswell's 
invitation to attend a conference on the unemployment problem in 
Cape Town scheduled for 26-27 August 1924. 131 The Johannesburg 
representatives immediately drew up a memorandum which outlined their 
d · d . 132 eS1res an expectat10ns. It included such recommendations as 
the introduction of a dole system in preference to relief works; the 
"institution of a small industrial commission to advise and work in 
conjunction with the Board of Trade and Industries." It called for 
the regulation of the ration of whites to blacks in favour of the 
former, by legislative means if necessary. 
I.l",l:; ... p~ 
Reputedtgold resources were 
to be exploited and they called for a bonus system for increased 
130. Stuart - C B Tyler (Building Workers Industrial Union) 3 July 
1924 CFLU papers Ac 2 
131. ego CFLU Special Federation Meeting Minutes 21 August 1924 
CFLU papers Aa 1.3 
132. RDM 26 August 1924 Reproduced in full in the ~ 22 August 1924 
1<)0 
d .. .. d tr · 133 pro uct10n 1n certa1n 1n us 1e5. Creswell opened the conference 
which was attended by forty nine skilled trades representatives, some 
Labour Members of the Legislative Assembly. and C W Cousins, the newly · 
appointed Secretary for Labour. Creswell stressed the need for confi': 
dence between Government and organised Labour if their period in 
office was to be successful. He concluded by saying that "if the nation 
was to grow to full stature" then "the basic principles on which they 
had built up their industries in South Africa must undergo very consid-
erable change .. " The Department of Statistics had further pointed 
out that existing popUlation trends meant that white civilisation 
as they knew it encapsulated. in the white population, would be 
- 134 
eradicated if population growth went unchecked. The Conference was 
clearly a forum for the discussion of ways in which a 'civilised' 
policy of reconstruction and improvement could be brought about • . 
Press coverage of the proceedings appears to have been fairly broad 
. 135 1n scope .. In all, twenty eight resolutions were passed which 
covered topics from the provision of housing to the exclusion of blacks 
from certain food producing industries. 136 At least two important 
resolutions were debated at length. One called for the "adequate 
protection and encouragement ... (of) South African manufacturing 
industries" through the provision of increased tariff and bounty 
133. EPH 22 August 1924. The RDM referred with distaste to what it 
termed "the pernicious dole system" .. 
134. RDM 27 August 1924 
135. cf RDM 27 August 1924; 29 August 1924. EPH 28 August 1924 
136 . "Resolutions", Conference of Trade Union Delegates, Department of 
Labour Archives 1427: 1069 Lc 810 RDM 28 August 1924. Johnstone,F 
~lass, Race and Gold p 156. 
I~' 
protection as long as those industries employed "a fair ratio of 
137 
civilised persons at average wages. II The first part of this 
resolution was agreed to, but the second part was not. '!his latter 
was later to be placed on the statute book with the passing of the 
1925 Customs Tariff and Excise Duties Amendment Act. The Govern-
ment was also urged to establish a "minimum 'civilised' wage through 
13a Wages Boards .. " 
The Rand Daily Mail had expressed the fear at the outset of the 
conference that 
the trade unionists may run away with the proceedings, 
and that the only outcome of the conference may be the 
formulation of a series of recommendations which will 
be quite useless so far as any practical solution of the 
L-unemploymentJ problem is concerned. 139 
Its fears were largely unfounded. Calls for the abolition of convict 
labour,the employment of 'civilised' labour in all public works, the 
dole, the ratio law, the institution of equal pay for equal work 
between men and women, and others never saw the light of day. Only 
the praroticn of a civilised labour policy in Railways and Harbours, 
137. "Resolutions" 6(l} "Resolutions" op cit. RDM 28 August 1924 
138. Resolution 1 (a) "Resolutions" op cit. Johnstone, F Class, Race 
and Gold p 156 cf ch 3 pp "'·3 below 
139. RDM 26 August 1924 Leader page 
support for the motor, iron and steel, and fishing industries, as well 
140 
as the wage boards received Government attention at this stage. 
Individual unions passed resolutions which called for the 
141 
establishment of wage boards after the conference. The Confer-
ence of Juvenile Affairs Boards met in Pretoria in September 1924. 
The Conference called, inter alia, for the establishment of a national 
wage board in order to prevent the "importation of native labour into 
urban industries" by effectively pricing Africans out of the labour 
market. Only in that way, the Conference argued, would they secure 
the interest of juveniles, "especially in unskilled and semi-skilled 
. 142 
occupatl.ons .. tl In November the Cape Division of the Juvenile 
ff . d d 11 f . . . . 1 143 A a1rs Boar supporte ca s or a m1n1mum wage to protect Juven1 es. 
It is clear that requests for the establishment of some sort of wage 
regulation issued from a fair number of organisations with various 
interests .. 
The official announcement of the legislation which was to be 
introduced in the House of Assembly during the 1925 session was made by 
140. The tariff protection system seems to have appeared from else-
where. For these resolutions cf RDM 28 August 1924 and Johnstone,F 
Class, Race and Gold, p 156 
141. 
142. 
143. 
for ego Kimberley Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and Clerks' Assoc-
tion. Harding (Secretary for KSAWCA) - Secretary for Labour. 18 
September 1924. Department of Labour Archive 1427 : 1069 Lc 180 
"Resolutions adopted at Conference of Juveniles Affairs Board, 
Pretoria, 25-26 September 1924" and "Memorandum on National Wages 
Board legislation"(no date, but presented at the Conference 
Department of Labour Archives 1427: 1069 Lc 180 
Versfeld, B J (Secretary) - Secretary for Labour 2 December 1924. 
The Resolution was passed on 14 November 1924. Department of Labour 
Archives 1427: 1069 Lc 810 
144 Creswell in a speech to his Denver constituents in January. 
Included in the package was the Bill which was later to become the 
Wage Act , and the Mines and Works Amendment Bill which became the 
Colour Bar Act of 1926 . The ire of the opposition parties was 
immediately raised as it was rumoured that Creswell contemplated intro-
d · . . f 6/ d 145 uC1ng a m1n1mum wage 0 - per ay. The parliamentary debates 
on the Wage Bill proved to be vi cious, lively and extremely long. 
Speaker after speaker rose either to lodge complaints against the 
Bill or to celebrate its provisions. The National Party caucus had 
considered and accepted the Bill in March at the same time that the SAP 
d t d tr . . th 1 46 vowe 0 es oy 1t 1n e Senate . The individual parties were not 
united over the Bill, and reflected divisions similar to those .. which had 
been evident in 1921 and 1922. The battle was fought long and hard, 
for some thought it was going to herald a new dawn,whilst others 
awaited the apocalypse. 
Creswell opened the second reading of the Bill on March 30. He 
mentioned that the Bill was needed "to avoid the public inconvenience" 
144. Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" p 85 
" 
145. Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government" p 86-7 
146. Forward 27 March 1925 
of strikes. It was itself the direct outcome of the earlier strike 
period . Because existing conciliation apparatus presupposed a 
degree of organisation on the part of both employers and employees, it 
had failed to cover adequately sweated trades, the trad~s which were 
largely unorganised. Thus the new Bill was aimed specifically at 
these trades. He also referred to the influence of the public conscience 
which held that "the state should not permit anybody to be oppressed by 
th f h . 147 any 0 er sector 0 t e commun1 ty ~ II TUrning specifically to South 
Africa, Creswell argued that because of the Union ' s heterogenous 
population different standards of living existed. Generally there 
were two: civilised and uncivilised. The former standard was classified 
as "European" and the Bill was going to ensure that industry in the 
Union was to be guided 
in a direction in which they would afford the greatest 
possible field of employment for men who require a 
rate of wages upon which they can live according to 
decent civilised standards of life. 
The Bill was meant to complement the Industrial Conciliation Act, not 
to supersede it. Agriculture was excluded because it was 
unnecessary to regulate wages in that field as farmers, in their 
pursuit of efficiency, tended to employ "an intelligent class of 
147. cf Reeves, W State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand p 49 
where he outlined the role of the press in Victoria in 
bringing sweating to the attention of the public and the outrage 
which then ensued . 
labourer and [to_7 pay them more." Horticulture, forestry, domestic 
service and pastoral pursuits, and areas covered by the Apprenticeship 
Act, were also excluded. One Wage Board would be established for the 
Union instead of the system as it then stood. He conceded that an 
initial problem of congestion would exist but argued that the benefits 
of the system overrode the negative aspects. Wages could be more 
easily co-ordinated if they were administered by one board which was 
manned by the same competent people. Furthermore, they would benefit 
from the great mass of information which would be collected under the 
auspices of the Department of Labour. Good employers would have 
nothing to worry about. They would in fact benefit from the Bill 
because the Wage Board would see to it that unfair competition from 
the "man who is sweating his employees" was eliminated. 148 A safety 
mechanism for employers existed in the procedure for the publication of 
determinations. Employees were protected by the provision that the 
onus of proof of fair dismissal and wage complaints rested with the 
employer .... He touched briefly on the 'South Africa first' theme: 
During the election it was said that the children of 
Europeans will have to get out of this country, as 
their parents can afford to send them elsewhere. 
But we think the children should be able to find a 
living in South Africa, and we propose to do our best to 
see that that is done without injustice to anyone, but 
with a very stern determination and steady pressure to 
prevent the European civilised man being crowded out of 
the country. 
148. cf P 39 note 120 above, for definitions of sweating 
The main reason for the Bill, Creswell concluded, was the provision 
that the sweated worker could be helped and industry controlled so 
that they could no longer "make a living out of the sweat and 
149 
suffering of their fellow men." 
These points were expanded upon, attacked and modified by 
other speakers during the rest of the debates. Differences of 
opinion arose between members of the same parties over the merits and 
demerits and scope of the Bill. They were also marked by the lack 
of encouragement the Bill received from the very small number of 
Nationalists who participated in the debates. In general the 
South African Party supported Smuts's amendment that the Bill be 
f d l O b f th h d dO 150 re erre to a Se ect Comm1ttee e ore e vote on t e secon rea 1ng . 
which established the principle of the Bill. Although he had stated 
that he supported the principle of the minimum wage, his amendment was 
interpreted by the government benches as opposition to that principle. 
A summary of the main points of difference and argument will suffice 
as a means to identifying the fears and hopes which came to the fore. 
Smuts expressed the opinion that the provision of equal pay for 
equal work made the Wage Bill a bill of "fundamental importance".151 
Wages were to be settled irrespective of colour. As such the wage 
149. House of Assembly Debates 1925 cs 1587-95 
150 . ibid c 1603 
151. ibid c 1595 
,~, 
policy of the Union was to be turned on its head; it was going to 
u' tr d l't h th h f be d ' ff 152 1n 0 uce equa 1. y were ere as so ar en 1. erence. II He 
pointed out that the Government itself realised that it could not 
effect that equality and quoted the example of wage differentiation 
b 1 d d h · h'l 153 etween co aure 5 an W l.tes on t e Ral. ways. The question of 
minimum wages was linked to the determination of wages. He wanted 
to know how wages would be determined in the last instance and which 
154 group of employees would be used as the measure for minimum rates. 
These points were picked up by other membeEof his party. They 
complained about the amount of power which Creswell would have as 
Minister of Labour. H ld b d · t t 155 d b ewell ecome a 1e a or, supporte y 
incompetent governmental officials, or, even worse J a board comprised 
156 
of his lackeys. Th BJ.·ll t f h' . 157 d e arose ou 0 18 egol.sm an 
represented a "declaration of war on capital" because th~ Minister 
158 had the final say. J Marwick ( Illovo ) congratulated Hertzog 
on not appointing Creswell as Minister of Mines~59 but he saw the 
B'll Cr 11' th . . . d t 160 1. as eswe s revenge on e ml.nl.ng 10 us ry. Rockey (Parktown) 
152. ibid c 1600 
153. ibid c 1601 
154. ibid c 1602 
155. ibid Smuts (Standerton) C 1598 
156. ibid Chaplin (South Peninsula) c 1659-60 
157. ibid Chaplin c 1656-7 
158. ibid Nel (Newcastle) c 1708 
159. ibid Marwick c 1722 
160. ibid Marwick c 1714 
and Gilson ( Gci~ ) stated that the Nationalists were being 
dragged along by the Labour Party .and the former stated that he 
was against any type of state interference, thus going against the 
expressed ideas of his leader . 161 Many thought that the Nationalists 
were tied to the Labourites. 162 Stuttaford (Newlands identified 
the choice before the House as one between "democratic freedom and 
socialist slavery" and argued against Creswell's proposed method of 
imposing the minimum wage. He called for a procedure of "mutual 
b t I d 1 .. . d tr· 1 ff· 163 agreement e ween emp eyers an emp oyee" 1n 1.n us 1a a al.rs. 
Reyburn Umbilo ) replied from the Labour benches that no equality 
existed between groups of employers and employees in the Union and thus 
f d . 1 · t 11 164 Stutta or's suggest10n was not a so ut10n a a . The SAP further 
165 
complained that not enough protection was granted to employers. The 
response to this was Hertzog's dictum that "good" employers need not 
166 
worry . Struggling employers could perhaps benefit from the 
exemption clauses under the Bill if the need arose. 167 
A great deal of the Assembly debates dealt with three questions 
in particular. The role of agriculture, the position of the mining 
industry and the bogey of the colour bar were thrashed out on the floor. 
161. ibid Gilson 1711 . Rockey cs 1692-3 
162. ibid Geldenhuys (Johannesburg North) c 1682. Gilson c 1713 . Gilson 
could see "the trail of the labour serpent in all the Bills before 
this House. II 
163. ibid c 1672-3 
164 . ibid c 1696 
165. ibid Chaplin c 2660; Geldenhuys cs 1681,1684; Nel cs 1706, 1708 . 
Richards (Weenen) c 1726 
166. ibid Hertzog (Smithfield) c 1593; Dr van der Merwe (Winberg) c 1671; 
Reyburn c 1699 accussed businessmen of being inefficient and unable 
to run their own businesses 
167. ibid Te Water (Pretoria Central) c 1830 
The Bill excluded agriculture, but this was no different from 
previous proposals. Smuts, somewhat hypocritically, accused 
Creswell of excluding agriculture purely as "a matter of political 
d ' 168 expe l.ency". He did not propose that agriculture be included as 
did Alexander and Brown ('lhree Rivers ) ,169 but argued instead that the 
dividing line between what comprised agricultural pursuits proper and 
agricultural industry was not clearly defined. 170 Creswell only 
succeeded in confusing it still further. Creswell made the 
distinction between "regular factory industries" and "the sort of 
domestic industries" like barn building or cheese making which would 
171 be excluded. Hertzog stated that when the industrial effort was 
"no longer part of farming but an independent industry" the Govern-
t ld t th bo d f k ' bo ' 172 men cou no "prevent e ar rom rna 1ng a report a ut l.t". 
He left the issue still as vague as ever when he in essence contra-
dicted Creswell: 
we must leave it in the hands of the board to decide 
upon it. If it is actually a subordinate part of 
farming it is covered by the Bill .•. if it is a matter 
subordinate to farming, the board ' can say that it will 
have nothing to do with it. If the Board makes a 
168. ibid c 1602 
169. ibid Alexander (Hanover Street) c 1665 . Brown in the Committee debate 
c 4439 also wanted the inclusion of domestics . 
170. Chaplin for ego accepted the, exclusion of agriculture ibid c 1663 
171 . ibid c 4466 
172. ibid c 4469 
11,0 
report thereon, then the Minister, or the Ministry, 
can say that it is not of so much importance, and 
employs so few people that the Bill should not be 
applied to it. 173 
The exclusion of farming was not wholly believed. Increases in 
rail tariffs to pay for the higher wage bill would, it was argued, 
' 1 ff h d ' f ' lt 174 necessar1 y a ect t e pro uct10n costs 0 agr1cu ure . Keyter, 
Nationalist Member for Ficksburg which bordered on one of the scheduled areas, 
accepted the Bill but expressed his misgivings about its effects on 
agriculture. If wages were increased in the numerous small factories 
in his area, the numbers of farm labourers who would be available to work 
for the lower farm rates would decrease. His reflection on low agri-
cultural wages was far closer to the truth than Creswell's comment 
'h' " I ' t' 175 1n 15 or1g1na mot1va 10n . Wage increases would further 
cause dislocation to black family life if members of the same family 
started earning widely disparate wages. This was not all. Agitators 
d f ' ld d " th h ' 'lab 176 woul have a 1e ay st1rr1ng up e ot erw1se pass1ve ourers. 
The spectre of agitation and the encouragement of black trade unionism 
caused a number of members to voice their dimpproval of the Bill. 1 77 
173 . 
174. 
175 . 
176 . 
177 • 
ibid c 4470 
ibid Stuttaford c 1677 
cf P l1q.~ above 
ibid c 1746 
Marwick referred to Kadalie's threatened disruption of railways 
and mines in the Free State if a minimum wage bill for blacks 
was not introduced and passed. ibid c 1718. Payn c (Tembuland) 
c 1813-4; Chaplin c 1664; Rockey c 1693-4. Trade unionism: 
Marwick cs 1714-5 
, Co , 
Smuts first raised the question of the mining industry in his 
reply to Creswell. He was concerned about the effect the policy 
of equal pay would have on the profitability of the mines. 178 In 
h ' h h db th t ' f" 't t 179 t 18 e was ec oe y 0 er representa 1ves 0 m1n1ng 1n eres s. 
Their grounds for concern were to a certain extent well-founded. 
Sampson ( Jeppes had expressed the desire earlier on in the 
debate that he hoped that "sooner or later the Minister will consider 
the advisability -of applying this Bill to the gold-mining industry - the 
180 
sooner, I think, for the safety of this country." Pretorius (Fordsburg) 
intimated that the Bill was necessary for uniformity of wage levels and 
used as his example the high wages of municipal workers compared to the 
low wages received by miners "who work 6 000 feet under the surface 
and who are exposed to the dreaded miners' phthisis.,,181 Creswell 
himself stated towards the end of the debate that the 
m1n1ng industry had very little place in my thoughts when this 
Bill was being framed, except in so far that I hoped it might 
make the people in the industry on both sides see the 
advantage of forming an industrial council of their own. 182 
This answer was a hollow one indeed, especially when Creswell in April 
1925 asked the House's permission to introduce his Mineworkers (Mini-
mum Rates of Pay) Bill which was designed to secure a minimum rate 
178. ibid c 1602 
179. ibid Chaplin c 1662; Rockey cs 1693-4; Marwick cs 1720-1; Watt 
(Dundee) c 1759; Nathan (Van Brandis) c 1796, all SAP members 
180 . ibid c 1655 
181. ibid cs 1685-6 
182. ibid c 1847 
for the mines. It arose directly out of a stalemate situation 
b th Chamb f " d h M" W k U" 1 83 etween e er 0 M1nes an t e Lne or ers n10n. The 
Chamber of Mines was not the only member of the mining fraternity to 
have reason to feel threatened. In response to a query from the Board 
of Control for Alluvial Diamond Interes~ the Secretary for Labour had 
communicated to the Department of Mines and Industries that in terms of 
the Wage Bill as it then stood, (and was in effect to remain), 
the terms ' employer', 'employee' J and 'trade' do include 
alluvial diamond diggers and the alluvial diamond digging 
industry. 184 
The colour bar question aroused the feelings of the Assembly to 
amazing heights. The session had already seen the introduction of the 
Mines and Works Act (Amendment) Bill which sought to enforce the colour 
bar in certain spheres of the mining industry. Smuts objected to the 
introduction of a system of equality between black and whi te in the 
185 
wage market. The Pact was attacked for introducing a policy which 
would exclude blacks from employment and ensure their replacement by whites. 
The Pact's civilised labour policy was merely a euphemism for unjust 
white advancement. 18G "This was an inaccurate assessment as it was too 
183. See chapter 3 pp '1~-""" below 
184. Secretary for Labour - Undersecretary for Mines and Industries 
20 February 1925. Department of Labour Archive 1427 : 1069 Lc 810 
185 . See above note 152. House of Assembly Debates 1925, Watt c 1761 
186. ibid Chaplin c 1663; Jagger (Cape Town Central SAP) c 1723; 
Struben (Albany SAP) c 1838; Papenfus (Hospital SAP) c 1701 
simplified, as will become evident bela<. But arguments were put 
forward to justify the exploitation of black labour "having regard 
h . 1 f . '1· . 187 to t e1r sea e 0 C1 V1 1sat10n It. Labour members replied that it 
was "unjust to say that a civilised man whether native or coloured 
will never be able to earn the same money as the white man. ,,188 
Smuts was correctly accused of favouring the colour bar as long as 
189 it did not appear on the statute book. Nationalists had a different 
conception of the operation of the Bill and Wage Board from that of 
some of the more egalitarian Labourites. Dr van der Merwe stated 
that if a civilised wage could not be de~ermined for .. an industry 
it ought either to close down or be "black altogether". He added 
that if the Union was to become a ci.vili.sed country "we must make it 
possible for as many industries as possible to exist for the white 
man, and this will be the necessary work of the Wage Board . ,; 190 
The Bill was seen as a means to force the unskilled blacks into 
d t · d f' . 191 omes 1C an arm1ng serV1ce. 
The Bill passed very quickly through the Committee stage, and 
Creswell received a letter of thanks from the Cape Federation of 
Labour Unions "for the way in which he had pushed the Bill through 
187. ibid Chaplin c 1662 
188. ibid Alexander c 1665; Reyburn c 1699; Waters ton (Brakpan Lab) c1791 
189. ibid Dr van der Merwe c 1669 
190. ibid 1671; Te Water c 1830; Moll (Christiana NF) c 1812 
191. ibid Struben c 1835; Papenfus cs 1701-2. cf the same sentiment 
voiced at the Conference on Juvenile Affairs, Pretoria, 25-26 
September 1924. Department of Labour Archive 1427 : 1069 Lc 810 
192 the Committee stage." It finally became law in July 1925 and was 
promulgated on ·1 2 February 1926. Only the future operation of the Act 
would indicate whether the opponents or protagonists of the Bill were 
correct in their respective judgements and asse~sments of its merits. 
As it turned out, both the gold mining and the diamond mining industries 
'f' d 193 were pac1 1e .. The parliamentary opposition passed away and the 
SAP came to support the Act. Labour, incorporating both a section 
of the party and organised labour, became increasingly disillusioned 
wi th the administration of the Act. Another era was about to begin. 
On the one hand labour looked ahead with greater expectations of things 
to corne whilst industry grudgingly settled down to attempt to bypass the 
provisions of the Act as effectively as possible. The attitudes of 
these two generalised groups within the Union were to change 
dramatically over the years. Capitalist accommodation and the gradual 
weakening of the organised trade union movement were effected by the 
operation of the new industrial relations system which was imposed on 
the Union's political economic structure by the Pact government. 
192. CFLU Minutes, Federation Executive 18 June 1925. CFLU papers 
Aa 1,3 
193. The gold m1n1ng industry is dealt with in ch3 ppI1~·~below. 
The Board of Control of Alluvial Diamond Diggings was later 
given the assurance that it was unlikely to be controlled by 
the Act. Budlender, D "Labour Legislation in South Africa" 
p 125 
\ 
OllIPTER3 'ltle General Features, Development and Administration of the 
Wage Act of 1925 
The Department of Labour was established in July 1924, nearly 
a month after the new cabinet was announced on 30 June. 1 It was 
divided into two branches. Rural affairs were to be run in con·· 
juction with the Department of Lands and industrial matters were to 
be administered independently. The programme for the abolition of . 
temporary relief works in favour of farmer tenancy and the land re-
settlement scheme fell under the aegis of the rural section. The 
Juvenile Advisory Boards. labour bureaux. the Factories , Apprentice-
ship. Industrial Conciliation and, later, the Wage Acts fell under 
h . d . I . 2 t e 1n ustr~a sect10n. 
The most important elements of the 1925 Wage Act need to be 
outlined . 3 The Act established a Wage Board for the Union 
which consisted of three members, one of whom was chairman, and all 
of whom were appointed by the Governor-General. Extra members 
1 . Maud, P' "The Labour Party and the Pact Government 1924-1929" 
pp 42. 46 
2. Creswell. M An Epoch of the Political History of South Africa p104 
3. The outline provided here is meant to serve merely as a legalistic 
summary of the important sections of the Act. Summaries of the 
Act appeared periodically . For example, Forward, 25 September 
1925. published an article entitled "The Wage Board: will it 
assist you" which outlined the details of the Act. Similarly, 
the first twenty-eight paragraphs of the Wage Board's public 
report dated 28 February 1929 - hereafter 1929 W8R - summarised 
the Act's provisions. 
could be appointed from time to tim~ as the need arose. The 
Governor··General could also appoint a division of the Board. whose 
purpose would be to report to the Board itself on any matter for 
which the Board requested information. 4 As noted in the previous 
chapter. the Act did not apply to anyone employed in "agricultu,(t<\. 
horticultural or pastoral pursuits. or in forestry or ... domestic 
servants in private householdS.) or to officers of Parliam.ent .. " 
Any employees of the Public Service . Railways and Harbours whose 
wages were covered by an ' Act or regulation relative to the services 
were excluded. Only the Governor··General could initiate an investi-
gation into the wages of government. provincial administration or 
railways and harbours employees other than those specifically excluded . 5 
Apprentices who fell under the jurisdiction of the Apprenticeship Act 
6 
of 1922 were not covered by the Wage Act. 
Employers and employees who were subject to binding agreements 
under the Industrial Conciliation Act were also excluded, subject to 
4. Act 27 .- 1925. Section 2 . Statutes of the Union of South Africa 
1925. "Act to provide for the determination of conditions of 
labour ahd of wages and other payments of labour, the appointment 
of a wage board and investigation as to wages and conditions 
5. 
6. 
of labour." 
ibid Section 3(1)(b). The Wage Boards in the Australian states did 
not cover "dairying. agricultural. horticultural J viticultural 
and pastoral occupations .. 11 Gordon, H P "Wages Boards and a 
Minimum Wage" p 527 
ibid Section 1 
one important proviso. 7 Wages under the agreements could not be 
lower than those set down under the wage Act in the industry 
concerned, regardless of whether those agreements had been reached 
8 
"before or after the commencement" of the Wage Act. The Board 
noted in 1929 that the provision was obscure. It was taken to 
mean that determinations could not apply to ' trades in which agree-
ments operated. But if determinations operated, employers and 
employees could enter into agreements which, if they were not lower 
than the determinations, would apply and the determinations would 
9 fall away, Thus, employees not covered by the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, namely pass-bearing Africans and indentured Indians would not be 
subject to wage regulation. The Industrial Conciliation Act could 
thus be used to undermine the provisions of wage determinations. 
On the other hand, future agreements in trades regulated by wage 
determinations were bound by the wage provisions of those determinations. 
This possibility undermined the voluntary principles of the Industrial 
7. The sections of the Industrial Conciliation Act concerned were 
section 7 which made the recommendation of an arbitrator especially 
appointed under the Act binding on all groups represented as the 
industrial court or conciliation board, and section 9 which enabled 
the Minister to extend the terms of the agreement to cover all 
other employers and employees engaged in the trade. Act 11 - 1924. 
8. Act 27 - 1925 Section 1 (2) (a) 
9. Report to the Honourable the Minister of Labour by the Wage Board 
upon the Work of the Board for the Three Years Ended 28 February 
1929 p 1 (Hereafter 1929 WBR) 
Conciliation Act and raised the spectre of a Wage Board which raised 
10 
wages at random . The confusion was removed by an amendment to 
the Act in 1930 which did two things. First, the provision for 
parity at least between agreements and determinations was removed, 
and second, only those parties subjected to binding agreements or 
awards IIprior to the date" upon which a determination came into 
11 force were exempted. This meant, in effect, that industrial 
cOJeilsno longer needed to consider the provisions of wage determina-
tions as in any way binding on them. The voluntary conciliation 
machinery provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act, became more 
amenable to employers and employees. How industrial councils 
superseded the activities of the Wage Board after 1930 is dealt with 
12 below. 
The Wage Act did not define "employee" in racial terms as was 
th ° hth d O l °1° ° 13 e case W1t e In ustr1a Conc1 1at10n Act. Instead, it 
referred to "any person whatsoever employed by or working with any 
employer . II Furthermore, an employee received payment either in kind 
or in money for his labour and included "any person working in 
association with another or others for a wage or any share of the value. 
10. cf, for example, Smuts's speech to Parliament in 1925, House of 
Assembly Debates, c 1598 
11. Wage Act, 1925, Amendment Act, 23-1930, Section 1 
12. pp ~n.&( 
13. Act 11-1924. Section 24: employee was defined to exclude "a person 
contract of service or labour is regulated by any Native Pass Laws 
and Regulations, or by Act no 15 of 1911/-Native Labour Regulation 
ActJ, or any amendment thereof. or re91;llations thereof, .... " 
of or profit derived from this output of their labour".14 It later 
became necessary to clarify this last definition to prevent evasions 
of determinations on the basis of bogus partnerships between employers 
,15 
and employees. Apart from the ~usion of people already mentioned, 
certain specified occupations were also ~uded from the provisions 
of the Act. These comprised voluntary work; teachers at universities, 
colleges, schools, etc; and work performed by people who were 
"compulsorily resident or detained in any institution under the 
direct administration of the Government or of any Provincial Adminis-
tration 11.16 The latter groups included convicts and thus convict 
labour was excluded. As was noted in chapter one, convict labour was 
an issue which elicited a great deal of attention and criticism from 
trade unionists throughout the period. 
The Wage Board could be set in motion in three ways. In itself 
it had no power to initiate an investigation. The Minister of Labour 
could request the Board to "investigate and report .•. upon any matter 
relative to wages or rates or laws or conditions of labour n '? Further, 
any association of employers and/or employees registered in terms of 
14. Act 27-1925 Section 18(1) 
15. Act 23-1930. Section 9(c). This aspect is dealt with in more detail 
below, pp ~,o « 
16. Act 27-1925. Section 18(2) 
17. ibid Section 3(1)(a) 
". 
170 
chapter III of the Industrial Conciliation Act,18 or alternatively 
where no such associations existed, those groups deemed by the 
Board to be sufficiently representative of the trade, could request the 
d ale ' . t' 19 Boar to m an 1nvest1ga 10n. Once an investigation got under 
way the Board was bound to consider the labour conditions and 
remuneration within the trade or industry, any recommendations issued 
by the Board of Trade and Industries, the cost of living in the 
particular area, the value of any remuneration other than wages and, 
most important, the ability of the industry to pay the recommended 
20 
wage. Once the Board had considered the above factors, and it 
found that it could not recommend a wage or rate which would enable 
all employees "to support themselves in accordance with civilised 
habits of life", the Board was not empowered to make a recommendation 
to the Minister. It could only report that it could not recommend a 
civilised wage. The Minister could then voluntarily request the 
Board to make a recommendation which it deemed fit.21 Given the 
18. cf Chapter 1 pp '1-1'\ above 
19. Act 27-1925 Section 3(1)(b)(ii). The method of application under 
this clause was altered in 1929 with important implications for 
the scope of the Act. This point is dealt with below, pp 11t·b 
20. ibid Section 3(2)(a),(b),(d),(e), and (c) respectively. Any 
other matters prescribed by regulation under Section 12 had to be 
considered as well. 
21. ibid Section 3(3) 
( II 
Prime Minister's definition that civilised habits of life corresponded 
22 to white standards, it is evident that this section was potentially 
di.sc::riminatory. In practice, the Board often reported to the Minister 
that it could not recommend civilised wages for all employees in a 
particular trade. on instruction to recommend wages it deemed fit 
the Board usually set wages at what it considered civilised rates for 
jobs largely done by whites and 'uncivilised' rates for others. 
These points are pursued at greater length in chapter 5 below. 
The Act also prescribed the procedure for investigations. Prior 
to 1930, the Board could only make a recommendation one month after the 
bl ' t' 'th' f" t' , , 23 pu 1ca 10n 1n e Un10n Gazette 0 1tS 1n ent10n to 1nvest1gate. 
The 1930 amendments removed this section in an attempt to rationalise 
the operation of investigations. Court judgements, many based on the 
technicalities of law had made a farce of the Act and a number of 
determinations had been declared invalid. As a result determinations 
24 
could take up to twice the normal expected time to complete. The 
Board had the power to subpoena witnesses to testify before it. 
Hearings could be held in camera and sensitive material or information 
could be withheld from the public to prevent the victimisation of 
employees or the disclosure of 'business secrets,.25 
22. cf ch. 2 pp I')" ~( above 
23. Act 21-1925 Section 5 
24 . cf pp ;;l l, ~ ' below, where this poin,t is expanded 
25. Act 27-1925 Sections 5 and 6 respectively 
\ 
Once the Board had reported or made a recommendation to th"e 
Minister, it was up to the latter to decide what action to take. 
Until 1930, if he accepted the report the recommendation had to suffer 
the rigours of the previously mentioned one month rule. Objections 
had to be called for and if these were of a serious nature, the Minister 
could refer the matter back to the Board for comment. Under the 1925 
Act, the maximum period the Board could recommend wages for was two 
years. The determination could remain in force until such time as it 
26 
was replaced. The 1930 amendment rationalised procedure so that the 
length of time between the initial investigation and the grant of a 
determination was considerably shortened. The amendment also empowered 
the Minister to alter, suspend, supersede or cancel any determination if, 
either on application from employers or employees or in his own opinion, 
the conditions in the trade had changed sufficiently to warrant such 
t " 27 ac 10n. Thus the operation and implementation of determinations 
potentially became more flexible, and the Minister's powers more evident, 
after 1930. Thit element was to have important consequences for the 
28 
operation of the Act during the depression years and after. 
Penalties for infringem;nts of the Act were stipulated. In four 
specific cases, fines were laid down. An inspector or member of the 
Board who publicised any confidential information was liable on 
26. ibid Section 7. In 1930 this whole section was replaced by a 
new one, of Act 23-1930, Section 6 
27. Act 23-1930 Section 6 also added a new Section 7a to Section 7 
which outlined this power. 
28. cf pp ~~ ~·S~ below 
conviction to a fine of up to £50. 29 Any employer or employee 
convicted fgr not meeting the full requirements of a determination 
which affected him was liable to a fine not exceeding £100. Further, 
the guilty enployer CDJld be ordered to pay into the court a sum in refund 
of monies due to the employee. 30 Similarly, a penalty of not more than 
£100, or imprisonment for up to six months without the option of a fine, 
could be imposed upon conviction of giving fraudulent evidence, refusal 
to answer lIany question relative to wages, rates, hours and conditions 
of labour" by competent authority, or for obstruction of competent 
authorities in the exercise of their duties. 31 If an employer was 
convicted of unfair dismissal or victimisation, not only could the 
court rule that the employee be reinstated, but it could also award 
damages not in excess of £50, or both. The defendant could further 
find himself imprisoned for up to three months if he failed either to 
reinstate, or to pay damages to, the employee. 32 Lastly, section 16 
of the Act prescribed that anyone convicted of an offence not included 
in the above list would be liable to a fine of up to £50. The labour 
movement loudly denounced the courts for imposing inadequate fines. 
A great deal of controversy arose over court rulings about the payment 
of damages. The pdncipal Act was amended in 1930 in such a way that any 
order of court affecting payment ~f monies due should have "all the 
29. Act 27-1925 Section 6(2) 
30. ibid Sect,ion 8(2) 
31. ibid Section 11(3) 
32. ibid Section 13(3) 
17<f 
effects of and may be executed as if it were a civil judgement in favour 
33 
of the Crown." , This had the effect of tightening controls on employers 
and was done partly to assuage trade union complaints of lenience on 
the part of the courts. 
The compulsion of employers to pay correct wages was encouraged 
by a section which forbade employers and employees to contract for wages 
lower than those prescribed in a determination. Contracts of that 
nature were void, and the guilty parties could be fined if convicted. 34 
Employers were obliged to keep accurate records of all aspects of their 
enterprise. The wages paid to employees, the hours they worked as well 
as administrative details like the. address of the nearest inspector, all 
had to be kept up to date. The onus of proof in any allegation of 
an employer's failure to comply w{ti, the conditions of a 
determination lay with the employer himself. 35 The duties of inspectors 
employed by the Labour Department to monitor industries were defined. 
The Act also made provision for exemptions whereby employers or employees 
could be exempted from a determination as a whole, or merely some sections 
of it. Specific guidelines were instituted by the Labour Department to 
regulate the granting of such exemptions. 36 
33. Act 23-1930 Section 7(c)(2)(c). pp )~. If- below 
34. Act 27-1925 Section 8(3) 
35 . ibid Section 15 
36 . ibid Sections 9,10,11 respectively, cf ppl'~~( below for expanded 
comment .on these points. 
f 7s' 
As with many other laws, the Wage Act made provision for the 
compilation of regulations "for the effective carrying out of the 
37 
objects" of the Act. The most significant regulations gazetted 
stipulated the format of the application form which registered 
organisations or representative associations 38 had to fill in if they 
wanted the Board to investigate the conditions of their trade. At first, 
both used the same form. Prior to the 1930 amendments to the Wage and 
Industrial Conciliation Acts the regulation was changed. Henceforward, 
groups which were not registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act 
had to utilise a different form. 39 The memorandum which outlined the 
grounds for the investigation and established the applicant's bcna fides 
had to bear the signatures of all the employers/employees who supported 
the "FPlication. The largest group of people affected by the amended 
regulation were pass-bearing African workers who were precluded from 
registration under the Industrial Conciliation Act. 40 The vast 
bulk of the African, Indian and Coloured workforce was illiterate. 41 
It was this regulation that commentators on the Wage Act have largely 
37. ibid Section 12 
38. In short: organisations registered in terms of 
chapter III of the Industrial Conciliation Act, and unregistered 
associations deemed by the Wage Board to be representative of the 
particular branch of the trade concerned. 
39. The Regulations of 1926 and 1930 are reproduced in Appendix A 
p ~If l>" below. 
40. The reasons for this are given in chapter 1, pp "7-7~ abcve. 
41. Even though Coloureds were covered by the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, that did not mean that their unions would have automatic 
registration. 
Similarly, the mere fact 
of registration did not necessarily mean that they would fare any 
better, as in the case, for example, of the (coloured) Port 
Elizabeth Milling Employees' Union; cf .pp 3~~ below. 
'7~ 
42 
concentrated on. to indicate that the Wage Board operated on a racial 
basis. 
The salient features of the Wage Act can now be summarised. It 
established a national Wage Board which could be divided into other units 
if circumstances required such action. It covered all employers and 
employees regardless of race except those in specially delineated 
categories. Agriculture and domestic service. two areas almost wholly 
dominated by African labour. were among those exluded. whilst the mining 
industry with its large unskilled workforce was included. State 
employees for the most part and convict labourers were excluded. whilst 
employers and employees in manufacturing and secondary industry could be 
covered. The procedure which the Board had to follow was lengthy and 
cumbersome until it was rationalised in 1930. The discretionary powers 
vested in the Minister of Labour under the 1925 Act were increased in 
1930. Penalties for infringements of the Act were stipulated. 
Certain loopholes which were used by employers to get around the 
payment of monies were closed in 1930 as well . Rules were laid down to 
enable easier enforcement of the provisions of determination. Lastly. 
the most important regulation ~ the method of application. Its 
amendment in 1929/30 went a long way to secure the exclusion of the vast 
number of illiterate African workers. 
Advocate F A W Lucas. KC. was appointed the first chairman of the 
Wage Board. Not only was he a long-standing friend of creswel143 but 
42. cf Introduction 
43. Creswell. M An Epoch of the Political History of S A. P 106 
• 
/17 
he had had close contact with the labour movement itself. Ibydell, as 
Minister of Labour, told Parliament that Lucas was chosen because of 
"his high standing professionally" and his "considerable experience as 
an arbitrator and counsel in industrial disputes and investigations. ,,44 
The other two members were A T Roberts and J F Malherbe, both of the 
Department of Justice. Boydell envisaged that the division system would 
be used quite often and expressed the belief that the members of the 
Board would individually chair divisions, hence the requirement that they 
11 h 'd" 1 ' 45 a ave JU ~c~a experlence. W Freestone, President of the C FLU, 
twice joined the Board as a temporary member,first when Roberts went on 
46 leave in 1928 and then for six months in 1929 when Lucas took leave. 
Malherbe was recalled on promotion to the Justice Department in 1930 and 
47 his place was taken by a civil servant, A C van der Horst. Roberts, 
who had acted as Chairman during Lucas's absence, died in April 1935. 48 
Two additions were then made to the Board in the persons of the Rev E J J 
49 
van der Horst and T G Strachan. The Board's term of office expired in 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
House of Assembly Debates, 1926: col 783. 
" 
' fiJl' ~ , 
House of Assembly Debates, 1926, ::01 783 
Forward 16 March 1928 and Executive Council Papers, file 1084/3066-7 
respectively 
H W Sampson - H Pereira, 1 December 1930, in reply to an un traced 
letter, Pereira - Sampson, 25 November 1930. Transvaal Executive 
Council General Correspondence ~929-1932, Loose Correspondence, 
File 6, SALP Archive 
48. Executive Council Reports, file 1 084/3066-7; Department of Labour 
Annual Report UG 4-1937, p72 
49 . Department of Labour Annual Report UG4-1937, p 72 
, )~ 
August of that year and a new Board was appointed. F McGregor, 
W H Windsor and Dr J H Botha took over the rems, with McGregor as 
Chairman. All of the members had had some dealings either with the 
Labour Department or were au fait with labour and industrial affairs . 
The only controversial appointment appears to have been A C van der 
Horst, who upset Labourites and eventually clashed with Lucas. The 
question of the importance of the personnel of the Board is dealt with 
in chapters four and five below. 
Lucas outlined two main aims the Board had set itself at its in-
augural meeting in Cape Town on 17 February 1926. It desired first 
to "safeguard civilized standards of living for all classes of workers 
irrespective of race or colour ·'~ and second) not. to interfere with the 
"productive energy of the c.ommunity" so as not. to impede economic 
growth. The Wage Board's task in the scheme was 
to establish in the country as soon as it is reasonably 
possible 'a just and balanced system of wage regulation' 
avoiding as far as "possible the irritating contrasts in 
wages which lead to trouble and the securing. of a wage level 
which will, as far as is humanly possible, give satisfaction. 
The need for action has been clearly pointed out, and the Board 
will not shirk from taking the responsibility where necessary. 
The Board's aim is to create a system under which industry 
will be stimulated and its products justly distributed. 50 
The extent to which the Wage Board was able to fulfill its aims 
became clear after it began operating. Its operation to stimulate 
50. Quoted in 1929 WBR, P 3 
, -
industry is analysed in chapter four. The statement that it 
operated "irrespective of race or colour" is challenged in chapters 
five and six below. The rest of this chapter is devoted to an ex~-
ination of other developments. 
The Wage Act included the mining industry within its jurisdiction. 
Its passage through Parliament was greeted with hostility by the Gold 
Producers' Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. 51 Yet, by 
1928, the Chamber's opposition to the Act had waned, largely because 
it had circumvented the Wage Act. The mining companies, forced onto 
the defensive in a dispute with white mineworkers, opted for the 
machinery of the Industrial Conciliation Act. The manner in 
which the mining industry thus escaped regulation under the Wage 
Act is dealt with below. Similarly, the position of industry and 
commerce changed from support to opposition and then back to support. 
A section which identifies a number of the factors which determined 
functional parameters for the Wage Board concludes the chapter. 
Under'that heading are included issues like the evasion of determina-
tions by employers and employees alike, the Labour Department's policy 
on the prosecution of offenders, the activities of the courts which 
led to the invalidation of determinations and the imposition of ~mall 
fines, the constant delays which slowed down the ratification of 
determinations and the shift in emphasis which took place from wage 
determinations to industrial council agreements. Simplistically 
put, the Wage Board faced a hostile reception from employers during 
51. Hereafter abbreviated as GPC 
the first years of its existence. The hostile climate thus 
engendered was compounded by procedural problems which alienated 
worker support. The depression years witnessed the principal Act's 
amendment which rationalized procedure and helped to make the Board 
operate more easily after 1930. As the altered conditions after the 
depression took root the Wage Act declined in importance and most of 
its work was taken up by industrial councils. It is with these devel-
opments that we are here concerned. 
The developments which led up to the final de facto removal of 
the mining industry from the ambit of the Wage Act are complex. 
The conflict that arose between white mineworkers, represented by 
the South African Mine Workers' Union and the South African Reduction 
Workers' Association, and the Gold Producers' Commi·ttee of the Chamber 
52 
of Mines was of wider importance than Rob Davies's analysis suggested. 
His conclusions that "the white mine employees did make certain 
economic gains" which remained "firmly within limits ... tolerable 
to mining capital" and that "rank and file white workers II became 
increasingly despondent with the Pact thereafter, are correct as far 
53 
as they go. Davies was not concerned with "the details of the fairly 
complex process of wage bargaining which ocurred" between 1924 'and 
1927".54 Failure to analyse those details caused Davies to under-
52. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour, pp 182-190, 228-9 
53. ibid pp 183 and 229 respectively 
54. ibid P 183 
I g-, 
,estimate the actual extent and nature of the State's intervention 
and also to underplay the tensions and splits within the white 
miners ' trade union organisations which largely contributed to their 
eventual capitulation. 
In July 1918 the Chamber and SAMWU agreed, inter alia, to a 
55 
schedule of minimum wages for underground workers. This wage 
agreement comprised part of the Chamber's offers in response to 
white miner demands which eventually culminated in the Status QUo 
56 Agreement of September 1918. Towards the end of the 1922 
strike, the GPC declared that all agreements between itself and the 
mineworkers were null and void. 57 The battle that waged from 1924 
to 1927 resulted from the encouragement that the victory of the Pact 
government in 1924 gave to white labour generally. White miners 
attempted "to restore their wage rates to their pre-1922 levels in 
58 terms of real purchasing power if not in monetary terms . " 
J George, the South African Association of Employees' Organisations' 
representative on the Advisory Council of Trade Unions for the Mining 
55. "Award of the Arbitrators in Certain Matters in Dispute between 
the Gold Mining Companies, Members of the Transvaal Chamber of 
Mines, and Certain of their Employees" in Transvaal Chamber of 
Mines, Mining Industry Arbitration Board, p 519. Johnstone, F A 
Class, Race and Gold, p 109 
56. cf. Chapter 1, pp ~~-bO above 
57. "Award of the Arbitrators", p 520 
58. Davies, R capital, State and White Labour, p 183 
\ 
Industry and Victoria Falls Power Company, claimed that the cost of 
living on the Witwatersrand in 1925 was 30\ higher than in 1914, 
but that real wages had dropped by 22.5\ for the same period. 59 
Davies noted that the mining companies had reduced wages by between 
25% and 50\ after the 1922 strike. 60 Structural changes in the 
work process had occured which caused changes in the division of labour. 
Some whites had been removed from certain jobs into others which 
involved greater responsibility and more work for the same wage. The 
Hildick-Smith judgment had made the widely acknowledged ultra vires 
status of the colour bar official in 1923,61 and miners feared that 
the mine owners would act against them. In the end the mineowners 
did not enforce the judgment but mineworkers' fears still persisted. 62 
In August 1924 the conference of trade union delegates accepted 
a resolution which called for t4e establishment of wages boards in 
59. Minutes : ACTU in the MI and VFPC. 12 July 1925; 23 August 1925. 
SATUC papers, Ca3 
60. Davies, p 183 
61. Both trade unionists and officials realised at least astearly as 
1920 that the regulations of the 1911 Mines and Works Act were 
operated ultra vires: cf UG34-'20 Majority Report 5163, and the 
"Memorandum on the Colo'lr Bar" submitted by the three trade 
unionists, (Archie Crawford, J Forrester-Brown and B Pohl) who 
served on the Commission at paras. 4 and 17 
62. For a deeper analysis of the socio-economic context of this 
question cf Chapter 2 above 
\ I (?3 
all industrial undertakings, including mining. 63 SAMWU submitted 
demands based on five essential grievances to the GPC on 2 Septem-
ber 1924. 64 They demanded an "all-round increase in wages") payment 
for May Day and Dingaan's Day,65 time and a half for overtime and 
double pay for Sundays. They further called for improved working 
66 
conditions and demanded that miners would not be overworked. 
67 Their demands were not acceded to by the GPC. From that moment the 
struggle between white workers and mine owners began in real earnest. 
Towards the end of 1924, SAMWU applied for, and was granted, 
the establishment of a conciliation board. The dispute between the 
two parties was not settled and the only agreement they reached was on 
the appointment of Judge J de Villiers as mediator in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act . As the Union and the Committee could not 
agree, De Villiers issued a report in early 1925. 68 His position as 
mediator meant that his was only an. advisory report with "no more 
legal effect than the report of a commission appointed to make an 
63. cf. Chapter 2. pp I~~ " ~':iliove. Davies, Capital, state and White 
Labour, pp183-4, incorrectly restricted the call to the ' mining 
industry, perhaps because his sources do not mention the parti-
cular resolution ooOCBrned (ibid, P 233 note 16) 
64. "Award of the Arbitrators", p 520 
65. 1 May and 16 December respectively 
66. Urnsebenzi, 10 December 1926 
67. "Award of the Arbitrators", p 520 
68. ibid, P 520 
" 
<" 
investigation ". 69 Nevertheless, SAMWU pressed for the implementation 
of the report, for De Villiers had reported largely in their favour. 
The wage increase recommended was rigid and independent of 
market fluctuations which c ould seriously harm the profitability 
of the mines. An award of 20% of the basic grade rates, without 
"any differential or secondary wage ll was made and could not 
be used "either to increase or decrease the amount to be paid." 
The mineworkers noted that the latter proviso meant that employers 
could not deduct any monies paid above the basic rate from the per-
70 
centage increase due. The GPC categorically rejected the De 
Villiers report and Union attempts to win the Committee over failed 
dismally.71 It was at this stage that the government stepped in . 
Creswell asked the House for leave to introduce a "Bill to 
determine the minimum rates of wages or other remuneration in mines 
on the Witwatersrand" on 16 Apri.l 1925. His action was justified, he 
argued, as a Bill was necessary to implement a section of the De Villiers 
d · h I' h f h h ' . 72 awar 1n t e 19 tot e Cambers' 1ntrans1gence. The degree of 
hostility to a suggestion of that nature was clearly evidenced by the 
69. Lucas, "The Determination of Wages in South Africa" p 51 
70. Forward 6 March 1925 
71. "Award of the Arbitrators" p 520 
72. House of Assembly Debates, 1925, c 2157 
, 
fact that no less than four members of the House rose to oppose 
73 the Minister's proposal. Their arguments dealt mainly with the 
bleak prospects for the future of the fledgling Industrial Concilia-
tion Act .and employer/employee relations if the Minister's action 
74 
established a precendent. Part of the problem lay in the fact 
that the contents of the Bill were not yet known: it was only 
published on 22 April 1925. 75 Smuts's attempt to have the Bill 
struck from the Order Paper on a standing rule technicality failed. 
Creswell introduced the Bill, read it a first time and had the 
second reading set down for 23 May. In the event, that reading was 
postponed and the Bill was finally struck from the Order Paper on 
76 the Speaker's ruling on 10 July. 
73. They were Chaplin, Close, Blackwell and Smuts. Blackwell claimed 
that he supported De Villiers' recommendations, but protested 
against the way in which Creswell attempted to get them accepted. 
74. House of Assembly Debates, 1925, c 2157-2163 
75. Government Gazette Extraordinary. No 1468 22 April 1925 
76. Smuts referred to the Standing Rules for the conduct of Parliament 
to support his argument that it was tlnot proper" to introduce a 
second Bill in the same session which dealt with the same~ubject 
matter as contained in a Bill already before the House which, in 
this case, was the Wage Bill. The Speaker referred to Erskine 
May's IBrliamentary Practice (11 th edition, p 468) to overrule 
Smuts as no rule existed to restrain tithe introduction of two or 
more Bills relating to the same subject and containing similar 
provisions" (House of Assembly Debates, c 2163-4). The Speaker 
conceded that a different decision could be arrived at once the 
Bill was published and its contents properly known. On 10 July 
the Speaker drew attention to House of Commons practice and the 
Unions ' S own standing orders. He concluded that members were 
left with "perfect freedom of action '" to introduce whatever 
Bills they wish, and it is only when a Bill has passed the third 
reading or has been rejected, that another Bill of the same substance 
cannot be proceeded with, and the rule as to the same question not 
being twice offered/-in the same session 7 comes into operation .. 
(c 5831). The Wage Bill had passed through its third reading on 
23 June, and for this reason the Mineworkers' (Minimum Rates of 
Pay) Bill was officially struck from the order paper. 
In the interim, loud voices of protest were raised against 
the Bill. It is clear that the delay over the second reading 
resulted in the Bill's demise, but the standing rules contained no 
rule to prevent the incorporation of the Bill's provisions into the 
77 Wage Bill amending the latter. To assess the causes of thes extent of 
its hostile receiption we need to examine the extra-parliamentary reasons 
for the Bill's removal from the order list. 
The rejected Mineworkers' Bill was short and to the point. 
78 It specifically excluded Africans, but not other blacks . Mine-
workers' wages were specified according to occupation in a schedule 
to the Bill. The wage rates could only be altered by agreement 
between associations of employers and employees which the Minister 
considered sufficiently representative. De Villiers had recommended 
a stronger version of that proposal, but the Bill placed a great deal 
of discretion in the hands of the Minister of Labour. Wages regulated 
by the Bill (if it became law) would have effect until 31 December 1925, 
regardless of any action taken under any of the other laws which 
regulated wages, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act and the 
envisaged Wage Act. Furthermore, employees who had commenced work 
on 1 October 1924 would be entitled to backpay. Failure to pay the 
required wage was punishable on conviction with a fine not in excess 
77. House of Assembly Debates, c 5831-3, Speaker's ruling 
78. This was in accordance with the definition of IInative labourer" 
in the Native Labour Regulation Act, 15-1911, section 2 which 
classified "native" as !lany member of the aboriginal races or 
tribes of Africa. II 
of £50 plus compensation. Just more than half of the occupations 
catered for fell outside the scope of the 1911 Mines and Works Act 
regulations. They were divided into three groups and wages were 
to be increased by 20% on the 1918 minima. 79 
It is possible that the GPC took exception to the Bill because 
Creswell. well known for his enmity towards the mining companies. was 
the Minister of Labour and would thus be responsible for the adminis-
tration of the Bill if it passed into law. More concrete objections, 
on the other hand. were not lacking. The GPC addressed itself directly 
to Creswell on the day after the Bill was published.80 Copies of 
the letter were sent out to all members of Parliament soon afterwards. 81 
The GPC argued that the Bill would detrimentally affect, ancillary 
industries and consequently increase the CQst of living. 82 They 
argued that dissatisfaction would erupt within the ranks of the 
14 600 odd whites who would not be affected by the proposed increases. 83 
Similarly. but more important. black unrest would inevitably follow. 
not only in the mines as had ocurred in 1920, but in manufacture and 
84 industry as well. Furthermore, only a small, privileged sector of 
79. cf Appendix B pp 11«(. ' 7 below. 
BO. Anderson, P M (President GPC) - Minister of Labour, 23 April 1925. 
This letter was printed as a pamphlet in English and Afrikaans 
under the title: "Facts in Connection with the Mineworkers' 
(Minimum Rates of Pay) Bill~,hereafter abbreviated as "Facts" 
B1 . RDM 2B April 1925 
82 . "Facts" paras .. 15, 19 
B3. ibid para. 6 
84. ibid paras . 10. 11 
l 'rt 
the white and coloured miners would be affected. Higher earners 
faced an increase and lower paid men would face an effective 
85 
reduction in their respective wage packets. They correctly accused 
De Villiers of supporting the white labour policy by extending the 
recommendations to coloured labourers who would be entitled to immediate 
back pay of c E100. 86 That fact, they argued, represented " a direct 
attack on the employment of such persons in the underground occupa-
tions open to them" at the time. 87 Seven mines would have to close. 
with consequent further retrenchment of white workers. 88 The 
Committee saw the Bill as an unashamedly biased attack on the industrial 
conciliation machinery of the union. 89 Leading mine officials 
vehemently complained about the Governrnen~s action. In July 1925, 
A French, speaking on behalf of Sir George Albu, Chairman of the General Mining 
and Finance Corporation, expressed a common opinion when he stated that 
85. 
86. 
87. 
Ministers have paid us L the mining industry~ the doubtful 
compliment of introducing ... a number of draft Bills 
affecting the mining industry. In no single instance 
can any of these Bills be considered as helpful to the 
industry, but rather do they take the form either of 
adding further to the already overtaxed mining companies or 
aim at placing on the freedom of action of the managment 
restrictions which are utterly unjustifiable. 90 
ibid paras. 3, 6 
ibid paras. '.2 
ibid para 1 
88. The mines were: East Rand Proprietary Mines, Ltd.; Geldenhuis 
Deep, Ltd.; Modderfontein East, Ltd.; New Kleifontein, Co. Ltd.; 
Nourse Mines, Ltd.; West Rand Consolidated Mines, Ltd,; and 
89. 
90. 
Wolhuster Mines,Ltd. Theycollectively employed 3 772 whites. 
ibid para 12 
ibid. para 22-26 
Quoted by Scholtz, G D Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke 
van die Afrikaner, v VII, P 200. Scholtz refers to two other 
speeches by Ernest Oppenheimer, RDM 18 May 1925, and P MAnderson, 
at the annual meeting of the Chamber of Mines, ~ 29 June 1925 
Scholtz, p 199 
The prospects for the Bill's future looked bleak in the face 
of the GPC's opposition to it. The mineworkers for their part 
91 threatened to strike if the Bill was not passed. Their demand for 
the reconstitution of the De Villiers mediation board was turned 
down by Creswell. Following Union pressure, the GPC agreed to meet 
SAMWU. The committee suggested a "temporary arbitrary increase" 
on 3 June. They stressed that the proposed increase had nothing to 
do with the De Villiers award but was agreed upon "solely with a 
view to meeting the request of the Government that the minimum rates 
of pay of certain classes of underground workers should be increased." 
The agreement, if acceded to, was to lapse one month after the 
92 publication of the Economic and Wage Commission's Report or 31 
. 93 
March 1926, whichever date came first. A meeting of the Advisory 
Cbuncil of Trade Unions in the Mining ·Industry and Victoria Falls 
Power company94 unanimously accepted resolutions which called on 
SAMWU not to accept the GPC's offer, and to insist on an increase of 
95 6d per hour. Creswell despatched Waters ton to the Witwatersrand 
to pacify the miners with the announcement of a pay increase of 6d 
per day. Creswell's apparent apostasy at this ~ture was attributed 
91 . RDM 4, 15 June 1925 
92. The Commission was appointed in terms of Government Notice 1332 
dated 4 August 1925, and reported on 29 January 1926 
93. "Award of the Arbitrators" p 521-2 
94. The Unions represented were the Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the Boilermakers Union, 
The Ironmoulders Society, the Building Workers' Industrial Union, 
SAMWU, the Reduction Workers Union, the South African Organisa-
tion of Masons and SAAEO 
95. ACTU Minutes, 12 July 1925. SATUC papers Ca 3 
to the government's desire to maintain industrial peace during the 
Prince of Wales's visit to South Africa in the middle of the year. 
In the event, SAMWU accepted the 6d per day increase, which, it was 
jocularly noted, would enable miners to purchase "an extra glass of 
96 beer" .. That settlement did not include all of the miners' original 
demands. The absence of a total settlement, perhaps compounded by 
tensions within the mining trade union ranks, induced Creswell to 
assure SAMWU of a Wage Board investigation if no settlement was 
97 
reached one month after the Economic and Wage Commission reported. 
Negotiations between State, Chamber of Mines and white miners were 
complicated by the retrenchment of white miners towards the end of 
1925. Wages, retrenchment and miners' action now placed the industry 
and the state in a critical position which needed rapid resolution. 
The National Executive Committee of SAAEO agreed that if the 
Chamber did not cease retrenching miners, the Council would apply 
for a conciliation board to investigate the matter. SAAEO acted on 
98 SAMWU's request, which in turn formally justified its cause on an 
"implicit pledge of protection to •. .. white workers in the Union against 
d . . umbe b th 1 . . . 99 re uct10ns l.n n rye ate Prl.me Ml.nl.ster, Gen Smuts" Smuts 
had stated in 1921 that he "did not want the black man to be put in 
96. This was apprently ~tridge's quip at a constituency report back 
meeting in reply to Tielman Roos's query as to the benefit of 
such a paltry pay increase . Kentridge, M I Recall pp 140-2 
97. "Award of the Arbitrators" p 521 
98. SAAEO NEC Minutes, 1 December 1925, SATUC papers Ca 1.1 
99. SAMWU statement included in a letter from SAAEO - Minister of 
Mines and Industries, 3 December 1925 . SATUC papers, C c 5.4 
the positions ••• L of J the White man" . nor for "the whites to go 
down in number" but that the avoidance of both events depended on 
the efficent use of black labour. 100 The miners expected the Pact 
to "redeem that pledge without increased introduction of foreign 
1 bo ,,101 a ur .. The GPC refused to co operate with SAAEO. The Commi tt.ee 
did not think that the organisation was at all "representative of the 
employees on the gold mines" and refused to recognise it. 102 Eoydell, 
only recently installed as Minister of Labour,turned down the SAAEO's 
applications for a conciliation board on the grounds that he considered 
it "inadvisable at this juncture to consider the appointment of a 
C ·1 ' t ' d 103 onC1 1a 10n Boar .11 In March the NEC accepted recommendations 
that they withdraw their application on the understanding that the 
government would agree to consider their written report on the issue 
"in terms of its L-the governmentsJ promise to the deputation which met 
the Government in· November L-1925J with a view to preventing a 
100. Quoted in Report of the Trade Union Delegation to Ministersof 
Mines and Industries, Defence, and Labour,23 November 1925 . 
SATUC papers, Ca 3 
101. SAAEO - Minister of Mines and Industries, 3 December 1925. 
SATUC papers Cc5.4 
102. GPC - SAAEO 22 December 1925, in reply to SAAEO - GPC, 
7 December 1925. SATUC papers Cc5.4 •. Terms of recognition 
of trade uions were laid down by the mining industry after the 
1922 strike. (Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Mining Industry 
Arbitration Board p 283, Annexure A) These were changed in 
1937 with the effect that the Companies would only recognise 
one union per class of employee (Simons and Simons Class and 
Colour in South Africa, p 523) 
103. Secretary for Minister of Labour - SAAEO, 15 January 1926. 
Letters of application were dated 24 and 31 December 1925. 
On 14 January 1926 SAAEO requested a reply to their applications . 
Cousins informed them on 15 January that the application was 
refused. The Secretary for Mines and Industries claimed in a 
letter to SAAEO on 16 January that insufficient evidence of 
retrenchment existed to warrant the establisrnent of a concilia-
tion Board. SATUS papers Cc5.4.See als.o SATUC NEC Minutes, 
19 January 1926. SATUC papers, Ca 1.1 
- '. 
104 
recurrence of such entrenchment ." 
("I z-
It was quite clear that the initial support enjoyed by the miners 
from government was on the wane. This change in attitude perhaps had 
something to do with Hertzog'S cabinet reshuffle in November 1925 . 
Creswell relinquished the Labeur Department but retained Defence. 
EOydell became Minister of Labour and left the fairly innocuous 
Posts and Telegraphs portfolio to the more radically inclined 
Walter Madeley, who became the third Labour Minister in the Cabinet 
promised to the SALP by Hertzog after the formation of the pact. 10S 
Margaret Creswell later commented that Madeleywas safest in Posts 
and Telegraphs usince it was a state enterprise" where his socialist 
106 tendencies could be held in check. The importance of the Boydell-
Creswell rearrangement soon became ~lear. 
Soon after as&~ing his new position Boydell commented that he 
would "like to see wage disputes, etc., settled, not by strikes and 
upheavals, but by consultation and agreement through the medium of 
established machinery. ,,107 That sentiment was in contrast to 
104 . SAAEO NEC Minutes, 2 March 1926, SATUC papers, Ca 1.1 
105. Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Government 1924-1929" 
pp 143-4 
106. Creswell, M An Epoch of the Political History of South Africa 
p 109 
107 . Forward, 20 November 1925 
1'1 3 
Creswell's actions over the Mineworkers' (Minimum Rates of Pay) 
Bill when he tried to force aspects of the De Villiers award on 
reluctant mineowners. In August 1925 Roos and Creswell met a 
delegation of miners' representatives. At that meeting they 
had advised that the wage and retrenchment negotiations be deferred 
"till the wage board was constituted when {-those mattersJ would 
receive first consideration. II Creswell repeated the promise at a 
bl · . f d 108 pu 1C meet1ng soon a terwar s. Throughout 1925 the Department 
of Labour had come under heavy fire from the GPC. When Creswell's 
attempt to chastise the mining companies with his ill-fated Miners' 
P.ay Bill failed, he then promised to invoke, legitimately, the Wage 
Act to control them. It will be recalled that Creswell himself 
was anxious to keep the peace when workers reacted in the face of the 
109 GPCs intrl!-ooigence over the De Villiers award. On the other hand, 
Creswell, more than any other minister besides Roos, was prepared 
to make serious inroads into the mines' autonomy and profit margins. 
General accounts of Boydell's move to ~ Labour Department concentrate 
solely on the idea that the SALP was given a third cabinet position, 
or see 't t tr . 1 110 • as no con overS1a . It seems not unlikely that 
Creswell's attitude to the mining industry could have embarrassed 
108. ACTU Minutes, 23 August 1925, and SATUC NEC Minutes, 18 April 
1926, SATUC papers, Ca3 and Ca 1.2 respectively 
109. cf pp If'l-qo above 
, 
110. ego Maud, P "The Labour Party and the Pact Gcvernment 1924-1929" 
pp 143-4; Creswell, M An Epoch of the Political History of South 
Africa p 109; Davenport, T R H South Africa: A Modern History 
p 199; Simons and Simons Class and Colour in South Africa p 323 
Hertzog. In order not to infuriate the Chamber too much, 
Creswell was removed from his post, at least until the storm had 
passed. After his departure the fortunes of the miners went from 
bad to worse. 
Tielman Roos let off a volley against the Chamber in 
December. Speaking in Kentridge's Troyeville constituency he openly 
challenged the Chamber that if they continued to retrench white miners, 
the government would not hesitate to increase the tax on mines. In 
the event of a collision between Chamber and Government, he warned, 
111 
"sou eersgenoemde die slegste daarvan afkom". Notwithstanding the 
Department of Labour's refusal in January 1926 to establish a concilia-
tion board, . the SAMWU once again took up the cudgels. In February it 
was suggested that the miners should apply for an industrial council. 112 
The NEC of SAAEO recommended that SAMWU should request "the Minister 
of Labour to submit the wages of mine-workers to the Wage Board for 
investigation"because not all of the affected unions had submitted 
recommendations for IIco-ordinated demands. u113 In March, Cousins, 
111. Brits, J Tielman Roos p 228 
112. 
113. 
Moore, A (General Secretary of the Reduction Workers' Assoc-
iation) - SAAEO, 23 February 1926. SATUC NEC Minutes, 18 
April 1926. SATUC papers ca 1.2 
SAAEO NEC Minutes, 2 March 1926. SATUC papers Ca 1.1 
the Secretary for Labou~suggested that an industrial council would 
114 be a better idea as it could operate on wider terms of reference. 
SAMWU accepted SAAEO's. advice, and jettisoned the idea of an indus-
trial council for the industry as a whole. The miners, according 
to J Hardman the MWU secretary, "had made up their minds" to submi t 
their claims to the Wage Board "as promised by Col Creswell when he 
was Minister of Labour.,,115 W J Wilson, a former acting-secretary 
of the Union, expressed scepticism about the benefits which could be 
gained on application to the Board . But he noted that his union's 
members "would say that the Executive had let them down if they 
departed from the policy of asking for a Wage Board enquiry." 
The unions, it was suggested! should form an industrial council amongst 
themselves tc "facilitate proceedings"and make the Wage Board's work 
. 116 
eas~er~ Boydell himself had noted that an industrial council for 
the industry was "the best way out",117 but in the face of SAMWU's 
resistance Cousins conceded to Andrews that if an industrial council 
proved impracticable, Boydell would be "prepared to instruct the 
114. Cousins - Wallace, (Acting Secretary, SAAEO) 12 March 1926, 
and SAAEO NEC Minutes, 16 March 1926, SATUC papers, CcS.4 and 
Ca 1.1 respectively. 
115. cf pp ,qo above 
116 . SATUC NEC Minutes, 18 April 1926. SATUC papers Ca 1.2 
117. ibid 
d f . 118 Wage Boar to unctl.on" .. During debate at the meeting of 18 
April, two resolutions were carried in spite of strident 
opposition. The NEC resolved in effect not to reject the prin-
ciple of an industrial council. They ought to fight for one but 
. 119 
ought not to "prejudice the right of appeal to the Wage Board." 
At about the same time, the Reduction Workers' Association, who had 
been excluded from the arrangements surrounding the "temporary 
arbitrary increase" mentioned above, also applied for a Wage Board 
investigation . Soydell tried to get SAMWU, the GPC and the Assoc-
iation together to sort out their differences in an attempt to avoid 
the. applications for wage board investigations. A number of meetings 
were held but no settlement was forthcoming. Eventually the parties 
agreed to the establishment of a conciliation board which met in 
September. In the event, further non-agreement caused all the 
parties to agree to the appointment of the Wage Board's members as 
arbitrators in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. 120 On the 
surface it appeared as if a compromise was reached: the Wage Board 
was set in motion within the constraints of the Industrial Concilia-
tion Act. Whereas miners hoped that the Wage Board as a Labour 
creation would report in their favour, the mineowners hoped that the 
Industrial Conciliation ActBlimitations would benefit them. 
118. Cousins - Andrews, 4 May 1926, SATUC papers Cc5.4 
119. SATUC NEC Minutes, 18 April 1926, SATUC papers Ca 1 . 2 
120. "Award of the Arbitrators" p 523. cf also the Prefatory Note 
to Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Mining Industry Arbitration Board 
A Communist Party commentator, thinking in terms of the statu-
tory colour-blind nature of the Wage Act, correctly suggested that 
the apointment of the · Board under the Industrial Conciliation Act was 
"an ingenious attempt to avoid the necessity of dealing with workers 
in the various grades irrespective of colour." As such the enquiry 
would be confined "to the workers represented on the Board, (ie. the 
European workers), a disc~imination which· could not be made if enquiry 
was made by the Wage Board. ,,121 The exclusion of Africans, the vast 
majority of mine workers, in this manner would have appealed greatly 
to the Chamber, and goes part of the way to explain why they agreed 
to accept the Government's move. The interests of the work force 
as a whole were thus ignored again as they effectively had been with 
the De Villiers report. The potential division between black and 
white employees was further encouraged depending on how the Board 
122 
reported. The miners, for their part, accepted the method of 
arbitration as a means of escape from the impasse. They did so 
"with open arms" because the initiative came from the Labour Depart-
ment. They hoped "to have the scales equally weighted {-between 
the Chamber and themselves-1, and they thought they would get a 
portion at least of the De Villiers award ... ,,123 
121. Umsebenzi, 2~ October 1926 
122 . For discussion on the advancement of the divisions between 
black and whi te workers, cf ch 1, pp ~~( above 
123. Evidence of Haynes before Cost of Living Commission, UG 36-'32, 
quoted in Porward, 16 January 1931 
The Arbitration Board met with the Conciliation Board on 
25 October 1926. SAMWU was represented by W J Wilson, President 
of SAMWU, H Day a general miner and J C Mego, the Union's general 
secretary. M Kentridge acted on their behalf in his capacity as 
an attorney_ The Association's case was put by A Moore, secretary 
and its treasurer, T F Day. The GPC instructed W Gemmill, manager 
of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, F G A Roberts, the Chamber's 
technical advisor, and H 0 Buckle, formerly Chief Magistrate of 
124 Johannesburg. The Board sat from November through to the 
end of February and issued its award on 1 April 1927. Davies noted 
that the miners' claims were rejected and that they were offered an 
125 increase which was well within the bounds acceptable to the Chamber. 
The Chamber was ecstatic, the white miners despondent. Protest 
126 
strikes were called in April and May. The Communist Party strongly 
attacked the Pact, the Wage Board, the Chamber and the award. It 
accused the Wage Board of kowtowing before the Chamber whom it described 
as the representative of the "class-consciously embattled and statis-
tically well-equipped forces of the predominant industry" in the 
Union . As a result the Board had presented the workers "with nothing 
but defeatism .. " Its award represented Ira final condemnation of 
124. Kentridge, I Recall p 143, and "Award of the Arbitrators" p 519 ,11><~ ... 
~pfA.""a,.(..c " .:f. ~~ ~t'"" 'I'V<(\ .... ~''I'' o ~- {{.... """"" , q H~oW" .... l"eell~~, ~It ~ ql.'t:k t .,cJ. P"4-7 
125. Davies, R capital, state and White Labour, p 184 
126. Umsebenzi, 29 April, 6 May, 20 May, 27 May and 3 June 1927. 
The references are mainly to City Deep Mine. 
RDM 29 April, 30 April, 30 May 1927 
reformist 'collaboration'.11 strike action was the only means 
left through which to seek redress. Urnsebenzi proclaimed that 
They returned from the ride with 
the miner inside 
And a smile on the face of the 
Chamber. 127 
Conditions favoured another showdown with both government and 
Chamber. The SAMWU leadership was in a quandary. Whilst they 
expressed some support for particular strikes, they did not support 
h . d f . d d l ' k 128 t e ~ ea 0 a W1 esprea J genera str~ e. They were caught between 
the Scylla of a conciliation system which required acceptance of 
certain rules, and the Charybdis of militant action which many believed 
was the only way to get positive results. 
At SATUC's third annual congress in April 1927, Boydell laid the 
blame for the disappointing award squarely on the shoulders of the 
trade unions themselves. He claimed that the Pact had changed the 
labour policies of former governments only "in so far as it had 
assisted and encouraged the organisation of the workers." The 
problem in his opinion, lay in the fact that "the unions had found 
it difficult to adjust themselves to the new conditions" . 129 In 
fact, it appears that the problem with the unions was that they had 
mistakenly assumed that Labour Party representation in a predominantly 
127. Urnsebenzi, 15 April 1927 . The Leader carried similar accusations . 
128 . Davies, R capital, State and white Labour, p 185 
129. SATUC 3rd Annual Congress, 15-17 April 1927, Minutes, 
SATUC papers Ca 1 . 3 
Nationalist government automatically ensured the advance of workers 
in general and white workers in particular. The "new conditions II 
were meant to curtail union action rather than provide avenues 
through which mines could seek redress. In May Boydell persuaded 
SAMWU to desist from participation in strikes against the Lucas 
130 
award. Disunity, disillusionment and apathy took hold of the 
miners and the Chamber emerged supreme. A major problem that con-
fronted the white miners was the issue of union unity. 
The miners' trade union movement split in two, partly because 
of the non-implementation of the De Villiers report, and partly 
because of different ideas about trade union organisation and strategy . 
Simons and Simons noted that W D Dey, "chairman of the central areas 
branch of the miners' union I! persuaded the Jeppe branch in the second 
half of 1925 "to form an opposition union under the name of the 
Transvaal White Miners' Association." The union was to strive to 
"redress the wrongs of 1913, 1914 and 1922." Dey also decried 
wage and conciliation boards as well as commissions of enquiry. 
Those institutions he claimed were "'the same tripe as Jan Smuts 
used to dish up by the pound, the only difference being the present 
crowd are slinging it out by the yard,,,.131 The history of the 
Transvaal White Miners' Associaion was not traced by the Simons, but 
it seems possible that it was either the forerunner of, or developed 
130. RDM 2, 5 May 1927 
131. · Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa pp 339-340 
· t th . t t d Wh " . . 132 1n OJ e W1 wa ersran 1te M1ners' ASSOc1at10n. The 
Association broke away from SAMWU in January 1926, but collapsed 
after attempts to settle differences between the two bodies failed 
in May of the same year. The points of difference appeared to be 
at least three in number. First, the Association accused the Union 
of acting unconstitutionally on a number of occasions. These 
included SAMWU executive's acceptance of the GPC's offer of a 
temporary arbitrary increase and a'later offer of an extra 1/-
per day, and the alleged relaxation of point 3 of the MWU constitu-
tion which established a membership colour bar. This latter accusa-
tion was vigorously denied by SA~U . Second, the Association stressed 
that it was a non-political organisation and that its members should 
limit themselves to activities of an "industrial capacity only." This 
plea .for an economistic approach to trade union affairs was countered 
by the Union . SAMWU representatives pointed out that miners voted 
in elections for candidates who were also Union members. The Assoc-
iation further accused the Union's executive of mismanagement and 
hence of alienating the rank and file. Lastly, the Association 
132 . Minutes of a Joint Meeting between Delegates of the South 
African Mine Workers' Union and the Witwatersrand White Miners ' 
Association with a view to Amalgamation of the Union and the 
Association, 15 May 1926, and SATUC NEC Report to 3rd Annual 
Congress, 15-17 April 1927 . SATUC papers, Ca 4.2 and Ca 1.3 
respectively. Information of the WWMA and SAMWU split is 
lacking. The minutes of the meeting on 15 May 1926 indicate 
that the WWMA's address was 62 Betty street, Jeppe, which suggests 
it was possibly connected to the Association described by Simons and 
Simons. The WWMA apparently never agreed to the conditions of 
recognition laid down by the GPC which would also suggest an 
affinity with the Transvaal White Miners' Association ; 
cf Transvaal Chamber of Mines Mining Industry Arbitration Board 
p 281. Unfortunately, Davies and others are mute on this 
interesting aspect of the SAMWU's history. 
accused the Union of a dereliction of duty for failing to see "that the 
De Villiers award was enforced. One delegate went as far as to say 
that secession was caused "only on account of the De Villiers award." 
As mentioned, the Witwatersrand White Miners' Association collapsed 
sometime after May 1926. Whether the two white miners· associations 
were one and the same organisation or not is a moot point. What matters 
is that serious divisions over strategy and organisation existed. Further-
more, the differences between sections of SAMWU were not the only differences 
of opinion that accentuated tensions within white miners' ranks at the 
time. 
In mid-1925 disagreements about policy broke out between the Joint 
Mechanics Committee, and the Reduction Workers Association and SAMWU. 
The former dug their heels in and refused to endorse any further action 
until a conciliation board had been set up and their outstanding demands 
disposed of. 133 The latter two associations wanted to press ahead with 
specific wage demands. They eventually compromised and agreed on the 
second course of action, pending the result of the Mechanics' request. 
The dithering which took place substantiated the view that "every day's 
delay L-wasJ a gain to the Chamber and a loss to the men.,,134 Disunity 
within the ranks continued throughout the negotiations of the Lucas arbi-
" b d 135 trat10n oar_ 
133. ACTU Minutes 12 July and 23 August 1925. SATUC papers, Ca 3 
134. ACTU Minutes, 23 August 1925. SATUC papers Ca 3 
135 . Kentridge, M I Recall p 141 
It is interesting to note that the legislative instrument used 
to settle the dispute was the Industrial Conciliation Act, a product 
of the Smuts era. Attempts to bring so-called workers' legislation, 
namely theWage Act into operation had failed . Disunity and disagreement 
within the miners' unions, ranked against the adroit operations of both 
Chamber and Government, secured for the latter two the victory they 
desired . Baydell had made it blatantly clear when he took over the 
Labour Department that he planned to operate within the conciliation 
structure. It was made clear with the Lucas award fracas that he 
expected the unions to follow suit. Kentridge noted an old adage 
attributed to Creswell that 
During the South African Party Government, the Chamber of 
Mines goes up to the Government through the front door . 
When the Nationalists • •• come to power they will go up 
to the Government through the back door. 136 
Exactly to what extent Creswell's comment could be verified is difficult 
to say, but it is clear that the GPC was satisfied with the outcome. 
A most crucial workers' weapon, that of unity, was blunted. Its 
absence contributed toward the failure of white miners to secure wage 
be nefits at the expense of the mining companies. Destabilisation caused 
by white working class action specific to the mining industry was a verted 
at a cost they were prepared to pay. The IItemporary arbibary increase" 
of 1925 "added £50 000 to L-the_7 annual costs L-of the mining companiesJ 
136 . ibid 
and the Lucas award an extra E24 000 on top of that; making a total 
increase of E74 000,,~37 Compared to the Chamber's estimate of an 
extra E2.65 million per annum.expense if the Mineworkers (Minimum 
Rates of Pay) Bill was enacted,138 that sum was not exorbitant. In 
1926 the colour bar regulations were enacted. It is possible that 
their enactment compounded the weakness of the unions. The miners 
fell back on the security of the colour bar. Attempts by white miners 
to reduce the degree of their exploitation by insisting on wages 
regulated by an occupational structure defined in terms of definite mini-
mum wages had failed dismally. Instead, the state offered them the 
security of wages regulated by an occupational structure defined i~ 
terms of the colour bar. White workers, potentially a disruptive 
force within the mining industry, were accomodated at a far lower cost 
to mining capital than would have been the case if the Mineworkers' 
(Minimum Rates of Pay) Bill had become law. Although the Colour Bar 
Act was first introduced during the same parliamentary session as the 
Mineworkers' Bill and thus was not consequent upon the latter's failure, 
. d h 1" f h' 1 bo . t t' t If" 1 39 ~t represente lit e l.ml.ts 0 W l.te a uris actl.ons to pro ee 1. se . 
The SALP for its part suffered dearly as a result of the Lucas 
Award affair. It caused members of the party and the labour movement in 
137. Davies, R Capital, state and White Labour, p 233 note 8 
138. "Facts in Connection with the Mineworkers (Minimum Rates of Pay) 
Bill." The 1929 WBR, P 24, inflates this figure to E3m 
139. Bonacich E "Reply to Buraway" p 341 
,,; 
general to question the beneficial aspects of conciliation. 
Different opinions about labour's future participation within the 
conciliationist structure of the Union promoted the tensions within 
the Party which contributed to the split between Councilites and 
Cre9'elli tes. Th . If b . 11' 140 e Pact 1tse ecame a more precar10us a 1ance. 
Davies concluded of the Lucas Award affair that whit.e wage earners 
benefitted economi~ally without e~g ·the overall profitability of 
the mining industry. He also noted the link that must be made between 
the failure to gain greater economic advantage and the institution of the 
colour bar. Similarly he was aware of the effects the affair had on the 
unity of the SALP. 141 His analysis did not illuminate the way in which 
the state went about protecting the interest of the mining industry at 
the expense of labour. Creswell's actions before his removal from the 
Labour Dep~tment could quite easily have created a crisis for the 
industry similar to that of 1922. The state's action- Clearly indicated 
that the state could have intervened on white labour~ side to a far 
greater extent than it eventually did. It had to back down before 
the stronger interests of mining capital. Further, Davies was silent 
on the issue of trade union, as opposed to SALP, unity. The rivalry 
140. Davies, R 
and ch 1 
Capital, State and White Labour, p 187 para 
above 
141. ibid, pp 182~190, 228-232 
.~ 
which permeated the unions weakened them in the face of the Chamber's 
unity. The fact that the settlement resulted from a binding award and 
not from an industrial council agreement per se meant that the industry 
could operate with greater independence from the Industrial Conciliation 
Act as well. The three elements of trade unions weakness, the Chamber's 
ability to accomodate opposition, and the state's intervention as a catalyst 
which provided the machinery to 'settle' the dispute acted together to 
secure the exclusion of the mining industry from the ambit of the Wage 
Act throughout the period under review. 
The Wage BOard, then,was restricted to workers in secondary and 
manufacturing industries. In the rest of this chapter we are concerned 
.with the general, formal administration of the Wage Act. The changes in 
policy, and aspects of administration which effected specific discriminatory 
practices, are dealt with in chapters five and six. It must be remembered 
that the majority of white industrially organised, ie. mainly skilled, 
employees were covered by the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Wage 
Board investigated a large number of widely different industrie's.142 
The Board faced many difficulties during the period . No South 
African precedents existed from which the Board could draw. 143 The 1918 
Regulation of Wages Act provided little assistance owing to the different 
administrative structure which that Act established. 144 The experience 
142. cf Bibliography, pp 41r·1o below for a list of 
and trades investigated by the Wage Board. 
below provides a list of determinations and 
affected. 
143. 1929 WBR P 5 
144. cf ch 2 pp 11cV~~ above 
the different industries 
Appendix C pp I/~". ,0 
the number of employees 
of other countries which had adopted wage regulation instruments was of 
little use as well. The extremely wide wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled, largely white and largely black, respectively, 
was unique to South Africa and presented a particular strait jacket 
~ . 
of its own to the operation of ostensible equal pay for equal work 
legislation. Lucas believed that the differential was "understated" 
by reference to a division between ~ a day .and £1 a week, which was 
the usual classification.145 Briefly put, the problem lay in the 
almost universely held-opinion that unemployed skilled labourers 
could not live at unskilled rates and unemployed unskilled could not -
- 146 
expect to be employed at skilled rates. 
The Board faced criticism and opposition from both manufacturers 
and the labour movement. The opposition/support emphases within the 
two groups were not uniform and necessarily operated at different 
phases. These phases were directly linked to the policies of the 
Board and the Department of Labour and the elements of success or 
failure which accompanied such policies. One example of this process 
has already been dealt with in the case of the Lucas Award affair . 
There it was clear that the initial opposition of mine owners to the 
Award became tacit support as soon as it became obvious that their 
interests were not to be tampered with to any great extent. The reverse 
was true for the miners. In general terms, employers manipulated the 
Act's provisions, indulged in evasions and collusions and relied on 
the generally amenable courts of the land to secure their interest . 
145. Lucas, F "The Determination of Wages in South Africa" p 54 
146; For a more detailed discussion of this problem, ch 5 PPS6;'" below 
The success which they enjoyed with such tactics deflated their opposi-
Hon to the Board. On the other hand, the workers who were supposed 
to benefit from the Act complained about interminable delays, the 
inadequacy of sentences handed down by the courts, and of bias in 
favour of employers. The conflicts that arose were all the keener 
because the participants had a great deal to gain or lose. 
The initial support which the Wage Act enjoyed from commerce and 
industry vanished when the personnel of the Wage Board was announced and 
147 
when the Board issued its first reports. The loudest opposition to 
the Board was raised when it investigated the commercial distributive 
trade in 1927_28. 148 Chambers of Commerce around the country condemned 
the Board on behalf of . smaller firms. The essence of their complaints 
was that the recommendations of the Board would actually cause unemploy-
th "f 11 f " 149 ment or e ru1n 0 many sma 1rms. As the economic belt tightened 
with the onset of the depression in late 1929, employers' opposition to 
wage regUlation increased. The Department of Labour successfully . applied 
pressure on the Wage Board to curtail some of its activities. The 1930 ararl-
147. Commercial Bulletin of South Africa, vi, 68, September 1928. · Quoted 
in Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 226 
148. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation Under the South African Wage 
Act" p 93 
149. for example, ibid,for East London; and "Memorandum of Objection re 
the Proposed Determination published as a Schedule to Government 
Notice 1703 of 1928/-Shop Assistants 7" sultnitted by the Durban 
Chamber of Commerce; Objection number 30 to the same Proposed 
Determination by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, 7 
November 1928, (Department of Labour Archive, 2037: F4/19) and 
Secretary, Orange Free State Chamber of Commerce - Chairman, Wage 
Board, 16 July 1928, (Department of Labour Archive, 2037:F4/18) 
ments were necessary to streamline the application of the principle of 
wage regulation. By the time, the South African economy began to turn at 
the end of 1932, the voices of dissent had for the large part been silenced . 
The Labour Department' reported that by the end of 1932, "compulsory wage 
regulation" was becoming "accepted in a better spirit" because manufac-
turers realised that they benefitted from the "uniform competitive basis" 
h ' h th h d t t d I t' 150 upon w 1C ey a 0 opera e un er regu a 1on. , Ivan Walker, Chief 
Inspector of Labour, expressed himself more strongly on the issue . 
The 'good deal of active opposition" which he had encountered in the early 
years had evaporated by 1934 because employers now realised' 
value , in fact the absolute necessity, of wage regulation".151 
lithe 
The trend 
that can be indentified during the period under consideration is as follows. 
The expressed support for the Wage Act by industry and commerce rapidly 
changed into opposition once the practical job of applying wage deter-
minations got under way. That opposition was cool 'eel during and after 
the depression mainly because the Wage Board changed its policy, partly 
through government instruction and partly through its own will . How the 
policy change occur~~ ie. the removal of Africans, the reduction of wages 
and the levels of wages, is dealt with in the remaining chapters. The 
concern here is to outline the difficulties the authorities encountered 
when they tried to implement the Wage Act. 
150 . Department of Labour Annual Report, 1932,UG 37-33,p 41 
151. Walker, I 
quoted in 
"Memorandum to the Industrial Legislation Commission" 
Industrial Legislation Commission Report UG 37-1935 P 410 
U o 
The Durban Chamber of Commerce informed the Wage Board that in 
the event of the ratification of an unsatisfactory determination, the 
"satisfaction of normal L-businessJ ambitions and aspirations / wouldJ 
depend upon defeating its provisions.". In such circumstances, no govern-
ment would be able to ensure the determination's enforcement even if it · 
k t '" t' h .,,152 ep an ~nspec or 1n every S cp. . Employers indulged in a number of 
activities in attempts to avoid meeting the requirements of determinations. 
The most common way in which determinations were surmounted was by 
evasion. Evasion took a number of forms. The simplest form was "out-
and-out collusion" between employers and employees. Although specifi-
153 
cally prohibited by law, it appears to have been fairly rife . 
The Cost of Living Commission reported in 1932 that collusion involved a 
"certain class of employer" which did not include "the more reputable 
b . 154 USl.nesses". Factory inspectors could be duped in a number of ways. 
Employees would sign receipts which denoted the correct wage, but would 
155 
receive less than the specified amount. The choice, if it can so be 
Classified, before the employee was very simply one of take it or leave 
it. This form of evasion was especially prevalent during the depression 
h th f I d · d" 156 years w en e reserve army 0 unemp eye 1ncrease 1n S1ze. Variations 
152. Durban Chamber of Commerce. "Memorandum of Objection" p 18. Depart-
ment of Labour Archive, 2037 : F4/19 
153 . cf p l11f above 
154 . Cost of Living Commission Report,UG 36-'32, p 14 
155. Industrial Legislation Commission Report,UG 37- ' 35, p 124 
156. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1932, UG 37- '33, P 6 
., 
on that theme included the return of a portion of the correct wage in 
lieu of alleged expenses. It became necessary for the Board to lay 
down maxima which could be drawn from the employees ' pay for sundries 
such as board and lodging. 157 Even this action did not prevent extortion . 
The van Reenen Commission mentirned one case, for example, in which a deduction 
.of £3 . 10s . 5d was made from a total wage of £4.10s per week, for accommoda-
158 tion, which the Supreme Court ruled was worth only 7s 6d per week. 
Employers could cash endorsed cheques and give the employee less than 
159 the amount, or employees could be forced to purchase foodstuffs from 
160 the employer. Fictitious loans were advanced in some instances by 
giving employees receipts for money they never received but which was 
161 drawn from their weekly wages. Before the 1930 amendments to the Wage 
and Industrial Conciliation Acts employers could evade determinations 
with impunity through the establishment of bogus partnerships . It would 
appear that this type of evasion occured more often than not under the latter 
Act. The Board was of the opinion that evasions of this nature were not 
prevalent because employees could, if occasion demanded , embarrass their 
employers by acting as real partners who could influence business trans-
162 
actions, even though the employers were the dominant partners. 
157 . 1929 WBR P 14 
158 . Industrial Legislation Commission Repor~ UG 37-'3~ P 124 
159. ibid 
160. 1929 WBR P 14 
161. Industrial Legislation Commission Repor~ UG 37- ' 35,p 124 
162. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) September 1926 p 12; 
1(16) June 1928 1929 WBR P 16. Industrial Legislation Commission 
Report UG 37-1935 p 124 
Employee~ especially juveniles and young women, would often lie about 
their ages in order either to avoid entrenchment ot simply to get · jobs. 
163 Fictitious names were placed on wage sheets as well. On occasions 
when industrial council agreements were renewed employers would attempt 
to .reduce the wage operative at the time to the lower scale prescribed 
164 by the Wage Board . Employers attempted to delay the publication of 
determinations,165 or, alternatively, proposed wage cuts when agreements 
. d 166 
e x p1re . Attempts were also made to pass the extra cost of labour 
on to the consumer • The clearest example of this was in the baking 
. d t 167 1n us ry e An unusual occurrence of this otherwise fairly normal pro-
cedure occurred in the biscuit making industry. A meeting of biscuit 
makers, called to discuss the Wage Board recommendation for the industry 
"decided to kill price 'cutting ' by means of a wholesalers' list." 
Listed firms received a · 10 .. special discount but firms who "in the 
opinion of the biscuit makers" sold their products at cheaper prices 
were blackballed and were denied both credit facilities and the special 
discount. This meeting then decided to increase their prices with 
immediate effect "although the Wage Board award did not come into effect 
163 . Industrial Legislation Commission Report,UG 37- ' 35,p 124 
164. SATLC, 2nd Annual Conference Minutes 26-28 March 1928. 
SATLC papers Da 1 . 2 
165. CFLU FEC Minutes 12 November 1931 CFLU papers Aa 1.5 
166 . Minutes of a Special Conference called by the Federation of Labour 
Unions (Cape) , consisting of Delegates Representing Indus trial 
Councils, Union Executives, Operating under a Wage Board Determina-
tion or Conciliation Board Agreement i n the Cape Area. (No date : 
but follows the meeting of 14 July and before that of 27 July 1932) 
CFLU papers, Aa 1 . 5 
167 . 1929 WBR, P 11.cf ch 4, pp J(O'4 belo~ for a more detailed discussion 
of the baking industry in this regard . 
at once. ,,16B Besides sheer crookery , employers also indulged in 
measures which secured the extraction of absolute surplus value. The 
working day was extended in some instances .and different classifications 
f 1 . od d 169 o emp oyment were 1ntr uce. 
Various reasons exist to explain why employers and employees alike 
evaded determinations. The Van. Reenen Commission explicitly reported 
that ·little evidence existed to indicate that evasions arose because 
d t . d 'th t f 'l ' b' . 1 170 e erm1ne wages were e1 er ou 0 equ1 1 r1um or were uneconom1ca ~ 
The majority of employers guilty of evasions appear to have been small-
171 time manufacturers who were either financially weak or lacked techni-
172 
cal, administrative knowledge. The over-supply of labour, linked 
to the economic stress of the employed workers in insecure positions, 
played into the hands of employers who were able to force their workers 
to accept i llegal contracts . The lower levels of the wage hierarchy were 
overcrowded owing to the abundance of semi- and unskilled workers, both 
black and white, who flooded the urban areas . A "lack of a sense of 
social justice on the part of some employers" was also considered a 
173 factor which contributed to the problem. Evasions were to have 
16B . Forward 4 November 1927 
169. Industrial Legislation Commission Report,UG 37-'3~p 124.cf ch 'l-
pp ll. 3 of below 
170. 
171. 
172. 
173 . 
ibid P 123 
ibid P 122 " the evidence leaves little doubt that non-members 
of associations who are in the main small employers and inefficient 
workers, are the chief offenders under both Act." Davies's conten-
tion that Barone Bros was "one of the smaller Pretoria bakery firms" 
is not supported by his reference to Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) September 1927 
Davies, Capital, State and White Labour, pp 216-7 
Industrial Legislation Commission Report,UG 37_ ' 35 p 123 , 
ibid 
important consequences for economic development and for employers and 
174 
employees . Collusion tended to fall away when the economic climate 
improved during the 1930s.175 Thus a link can be made between the 
dissolution of manufacturers' opposition to wage determinations and the 
decrease in the incidence of evasions. 
The Department of Labour adopted the policy of settling cases out 
of court wherever possible. 1 76 R H Miller. Divisional Inspector at 
Johannesburg. informed the Labour Department that the number of cases 
submitted "for authority to prosecute" was ""infinitesmal when compared 
with the number of contraventions detected. ,,177 At first, it was left 
to the Minister of Labour to decide on what policy to adopt in the 
fight against evasions. Walker reported that "wholesale prosecutions" 
should be avoided and stressed that "it would be manifestly unfair to 
" 176 
select two or three firms for prosecution when nearly all are at fault." 
Two years later the Department had tougliened its stance in response to 
strident employer o?position. The Cape Town Divisional Inspector. for 
example. was authorised "in order to make the Department ' s attitude clear. 
to prosecute two defaulting firms in each industry subject to a determina-
tion" 179 The figures provided by various Departmental reports of 
prosecutions and convictions thus provide a scale only of the relative 
174 . cf ch 4 pp '?t, 'f below 
175. Department of Labour Annual Report. 1934 . UG 11-'36.p 49 
176. Department of Labour Annual Report.1932 .UG 37- ' 3~p 6 
177." Miller - Cousins . 21 May 1926. Department of Labour Archives 1429 : 
Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
176 . Walker - Cousins 29 October r 927 .• Department of Labour Archives 
1429: Lc 1069/2 Part 1 
179 . Muller - Divisional Inspector (Cape Town) 1 May 1929 .Department of 
Labour Archives 1429: Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
degrees of compliance of employers from year to year. The figures appear 
to touch merely the tip of the iceberg. More cases of contravention 
180 
were brought to court during the depression years. stricter 
enforcement of wage regulation measures occurred during the first few 
years of the economic boom of the 1930s. This was indicated by the 
increase in the number of cases brought before courts at a time when 
. . 181 
collusion as a general practice was on the wane. On the whole the 
prosecution policy of the Labour Department was pragmatic and adapted 
to the specific needs of different areas. Thus the reference to Cape 
Town above was motivated by the "serious" nature of the problem in that 
182 
area. But although alleged offenders were prosecuted, their con-
viction was quite another matter. 
The behaviour of the courts is important for at least three reasons. 
The courts either impeded the activities of the Board; .. focussed attention 
on different aspects of the ·principal Act in such a way as to influence 
amendments and the legislation of validation acts; or they gave cred-
ence to the idea that the law only benefited the working class peripherally. 
Wage Board investigations were delayed during the second year of the 
Board's existence as a result of the Lucas Award affair ... It will be recalled 
180. cf Appendi" E pp LI!.'l- below 
181. 
182 . 
Department of Labour Annual Report 1934, UG 11-1936 p44; -Department 
of Labour Annual Report, 1935, UG 4-1937 P 69 and Department of 
Labour Annual Report, 1937, UG 30-1938 P 58 
Muller - Divisional Inspector (Cape Town) 1 May 1929 Department of 
Labour Archives 1429:Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
that the Wage Board formed the arbitration court under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. Besides this, the first determinations had been invali-
dated by court decisions. Some of the decisions, detailed "below, were 
based "on very technical grounds" which contra:Hcted what many thought 
th 1 'l t" "l' t t' 183 was e eg1s a 10n s or1g1na 1n en 1on. 
A number of decisions were made which severely affected the Board's 
opera tions. In 1927 the Supreme Court ruled that if any amendments 
whatsoever were made to a recommendation then the procedure as laid out 
in section 7 of the Act, had to be followed allover again. 184 In effect 
this meant that investigations and recommendations could take up to at least 
185 
another three months before determinations could be promulgated. 
Cousins commented at the time that the Court'"s " action reduced the Act 
r 
lito a farce." He complained that the Department had acted "in all cases 
studiously on the legal advice"available.·186 The notion that the final 
recommendations of the Board could not automatically become determinations 
(the essence of the court's decision) was "an unexpected construction 
placed upon the Act. ,,187 The Barone Brothers' judgement affected the 
183. 1929 WBR P 22 
184. For section 7 of the Act, cf pp Ill- above. 
TPD 478} Head-note quoted in 1929 WBR P 22 
185. 1929 WBR P 23 
R vs Barone (No 1}(1927 
186. Cousins - Minister of Labour 19 November 1927 Department of Labour 
Archives 1429 : Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
187. Cousins'S marginal comment dated 29 October 1927 on Walker - Cousins, 
26 April 1927. Department of Labour Archives 1429: Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
sweet. furniture and leather determinations. as well as the proposed 
determinations for the clothing. glass bevelling and silvering. and 
t b - . d tr- 188 o aceD ~n us 1es. Lucas. himself a King's Counsel held in 
high esteem. suggested that Judge Saul Solomon be approached to act 
189 
as legal adviser to the Department. He was keen to see the sweet 
determination tested in the Cape Supreme Court in an attempt to get 
1 - h - - th 1 190 an opposite ru 1ng to t at 1n e Transvaa • The sentiments thus 
expressed indicate the existence of tensions within different 
branches of the legal fraternity. Possible avenues _through 
which either employers or employees could attempt to secure favourable 
judgements were thus provided. Attempts in the interim to take the 
Barone case on appeal to the Appellate Division were squashed on the 
191 
advice of the attorney-general. Lucas remained unconvinced to 
the end. Although correct in terms of the letter of the law. 
Lucas complained that the jlligerent was contrary to the spirit of 
188. No problems arose with there-publication of determinations for 
the furniture and leather industries as they were about to fall 
under new ~ndustrial Council Agreements. McGregor - Cousins. 
14 December 1927. Department of Labour Archives 1429 Lc 1069/3 
part 1 
189. Telegram. Lucas - Cousins 7 May 1927. Department of Labour 
Archives 1429 :Lc 1069/3 part 1 
190. Cousins - Minister of Labour 19 November 1927 Department of Labour 
Archives 1429: Lc 1069/3 part 1 
191. The opinion was that the ~t was correct in law and that 
"an appeal to the Appellate Division by the Minister under 
section 388 of Act 31 of 1917 (as amended by section 45. Act 39 
of 1926) would be fruitless . " The Act referred to was the 
Criminal Procedure Act. as amended . L G Nightingale, office of 
Attorney-General - Lucas, 23 May 1927; Cousins - Secretary of 
Wage Board, 12 December 1927. Department of Labour Archives 
1429 : Lc 1069/3 part 1 
(~ 
the law: 
Surely no court is going to say the Board must take two 
steps, with identical procedure in both cases, to do 
what could be done in one without any possible prejudice 
to anyone? 192 
193 Cousins agreed with Lucas, but the conflict was only resol ved when 
the Act was amended in 1930. 194 In this way, certain ambiguities 
in the principal Act highlighted by the Courts were cleared up with 
the rationalisation of the procedural features of the Act. 
In March 1929 a number of determinations were declared ultra vires . 
This resulted largely from cases in the baking and laundry trades . 
A Magistrate in Pretoria held that the Social and Industrial Review 
special editions were not newspapers in terms of the Act. 
trates in Johannesburg and Wynberg did not agree. 195 
Magis-
Two judgments 
subsequently handed down in the, Transvaal and cape divisions of the 
Supreme Court respectively held that the publication was a newspaper. 
The nppellate Division held in March 1930, in the case of R vs Lewin 
which stretched back to 1928, that it was not a newspaper and conse-
quently all determinations then in force, with the exception of the 
Bloemfontein unskilled determination were invalid. 196 The employers' 
192. Lucas - T J Roos, 11 January 1928. Department of Labour Archives 
1429: Lc 1069/3 part 1 
193. Cousins - Lucas 18 January 1928 Department' of Labour Archives 
1429: Lc 1069/3 part 1 
194. Act 23-1930 Section 6 amended section 7 of the principal Act 
195. 1929 WBR P 23 
196. R vs Daya Morar (1929 TPD 696) and R vs Weinrich (10 July 
CPD not reported) J R va Lewin (1930 AD 344) .. <{ ~r ..... - ~''; 
1929, 
k.to-.. 
success in this action was short-lived. In May 1930 the Wage 
Determination Validation Act became law. It stated that the 
Review was a newspaper in terms of the Act. The Act itself was 
197 
retrospective to 1926, the date of the Wage Act's commencement. 
After 1930 though, reports, recommendations and determinations were 
not published as special editions of the Review, presumably for 
reasons of economy_ 
In other cases J determinations were declared ultra vires 
because they were not dated correctly. Early Social and Industrial 
Review special editions only gave the month of publication and not 
the actual day.198 The invalidation of the Cape determination for 
the dyeing, cleaning and laundering trade in 1929 was referred to 
the Appellate Division after a contrary decision in the Transvaal. 
The Appellate Division found that the Transvaal decision was in 
fact the correct one, and that the Minister could limit the scope 
199 
of determinations to sections of trades. The courts also found 
tha~ .. the amended Act was meant to operate in the same way as the 
principal Act, ie.that amended provisions were to "take the place 
197. Act no 21-1930: To validate certain procedure under the 
Wage Act, 1925 . 
198. R vs Strieter (1928 TPD 708) and R vs Portuese (1929 CPD 157) 
An 124-1931; An 49-1931/2 
199. R vs Weinrich, (10 July 1929, CPD, not reported) R vs Weinrich 
(1930 AD 184), R VB Daya Morar (1929 TPD 696) 
200 
of the old provisions completely." The determination for the 
Pretoria baking trade was declared ultra vires because certain 
201 definitions were not clear enough. Numerous other decisions 
affecting the administration of various determinations were 
202 handed down. A great deal of insecurity and delay persisted and 
1 d · d . . 203 was fortified by the delays that took p ace pen 1ng court eC1S10n. 
A few of the more important cases are dealt with below. 
204 The question of piece-work was also considered by the courts. 
The Wage Board initially assumed that piece-workers were automatically 
covered by determinations. The courts ruled in 1929 that piece-
workers could only be covered by determinations if the determination 
205 laid down specific piece-work rates. The BOard pointed out that 
the diverse nature of piece-work made it extremely difficult to 
200. 
201. 
202. 
203. 
204. 
205. 
R vs Schwartz (1931 TPD 142); R vs Morris (1931 OPD part II 98) 
R .vs Germnera (1930, TPD not reported) and confirmed by 
R vs Gerstnera (1930 AD 420) An 122-1931 
The determinations for Krugersdorp Pumpmen, Witwatersrand 
Hairdressing and Motor· Omnibus Drivers and Conductors were 
invalidated as a result of R vs Portuese (1929 CPD 157) and were 
not replaced by new determinations. (cf Report to the Honourable 
the Minister of Labour by the Wage BOard upon the Work of the 
Board for the Period 1st March 1929 to 31st December 1931, An 
108-1933, pp 3-14 - hereafter 1931 WBR - for a summary of court 
decisions. A shorter but similar summary can be found in 1929 
WBR pp 22-23) 
A number of determinations could not be enforced pending decisions 
by the Supreme Court. Among these were: 
Determination 12 Furniture (Supplementary) - Union R vs Lewin (AD) 
Determination 15 Clothing - Cape R vs Roy (CPD) 
Determination 17 Baking - Pretoria R vs Gerstnera (TPD) 
Determination 27 Sweets - Cape R vs Lefson (CPD) 
Determination 28 Baking - Witwatersrand R vs Raronne (TPD) 
Walker - Cousins, 15 January 1930, Department of Labour Archive, 
1429: Lc 1069/3 Part 1 
For a detailed examination of piece-work and the attitudes of the 
Wage BOard, employers and employees, cf ch 4 pp below 
R vs Repanis (1929 OPD 195) 1931 WBR pp 2, 12, 35 
regulate wages in the way the courts expected. Accordingly, the 1930 
amendment effectively nullified the effect of the judgement and provided 
for minimum remuneration for pieceworkers at wages not lower than those 
paid for the type of work engaged upon . Employers and employees 
would have to arrange the actual rates, subject to the mentioned 
proviso. 206 Even the amendment did not secure the position of 
piece-workers. The Appellate Division found in 1934 that in 
certain circumstances piece-work could still fall outside the 
207 
ambit of the Act. The background was as follows. Employees 
found themselves switched off time rates onto piece-work by 
employers who wanted to evade determinations. The situation reached 
crisis proportions by December 1934 when sixteen affected determina-
tions out of 19 were declared invalid. 208 Once again the legis-
lature passed a validation act,this time to amplify the powers of 
the Act . 209 The state once again had to intervene to secure some 
sort of stability in the industrial sphere. The action taken to 
prevent the employment of piece-workers fitted in with the general 
206. 1931 WBR P 2 . Section 3(4)(b) of Act 23-1930, UG 43-1934 P 65 
207. R vs Cohen (25 October 1933, NPD not reported); R vs Cohen 
(1934 AD 521) upheld. Department of Labour Annual Report 
1934 UG 11-1936 P 53 
208. R vs Cohen (25 October 1933, NPD not reported); R vs Ryba 
(1935 TPD 192) Industrial Legislation Commission Report, 
UG 37-1935 pp 108-110, and Department of Labour Annual Report 
1934, UG 11-1936 P 53 
209. Act 16-1935: To amplify the powers of the Wage Board and of the 
Minister of Labour in regard to the fixing of a minimum remunera-
tion for piece-work, and to validate and amplify certain wage 
determinations made under the Wage Act 1925 
trend towards mechanisation which took root during the period 
under review. The Validation Act of 1935 was subsequently 
210 
repealed when its provisions were i ncluded in the 1937 Wage Act. 
A number of cases occurred which affected workers vis-a-vis the 
repayment of monies wrongfully withheld . The issue at stake was 
whether or not an employee could institute civil action against an 
employer found guilty of underpayment in a criminal court in which the 
magistrate did not actually make an award . The Transvaal Division of 
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no recourse to the civil 
courts, whereas the Natal Division held the- cx:ntra:ry . 211 V1ew. The 
Department of Labour agreed that the confusion whim had arisen out of 
the conflicting judgments ought to be "removed as soon as circumstances 
permit ", .and promised to give the problem "careful attention when next 
amendments to the Wage Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act are 
212 
contemplated. " 
The confusion and seriousness of the situation became clear in 
1933. Van Dyk, a bus conductor, sued his employer Bolon for alleged 
210. Act 44-1937 Section 9(1)(g) 
211. Donner vs Yzelle (1932 TPD ·232) Gebela vs Banks 
(1931 NPD 346) SATLC NEC Minutes 3 May 1932 and Secretary, 
SATLC - Secretary for Labour, 27 June 1933, SATLC papers Da 2.2 
and Dc 8 . 9 respectively 
212 . Secretary for Labour - SATLC Secretary 19 July SATLC papers Dc 8.9 
underpayment of wages after Bolon had been convicted in a 
Magistrate's Court in the Cape. An award of wages was not made 
213 to Van Dyk. The civil court dismissed the suit on the basis of a 
Transvaal precedent. It was argued that the stat;utes "provided 
L-specificJmachinery for the enforcement of payment" and the case 
was therefore beyond the civil courts' juriSdiction. 214 It is 
unclear whether the civil court magistrate was influenced by the 
reasons for the criminal court's inability to assess the extent of 
wages underpaid in this particular case. Van Dyk had contracted for 
a lower wage than the one prescribed and had been unable to convince 
th t f th t th t h h d b d ·d 215 e cour 0 e amoun a e a een un erpa~ _ In the case 
of Manoim vs Veneered Furniture Manufacturers in 1934 the Appellate 
Division found that employees who contracted for lower wages under the 
Wage Act were entitled only to the amounts awarded by a criminal court 
216 
and could not civilly sue their employers for the underpaid amount . 
The APpellate Division's decision effectively undermined an important 
element of Departmental policy. Divisional and industrial inspectors 
213. Secretary, SATLC - Secretary for Labour 27 June 1933 SATLC 
papers Dc 8.9 
214. SATLC Memorandum "A Matter of Interest to all Secretaries: 
Busman loses wage claim. After employer was prosecuted: 
No civil remedy available." (no date) SATLC papers Dc 8 . 9 
215 . Secretary for Labour - Secretary SATLC 19 July 1933 SATLC 
papers Dc 8.9 
216. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1934 UG 11-1936 P 76 
had been informed that in cases where magistrates refused to award 
arrear wages, employees still had recourse to the civil courts. 
This was now officially abrogated. Even before the depression the 
Department had been plagued by public prosecutors' poor knowledge 
of criminal court procedure. Walker instructed all inspectors employed 
by the Department that in appropriate circumstances they could "tact-
fully remind public prosecutors ••. to apply for an order in regard to 
arrear wages" after conviction rut before sentence had been handed 
d 217 own. E S SaChS poignantly pointed out the sensitivity of court 
decisions. Where determinations and agreements were upset on a 
"mere trivial technicality prejudicing no-one, then until such a state 
218 
of affairs is put right, no one will have faith in any agreement." 
Trade unionists complained bitterly about the inadequacy of the fines 
b th f t ' ,219 which were meted out y e courts rom ~me to t~me. It will be 
recalled that the fine ceiling for the various offences under the Act 
was £50 and £100 respectively.220 By and large, the penalties imposed 
by the courts were lenient. For the most part these ranged between 
cautions and discharge to various small fines. One representative 
case was that of R vs Tabakin. Tabakin was convicted for offences 
which carried maximum sentences of £50 and £100 respectively. On 
the former he was fined £3 with the alternative of seven days with hard 
labour, and on the latter charge, he was fined £5 with the same option 
217. Walker - All Divisional Inspectors and Industrial Inspectors 
4 November 1929 Department of Labour Archive 1429: Lc 1069/3 part 1 
218. Sachs - Acting Secretary SATUC 14 June 1929, SATUC papers Ccl.l0 
219. SATLC NEC Minutes 2 August 1932 SATLC papers Da 2.2 
220 . cf pp 11t- S below 
\ 
221 
as the previous sentence. Arrear wages were occasionally paid 
, 222 
out as a result of court orders. 
So numerous were the alleged misdemeanours of the ordinary 
courts of the land that several appeals were made to the government to 
establish special industrial courts to monitor labour legislation. 
N C Havenga, Acting Minister of Justice in February 1929, agreed with 
a labour union delegation that evasions under the various industrial 
acts had to end. He was not in a pof?ition J though, to "give ... 
encouragement to the idea of a special court" as in his opinion the 
magistrate's courts were quite adequate for the job. 223 It is clear 
that the magistrates courts did not operate effectively and further 
calls for the institution of special courts were foiled by appeals for 
austerity during the "period of financial stringency".224 Trade 
unionists also appealed for the stricter, enforcement of insolvency 
' laws. They thereby attempted to protect workers from unnecessary 
221. R vs N Tabakin, 19 February 1931. "Confidential" circular from 
General Secretary, National Industrial Council of the Building 
Industry of South Africa - unnamed organisation/individual, 
3 March 1931 p 2.SATLC papers Dd 9.3 This particular circular 
provides information about another ten random cases from around 
the country. The employers were convicted under either the 
Industrial Conciliation Act or the Wage Act. All the sentences 
were uniformly low, with occasional demands that arrear wages 
should be paid into court. 
222. cf Appendix F pp ~!>''l- below 
223 . SATUC NEC Minutes 30 April 1929 SATUC papers Ca 1.4 
224. SATLC NEC Minutes 22 March 1932, quoting a letter from F van den 
Heever, Secretary for Justice. SATLC papers ' Da 2.1 
o dO h O d 1 dOl t 225 preJu 1C~ w en compan1es were ec are 1n80 ven . Attorneys-
General and public prosecutors were openly accused of failure to 
prosecute "even when evidence of sworn affidavits" had been placed 
226 before them. The Minister of Justice naturally replied that the 
Attorney- General of the Cape in this specific instance - was 
impartial and that he) the Minister, "would deprecate any interference 
by outside influences. II He urged the CFLU to make their accusations 
o 0 0 227 1.n wr1tl.ng. It is unclear whether the CFLU followed up the 
Minister's request. Whatever the outcome,the feeling within the 
trade union movement was quite evident: the courts, if not biased 
in favour of employers, were wholly ineffective . 
In numerous cases the organised trade union movement appealed 
directly to the Department of Labour for assistance. In most instances 
they were unsuccessful and the Department made it quite clear that it 
had to operate within the narrow confines of the law and of accepted 
legal practice. The CFLU was informed that "the Department itself 
was regulated by law and if the law did not allow them to do what 
228 they wished to do the officials were helpless." Similarly, the 
225. 
226. 
227. 
228. 
CFLU FEC Minutes 13 August 1931. CFLU papers Aa 1.5 . The number 
of insolvencies in the Union increased dramatically as a result 
of the depression, cf ch 4-, pp ;)~' on. 10" ,.w 0 
CFLU FEC Minutes 13 June 1935, and SATLC NEC Minutes 4 October 
1932, noted a letter from the Reef (Native Trade) Assistant's 
Union which noted a "refusal on the part of the Public Prosecutor 
to prosecute in cases where illegal trading has been established, 
employers were openly defying the law. " CFLU papers Aa 1.6, and 
SATLC papers Da 2.2 respectively 
CFLU FEC Minutes 5 March 1936 CFLU papers Aa 1.6 
CFLU FEC Minutes 25 July 1929, CFLU papers Aa 1 . 4 
SATLC was told that no machinery existed in terms of the Criminal Pro-
ceedings and Evidence Act whereby .the: Department of Justice could refer 
th 11 0 0 0 h 0 h h d 0 fool 229 to e Appe ate D1V1S10n matters W 1C a ar1sen out 0 C1V1 cases. 
It was ruled that cases could not be fought on appeal in forma pauperis 
except at the discretion of the Appellate Division. 230 The Department 
231 
was powerless to assist in cases of that nature too. As it turned 
out, in the particular case which had given rise to the ruling, leave 
. 0 232 
to appeal was granted but not in forma pauper1s. The case clearly 
indicated one problem with legal protection: the implementation of 
wage determinations in particular and seeking redress of grievances 
before the law in general~ dependent on the complainant's financial 
means or access to funds. Trade unions were unable to support 
workers to any great extent, especially during the depression years 
when membership, and consequently paid-up dues, fell. 
It is not suprising .that certain representatives of the trade 
229. SATLC NEC Report· to 03rd Annual Congress 8 - 11 April 1933 
SATLC papers Da 2.3 
230. 
231. 
232. 
In forma pauperis: literally "as a poor man". A legal custom 
whereby people could apply to the Appellate Division for per-
mission to receive legal representation at state expense on the 
grounds that they could not afford the costs; especially pre-
valent before the days of legal aid schemes. 
McGregor, Secretary for Labour - Secretary SATLC 20 May 
1932 SATLC papars Dc 8.2 
SATLC NEC Minutes 3 May 1932, SATLC papers Da 2.2 
union and labour movement adopted a suspicious perception of the 
concept of the equality and efficiency of the law. In his chair-
man's report to the 1930 annual conference of SATUC, Archie Moore 
commented sharply on the opinions of some trade unions that the 
amendment of acts was all that was needed to "put an end to the 
clever pleadings of lawyers, and their emoluments gained from the 
suhleties of lawe u Harsh experience had informed them that the 
"law of Capitalism" was "but one law, the law of exploitation. II 
Moore assessed the situation correctly, but he was not daunted, for 
he sa<oIthat the laorW1lS "comparatively useless" as a means of protection 
"and often a great danger, unless watched and instrumented by power-
f 1 . t' f k 233 U organ1sa 10ns 0 wer ers .. " 
The courts of law, then, performed a number of functions. In 
the first instance, they pinpointed certain ambiguities in the Act 
itself. Because some issues were issues of substance and not .merely 
of error or mistake, the Act had to be amended in a number of ways. 
As a result, the actual procedure followed by the Board was rationalised, 
the powers of the Minister of Labour redefined and the status of piece-
work classified. On the other hand, the courts also had a negative 
effect. Occasionally determinations were overturned on mere technical i-
233. SATUC 6th Annual Conference Minutes 18-19 April 1930. 
SATUC papers Ca 1.5 
ties. Whilst the courts did not place heavy financial burdens on 
intransigent employers, their actions militated against the interests 
of workers .. The courts were soon identified as instruments of the 
ruling classes in that they had to act within the parameters of laws 
which, in the long run, were meant to maintain and extend the operation 
of the particular system in which they existed. 
other areas of conflict and disappointment included ministerial 
delays in the ratification of determinations, the failure to publish 
de·terminations and the policy of asking the Board merely to report 
without making any recommendations. Although attempts had been 
made to streamline proceedings from time to time, these had not 
always resulted in success. Delays in the ratification of determina~ 
tions caused insecurity in affected industries234 and employers often 
took the opportunity to lower wages when 
. 235 
delays occurred. 
Whilst the Bill was still the subject of debate in Parliament, 
SATUC urged the government to clarify the section on ratification to 
avoid the problems which in the event they quite correctly 236 foresaw. 
The Minister of Labour came under severe criticism from the 
unions. The National Executive of SATUC "emphatically" protested 
234. For eg, Industrial Legislation Commission,UG 37-'35, p 107 
235. See pp ' "~ above 
236 . SATUC NEC Minutes 19 April 1925 SATUC papers Ca 1.1 
against Boydell's delay in making determinations and deprecated 
the use of the formation of industrial councils "as an excuse for 
>0 ld' th M' . t d t . . 237 110 ~ng up e ~nl.S er's e ernu.natl.on". Delays could last up 
to a number of. months . Reference was also made to the establishment 
of bogus unions outside the normal union structure. These unions, it 
was argued, were formed for the specific purpose of causing delays and 
238 
were the employers' catspaw. The provision which entitled the Board 
merely to investigate and report without making a recommendation tended 
to "nullify the effect of the investigation or at best result in a 
delay of some months before a Determination was made. ,,239 The 
consideration of objections also caused delays. Delays were also 
caused in one instance when the "Minister himself was travelling with 
the Prince of Wales around the Cape Province,,!240 The delays were 
considered in so serious a light that the issue was raised in Parliament. 
George Brown, Labour MP for Germiston, at the request of and on inform-
ation provided by trade unionists,241 argued that if industrial 
237. 
238. 
239. 
240. 
241. 
SATUC NEC Minutes 16 November 1926; General Secretary SATUC -
Minister of Labour and Secretary of Wage Board, 18 November 1926. 
SATUC papers Ca 1.2 and Cc7.1 (2) respectively 
SATUC NEC Minutes 16 September 1930 SATUC papers Ca 1.5 
SATLC Study Commission Minutes 16 June 1931. SATLC papers Da 2.1 
The 1930 Amendment to the Wage Act empowered the Minister to 
request the Board to make a survey "with the sole object of 
collecting information in regard to existing employment condi-
tions". Department of Labour Annual Reports, 1932 UG 37- 1933 P 41 
Tyler - Stuart, 11 June 1925, CFLU papers, Ac 2 
Andrews - Brown, 20 May 1927, SATUC papers Cc 1.8 
peace was to be maintained, then speed was of the essence to prevent 
grievances swelling "into a big dispute until finally the disagree-
242 
ment gets out of hllnd." The 1930 amendment did speed up matters 
and the delays which still occurred were slight in comparison tothose 
before 1930. _ 
The non-publication of _determinations -and the failure to instruct 
the Board to investigate industries did not only result in the insecurity 
which affected the working lives of the workers. They also suffered 
from the lack of wages due to them. This last aspect was quite 
different from the complaints made about the actual reduction of wages, 
but was no less an important factor than actual reductions. 243 The 
issue was well stated in a resolution to the SATLC 1932 conference. 
The failure to grant the liquor and catering trade employees 
associations' application for an investigation meant that the relief 
due to -a large number of employees was withheld during a period in 
which their wages h ad been reduced following the expiry of their 
244 industrial council agreement. In 1936 the conference debated 
and passed a motion which protested "against the delay in publishing 
Wage Determinations, which is robbing the workers of thousands of 
pounds in increased pay and benefits." The case of the liquor and 
242 . House of Assembly Debates 1927. Debate of Vote and Supply No 38 
Department of Labour, Cols 4637-4638 
243. cf ch 4, pp2t~-~ below 
244. SATLC 2nd Annual Conference Minutes, 26-28 March 1932, Motions 
29 and 30 preamble.SATLC papers Da 1.2 
245. SATLC 6th Annual Conference Minutes, 13-17 April 1936, SATLC 
papers, Da 2.6 
catering trade is a typical example of how determinations were 
eventually resolved. 
The Wage Board received a reference dated 25 October 1928 to 
investigate, report and make a recommendation for the liquor and 
catering trade in Cape Town hotels and bars. It issued a draft 
recommendation on 25 March 1929, followed by a final recommendation on 
246 8 June 1929. The Minister failed to act on the recommendation as 
negotiations for the establishment of an industrial council for the 
trade were under way. Some arguments were negotiated but were subse-
quently declared invalid. Further agreements were negotiated but collapsed 
through antagonism between employers and employees on the industrial 
council. The Board was again asked to investigate and report in 
June 1931. It reported on 21 July 1931 to the effect that, inter 
alia, the trade should be regulated. 247 A new reference was issued 
on 18 January 1932 and the Board reported on 7 June 1932248 that it could 
not recommend civilised wages for all the employees concerned. 
Two weeks later the Minister requested the Board to recommend a wage 
which it deemed fit. This the Board did on 1 July 1932. 249 The 
246. Hotels and Bars, An~109-1929 ii 
247. An 58-1931/2 
248. An 110-1933 
249. An 113-1933 
Board reported on 8 October on the objections lodged against the 
proposed determination published in the Gazette on 16 July 1932. 250 
251 The amended recommendation was presented on 3 November 1932. Even 
after all that, the Minister did not issue a determination. 252 As 
a result 1 313 employees were denied wage regulation under the Wage 
Act. 253 Throughout the period from June 1931 when the Board was 
asked for the second time to investigate, the SATLC NEC discussed the 
254 delays that occurred. Their committee was relentless in its 
criticism of the Minister of Labour. 
During the depression year, the Minister increasingly either 
refused to act on Wage Board recommendations or did not instruct the 
Board to issue recommendations in industries for which it issued 
255 
reports . After 1932/33, the Board's work tailed off considerably. 
250. An 138-1933 
251. An 223-1933 
252. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1933, . UG 43-1934 P 75 
253. ibid, p 67 
254. SATLC Study Commission Minutes, 16 June 1931, and SATLC NEC 
Minutes 30 June, 6 October, 20 October, 15 December 1931, 26 
January 1932. SATLC papers Da 2.1 
255. No further action was taken after the Board reported on firemen 
on Durban Whalers, (An 105-1929 ii); certain unskilled employees 
in the Durban municipal area (An 111-1929 ii); Kroonstad un-
skilled (An 51-1930) - these three are dealt with in greater 
detail in chapter six, below - brushware manufacturing (An 48-
1931/2); canvas and rope-making (An 57-1931/2); cotton blanket 
and sheeting section of the textile trade (An 60-1931/2) and 
many others. cf 1931 WBR pp 56-104; Industrial Legislation Comm-
ision Report, UG 37-1935 pp ;Department of Labour Annual 
Report, 1933, UG 43-1934 pp 74-77, for further examples. 
Only two investigations were initiated in 1934256 and none in 1935. 
No new determinations were proclafmed in 1935 or 1936. 257 Although 
accidental factors such as the death of a member of the Board and the 
end of its period of office in August 1935 may have affected the 
Board's operation, it is more likely that the pronounced move away 
from using the Board to industrial councils for the regulation of 
wages was more important. 
The Wage Board operated closely with industrial councils through-
out its existence. In the years before the amendment to the Industrial 
Conciliation Act in 1930 the Wage Act operated in part to supplement or 
support industrial council agreements. Wage determinations covered 
employees who did not fall within the definition of employee in the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. 258 We noted how the Board's members 
acted as an arbitration board under the Conciliation Act during the 
256. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1934 UG 11-1936, P 52 
claimed that no investigations were initiated in that year. This 
is contrary to the evidence in the wage Board reports for the 
glass bottle-making industry (An 582-1935) and the building 
trade (Ans 664-1934 and 816-1934). This fact does not contradict 
the general trend identified in that Annual Report that work 
was falling off. 
257. Department of Labour Annual Reports, 1935 and 1936, UG4 -1937 
P 67 and UG 44-1937 P 60 respectively 
258. cf ch 3, pp 
Lucas Award affair. They acted as arbitrators in the same way 
in at least one other instance as well when they settled a 
. f h l'd 1 f th h . d ' tr d 259 quest10n 0 0 1 ay eave or e a1r ress1ng a e. The 
number of industrial councils increased dramatically soon after the 
. . 260 
inception of the Wage Board. The Board ascribed this to 
261 
employers' attempts to escape the clutches of the Wage Act. 
Close relations existed between the Board and industrial councils. 262 
The Board assisted the council in the furniture trade to draw up its 
agreement for 1927/28. 263 Pursell noted that the Board helped to 
settle a dispute within the baking trade industrial council on the 
R d 264 an , and that OCc~sionally the Minister of Labour referred 
259. An 165-1938 ii.The reference is made in a section dealing with 
determinations and agreements in force during the early 1930s, 
so it seems that the arbitration board could have consisted of 
the pre-August 1935 Board. 
260. The number of Industrial Councils in forcein each year of our 
concern was as follows: 
1925 : 2 1931 : 43 
1926 : 14 1932 : 41 
1927: 22 1933: 35 
1928: 29 1934: 32 
1929: 31 1935: 38 
1930: 38 1936: 46 
Industrial Legislation Commission Report, UG 37-1935, p 93 and 
Department of Labour Annual Report, 1936, UG 44-1937, P 55. 
Other Department of Labour Annual Reports carry exact details 
of the council agreements in operation during each particular 
year. 
261 • 1929 WBR P 6 
262 . ibid P 5. Lucas's 1927 address before the Witwatersrand Branch 
of the Economic Society of South Africa contains paragraphs which 
later appeared in the 1929 WBR in exactly the same form; 
cf Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Board", pp 3-5, 
for the sentiments echoed here. 
263. An 113-1931 
264. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Legislation under the South African 
Wage Act" p 99 
"proposed agreements to the Board for l;"eview before they were made 
ff ' , 1 b . bl' , 265 o ~c~a y pu ~cat~on". The emphasis of the Wage Act's relation 
with the Conciliation Act altered markedly after 1930 in one very 
important way. 
The Board argued that as it only set down minimum rates of pay 
the only avenues through which workers could negotiate higher wages 
was th h th f t ' f' d '1 '1 266 roug e orma 10n 0 ~n ustr~a counC1 s. The Board 
also refused to lay down any recommendations for anything other 
than wages and hours in the building trade. Workers in that trade 
were "encouraged" to operate through an industrial council to regulate 
th ' 1 d" f k 267 e1r genera con 1t10ns 0 war . Similarly. the Board told the 
Industrial Legislation Commission that it encouraged "the formation 
f ' 1 d f' 't l' 268 o councl. s as a e 1.n1 e po l.cy •.• " That policy did not alter 
when new members took over the Board in September 1935 or when the Act 
was replaced in 1937. That Board stressed that it was to be remembered 
265. ibid P 97 
266. cf reports on the sweet industry (An 125-1931) and the Cape 
furniture trade (Ans 113-1931 and 160-1931) 
267. An 816-1934 
268. UG 37-1935 P 93 
that 
if the Wage Board, a body charged primarily with the duty 
of recommending minima for unorganised workers, should 
recommend probable optimum conditions, thereis little 
for either party I-workers or employers 7 to strive for 
by Industrial L-c"OOrrilJ Agreement, a system of wage 
regulation which at its best must be regarded as the 
highest form of industrial organisation. 269 
The change in emphasis from supporting axmcilsin their operation to 
initiating their establishment occurred at a time when the whole question 
of African wages fell under the spotlight. Contemporaries were also 
concerned with the changes in the economic and labour conditions which 
were taking place. Finally, the drive towards industrial councils 
as protectors of civilised labour instead of the Wage Board coincided 
°th th 1934 ° °1° d 1 bo ° 270 W1 e C1V1 1se a ur campa1gns. Already in 1934 the 
Department of Labour noted that a certain number of cx:uncils had adopted 
IIsuitable provisions to meet the requirements of civilised workers" 
and that others had been advised "of the necessity for making such pro-
271 
visions in future agreements." The trend continued in 1935 when the 
269. Report on the Hairdressing trade, dated 14 February 1938, (An 
165-1938 ii) and reaffirmed in similar terms in a later report 
for the same trade dated 6 May 1938, (ibid) 
270 . These factors were all discussed in chapters 1 and 2 above 
271. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1934, UG 11-1936, P 18 
Department inadvertently admitted that the civilised labour policy 
was being implemented through industrial councils. By the end 
of 1936 the number of ' civilised' workers had increased by 1 358 to 
4 458 compared to 1935 through the operation of industrial councils 
. h d'b d 272 1n t e manner escr1 e . 
The Wage Act established a Wage Board for the Union whose task 
it was to recommend minimum wages at 'civilised' rates in the first 
instance . If the Board could not recommend such wages it was left 
to the Minister whether or not to instruct it to recommend wages it 
deemed fit. The Minister was not beholden to act on the Board's 
recommendations. A number of occupations were excluded from 
regulation under the Act. The most important of these were domestic 
service and agricultural work, which effectively excluded the largest 
number of African workers. The Act was bypassed by the mining 
companies with the aid of the state and eventually only affected 
secondary industries and certain commercial undertakings . The work 
of the Wage Board was adversely affected by ambiguities in the wording 
of the Act, most of which were eventually ironed out by the amendment 
of the principal Act in 1930. Problems settled in 1930 included the 
272 . Department of Labour Annual Reports, 1935 and 1936, UG 4-1937 and 
UG 44-1937, pp 15-16 and pp 12-13 respectively 
length of time necessary for the completion of the various stages 
between the issue of a reference and the establishment of a 
determination, and the position of piece-work. The courts not 
only highlighted loopholes in · the Act. They also handed down 
light sentences which benefitted employers and upset employees. 
The administrative strictures placed on the Wage Board played an 
important part in reducing the degree of employers' opposition to 
the board. Dissatisfacticn arose within workers' ranks at the 
inability of the Board and the apparent failure of the Department of 
Labour to act in their interest. We turn now to examine the effects 
the wage Board had on the economic development of the Union. 
CHAPTER 4 The Role of the Wage Act in Economic Development 
The day to day administration of the Wage Act brought to the 
surface a number of weaknesses of the wage regulation machinery. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Wage Board operated in the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors of the economy. Agricultural 
enterprise and domestic service were excluded in law whereas the 
mining industry was exempted on a de facto basis . The mining 
companies escaped from wage regulation under the Wage Act after a 
long battle with the state and the white mine workers. The restric-
tion of the wage Act to secondary production necessitated a different 
approach on the part of the state to economic problems such as market 
expansion and to the consideration of factors like cost structures 
which did not affect the mines in the same way. Of primary importance 
in this regard was the state's strategy of tariff protection and the 
employment of white labour. The costs of both policies had to be 
borne largely by manufacture itself and only indirectly by the mines 
through government revenues. This chapter sets out to examine the 
effect the Wage Act had on economic development in the Union. 
The two three year reports of the Wage Board each dealt with the 
effects of the Board's work under six headings. These were the effect 
it had on efficiency in business, on ,production cost~, on the numbers 
employed, on ·the racial composition of the labour force, on competition 
1 between employers, and on prices to the consumer. These headings 
are not fully comprehensive, and the Board's treatment of them is not 
exhaustive. It will be helpful to examine each in turn, except for the 
effect wage regulation had on the labour force as this aspect forms 
part of chapter five below. Thereafter, the Board's recommendations 
on the working day, its exemption policy, its policy on the employ-
ment of women and finally aspects of its wage recommendations are 
examined . 
In 1929, three years after the promulgation of the first determina-
tions in the country, the Board cautiously remarked that there was "not 
much direct evidence" to indicate what effect wage regulation had had on 
efficiency. It argued that the figures available for the sweetmaking 
and baking industries suggested that business efficiency had improved 
"through the pressure of higher wages." This conclusion was based 
on the returnsof all the firms investigated by the Board taken as an 
aggregate. The returns indicated that a sharp increase in the total 
volume of sales had accompanied an equally substantial increase in 
wages. The Board defined efficiency in managerial terms, and stated 
that it seemed 
to be generally accepted by those in a position to judge that 
there is a very considerable degree of inefficiency in the 
management of a large number of businesses in South Africa. 2 
1. 1929 Wage Board Report, pp 8-11; 1931 Wage Board Report pp 15-31 
2. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 8 
In late 1927 Lucas indentified at least two types of business 
establishment in the Union. There were those that were "well-managed, 
up-to-date and in every way satisfactory ", and those which were "filthy, 
badly managed, and badly housed" and which served "no useful purpose 
to _ the conununi ty ... The Wage Board, Lucas continued 
had been struck by the almost total absence of proper training 
for employees; by the frequent lack, of provisions of reasonable 
comfort for the maintenance of the energy of the employees; often 
by the low level of managerial efficiency; and by the almost 
total absence of any system of costing. 
He further remarked that employers were "frequently quite unable to say 
whether a particular branch of their business lI was a "payable one or 
3 
notll. The Board claimed that it had discovered many such instances 
of inefficiency "during the course of its inspections . ,,4 
The crux of the matter, as Lucas stated, was that South African 
industry could not "hope to develop and be really successful" if it 
was not efficient. Central to the problem was the ability of industry 
to carry the financial burden of the civilised labour policy. 
Inefficency meant poor productivity which reacted against the initial 
higher costs of white labour. The only solution to the probl em was 
for iridustry ' s house to be put in order. The Board helped "industry 
by ,a careful use . of wage regulation • •• to achieve efficienc.~ 
d 't 5 an prosperl. Y." Boydell, as Minister of Labour, shared these 
3 . Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 27 
4. 1929 Wage Board Report) p 8 
5 . Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 38 
opinions and expressed his views in a number of formal addresses . 
These included addresses to the ninth annual congress of the South 
African Federated Chambers of Indu~es.6and to the annual dinner 
of the Transvaal Chamber of Industries. 7 The idea that the Board 
should be used to encourage the development of industry drew unfavourable 
comment from some quarters. A Forward correspondent, for example , 
retorted that Lucas's remarks proved there was "no limit to self-
deception II because IIno Wage Board could possibly assist such a result". 8 
The Board was itself bound by the Wage Act to consider the ability of 
a particular industry or trade it was investigating at anyone time to 
continue without too much effort. 9 As such it was in a position to 
encourage and support certain· industries from its very inception, 
even if it was subject to the chagrin of people who thought otherwise. 
Increased efficiency in management, brought about by Wage Board 
action, was also matched with increased efficiency of employees. 
As one clothing manufacturer from the Cape stated in 1931 : 
I consider that the last determination was responsible for 
putting the shirt industry on its feet. It enabled factories 
to attract much better types of people. 
6. Rand Daily Mail 28 July 1928 
7. Rand Daily Mail 10 November 1926 
8. Forward 30 March 1928 
9. Act 27-1925, section 3(2}(c} 
The Board claimed that other large employers in the clothing industry 
agreed with the above sentiment. 10 In the sweet trade increased 
efficiency which followed a determination enabled one manufacturer 
to increase steadily his turnover and profit, but cut the wage bill 
from 26% to 21% of his costs. 11 A foreman employee claimed that 
since higher wages were determined for the tea, coffee and chicory 
trade, black workers had "shown a marked improvement in efficiency 
and attendance in work".12 The Board's thinking on the issue was 
quite clear. In response to a call from manufacturers that coloured 
females be not paid the determined wage in the sweet trade because they 
did not deserve it, the Board stated that such opinion was "based upon 
a long-established, but ..• unwarranted belief" that workers generally 
were not worth the wage they received. The Board stressed that "the 
level of intelligence, vitality and capacity of employees in industry" 
d d d 1 I b 1 " d't' 13 epen e arge y on etter lvlng can 1 10ns. It is clear that . 
extra costs involved with the determination of higher wages were counter-
acted in many instances by improvements in efficiency. 
10. Report of the Wage Board, Clothing, 23 October 1931, An 82-1931/2 
11 • Report of the Wage Board, sweets, 15 July 1931 , An 125-1931 
12. Report of the Wage Board, Tea, coffee and cnicory J 13 April 1933 
An 175-1933ii 
13. Report of the Wage Board, Sweets, 15 July 1931, An 125-1931 . Also 
quoted in 1931 Wage Board Report, p 16 
The Board's opinion on the efficiency of both management and 
labour was no different from the experiences of foreign industry 
nor was it out of line with economic thinking at the time. The 
British laundry trade. for example. became mechanised and embarked on 
an "efficiency movement II when it came under the control of regulations 
14 issued by the Trade Board. E M Burns. an oft-quoted economist in 
the mid-twenties urged that a great deal of "both mental and physical" 
ineff,iciency probably resulted from "unduly low wages". Insecurity 
caused by inadequate income adversely affected the workers' performance. 
and Burns claimed that increased wages would "force employers who at 
the moment feel that low wages render efficient organisation 
15 
unnecessary, to. choose between economic extinction or better management ... 
Similarly. Henry Ford in the United States claimed that one reason why 
his company had inaugurated a higher "''j<1- scheme was "so that the 
business would be on a lasting foundation 
wage business is always insecure ... 16 
17 Fordist principles were analysed keenly by the Wage Board. 
The Communist Party for its part argued that the references to Ford in 
Wage Board reports proved that the Board was only concerned with 
II increasing the degree of exploitation II of the workers .. 1 8 Fordls 
14. Sells. D "The Br-itsh Trade Boards System". quoted in 1929 
Wage Board Report. p 9 
15. Burns. E M Wages and the State _pp 392-4 
16. Ford. H My Life and Work p 126-7 
17. For a general statement. cf 1931 Wage Board Report. p 22. The 
allegiance to Fordist ideas is also reflected in the Minority 
Report of the Economic and Wage Commission to which Lucas himself 
subscribed. UG14-1926. p 314 
18. Urnsebenzi 22 october 1926 
scheme was linked directly to the, introduction of more mechanised 
processes which in turn increased productivity which enabled his 
company to pay higher wages. The Wage Board for its part argued that 
in South Africa, employers had to be encouraged or alternately coerced 
into using mechanised processes, and that the way to do it was to force 
up wages . In 1934 the Board noted ruefully that increased mechanisa-
19 tion had in turn led to deskilling and a tendency for wages to drop. 
The belief by the Board and many employers that higher wages 
alone meant increased efficiency and hence greater productivity was 
not universal. One case in particular, which perhaps is more of an 
aberration than a viable alternative to the dominant belief of the 
Board, illustrates the point. A builder and contractor, Becker, 
was able to evade the requirements of a wage agreement by claiming 
that his utilisation of specially re-inforced concrete plates in 
construction was an innovation and his own patent. The courts up-
held Becker's contention that he fell outside the terms of the 
agreement. Instead of employing labour at skilled rates, he employed 
only unskilled labour. Becker sold his patent to the Durban City 
Council for £250 000 for use in their sub-economic housing scheme. 
The Council subsequently saved an estimated £40 000 on labcur through 
using only unskilled workers. The National Industrial Bulletin 
commented that because "unskilled workers at low rates of wages may 
I k th d . 1 ttr' 20 be emp oyed II J Bee er I s me 0 was IIpartlcu arly a actl. ve. II 
19. Report of the Wage Board, Engineering, 30 April 1934, An 914-1934 
20. National Industrial Bulletin 30 October 1939 
One commentator made the valid point that without the wage agree-
ment in force at the time it was "doubtful whether the patent would 
have been thougJ-t of" and, further, it was "doubtful whether it would 
th o 21 have been worth any lng." The case is exceptional and does not 
detract from the general idea that higher wages could result in greater 
efficiency. The Board consciously thought along those lines, and 
greater efficiency did result in part from the determination of mini-
mum wages . 
The question of efficiency was linked to the question of the 
ability of industries to pay the recommended wage. The issue was 
a sensitive one, as is indicated by the statements of two parliamen-
tarians when the Wage Bill was debated in 1925. Sir Drummond Chaplin 
(South Peninsula) had raised the spectre of large numbers of manufac-
turers closing down as a "last resource" if they had to pay higher 
22 
wages . Te Water (Pretoria Central) retorted that businesses 
would have had to close down as well if the South African Party I 5 
Wage Bill of 1921 had become law. 23 A more determined line of 
argument was that industries should close if they could not afford 
pay a living wage. 
The labour commissioners of the Economic and Wage Commission 
24 
represented a substantial body of opinion within the country. 
to 
21. Fletcher, E "State Intervention in South Africa with special 
reference to Wage, Tariff and Marketing Legislation 1920-1938" 
pp 74-5 
22. House of Assembly Debates, 1925,c 1663 
23. ibid, c 1830 cf ch 2, ppll,4above for a discussion on the 1921 Wage 
Bill 
24. The Minority Report was signed by W H Andrews, a pioneer trade 
unionist, Communist Party secretary and General-Secretary of the 
South African Association of Employees' Organisations; F A W Lucas, 
Labourite and Chairman of the Wage Board,and W H Rood, National 
Party Member of Parliament for Nelspruit/Barberton 
~ conceded that the introduction of wage regulation would force 
some industries to tl?e wall uhowever much time is allowed for their 
adjustment to a minimum living wage." struggling industries which 
were indispensable to the country, they argued, should be subsidized 
to enable them to pay living wages at whatever cost to the community. 
Any other industry which could not pay suitable wages should collapse 
because 
it cannot be considered just that the workers in these 
industries should be required to work for a wage which 
does not enable them to maintain the necessary standard of 
health and strength. 25 
Minister of Labour Thomas Boydell on one occasion went so far as to 
remark that an 
industry that could not afford to give those engaged {-in work-1 
a chance of living a life suitable for a civilised person had 
no claim for assistance {-from state revenue or via exernptions-7 
or existence in a civilised community. 26 
He announced to the concerned chairman at the 1926 annual dinner of the 
Transvaal Chamber of Industries that if they could not pay the wage, 
their businesses did not deserve to exist. 27 One commentator has 
stated that "carried to its logical conclusion" wage regulation as 
enforced by the Wage Act would result in "the driving out of existence 
of marginal firms" for the same reasons as stated above. 28 The Durban 
25. Economic and Wage Commission Minority Report, UG 14-1926 P 315 
26. Rand Daily Mail 28 July 1926 
27. ibid.} 10 November 1926 
28. Fletcher, E "state Intervention in South Africa with special 
reference to Wage, Tariff and Marketing Legislation" p 74 
Chamber of Commerce thought that the Board operated under the 
misapprenhension that "Chambers of Commerce and Employers' Organisa-
tions" involved everyone in the corrunercial shopping trade . The Chamber 
argued that it did not represent snail enterprises, but explained how would 
be affected by a proposed reconsideration for shop assistants in late 
1928. In circumstances where "very often the small annual subscription 
required L-by the Chamber-1 represents a serious addition to their 
general expenses" it was hardly likely that small enterprises could 
continue on their own. other enterprises were so small they took 
up all the proprietors' time, especially in cases where the proprietor 
ld t ff d . t t 29 cou no a or proper aSS1S an s . Umsebenzi declared that the 
Board lIat best II attempted to "stabilise the conditions of the 
(capitalistically) most 'enlightened' factories: 30 This opinion 
had been raised earlier in the same year by Boydell when he claimed 
that 
all would admit that the present L-pact-1 Government had 
gone out of its way in order to show the industrialists of 
South Africa that it was .out to help the healthy industries 
of this country. 31 
Complaints that businesses were forced to close as a result of 
wage determinations were often made by manufacturers' representatives 
32 before the Board . These, in turn, were just as repeatedly denied 
29. "Memorandum of Objection re proposed Determination published as 
a schedule to Government Notice 1703 of 1928 submitted by Durban 
Chamber of Commerce" p 15. Department of Labour Archive 2037/F4/19 
30. Umsebenzi 19 November 1926 
31. Rand Daily Mail 28 July 1926 
32 . For example, Report of the Wage Board, Tea, Coffee and Chicory , 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 11 (5) 7 September 
1928, p 99; Report of the Wage Board, Clothing, 23 October 1931, 
An 82-1931/2 
b th B d ' t' t' 33 y e oar upon lnves 19a lon . The Board did report that wage 
regulation "must ultimately mean the almost complete elimination 
of competition, based on difference in wages. II Further, it also 
reported that employers who fulfilled the provisions of the 
determinations welcomed its investigations "because wage regulation 
would remove this very unsocial form of competition. 11 34 The stated 
policy of the Board was to rid the economy of "unsocial" forms of 
competition, namely employers who relied for their success on the 
payment of low wages and had "no regard for the interest of their 
.35 
employees. In effect this meant pleasing the 'better' employers 
who paid higher wages in return for better productivity as it pro-
tected them from the imbalances caused by undercutting. This 
policy was not restricted to individual trades or sections thereof 
in one place. It applied to industries in .different localities as 
well. Uniformity was to be .achieved except in so far as "minor 
variations to meet local conditions" were permitted. The Board stated 
that it would be 
clearly unfair to favour one area as against another by 
allowing to one and not to another advantages either by way 
of lower wages, or by an excessive number of exemptions from 
the prescribed wage, or by permitting the employment as low-paid 
workers of an excessive number of apprentices, or in any 
33. Report of the Wage Board, Baking and Confectionery Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) 11 (6) 14 September 1928 p120 
34. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 11 
35. ibid, P 11 
other way by which one could get an advantage 
over another. 36 
Industries should, as far as possible, be able 
to promote and dispose of their goods according to 
their capacity for efficient management and their 
adoption of up-to-date machinery and methods. 37 
It is clear that the Wage Board sympathised with the sentiments 
of the representatives of Durban commerce. The onset of the 
depression could only have exacerbated the difficulties of small, 
ill-organised establishments. As companies and business in 
general had to tighten their belts, more and more of them fell by the 
wayside. As noted above, the number of prosecutions and successful 
judgements for wage regulation offences cannot be relied upon to 
give an accurate picture of the effects of wage regulation~8 The 
number of insolvencies, on the other hand during the depression 
years itself is notable. The number increased from 1 392 in 1928 
to reach a peak of 2 576 in 1931. It began to decline slowly 
from the first half of 1932. 39 Brought on largely by the depression, 
36. Report of the Wage Board, Furniture, 16 June 1930, An 592-193~ 
1931 Wage Board Report,pp 29-30 
37. "Memorandum of objection re Proposed Determination published as 
a Schedule to Government Notice 1703 of 1928, submitted by the 
Durban Chamber of Commerce" pp 17-18. Department of Labour 
Archives 2037/F4/19 
38. cf ch 3, pp lIS above 
39. The number of insolvencies over the years was as follows: 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
392 
687 
2572 
2 576 
Jan-June 1932 1 458} 
June-Dec 1932 1 038 2 496 
Jan-March 1933 further 
diminut:ion 
Source: United Kingdom Department of Gverseas Trade, Reports on 
the Economic Condition in South Africa, July 1931 and September 
1933 p 12 and p 18 respectively 
the position must have been exacerbated in some cases where wage 
regulation existed, notwithstanding the evasions and deceptions which 
took place. In effect the drive toward increased efficiency had 
prepared business managerially for the boom years which were to 
follow. 
Employers were wont to use the argument that they could not 
implement wage cleterminatiCXlll as their production costs would auto -
matically rise to unprofitable levels. 40 For example, complaints 
were made that some bakers could under-cut minimum prices set up 
by the Master Bakers' Association, because they employed cheap 
41 labour. The Chamber of Mines put in a strong appeal along 
conventional lines that the increase would raise production costs, 
and thus sabotage the policy the mine bakeries employed to thwart 
that of "some bakers who had hitherto supplied bread " but had 
"supplied an inferior article, the issue of which to the natives had 
given rise to dissatisfaction and complaints a ,,42 The Wage Board 
rejected both arguments. The Board's investigation showed that the 
difference between one firm 
where all the operativeswere European in receipt of at 
least the minimum rate of wages laid down in the agree-
40. 1931 Wage Board Report,p 20 
41. 
42. 
Report of the Wage Board, Baking, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) September 1926 p 72 
Repo~t of the Wage Board, Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Ed1t10n) September 1927, p 3. The same complaints were made in 
February 1928, cf Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
February 1928 p 84 and in 1929, cf Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) 6 September 1929 p 590 
ment,43 and I-firm INo 3, with the lowest wage-
production c~stsJ where natives, who are paid wages 
far below those laid down in the agreement, outnumbered 
the European employees by nearly two to one, is one-
fifteenth of a penny per lb.L-sic~ in the cost of pro-
duction. 44 
The baking industry was covered by an Industrial Council 
Agreement from 1925 but this agreement necessarily excluded Africans. 
The Witwatersrand investigation was initiated because of the unequal 
competition which arose between master bakers through the different 
ratios of black to white employees in certain industries. The 
implications of the investigation for the colour bar are dealt with 
45 below. The Board came to the conclusion that the introduction of 
higher" wages would not necessarily entail economic ruin for the trade 
as a whole but would perhaps prevent unfair competition caused by 
undercutting. The Board quoted a report of a Swiss Government 
enquiry into the determination of prices in the baking industry 
wi th approval. The report stated that 
neither the costs of making nor the costs of marketing 
but agreement between the master bakers is the main factor 
in determining the price of bread. 46 
43. Lucas stated that most of the whites' wages were "nearly 50% 
higher" than the wage laid down by the Board. Lucas F A W 
"Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 30. cf 1929 Wage 
Board Report p 8 and 1931 Wage Board Report p 20 
44. Report of the Wage Board, Baking and Confectionary, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition), September 1926 p72. 1931 
Wage Board Report,p 20. cf also Social and Ihdustrial Review 
(Special Edition), 6 September 1929, p 590-1. Natal estimates 
were approximately the same as the Pretoria/Witwatersrand 
complex, cf 1931 Wage Board Report, p 20 
45. ch 5 , ppl~?·'!below 
46. 1931 Wage Board Report, p 21 
Many Pretoria bakers raised the price of bread by 2d a loaf and 
bl d h d f th ' 47 ~e t e Boar or e lncrease. In Durban, a price war 
ensued during the early part of 1930 when one baker reduced the 
price of bread 
with the result that bread was sold wholesale 5d and 
retail 6d as against 6d and 7d respectively before and 
after the "bread war. II 48 
As we have already seen, biscuit makers got together in October 1927 
and decided to raise the price of biscuits, ostensibly to pay for 
the wage increases. But they did so before the determination was to 
. ff 49 come lnto e ect. The Wage Board only investigated the price 
effects of wage regulation in the baking trade in any detail. From 
that standpoint the Board suggested that increased wages did not 
affect production costs in any major way. The International Labour 
Office produced a report which compared and contrasted costs of 
production of Ford motor vehicles and wage structures in both 
Europe and America. The study concluded that where wages were 
high, work performance was also high and where wages were low, the 
50 productivity of workers was also low. Clearly, the Wage Board 
believed that increased wages were directly linked to increased 
productivity and the extra expense was thus compensated for and 
exceeded. 
47. Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 30 
48. 1931 Wage Board Report p 21 
49. Forward, 4 November 19271 cf ch 3, ppJI~-3 above 
50. 1931 Wage Board Report, pp 22-3, quoting an untitled extract 
from "Industrial and Labour Information" of 8 May L-1931?J 
Another area of disagreement between the private sectararrl the state 
was over the alleged effects wage regulation had on numbers employed. 
Some of the most strident arguments against wage regulation on the 
grounds that it caused unemployment came from commercial interests. 
The Durban Chamber of Commerce, for example, submitted a lengthy 
memorandum to the Board which outlined their objections to the 
proposed recommendation for shop assistants. The vast number of the 
14 559 employees affected were white men, women and f~e juveniles 
included in the returns from establishments. 51 The Board had "no 
option but to adopt a European standard as the basis for a recommen-
dation" because whites comprised over 90% of the work_force. 52 
The Board recommended average increases of £6.0.0 per month for the 
different grades of employment. The Chamber of Commerce in 
Durban commented that small employers would go out of business with 
the effect that thousands of workers would no longer have employ-
ment. The memorandum reveals that the Chamber realised that some 
business concerns liked the idea of the "weeding out principle 
approved by the Board" in order to get rid of inefficient employees. 
The Chanber went on to argue that 
The Board's report and recommendations as they stand would 
initiate a weeding out and concentrating process which must 
reduce the relative employment capacity of trade and commerce, 
and leave upon the hands of the State a progressively increasing 
number of people forced out from fields which have hitherto 
maintained them. 53 
51. There were 4916 white men, 1 511 white boys, 4520 white 
women and 3 236 white girls out of 14 559. Report of the 
Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) 5 October 1922, p 144 
52 . ibid, P 157 
53. "Memorandum of Objection re proposed Determination published as 
a Schedule to Government Notice 1703 of 1928 submitted by 
Durban Chamber of Commerce" pp 16-17. Department of Labour 
Archive 2037/F4/19 
A President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Karl 
Gundelfinger, "the reputed millionaire dry goods merchant" was 
quoted as saying that men in their early twenties were being 
put on the street, not because they were dissatisfied 
with the wage L-they normally received-1, not because 
the wage was not fair or ample, not because of incom-
petence, but because the employer could not possibly 
afford to pay the increase stipulated in the recent 
wage determinations under which these lads, on completing 
a total of five years work under one or more employers, 
were to be classed as fully-fledged, fully-competent 
adults . 
He went on to say that in 
cases where exceptional ability was shown, the lads were 
naturally retained, but in a large number of cases they 
were being replaced by a younger batch or by girls. 54 
Criticism of the Board appears to have been quite widespread as 
similar arguments were brought to the notice of the Board by 
employers in Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town, 
55 East London and the Natal Indian Congress. 
The Board usually made short shrift of these arguments. It 
stated that very few of the employers who advanced these arguments 
"would admit that they L-were-1 employing more persons than L-was-1 
necessary for the conduct of their business." Redundant employees 
54. Quoted in Forward, 26 July 1929 
55. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) 111 (13) 1 March 1929, p 363. cf also 
Department of Labour Archive, 2037/F4/19 
would be dismissed regardless of whether wage regulation existed or 
56 
not. Arguments of that nature implied 
either that the employers advancing them are carrying on 
their businesses so inefficiently that they are employing 
a considerable number of redundant employees, or in some 
instances that they will have to close down their 
businesses. 
Such inefficiency would in time be rooted out, "and the worst that 
could be urged against the proposed determination would be that 
that process is being accelerated. II The Board did not accept the 
argument that shop owners generally in this instance could not 
. 57 
surVl.ve. The extent to which the Board considered occupations 
other than shop assistants in this light is unclear . The Board's 
opinion that determinations did not cause unemployment as such was 
not exclusively reserved for shop assistants. Bakers in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg were supported by their employees in their attempts 
to reduce the determination for the region on the grounds that 
their trade was subject to undercutting from establishments beyond 
the 10 mile radius limitation of the determination. The Board 
rejected the appeals and suggested that the limit of 10 miles be ex-
tended to include the offending parties under the determination. 58 
A Johannesburg glass bevelling and silvering firm objected against a 
reduction in the wage for non-learners on the grounds that the 
56. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) 11 (7) 5 October 1928 p 161.Also referred 
to by Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) 111 (13) 1 March 1929, p363 
57. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) 111 (13) 1 March 1929 p 363 
58. Report of the Wage Board, Baking, 13 April 193~An 67-1933ii 
number of whites employed in the trade would decrease, and that the 
firm would not be able to recoup the costs it had incurred by emp-
loying whites after the introduction of the first determination in 
1927. The firm's representative argued before the Board that if 
the new determination came into force it would be "quite impossible" 
for white employees who had completed their learner period 
to exist on the wage suggested, and consequently they 
will all be compelled to leave, and in many instances 
the individuals will suffer irreparable harm for they 
are too old to be apprenticed in most other trades . 
The Board supported the Johannesburg firm and refused to lower .the 
d . 59 reconunen at10n. This case further indicated that the Board did 
not consider that high wages caused unemployment. In fact, it was 
of the opinion that lower wages would cause white unemployment. 
It would appear that the Board operated to restrict the number of jobs 
by maintaining higher wages in certain trades and by this means 
secure or hope to secure white employment. It was apparent that 
notwithstanding employers' complaints about the inability of certain 
industries to continue to operate profitably, no evidence could be 
adduced to indicate any reduction in output. The Board concluded 
that 
if there is any reduction in the number of employees, 
it must represent improved management and greater output 
of efficiency on the part of the employees retained. 
59 . Report of the Wage Board, Glass Bevelling and Silvering, 15 
December 1931, An 253-1931/2 
The Board admitted that dismissals had taken place, but that 
before the depression this did not represent a drop in the total number 
60 
of people employed. During the depression the Board urged a re-
duction in the number of busses used in passenger transporation in 
Port Elizabeth. It realised that a number of useful employees would 
become redundant but suggested that the shifts worked should be 
61 
shortened to take up the unemployed. cape Town hairdressing 
employees who were dismissed because of the financial burden caused by 
the determination when trade fell off during the depression became 
62 
self-employed. All the trades mentioned here, shop assistants, 
passenger transport and hairdressing, were predominantly adult white 
worker preserves. The introduction of a minimum wage of E2.0.0 
per week in the tea, coffee and chicory trade, on the other hand, had 
led to the dismissal of juvenile workers and their replacement by 
fewer, more efficient adult workers. Whether or not those juveniles 
found employment elsewhere is not readily known. 63 
Unemployment was not a new phenomenon in the Union and a number 
of factors other than wage regulation have to be taken into considera-
tion. For example, the reorganisation of the labour process in 
certain industries had caused some displacement. Even in those 
instances, it appears that employees discharged by one firm found 
60. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 10 
61. Report of the Wage Board, Passenger Transportation, 22 April 1932 
An 704-1931/2 
62. Report of the Wage Board, Hairdressing, 5 September 1931, An89-1931/2 
63. Report of the Wage Board, Tea, COffee and Chicory, 13 April 
1933, An 176-1933ii 
Uo 
employment in another which had reorganised itself differently.64 
The Board supported attempts to reorganise work operations by 
introducing labour saving devices. Such action ensured that 
because fewer employees co..tl.d then prcxluce the same number, if not more,) 
goods than before, a number of employees would be "set free for pro-
65 ducti ve use elsewhere". When a number of textile establishments 
refused to introduce power looms in place of automatic looms on the 
grounds that it would lead to "technological unemployment" the 
Board reacted in a hostile manner. It refused to entertain the 
notion that a lower wage should apply to establishments which did 
not employ power looms because it saw the use of "antiquated 
methods" as an artificial source of employment which should not be 
66 
encouraged .. In yet another trade, the Board argued that the 
determination in no way accelerated a tendency for dismissals to 
increase as a result of the introduction of labcur saving machinery. 
It concluded that dismissals were "likely to continue whatever 
wages are determined. ,,67 The wasteful hoarding of labour was 
frowned upon by the Wage Board. Its elimination through higher 
wage stipUlation did not appear to curtail the productive capacity 
of the country. 
It is clear that many employers did not agree with the policy 
of the Board. It is possible that many used the argument that 
64. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, 1 March 1929J Social 
and Industrial Review (Special· Edition) 111 (;3) p 370; 1931 
Wage Board Report p 24; Report of the Wage Board, Commercial 
Distributive Trade, 17 March 1931, An 557-1931 
65. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 10 
66. Report of the Wage Board, Textiles, 26 November 1936)An 46-1937 
67. Report of the Wage Board, Tea, Coffee and Chicory, 26 August 
1933, An 144~1934 
Ur 
wage regulation would lead to increased unemployment as a ploy 
to get out of paying better wages. The Board was itself wary 
about deducing from its available information exactly how wage 
determinations affected general employment patterns. It warned 
from time to time that figures it collated from investigations could 
not be used as indicators of actual fluctuations in employment. 
Figures for the sweet industry were collected for February 1926, 
68 1928 and 1930. The total number of employees in the trade 
dropped between 1926 and 1928, but rose above the 1926 figure by 
1930. The policy of retrenching redundant employees was carried 
out more strictly in 1928 than in 1926. 69 The dyeing, cleaning 
and laundry trade showed a decrease in numbers from figures collected 
in March 1927 and those collected in June 1931. The Board cautioned 
that the two sets of figures were not exactly comparable: the month 
of March was not a peak period in this semi-seasonal trade and that 
1931 was itself a depression year. A further factor which com-
plicated the issue in the laundry trade was the falling off in trade 
from ships, many of which had installed their own laundries on 
board since 1927 and no longer sent laundry ashore. 70 Extraneous 
factors affected the employment figures collected by the Board. 
Furthermore, these figures were not exhaustive or complete for the 
industries as a whole and only indicate very general tendencies. 
68. Table 8i, p~h~ below for the Sweet trade 
69. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 10 
70. 1931 Wage Board Report, p 27 
The Industrial Legislation Commission finally put an end to 
speculation about the e ffect of wage regulation per se on employ-
ment figures .. The report argued that it was "important to 
emphasise" the impossibility 
to prove statistically that the operation of the legislation 
I-ie., both the Wage and the Industrial Conciliation Acts I 
had had the effect of either increasing or decreasing the-
total volume of employment ... I -because I, in addition 
to the wage factor, .. . the availability of capital for 
maintaining or developing industrial and commercial enter-
prises, the availability of raw products and of markets, and 
the incidence of customs tariffs, of freight, and of railway 
rates ••• L-all influenced the volume of employment_I. 71 
The Wage Board's position on wage regulation and employment can 
be summarised briefly. It realised that numerous factors other 
than the regulation of wages affected the total volume of employment . 
It dismissed arguments by business interests that wage determinations 
of themselves led and contributed' to further unemployment. It noted 
that many employers wastefully utilised their labour resources. 
It argued that low wages were attributable to the employment of 
redundant workers .. The private sector was marred by an imbalance 
of the labour force and the Board attempted to rationalise the 
distribution of labour within the maket by breaking the system 
whereby some employers used labour wastefully. The Board 
believed that the workers who did lose their jobs because of wage 
determinations were redundant, and could be relocated elsewhere more 
productively. The inefficient utilisation of workers was to be 
replaced by more productive use in areas where they were most needed. 
The Board ' s encouragement of the reorganisation of the labour process 
71. Industrial Legislation Commission Report)UG 37-1935, p 60 
brought about by wage regulation in the intere~ of improved pro-
ductivity indicates a concern for economic advancement rather than 
the provision of benefits to workers themselves. 
The Wage Board acted to control the length of the working day. 
As Budlender has pointed out, with the development of industry, it 
became necessary to curb the worst excesses of capitalist production. 
These excesses include the health, welfare and ability of the worker 
to perform his tasks. One way to ensure his ability to work is to 
control the length of time the worker works. Ideally, the period 
should not be too long so as to exhaust the worker, nor too short so 
as to waste some of his productive capacity. Factories legislation 
was introduced in the Union partly through state recognition of the 
. need for control over individual enterprises and partly from labour 
. . 72 
organlsatl0n. Manufacturing industries were normally covered by 
the Factories Act and its various amendments. Retail establishments 
d b .. 1 d' 73 were covere y provlncla or lnances. The Wage Board was 
empowered in terms of Section 3 (1)(a) of the Act to investigate and 
74 
report on hours. 
The enforced payment of full wages for less time worked would 
72. Act 28-1918, and amendment Act 26-1931 was replaced by 
Act 22-1941 which established a 50 hour, 48 hour and 46 hour week 
respectively. For a general discussion of the Factories Act cf 
Budlender, D "Labour Legislation in South Africa 1924-1948"pp140-185 
73. Eg., cape Shop Hours Ordinance 14-1930; Transvaal Shop Hours 
Ordinance 5-1923; Natal Shop Hours Ordinance 5-1923; Orange Free 
State Shop Hours Ordinance 6-1925 
74. Act 27-1925 and as amended by Act 23-1930 
further prohibit employers from using labour wastefully. The 
wage determination for omnibus drivers, for example, set a 
maximum of 48 hours per week. The Board revealed that from 
"returns supplied by the employers, the hours {-for driversJ 
varied between 42 and 105 a week" although the time actually 
75 
spent driving was less. The Board later suggested reducing the 
number of hours to ensure that workers who could be dismissed if the 
76 
number of busses was reduced would still find employment . 
Similarly barmen in Bloemfontein and Kimberley were restricted to 54 
77 hours per week amidst opposition from employers. The hours had 
previously not exceeded 77 hours, although a representative of barmen 
not covered by an unofficial agreement between employers and employees 
78 
stated that some barmen worked for as long as 92 hours per week. 
Pursell noted that between 1926 and 1930 
34 determinations were made in 15 various industries. 
Nine determinations specified a fifty hour straight 
time maximum as provided in the Factories Act. Two 
determinations permitted a 54 hour week. Seventeen 
r e com mendations established a 48 hour week while three 
determinations laid down a 45 hour week. 
The point to note is that of the 34 determinations made, 20 
"contained provisions more liberal than the Factories Act". 79 
75. Report of the Wage Board, Motor Omnibus Drivers, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) November 1927 p 6 
76. cf p;lt'! above 
77. Report of the Wage Board, Barmen in Licensed Victuallers Trade, 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (6) March 1928 pl16 
78. ibid, P 110 
79. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation under the South African Wage 
Act" p 86-87 
The reasons for the Board's action need careful consideration. 
Pursell argued that the Board changed its policy after 1930 and 
thereafter failed to limit hours or determine holiday leave and the 
like. The pre-1930 actions, he explained, "'e .... the result of the 
"uplifting conviction of this L-1926-1930_1 Board." The change 
BO took place because the Board changed. At least three considera-
tions need to be examined. First, the Board qualified its policy 
of reducing hours in specific terms . Second, the membership of the 
Board did not alter to the extent that would have induced the change 
in policy as outlined by Pursell. Third, the evidence suggests that 
the change in policy was directed from the central government. Each 
point is dealt with seriatim. 
The Board did not propose to reduce hours to below the maximum 
prescribed by the Factories Act, except in special circumstances. 
It considered that when circumstances justified the payment of the 
weekly wage for a shorter number of hours, it would recommend that 
extra pay should be provided for the number of hours that made up 
the difference between the determination and the Factories Act. B1 
Alternatively, the Board could suggest shorter time to secure the 
employment of otherwise potentially unemployed workers. Clearly the 
Board did not operate merely to shorten hours regardless of the 
Factories Act. 
BO. ibid, P B5 
B1. 1929 Wage Board Report p 15 
Second, the Board's membership did not change dramatically 
enough to bring abcut a change in policy. Lucas remained Chairman 
of the Board for two terms of office until 1935. He was appointed 
for his second term in 1930. 82 The only significant change was the 
83 
appointment of A C van der Horst, a civil servant, in place of 
84 J G Malherbe. Van der Horst's appointment drew a storm of protest 
from the Transvaal Executive of the Labour Party. They protested 
against the lack of consultation between Labcur Ministers, in this 
instance the Minister of Labcur, Creswell, . and the appointment of 
commissioners in general and van der Horst in particular. The Party 
executive condemned the policy of non-consultation as "inimical 
th k · 85 to e war ers' l.nterest". 
Creswell justified his action to the Executive Council in a 
bill: L .... ~t~irt~d. £:{..,.J; 
typically arrogant fashion ;} Van der Horst had been recommended abcve 
the Labour Party's choice of George Brown for twop~pal reasons: 
(1) I consider that for the efficient working of the Wage Act 
it was desirable to have as one of its members a person who had 
considerable experience of the difficulties attending the prac-
tical administration of Wage Determinations under the Act, and 
that the inclusion of a person with such experience would 
strengthen the Board 
(2) I considered it desirable to maintain the position which 
82. Appointment of Mr F A W Lucas KC as Chairman of Wage Board for 
further period of 5 years. Executive Council Archives, document 9 
of 14, 1145 (old series) /2119 
83. Sampson - Pereira,1 December 1930, in reply to an untraced letter 
Pereira - Sampson, 25 November 1930. Loose Correspondence, file 6, 
Transvaal Executive Council General Correspondence, 1929-1932 
SALP Archive 
84. Other changes are indicated in ch 3, pptX·tabove 
85 . Sampson - Pereira, 1 December 1930. Loose Correspondence file 6, 
Transvaal Executive Council General Correspondence 1929-1932 
SALP Archive 
had obtained since the institution of the Board, ie. , 
that one of the two ordinary members of the Board should 
be Afrikaans speaking and one English speaking. 86 
Creswell's first reason need not be doubted . It will be recalled 
that members of the original Board were appointed on the basis 
of their familiarity with labour issues. 87 The second part on 
the other hand, is curious in one minor regard. It appears that, 
notwithstanding Creswell's avowed concern for bilingualism, 
exemption forms under the wage Act were only available in English 
. 88 
until 1931. It can be accepted that van der Horst was an admin-
istrator first and policy maker, if at all, second . As it happened, 
van der Horst only clashed with Lucas and Roberts over minor details 
of three Wage Board recommendations in 1933 and 1934, well after the 
change in policy. . d' th . . t 89 He remalne 1n e m~nor1 y . He was not 
appointed to the new Board in 1935 either. The furore in the 
Labour Party's executive appears to have been another round in the 
conflict between the parliamentary representatives and the party 
itself, as the opposition was based first and foremost to the policy 
of non-consultation and not the nomination of van der Horst himself . 
86. Creswell - Pereira, 28 November 1930, Loose Correspondence, file 6, 
Transvaal Executive Council General Correspondence, 1929- 1932 
SALP Archive 
87. cf ch 3, pn~'~above 
88. cf a note from the Divisional Inspector for Labour at Bloemfontein 
to the Accountant, Department of Labour, dated 6 February 1931, 
reques ting that Afrikaans forms be produced. Department of Labour 
Archive 147~/1069/2 part 1 
89. The investigations were : Native Trade, An 211-1934; Tea, C~ffee 
and Chicory packing, An 176-1933; and Passenger Transport 
Undertaking, Cape Town, An 96-1933. cf ch 5, ppJl¥-g below . 
The membership of the Board was not responsible for the 
alleged change in policy from one of "upliftment" through 
shortening hours to non-regulation of non-wage issues. 
The last f·c-do'r, >inich brings Pursell's conclusion into question 
is related to evidence he himself supplies. The Factories Act, as 
90 
already noted, was amended in 1931 and brought down the maximum 
length of the working day to ,48 hours . This move was significant 
because it automatically placed eleven more determinations, in 
91 Pursell's own term, above the Factories Act bracket. He misread 
the importance of 0... Cruc.. iOv \ statement of fact he himself used . 
The Department of Labour, recognising the fact that the Beard had 
shortened hours below the limits of the Factories Act and had 
recommended the institution of paid leave in a number of instances, 
cautioned the Beard that the terms of its recommendations were 
sometimes more favourable than those secured under collective 
b . . 92 argal.nl.ng. This indicated that the Department still considered 
the Wage Act to be complemen~=y to the voluntary principles entailed 
in the Industrial Conciliation Act. 93 The Department went further and 
stressed that it 
considered this I-policy 7 inadvisable and requested the 
Board to bear thi~' po;,,", iii mind when making future re-
commendations. 94 
90. cf P 2G5 above 
91 • cf p U't above 
92 . Minutes of a Meeting of the Wage Board and Labour Department 
Officials, 1929, Quoted by Pursell , D "Minimum Wage Regulation 
under the South African Wage Act" p 62 note 26 
93 . cf ch 2, pp I!>tt above 
94. Minutesof a Meeting of the Wage Board and Labour Department 
Officials, 1929 . Quoted by Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation 
in South Africa" p 62 note 26 
The Department obviously wished the Wage Board to operate carefully 
when it dealt with wages. It could be said that the Department con-
sidered the Wage Act as complementary to the Factories Act in much the 
same way as it was to the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
One example will suffice to ' indicate that Pursell misread 
the source of the change in policy. At first the Board recommended 
that a 45 hour week should be introduced in the sweet making industry. 
The employers appealed to the Board to raise it from 45 hours to 48 
hours per week when the Board investigated the trade in early 1929. 
95 The Board refused to comply. In 1929 the Department of Labour 
informed the Board that it should curtail its activities in the 
field of hours. In 1930, the Board raised the number of hours 
per week to 48 despite the pleas by trade unionists and workers not 
to. 96 The Board rejected further pleas from workers in 1932 to 
97 
reduce the number of hours per week to 45. It is also impera-
tive to note here that the Government constantly rejected trade 
union calls for a reduction in the working week as well. As early 
as 1926 the South African Trade Union Congress had made a call for 
an 8 hour day or 48 hour week in all industries as a means to 
98 
reduce unemployment. A restriction of 6 hours per working day 
95. Report of the Wage Board, Sweets, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) 111 (15) 23 May 1929 
96. Report of the Wage Board, SWeets, 15 July 1930, An 125-1931; 
SATUC NEt. Minutes J 19 August 1930, SATUC papers Ca 1 .5 
97. Report of the Wage Board, Sweets, 15 December 1932, An 333-1933 
98. SATUC NEC Minutes, 18 May 1926, SATUC papers, Ca 1.2 
for workers under the age of 18 was urged upon SATUC by the 
Young Communist League to combat "the tendency to employ an undue 
proportion of youths" to the detriment of older workers. 99 The 
6 hour day for juveniles had been established policy of the Young 
(oMmu.,irt,League since at least January 1925. 100 Attempts were made 
in the early 1930s to have the working week reduced to 40 hours 
t '1 101 o no aval .. The Department of Labour declined the SATLC's 
request to convene 
a tripartite conference compr1s1ng representatives of the 
Government, Federated Chambers of Industry, Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and organised labour with a view to 
discussing the introduction of a 40 ,hour working week 
without any corresponding reduction in the weekly or 
monthly earnings of the workers. 
The Conference of the Chamber of Industries "would not entertain 
the proposal" 102 to shorten the week further. The Department used 
the excuse that it could not do anything until some international 
guidelines had been established. 103 The Department's excuse was a 
99. Young Communist League deputation of Roux, Sachs and Chalmers to 
SATUC, SATUC NEC Minutes 24 August 1926. SATU~ papers,Ca 1.2 
100. Young Worker 111 (1) January 1925. Report on the First National 
Conference of the Young Communist League of South Africa, 
3-4 January 1925 
101. for example, SA'lLC 3rd Annual Conference Minutes., 8-11 April 1933. 
SATLC papers, Da 1.3 
102. As reported in the NEC Report to 4th Annual Conference, 31 March 
to 3 April 1934. SATLC papers, Da 1.4 
103. ibid 
l7/ 
red-herring. The Labour Section of the Versailles Peace Treaty 
laid down that "recommendations II made by International Labour 
Conferences were to be submitted to the Parliaments of countries 
affiliated to the League of Nations with a view to legislation. 
"Conventions" adopted at such conferences were to be ratified or 
rejected. The Factories Act covered most of the details included 
in the first recornrnendationsand corrections issued in 1920. The 
Mines and Industries Labour Division held that the most contentious of 
the ~e4sures was the 8 hour day or 48 hour week. South Africa 
urged that the special conditions of South African industry and its 
labour force did not exactly suit the recommendation. The Union 
~ that future conventions and recommendations "should be 
limited as far as possible to the statement of principles, and 
ld "d t d t"l f 1 " t" ,,1 04 shou aV01 too grea e a1 0 app 1ca 10n, •• • Its 
reluctance to implement International Labour Organisation measures 
was clear. The Wage Board clearly operated in direct compliance 
104. Department of Mines and Industries, Labour Division, Annual 
Report for 1920, UG 8-1922, pp 107-108. The Union's relation-
ship with the International Labour Organisation has been 
sorely neglected. Pienaar, S "The League of Nations and 
South Africa, 1929-1939" dealt briefly with the ILO but 
did not trace its early development. 
with the state against its previous practice. The state wrought 
the change in policy of the Board, and not .the dissolution of the 
"uplifting convictions of members of the Board." The Department 
of Labour took over the administration of the Factories Act from 
the Department of Mines and Industries. It curtailed the hour 
reduction activity of the Wage Board to keep the Board in line with the 
provisions of the Factories Act, rut not because the Department did 
not support a shorter working week. The change occurred not ~~ the 
p~"" s(. 
of labour;, but in the interest; ·of the rationalisation 
, 
of the industrial working week. 
Undercutting, or "unfair competition" between employers, was 
constantly attacked by larger employers and the Department. It 
involved the payment of wages lower than the wage .stipulated in 
determinations. This in turn enabled offending employers to 
reduce costs to the disadvantage of employers who wanted to fulfil the 
requirements of determinations. The Department of Labour received 
a number of communications from business concerns about the 
inefficient enforcement of determinations. Employers argued that 
they would be forced to disregard determinations if undercutting 
was not curtailed. 105 Miller, Divisional Inspector for Labour in 
Johannesburg, voiced a common opinion when he remarked: 
Firms of standing usually comply with the requirements of the 
Determinations without much pressure, and it is considered 
105. Numerous examples of this type of communication exist. Three 
of the most explicit are: Secretary, Crispette and Candy Co. 
Ltd., Doornfontein - Cousins, 3 May 1927; Secretary, Witwaters-
rand Baking Industry Industrial Council - Walker, 9 November 
1927, which contains the views of the Master Bakers' Associa-
tion; Beattie, Divisional Inspector for Labour, Cape Town -
Cousins, 18 April 1929. Department of Labour Archive 1429/ 
Lc/1069/3 Part 1 
that in justice to such firms, the small number of 
recalcitrants should be dealt with vigorously . 106 
Creswell, once again Minister of Labour, remarked to the Divisional 
Inspectors Conference in 1929 that 
inspectors should try to aim at using a sufficient 
amount of firmness, without being irritating. 
Lenience was necessary to enable J:Eterminations to get going 
particularly if firms were moving in the right direction . 
Steady pressure was essential, but the whip should be 
kept for firms who had no intention of complying. 107 
Although the Divisional Inspectors' reports on the admin'istration of 
the various determinations are i (l,complete because of staff shortages, 
108 they reveal that the smaller firms were the greatest offenders . 
Indian traders in Natal were especially focussed on as defaulters, 
but the extent to which black traders as a whole were affected is 
d 'ff' I 109 1 1CU t to say. It is evident that, at least in one case, 
if the Determination had not been declared ultra vires for the 
Laundry trade one of three Indian laundries in East London would have 
been prosecurted, "evidence having been obtained of the bogus nature 
of the partnership . " All firms with alleged "doubtful reputations" 
had "been carefully inspected and employers interrogated.,,110 
106. 
107. 
Miller - Cousins 21 May 1928.Department. of Labour Archives 
1429/Lc/1069/3 Part 1 
Minutes of Meetings Divisional Inspectors Conference 17-18 
September 1929.Department of Labour Archives 2038/F8/5 
108. Walker-Cousins, 21 January 1930; Divisional Inspector, Durban-
Cousins 16 July 1929; Divisional Inspector, East London - Cousins 
15 July 1929. Department of Labour Archives 1429/Lc/1069/3 Part 
"Memorandum of Objection re proposed Determination published 
109. 
11 O. 
as a Schedule to Government Notice 1703 of 1928 submitted by 
Durban Chamber of Commerce" passim. Department of Labour 
Archive2037/F4/19. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour 
pp 216-217 
Walker - Cousins)21 January 1930,re Bespoke Tailoring deter-
mination in Natal.Department of Labour Archive 1429/Lc/1069/3 
Part 1 
Divisional Inspector,East London - Cousins, 15 July 1929. 
Department of Labour Archive 1429/Lc/1069/3 Part 1 
Notwithstanding the dearth of direct evidence in this regard it is 
quite clear that small firms, notably those owned by Indians, 
would have been seriously affected by the implementation of Deter-
minations in their industries. 
The case of Indian male juveniles was put to the Board by 
the Natal Indian Congress. Congress asked that juveniles be 
dealt with along the same lines as female assistants who received 
lower wages .. They argued that 
having regard to the fact that owing to the discrirninatary 
repressive and harsh administration of the Licensing Laws 
whereby Indians are denied fair opportunities to carryon 
business in those parts of the town which are regarded as 
trading or shopping centres, it is very unjust, we submit, 
to expect of a trader relegated to an area where over-
trading is a rule, to employ qualified male adult assistants 
and to pay the proposed wages 111 
Ginwala has indicated that the net profit of small Indian traders 
was in the region of £100-£240 per annum . Only k"J~ of the 15 000 
trading licences issued in 1937/8 went to general dealers or fresh 
112 produce dealers. 
The Board reported that, given the modification it had made in 
its earlier report, it could not "see its way to go any further" in 
113 
alleviating the situation as far as Indian traders were concerned. 
111. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Indus-
trial Review (Special Edition),11 Hl3l, .1"Mm::h1929:jP365; Objection 
No 28/Natal Indian Congress, Pietermaritzburg - Cousins, 
8 November 1928. Department of Labour Archives 2037/F4/19 
112. Ginwala, F "Class, Consciousness and Control - Indian South 
Africans 1860-1946" p 307. Ginwala provides a general discussion 
of the barriers to Indian advancement at pp 303-331 
113. Report of the Wdge Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition), 11 (7), 5 October 1928,pp 157-158 
The original report was not as beneficial as the latter one appears 
to be. In the earlier report, the Board recognised the various 
disabilities under which Indian traders operated. But it still 
concluded that, although the Board had no pQwer to discriminate 
along racial lines, 
as in commerce European employers predominate o ver-
whelmingly in the occupations affected by this 
investigation, the Board feels it has no option but to 
adopt a European standard as the basis for a recommenda-
tion . 
The discriminabry "effect which ensued from adopting such a stand 
114 
was acknowledged by the Board. As such, the Board l s action 
contravened the terms of the Cape Town Agreement of 1927 between 
th d " d th Afri t 115 e In l.an an Sou can Governmen s . Both governments 
argued that 
'The principle underlying the Industrial Conciliation Act 
(Act 11 of 1924) and the Wages "Act (no 27 of 1925) which 
enables all employers including Indians to take their 
places on the basis of equal pay for equal work will be 
adhered to . ' 116 
The Board for its part concluded that the scale proposed in the 
recommendation as not too high for Europeans, but would mean "a 
b " " f tId " h " t t 117 very l.g l..ncrease or mos n l.an S op assl.S an s . II 
114. ch 5 below} outlines this point at length 
115. Davenport, T R H South Africa: A Modern History pp 204-205 
116. Quoted by Ginwala, F "Class, Consciousness and Control -
Indian South Africans 1860-1946" p 324 
117. Report of the Wage Board, Shop Assistants, Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition}) 11 (7},5 October 1928)pp 157-158 
The case of the Indian traders is in remarkable contrast to that 
of white traders in the !lnative areas" of Bloemfontein who sought and 
were given exemption from the operative determination. A cornmon 
plea by shopkeepers was: "Being Native area and mostly native 
tr d b . I k( . ) 118. a e USl.ness very s ac Sl.C" Not only were Indian employees 
discriminated against, the Board saw fit to discriminate against 
Indian traders as well. 
The Wage Act laid down that the Minister could exempt employers 
or employees from the conditions of determinations if circumstances 
warranted such action. The Minister had to be satisfied that 
exemptions granted under licence did not prejudice the position of 
other groups or classes of people in the same area. People who 
suffered from physical disabilities like old age or infirmity and 
were unable to perform the work of an able-bodied person could also 
119 be exempted. Exemptions were used as relief measures to 
employers who battled to fulfill all the requirements of determinations. 
The purpose of exemptions was clearly understood-by at least one of 
the legislators when he argued in 1925 that under the 1921 Wage 
Bill, small industries would have been ruined whereas exemptions 
118. 
119. 
Applications for exemption, A Harris, Bloemfontein, for a 
number of shop assistants. Department of Labour Archives 
1~39/Lc/1069/29/2/7-62; cf also 1439/Lc/1069/29/2/7-64; 
67; 68 
Act 27-1925 section 10 
120 
under the 1925 proposals would counter this tendency. 
The Department's policy on the granting of exemptions took 
two points into consideration. First, "justice to employees", 
and second, "that no individual concern shall receive preferential 
121 treatment. " The same sentiments were expressed by F McGregor, 
the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare and future Wage Board 
Chairmen, in 1935. 122 "Justice to employees" was to be inter-
preted as being 
in the interest of employees who were engagedin the 
industry at the time the Act came into force, and who, 
unless exemption were granted, would be unable to 
continue their employment in the industry. 123 
The Minister reserved the right to grant exemptions himself 
until such a time as the Department "had a measure of experience in 
d I " "th /-" -/ d t " t" 124 ea 1ng WI. Wb _ S1C _ e erml.na 1.ons. II This policy was 
120. Te Water (Pretoria Central), House of Assembly Debates)1925~ 
c 1830 
121. E Muller, Under~Secretary for Labour - Cousins, 12 March 1927. 
This was a covering letter to Cousins which dealt with 
Circular Minute No 17 of 1920 dated 11 March 1927 
122. McGregor - Divisional Inspector, Cape Town, 7 November 1935. 
Department of Labour Archive 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 2 
123. McGregor - Divisional Inspector, Port Elizabeth, 7 December 
1929. Department of Labour Archive 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 1 
124. Handwritten memo by E Muller (?)"'C', Application for 
Exemptions from Wage Board Determinations" 4 March 1927. 
Department of Labour Archive 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 1 
continued until late 1929 when the power was vested in Ivan Walker 
as Secretary for Labour, then in 1933 to the under-secretary CUff with 
the proviso that "all doubtful cases be referred to Mr Walker as 
125 before." The importance of these points is simply that in this 
particular field the Department of Labour and not the Wage Board 
controlled policy. 
Even when the system was relaxed slightly in 1929 when 
Divisional Inspectors were granted powers to "grant temporary ex-
emption for one month ••. in any case which you are prepared to 
d 126 th' Iff k d t th recomrnen • II 18 was more a resu t 0 pressure 0 war ue 0 e 
onset of the depression than any liberal opinions about the decentral-
isation of power. Exemptions were granted more liberally during 
the depression127 and the Department drew sharp criticism from trade 
. I d 128 unl.on ea ers. From 1933 the Department began to cut down on 
129 the number of exemptions it granted. From time to time directives 
went out from the Department to Divisional Inspectors. One such 
125 . on 28 September 1929 Walker was given this power by means of 
"a verbal delegation." An 29 April 1933 Walker passed his 
power on to CUff, and on 5 December 1933, Orken, another 
Labour Department official was nominated as an alternate to 
CUff. Information contained in an undated memorandum in the 
Department of Labour Archive, 1427/Lc/1 069/2 Part 2. See also 
the marginal notes dated 23 March 1927 to Cousins on a copy 
of Muller-Cousins, 12 March 1927. Department of Labour 
Archive,1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 
126. Telegrams to Divisional Inspectors at Durban, cape Town, 
Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth and East London, 27 and 28 July 
1929. The policy was reaffirmed in Circular Minute No 3 of 
1929,dated 3 September 1929. Department of Labour Archive. 
1427/Lc/1069 
127. Department of Labour Annual Report for 1933 UG 44-1934 p44; 
Department of Labour Archive for 1934 UG 11-1936 p 53 
128. Memorandum on Amendments to Act No 27 of 1925 as amended by 
Act No 23 of 1930 submitted by B Weinbren, General Secretary) 
Reef (Native Trade) Assistants Union to SATUC NEC,1930. 
SATUC papers Col 10.2 
129. Department of Labour Annual Reports for 1934, UG 11-1936, 
p 53; for 1935 UG 44-1937, p 61; and 1937 UG 30-1938, p 55 
directive stated that the Department realised 
that there is a tendency to submit applications for 
exemptions (both originals and renewals) only after 
inspections have revealed that employers are not in 
compliance with the requirements of determinations. 
In may cases it seems that employers are actually 
cognizant of the fact that they are over-stepping 
ratio provisions or underpaying employees but they 
rely on the grant of exemptions, with retrospective 
effect, to put matters right for them. 
The Department was unhappy with that practice, and consequently 
required that all Divisional Inspectors "impress upon business 
establishments" in their respective areas that the Department frowned 
upon 
up. 
Cape 
such activities. 130 By 1934, the Department began to tighten 
Ivan Walker endorsed a minute from the Divisional Inspector in 
Town in February 1934 with the comment that 
Divisional Inspectors should be warned that we are tightening 
up on the grant of exemptions as firms have had consideration 
for a long enough period now. 
131 This was still considered to be departmental policy a year later. 
The grant of exemptions did not merely allow the employer to 
pay wages below the prescribed determination wage and thereby cut costs. 
Grants of exemption did not benefit all employers, but only those who 
130. CUff - All Divisional Inspectors "Wage Regulation, Departmental 
Instruction No 7 (General)", 11 January 1934. Department of 
Labour Archive)1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 2 
131. Wainwright - Secretary (?), Cape Town, 6 March 1935 . Department 
of Labour Archive J 1427/Lc/1 069/ 2 Part 2 
Uo 
fell within the confines of the policy of improving efficiency and 
being well organised. In 1932 the Department noted 7 factors 
which needed consideration, over and above the original fundamental 
principle that each application was dealt with "on the merits of the 
132 
case." The 1932 memorandum was the most complete statement up to 
that point. The factors which had to be taken into consideration were: 
1. The competitive nature of the industry as between different 
centres and between different employers in the same locality; 
2. the personal circumstances of the employee) 
3 . whether the Employer is considered a 'fair' employer) 
4. whether the grant of exemption will lead to the displacement 
of employees who are in receipt of the prescribed wage; 
5. whether the refusal of exemption will mean the dismissal of 
the employeeJ 
6 . the unemployment position in the locality in which the 
applicant resides; 
7. the exemption at less than the minimum prescribed for 
unqualified employees is granted only in very special 
circumstance. 133 
An eighth clause was added! later .which stated that applications from 
132. 
133. 
non-Union Nationals are considered on their merits . 
Exemption _is not 9ranted on language grounds or where the 
the applicant has misplaced a Union National . 134 
Boydell's marginal comments to Cousins dated 23 March 1927 on a 
copy of Muller - Cousins, 12 March 1927; cf Circular to All 
Division and Industrial Inspectors of Labour, 13 July 1929) 
Department of Labour Archive 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 1. "General 
Principles on the Grant of Exemptions from Wage Determinations 
under section 10(c) of the Act", 6 October 1932. Department of 
Labour Archive· ) 1427/Lc/1 069/2 Part 2 
"General Principles on the Grant of Exemptions from Wage Board 
Determinations under Section 10(c) of the Act",6 October 1932, 
Department of Labour Archive 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 2. The note does 
not expand on the definition of 'fair ' in clause 3, but in the 
context of the time it is clear that ' fair ' employers were employers 
who employed satisfactory numbers of whites. cf ch 5, pp below 
134. "General Principles on the Grant of Exemptions from Wage Determina-
tions" no date, possibly 1935. Department of Labour Archive) 1427/ 
Lc/1069/2 Part 2 
Vii 
It is possible that the new clause was added in response to white 
135 trade union callS for the curtailment of foreign labour employment . 
The eight factors all have a bearing on the direction of policy of 
the Department. Numbers one and three reflected directly on how 
business undertakings were organised. The remainder refer to the 
type of labcur which was employed, whether it was displaced or not, 
whether wages would be undercut or not and the like. As such)the 
exemption policy fitted into the general policy which hoped to en-
courage business concerns to improve their organisation and productive 
capacity. 
The number of exemptions granted by the Department was not 
excesive. Between 1927 and 1937 rarely more ,than 1% of the total 
kf d b d t 't' k ddt' I' 136 war orce covere y e ermlna 10ns wor e un er exemp 10n lcences. 
The Department administered exemptions with circumspection. The Wage 
Board itself had no control over the administration of exemptions. 
Exemptions were only granted in special circumstances and ill-organised 
industries which applied for them were turned down. 
The caution which permeated the Department's exemption policy 
matched the caution which controlled the gradual implementation of 
determinations in the Union. 
Lucas, in his address to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Economic 
Society of South Africa mentioned that industries which fell within 
135. 
136. 
cf ch 1, pp lot·lo abcve 
This figure is based on detailed quarterly reports for the pericd 
in the Department of Labour Archive 1427/ Lc/ 1060/ 2 Parts 1 and 2. 
Representative tables for two periods are provided in Table 9 
pp If 1 , below 
the ambit of wage determinations "should be given ample time to 
adjust" themselves to the new wage rates. 137 In general terms, the 
Board stated that its policy was determined by the fact that wage 
regulation was new in South Africa. " . HIt would be unreasonable, 1t 
reported in 1929, 
to expect to be able at one step to reach the position attained 
in countries where compulsory wage regulation has been in opera-
tion for many years. For this reason the Board has frequently 
been compelled to recommend wages which are lower than the industry 
concerned might be expected at a later date to bear. Where for 
any substantial number of employees the wages recommended represent 
a substantial increase on those paid, the Board has recom-
mended that the operation of the provision for the minimum wage 
be suspended for a certain period and has provided for lower 
minima at different portions of that period. 138 
The gradual nature of the implementation of the determinations was also 
reflected in the attitude of the Department about the prosecution of 
recalci trant employers. It was noted in chapter 3 that the Department 
also followed a cautious policy in an attempt to encourage employers to 
comply before coercion had to be introduced. 
The Wage Board determined wages in such a way that wages were not 
raised astronomically. In fact, after initial increases during the 
pre-depression years, the Board reduced wages with the onset of the 
depression to ease the financial burden of employers. 
The actual reduction of wages was rigorously contested by workers. 
The evidence points to a general tendency for wages to fall during the 
137. Lucas, F A W "Some Aspects of the Work of the Wage Board" p 34 
138 . 1929 Wage Board Report, p 11 
139 depression years. International economic conditions necessitated 
a readjustment of the total economic infrastructure and had influenced 
the wage rate. Entrepreneurial activity also influenced the trend. 
An unemployed baker complained to the Pact-supporting newspaper, 
Forward, about the "reduction of wages under the L-wage_1 Act." The 
Act in 1928, in his opinion and of bakers generally, was lIa farcel! 
because they were "far worse off ll than they had been ever IIbefore in 
ths history of the baking industry in South Africa".140 But, not-
withstanding this early reference to a connection between the Wage 
Act and the reduction of .wages, the tendency for employers to reduce 
wages was only noted with general concern from 1931. R Stuart, 
secretary of the Cape Federation told his executive committee after a 
tr 'd tr' th t b ' d ed t' 11 141 coun yW1 e 1p a wages were e1ng epress na 10na y. 
Sections of the trade union movement considered that the reductions were 
caused by machinations of government, mining, industry and an unidenti-
142 fied "important section of the employers." The trades affected 
included transport, laundry workers, sweet workers, the meat trade, 
liquor and catering services, private hotels and boarding houses, the 
139. 
140 . 
141. 
142. 
Table 10, pp U1~ below provides a comparison of minimum wage 
determinations for the periods 1927-1931 and 1931-1934 
Forward 30 March 1928 
CFLU NEC Minutes 23 June 1932, CFLU papers Aa 1.5 
SATLC 1st Annual Conference Minutes, 4-6 April 1931; Chairman's 
address to the 2nd Annual Conference of the SATLC,26-28 March 
1932, SATLC papers Da 1.1 and Da 1 .2 respectively. 
Reef (Native Trade) Assistants, the garment making industry, and the 
glass-bevelling and silvering trade. 143 
143. Transport: CFLU FEC Minutes, 29 October 1931, CFLU papers 
Aal.5; SATLC NEC Report to 2nd Annual Conference, 26-28 March 
1932,SATLC papers Da 2.2; Minutes of a Special Conference 
called by the CFLU consisting of delegates representing industrial 
councils, union .executives, operating under a Wage Board Determina-
tion or Conciliation Board Agreement in the Cape Area, July 1932, 
CFLU papers Aal.5. Laundry Trade: SATLC NEC Minutes, 3 Novem-
ber and 1 December 1931, SATLC papers Da 2.1; SATLC NEC Report 
to 2nd Annual Conference, 26-28 March 1932, SATLC papers Da 2.2; 
SATLC NEC Report to 4th Annual , Conference, 31 March - 3 April 1934, 
SATLC papers Da 2.4. Sweet Trade: General Purposes Committee 
Report to SATUC NEC,20 May 1930, SATUC papers, Ca 1.5; SATLC NEC 
Minutes, 15 November 1932, Da 2.2; SATLC NEC Report to 3rd 
Annual Conference, 8 - 11 April 1933, SATLC papers Da 2.3: Reports 
of the Wage Board: 28 February 1929,An 106-1929ii; 28 October 
1930, An 125-1931; 15 December 1932, An 333-1933. Meat Trade 
(Port Elizabeth): SATLC NEC Report to 2nd Annual Conference, 26-
28 March 1932, SATLC Papers, Da 2.2; Reports of the Wage Board: 
29 Octcber 1930, An 53-1931; 30 August 1932, An 133-1933;6 October 
1932, An 248-1933; 24 March 1933, Am 97 and 99 - 1933ii; 
Liquor and catering Trade: SATLC NEC Report to 2nd Annual Con-
ference 26 - 28 March 1932, SATLC NEC Report to 3rd Annual Con-
ference, 8 - 11 April 1933. SATLC papers Da 2 .2 and 'Da 2.3 
respectively; Reports of the Wage Board: 12 March 1931, An 559-
1931; 21 July 1931, An 58-1931/2; 17 December 1931, An 191-1931/2. 
Private Hotels and Boarding Houses: SATLC NEC Report to 2nd Annual 
Conference, 26 - 28 March 1932 SATLC papers Da 2.2; Report of 
the Wage Board, 2 December 1932, An 111-1933. Reef (Native Trade) 
Shop Assistants: SATLC NEC Report to 4th Annual Conference, 31 March-
3 April 1934, SATLC papers Da 2 .4; Forsyth - Cousins, 9 December 
1933, SATLC papers, Dc 9.8. Garment Making Industry: Minutes of a 
Special Conference called by the CFLU consisting of delegates 
representing industrial councils, union executives, operating under 
a Wage Board Determination or Conciliation Board Agreement in 
the Cape Area, July 1932, CFLU papers Aa 1.5; E S Sachs - Secretary, 
SATLC, various dates, 1935, SATLC papers, Dc 8.17; SATLC 6th 
Annual Conference Minutes, 13-17 April 1936, SATLC papers Da 1.6; 
Reports of the Wage Board: 25 November 1931, An 194-1931/2; 
18 March 1932, An 469-1931/2; 7 June 1932, An 114-1933. 
Glass Bevelling and Silvering: SATLC NEC Reports to 3rd Annual 
Conference, 8-11 April 1933 and 4th Annual Conference, 31 March-
3 April 1934; SATLC papers Da2 .3 and Da2 .4 respectively; 
Reports of the Wage Board: 3 September 1931, An 91-1931/2; 15 
December 1931, An 253-1931/2 . 
Concomitant with the tendency of wages to be reduced from 1931 
was a switch in the policy of the Wage Board and the Department of 
Labour. The SATLC urged the Department to make a public statement 
which outlined the new line. They were of the opinion that, as 
indicated by Lucas, 
the policy of the Board would in future be to fix a m1nBnum 
wage rate in industries and to leave it largely to the workers, 
through their trade unions to make agreements with the employers 
respecting the various grades on a higher scale than the mini-
mum rate and also such questions as holiday leave, etc. 144 
The SATLC was quick to indentify the implications of the new policy. 
Senator J Briggs, Chairman of Conference and F Hicks of the Johannes-
burg Tramwayman ' s Union stated at the outset of the 1932 Conference 
that the tendency was for the minimum wage to become the maximum 
145 
and that, in effect, the Wage Board had become a wage-reducing agent. 
With regard to the. former point they were not quite correct, but they 
were right with the latter in so far as the later policy of the Board 
was more in line with the ability of industries to pay higher wages 
than before 1930. The new policy placed an immense burden on the 
unorganised trades for which the legislation had originally been 
designed. No change in the new policy was evidenced during 1932 
despite worker criticism and the "wage-cutting policy" of the Board 
was declared "even more pronounced. 1 )46 
144. SATLC NEC Minutes, 1 December 1931, SATLC papers Da 2.1. 
Pursell,- D "Minimum Wage Fegulation under the South African Wage 
Act " pp 85-87 
145. 2nd Annual Conference minutes, 26-28 March 1932, SATLC papers Da 1.2 
146. SATLC NEC Report to 3rd Annual Conferenc~ 8-11 April 1933, 
SATLC papers Da 2.3 
The Government was approached on the issue on a number of 
. 147 
occas~ons. The Department of Labour for its part did not deny 
the charges made against it. It singled out sweetmaking as a 
representative trade in which the minimum wage had been cut from £2.2s.6d 
on the Witwatersrand and £2.0.0 elsewhere to £1.10.0 per week. The new 
determination, the report urged, provided female employees "subject to 
good behaviour and the maintenance of efficiency, security to their 
. b ,,148 JO s. Numerous industries as already noted were affected by 
reductions. 
149 The practice of discriminating against women was itself not new. 
In 1927 the Board pointed out that it was anxious not to change "the 
personnel of employees in an industry so as to cause the displacement 
of males by females and vice versa." The Board referred to the 
position of women in the clothing industry. On the basis that they 
were paid less than men, and that the "capacity of women in the occu-
pations mentioned" was "generally considered to be less than that of 
150 
men" the Board had agreed to a lower rate for women. Forward 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
Untraced letters: SATLC NEC - Minister of Labour, mentioned in 
SATLC NEC Minutes,15 December 1931; Minister of Labour - NEC, 
NEC Minutes,9 February 1932, SATLC papers, Da 2.1; note references 
in NEC Report to SATLC 2nd Annual Conference,26-28 March 1932, 
to the fact that the matter had been taken up with the Minister 
from time to time but that "no improvement has resulted", 
SATLC papers Da 2.2 
Department of Labour Annual Report for 193~ UG 43-1934,pp 79-80 
The Wage Amendment Act 48-1981, section 4(3) for the first time 
prohibited sexual discrimination in wage determinations 
Report dated 28 September 1927 Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition), November 1927, pp 15-16~also quoted in Forward, 
18 November 1927 
correctly pointed out that the system of non-equal pay for equal 
work between men and women was only one way in which the working 
clas could be divided. 151 Not only was this one way to keep the 
workers divided, J::ut it also permi tted a lower wage bill than could other-
wise have been the case. 
The Department of Labour argued that employers had discharged 
higher paid employees and replaced them with beginners to reduce 
wage costs during the depression. Women had found themselves retrenched 
and the Department argued that the Board' s policy thus had to be directed 
towards securing "the greatest good for the greatest number. ,,152 Lucas, 
on the other harid, held the opinion that as the proportion of wages'S 
contribution to the cost of production was so small, wage reductions 
would make no appreciable difference. He argued that since 1929 
"when there had been little opportunity to raise ,wages" the wage 
regulation instruments had "played a large part in preventing the 
reduction of wages. ,,153 His statement was not wholly valid. The 
Board did reduce wages, but it could be argued within the narrow 
confines of Lucas' argument that it did prevent the further reduction 
151. 
152 . 
153 . 
,Forward, ' 18 November 1927 _, 
Department of Labour Annual Report for 1933,UG 43-193~ P 80 
Lucas, F A W "The Determination of Wages in South Africa" p 56 
, 
of wages . During times of depression especially employers would 
attempt anything to reduce costs. Wage reduction, linked to factors 
like speed:in;j up the process of production and the extension of the 
working week, the curtailment of holidays and leave subsidies, would 
be a factor in the reduction of working costs. 
Pursell noted that the depression "destroyed any hopes and illusions 
that legislation alone could improve living standards and effectively 
"154 halted the work of the first beard . Bozzoli noted that manufacturers 
tolerated wage regulation bec~u.se expansion depended on the consumption 
of their products by consumers: 
white workers became the central target for the market-
expanding efforts of the new beurgeoisie because the result 
of their power had been to confront employers with the fait 
accompli of higher wages. 155 
The British trade commissioner in South Africa commented in 1928 that 
state intervention in the private sector was based on two elements. 
First, the state wanted to provide employment for the growing white 
population. Second, it wanted to build up "a substantial bedy of 
consumers of good buying capacity to absorb a reasonable proportion 
156 
of the country's agricultural produce." The onset of the depression 
and the r .eduction in wages which followed it appeared to halt the plan 
to produce a larger consumer market. 
154. 
155. 
156. 
Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation and the South African Wage 
Act" p 239 
Bozzoli, B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 198 
United Kingdom Department of OVerseas Trade, Report on the Economic 
Conditions in South Africa, June 1928, p 34 
Even during the depression doubts were raised concerning the 
viability of wage reduction as a policy to combat economic 
depression . The Cost of Living Commission reported that industrial 
wages in the Union were no more than subsistence wages and deprecated 
157 the reductions which had taken place . The Commi ssion argued that 
to solve South Africa's economic problems t he large gap between 
skilled and unskilled wages had to be closed. That could be achieved 
by raising African standards of living. It thought that such a policy 
would in time 
increase the earnings of unskilled Europeans and in 
addition should afford greater opportunities for all 
alike. For the increased purchasing power which 
such an achievement would release · would be fertile 
soil for the expansion of South African enterprise. 158 
The sentiment of the Cost of Living Commission was echoed by the 
Industrial Legislation Commission in 1935 when it reported that the 
idea that wage reduction was the solution to problems had soon been 
dispelled. 159 Strategists began concentrating more and more on 
how to create extra avenues of employment to provide markets for pro-
160 ducts. The Wage Board reported that African purchasing power had 
not increased lito any extent since the depression II and quoted 
textile manufacturers who called for a higher unskilled wage to 
157 . Cost of Living Commission Report,UG 36-1932. para 34 
158. ibid. para 97 
159. Industrial Legislation Commission Report,UG 37-1934. para 196 
160. United Kingdom Department of Overseas Trade. Report on the 
Economic Conditions in South Africa. October 1935,p 2 
boost the p.n:d1asirq power of the African market. 161 Manufacturers 
generally appear to have been fully aware of the potential of the 
162 African consumere Wages rose slowly after the depression and 
African wage regulation was enhanced by the introduction of the 1937 
163 Wage Act. 
It is difficult to deduce from the wage Board reports how exactly 
the economic fortunes of particular trades were affected by wage 
regulation. As Davies indicated, the Board ·cast considerable doubt on 
the validity of •.• figures" it presented "by eg presenting an 
' adjusted net profit' as well as a 'stated net profit' figure.,,164 
The evidence taken as a whole suggests that in general terms South 
African commerce and industry was not affected adversely by the intro~ 
duction of wage regulation. The Department of Labour controlled many 
aspects of the Board's work and held it to a policy that was almost 
conservative in its rnoderatione Efficiency was improved , the working 
week in different trades was brought into line in common with inter-
national trends, and any increases in production costs, however rnini-
mal, were offset by the positive effects of other factors. An 
exemption policy was utilised to relax certain provisions for willing 
but struggling employers. The system of wage regulation was influenced 
161. Report of the Wage Board, Textile trade, 26 November 1936, 
An 46-1937 
162. Bozzoli , B The Political Nature of a Ruling Class pp 195-197 
163 . cf ch 6, pp 1>111--(" below 
164. Davies, R Capital, State and White Labour)p 250 note 120 
by economic conditions and the onset of the depression forced 
wage reductions to be effected. The Department insisted that 
regulation had to be gradual yet firm. It is quite possible that 
the change that occurred,partly as a result of enforced wage 
regulation,included an increase in the tempo of mechanisation. 
The reorganisation of South African industries before the 
depression, the protection accorded to some to build them up, and the 
recognition of the importance of and subsequent creation of an internal 
consumer market all assisted the strident economic development which 
took place during the 1930s. 
OIAPTER 5 The Wage Act as an instrument of the Civilised Labour Policy 
The division of labour between skilled and unskilled workers 
along racial or ethnic lines was not unique to the Union. 
Frederickson has shown how in the United States blatant discrimina-
tion was replaced in some southern States after the Civil War 
(1861-5) by a system of legal and extra legal practices to maintain 
the discriminatory status quo ante. Racial exclusion in the trade 
unions was due mainly to skilled workers' fears about competition 
from semi-skilled/unskilled operatives. 1 He concluded that a 
common factor between America's south and South Africa was lithe 
problem presented to a white labour movement by a growing disposition 
2 
on the part of employers to manipulate the 'split labour market.'" 
Professor Henry Clay, chairman of the South African Economic 
and Wage Commission, remarked in 1930 that perhaps the Conciliation 
Act, which to all intents and puposes effected the same discrimina-
tory results of the Wage Act, was meant lito stereotype the very 
wide gap that exists between the rates usually paid to white workers 
and those paid to natives. ,,3 Against his recommendations, but in 
1. Frederickson, G White Supremacy, pp 212-223 
2. ibid, P 222. 
3. Industrial Relations in Southern Rhodesia Report. CSR3-1930 
passim, quote p 7 
'Y 
line with his fears, the Southern Rhodesian government of the 
day passed an Industrial Conciliation Act which was based on the 
.. 4 
Union's 1924 Act, by excluding Africans from its prov1s10ns. 
The Act further allowed for the extension of its specifications to 
unskilled workers in municipal employment. Whilst "on the face of 
it" this was to protect African workers, it was later admitted that 
the clauses could be used "to prevent the so-called dilution of 
labour by Africans. II It aimed to prevent Africans from competing, 
where necessary J II in the skilled trade wi th Europ~ans because the 
employer is unlikely to employ an African at European rates in 
5 
preference to a European. II By 1951 the Act had not been involved 
in this way in Southern Rhodesia, partly through white trade 
union pressure and partly through wide-spread unchecked evasion by 
6 
employers. To what extent the legislation was used to buttress 
or implement a north Limpopo equivalent of the civilised labour 
policy whereby jobs would be created, not only made secure, for 
whites does not concern us here. What is important is that the 
4. ibid. Act 10-1934 cf Harris, P "Industrial Relations in 
Rhodesia" for a general survey of the topic. Lundhal and Ndlela. 
"Land Alienation, Socialism, and Economic Discrimination: 
South Africa and Rhodesia ll provide a more ambitious, economic 
model analysis of labour supply formation. 
5. Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa: Comparative 
Survey of Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. p 84 cf also pp 6, 20-21, 22, 82-88 
6. ibid. pp 84-5 
notion of indirect legislative discrimination was not restricted 
to the Union. 
Within the Union itself, the discriminatory organisation of 
labour was a phenomenon not unique to the years of the Pact's 
administration. Racial discrimination in the labour field had 
flourished in southern Africa for many decades. It was most 
pronounced in the mining industries from the time of the discovery 
of minerals. Discrimination in manufacture followed the mining 
boom as secondary industries became more important in the general 
economic organisation of South Africa. Attempts to regulate the 
development of secondary industries and to control the restive 
white labour force were conducted piecemeal. The colonial and 
Union governments recognised the problems of industrial develop-
ment, but other interes~ prevailed. The Pact Government was 
unique in that it was prepared to tackle the problems of labour 
organisation and industrial development in the area which previous 
governments, for a variety. of reasons, had either avoided or 
neglected. This area was the private sector, the burgeoning terrain 
of a nascent yet rapidly growing industrial bourgeoisie. It was the 
domain of expanding factories, private business and the concentration 
of capitalist industrial development. The civilised labour policy 
differed from its antecedents in that it extended the concept of 
actual white employment and white advancement in industry beyond the 
confines of the mining establishments and the civil service to 
· b . 7 pr1vate US1ness. 
The replacement of blacks by whites in government service 
had been practised by the South African Party government, but was 
more actively promoted by the Pact government. The Cape Coloured 
Commission, for example, reported in 1937 that between 1924 and 1933, 
the number of whites employed on railways and in harbours rose by 
nearly thirty per cent . The number of Africans for the same period 
dropped by just over twenty six per cent. From 1934 to August 
1936 the number of whites dropped by approximately ten per cent, and 
8 Africans increased by about the same percentage. Boydell informed 
the Orange Free State Municipal Congress in 1926 that since the Pact 
came to power the employment pattern within his Department of Posts 
and Telegraphs had altered dramatically. In Smuts's time 445 
whites and 900 Africans had been employed. That situation had 
changed so that by 1926 there were more than 1200 whites and only 
9 200 Africans employed. 
Pressure was also brought to bear on municipal authorities to 
employ more whites. The carrot of fifty per cent government 
7. For a discussion of the origins of the civilised labour 
policy and its theoretical development, cf above, 
ch 2. 
8. UG54-1937 P 44 . "Table showing labouring staff on the SAR and H 
1916 to 1936 according to data supplied by the Administration." 
Union Statistics for 50 years G15 
9. Star 25 November 1926. Boydell Archives. Albums, vol 13 
subsidies to help cover the extra cost involved was graciously 
extended to hesitant municipalities . Boydell pointed out in 
1926 that 19 municipalities in the Union employed 18 737 unskilled 
Africans to only 1 228 whites and suggested that these figures alone 
indicated one avenue at least for increased unskilled white employ-
10 
ment . Municipalities on the Reef, for example, employed whites 
in abbatoirs as cleaners. The meat trade was one area singled 
11 
out for increased white employment. Plans for the extension of 
white employment on Provincial schemes were also put into effect. 
These attempts to secure employment for whites at the 
expense of Africans were supported by the Labour Party into the 
1930's. 
as "an 
Whites were to be employed in government departments 
12 
example to private employers". Unemployment among whites 
was to be alleviated by replacing African drivers with whites in 
the SAR and in "any Government Municipal undertakings. 1I13 
All Provincial works were to be confined to whites; foodstuffs 
10. star 6 October 1926, reporting Boydell's address to Transvaal 
Municipal Congress, Ermelo. Boydell Archives. Albums, vol 13 
11. Report of the Wage Board into the Meat Trade, Certain Areas, 
10 July 1933. An 307-1934 
12. Benoni Branch of SALP resolution to Transvaal Provincial 
Conference, 4-5 September 1926, carried unanimously. The term 
'white ' in the original resolution was altered to 'civilised'. 
SALP Archives Box 32, item 4 
13 . Resolution 2(d) to 1928 Transvaal Provincial Conference of SALP 
SALP Archives. Box 32, item 5 
meant for white consumption were to be produced and handled "only 
by Europeans" and the colour bar as enunciated in the mining regu-
lations was to be strictly enforced. 14 
Notwithstanding the statements of Boydell and others, the 
Department of Railways and Harbours and the Minister of Native 
Affairs denied that a policy of replacement had been embarked 
upon .. Both parties claimed that whites had taken the place of 
15 Africans as a result of "natural wastage" or that it occurred 
16 lIonly when Natives leave ...... their places" .. The government 
claimed in 1933 that although 25 000 white and coloured were 
employed as a result of the civilised labour policy, it was not 
"unmindful of the interest of the uncivilised labourer. lI The 
policy concentrated on whites and coloureds because it was 
lithe civilised labourer J'V' :ainly and not the uncivilised" who was 
17 
"walking about unemployed". 
On the other hand it was conceded by a number of people that 
displacement had taken place as a result of government policy. 
14. Resolutions 2,3 and 7, all carried, at Transvaal Provincial 
Conference, 7-8 June 1930. SALP Archive Box 33, item 1 
15. Cape Coloured Ccmmission Report, UG 54-1937 pp 43-4 
16. "Distress and Unemployment among Natives" Report of an 
interview with the Honourable the Minister of Native Affairs 
on Wednesday October 26, 1932. SAIRR Archives B71.1 
17. P A Euvrard, private secretary to Minister of Labour, to 
unidentified addressee 3 July 1933. A 8 Xuma Papers, 330703 a 
\ 
One such individual was Edgar Brookes, who in 1934 went further 
to say that 
the loss of wages to the native community under the headings 
{-in the Industrial census:/ 'state, Provincial and Muni-
cipal Employment' had been almost exactly compensated for by 
the increase in the wages paid to native by private 
employees. 
The government ought not to intervene to change the situation 
Brookes continued, as interference might have led to the 
"specialisation of our poor whites as road and Railway navvies 
while our natives take their place in the more skilled industries_,,18 
Direct representations to the go"vernment were also made. An 
African member of a Johannesburg Joint Council deputation to the 
Minister of Native Affairs in 1932 pointed out that they did not 
want to see an end to the IIWhite Labour scheme," but that they 
disagreed 
that men who have given the best years of their lives to their 
work should be sent away to work on darns. Most of them have 
formed permanent connections in the towns where they have 
worked for many years and now they are prevented from going 
on with that work and are uprooted and are sent to other 
districts . There is no position for them there. My own 
brother is in the Transkei, where the Glen Grey system has 
18. Brookes, E 'Memorandum on the Questions - (a) whether a 
definition of spheres of labour between whites and non-whites 
is possible, and (bl if so, whether and how such definitions 
can be effected." 1934. SAIRR Archive, 71.4.3 
been introduced, has no land of his own: he must 
squat on my father's allotment. 19 
At least three different contemporary interpretations of the 
situation can thus be identified. On the one hand the civilised 
labour policy did not result in the purposeful exclusion of blacks, 
mainly Africans, from employment in government service. The belief 
was clearly not based on the available evidence mentioned above 
which indicated quite clearly that replacement had taken place. 
Another view was that the displacement caused in one sector was 
absorbed in the private sector. This assertion is more difficult 
to sustain because of the lack of reliable statistics. The general 
expansion of the economy after the depression certainly led to 
greater employment, but we argue below that white employment in-
creased at a faster rate than African employment . At the other 
end is the suggestion that those displaced were not absorbed and 
were actually rooted out and forced to the outlying districts. 
This assertion is supported by statements about the positive 
effect of wage regulation on the agricultural labour supply: 
African workers no longer employed could find work on farms. 
19. "Distress and Unemployment among Natives" SAIRR Archives 71.4.3 
The African delegat~s were, as quoted by the document, Mr Bud 
Mbelle, Selby Msimang, Motau, P S Selokwane -"native teacher 
from Pretoria ", W Mabana J Dr Xuma (?), Mr Masute (?) The spokesman 
quoted in the text is not identified. 
A closer e xamination of how the operation of the Wage Act and related 
statutes affected the racial composition of labour will provide some 
indication of how the civilised labour policy was administered in 
the private sector. 
In May 1926 the Board defined its position on racial discrim-
ination. The Town Clerk of Bloemfontein had asked the Board to 
investigate conditions of Africans in the city after the 1925 
d ' b 20 1Stur ances. The Board claimed that the Wage Act made "no dis-
tinction between employees on the ground of race or colour .. " The 
distinction could not be made as it was "conunon knowledge" that 
whites and Africans often did the same class of work. If a 
distinction was drawn between Africans and non-Africans in this 
case, the Board would be singling out 
certain employees only from a group of employees in the same 
way as it would if it dealt only with red-haired or blue-
eyed employees. The Board, therefore, holds that employees 
cannot rightly be classified as natives or non-natives though 
they may be rightly classified L-sic-1 as skilled or unskilled. 21 
20. cf, ch 6, pp"" (fbelow for a detailed analysis of the Wage 
Board investigation in Bloemfontein 
21. Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment in Certain 
Undertakings, 2 May 1928, quoting reply of Board. Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928. Also 
quoted in 1929 Wage Board Report, p 7; 1931 Wage Board Report 
pp 8-9 
In November 1926 the Board reiterated its statement that it did 
not propo s e to operate lias a colour bar body". 22 Al though the 
Board's bona fides with regard to its self-attributed status as 
d I 23 . a non-colour bar body are challenge be ow, 1tS statements can at 
this stage be taken at face value. Despite the Board's protesta-
tions about its inability to act in a racially discriminatory way, 
the issue was taken up in the courts of the land . 
Q~~~1~'t'" t'\.n """ e-.A.. 
In 1928 ~/-Lewin was convicted for the underpayment of employees 
whose wages were regulated by the de termination in the furniture 
24 industry which ran from June until 30 September of that year . 
He took his case on appeal to the Transvaal Supreme Court after 
his conv iction in the Johannesburg magistrate's court. His appeal 
was turned down and he then went to the Appeal Court in Bloemfon-
tein. 25 Although Lewin effectively won his case, both courts 
rejected counsel's argument that the Board could discriminate between 
22. Report of the Wage Board, Clothing Industry. 28 September 
1927. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
First Special Edition November 1927. Also quoted in 1929 
Wage Board Report pp 7-8 
23. cf pp lot -!1below 
24. Social and Industrial Review, 1 (9) 25 May 1928 
25. The Determination was declared ultra vires because the Appeal 
Court overturned the Transvaal Court's conclusion that the 
special editions of the Social and Industrial Review could be 
classified as newspapers in terms of the Act. cf, ch 3, 
pp .2 !f'Q above 
3ot-
African and white employees. Mr Justice Tindall of the Transvaal 
bench had disagreed that the sections of the Act which counsel 
for the appellant mentioned indicated that the Board could discrim-
. 26 l.nate. He was of the opinion that 
The fact that the Legislature has set up as a criterion a 
civilised standard of living negatives the view that the 
Board can concern itself with the question whether the 
employee is a Native of European. 27 
Mr Justice Stratford handed down the decision of the Appeal Court 
on 19 March 1930. The IIcivilised habits of life" clause, section 
3(3), of the Wage Act was to be interpreted to mean that "the measure 
of a minimum wage recommended by the Board" should be "the cost to 
the employee to support himself 'in accordance with civilised habits 
of life ' .11 No discrimination in terms of race was to be permitted . 28 
26. N E Rosenberg, for Lewin, referred to section 3(2)(a) , (c) and 
(d) and section 7(1 )(a) of the Wage Act . Section 3(2) detailed 
that the Board had to take a number of points into consideration 
when reporting to the Minister: SUb-sections (a),(c) and (d) 
mentioned the labour conditions and remuneration of the trade, 
the ability of employers to continue successfully if a deter-
mination was made J and the cost of living in the areas affected 
respectively. Section 7 dealt with the various powers vested 
in the Minister. Sub-section 1 (a) permitted him in certain 
circumstances J to determine rates of wages to employees "to meet 
special conditions and qualifications . " R vs Lewin (1930 AD 344) 
quote at p 345, cf 1931 Wage Board Report, p 9 
27. 1931 Wage Board Report p 10 
28. The other three judges concurred with Stratford. R vs Lewin, 
(1930 AD 344) cf pp 350-1. R vs Lewin TPD 1929 is not reported . 
Although the ruling of the courts on the racial issue was 
clearly defined, the implementation of the ruling in an essentially 
discriminatory system was not lost on Justice Tindall. He remarked 
that 
A native may complain that the result is that he is ground 
between the upper and the nether millstone; where no 
discrimination is made he suffers under the Wage Act because 
the raising of ·the scale of wages makes his employment too dear, 
while, where there is a discrimination, as, for example, 
under Act 16 of 1926 {-the Colour Bar Act_I providing for a 
colour bar in certain kinds of employment, he is not allowed to 
compete because his employment is too cheap. But such a result 
would not justify the Court in departing from the ordinary 
meaning of the language used in the Wage Act. 29 
The Court could not do otherwise, but its effective capitulation 
in this matter indicated that it could only operate within the 
structures of the particular society in which it existed. The 
limitations of the law per se were thus clearly indicated. 
The Appellate Division'S judgement came in the wake of a series 
of reverses for Africans who had turned to the Wage Act to seek 
redress of their grievances. The ICU's attempts in Durban and 
Kroonstad to get a determination failed. Only in Bloemfontein 
29. Quoted in 1931 Wage Board Report, p 10 
was a determination secured for unskilled workers. The 
Regulations to the Act were amended to ensure that applications were 
signed by applicants, thereby excluding the vast mass of unskilled 
workers who were largely illiterate. By the time the Courts ruled, 
the vast majority of Africans had effectively been removed from any 
of the benefits of the Wage Act. The final rebuff was formally 
announced in September/October 1930 when the government instructed 
the Wage Board to refrain from recommending wages for unskilled 
30 
workers. 
The Board was not unmindful of the possible effects of wage 
regulation on the racial composition of the labour force, and later 
conceded that it was obviously clear "that wage levels though 
fixed without discrimination do affect the race composition of the 
31 
employees." The Board turned its attention to this discrim-
inatory aspect in its 1929 three year report. It could not ignore 
the "existence of different races at different levels of civilis a-
tion "J and rationalised its action as follows: 
Unskilled work •.• is almost generally performed by natives, 
whose standard of living is much lower than that of the 
Europeans, of most coloured, and of many Asiatics. Such a 
fact must be recognised in wage legislation, and the Board, 
30. These points are all expanded on in ch 6 
31. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1937, UG 30-1938, P 65 
.) 
therefore, has had, in determining wages for what may be 
regarded as unskilled work, to pay regard to what is the 
customary level of wages for native unskilled workers. 
On the other hand, for skilled work, which is generally 
performed by highly trained Europeans, any wage proposed 
must take into account the standard of living of Euro-
peans of the type which is capable of acquiring training. 
The wage proposed for such occupations will •.. need to be 
one on which the employee can maintain himself according 
to the normal standard of living of such European 
employees. 32 
The. opinions of two members of the Wage Board, Lucas and van der 
Horst, can be cited in this regard. They are of interest for their 
similarity, notwithstanding the fact that the latter submitted the 
only minority reports of the Board to 1937. 33 
In 1933 Lucas commented that the Board had, largely unsuccess-
fully, "tried by stages to raise the wages payable for work, other 
34 than that of labourers, to what may be con5idered a civilised wage". 
This meant that in the case of labourers, the Board had not tried to 
increase wages to a civilised level at all. Roux's statement 
that one had to concede that Lucas did not subscribe to the view that 
32. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 8 
33. These were in the Native Trade, An 211-1934, 27 September 1933; 
Tea, Coffee and Chicory Packing, An 176-1933 ii, 13 April 1933; 
Passenger Transport Undertakings, cape Town, An 96-1933 ii, 
23 February 1933 
34. "The Determination of Wa:Jes in South A£rica" p 55 
the Wage Board was to be used exclusively for the benefit of white 
1 t be 1 " f" d 35 emp oyees mus qua 1 1e . Granted, Lucas did urge increases 
in African wages from time to time but his statements were always 
b d d b th "d" 36 aun e y 0 er cons~ erat10ns. African upliftment was 
always linked to the prospect of white regression. If African 
wages were not raised, if the wage gap was not closed, the whites 
37 
would "go down further and further . " The only consideration in 
the determination of wages was "the minimum upon which the employee 
can live according to a decent standard of living. u38 For van der 
Horst, the wide wage gap was "a stumbling block to the fuller 
employment of Europeans." Ideally, the Union needed "to have a 
minimum wage which would be sufficient to attract European unskilled 
employees and which would enable them to support themselves in 
accordance with civilised standards of life .. " He claimed that 
Africans might not necessarily be ousted , as employees would 
35. Roux, E Time Longer than Rope, p 208 
36. cf, for exampla, UG 14-1926, Minority Report, ch III; Native 
Economic Commission, UG 22-1932, Minority views of Lucas, 
Anderson and Roberts, para 1009-1056; reports of speeches 
made on his retirement, Umsebenzi, 20 July, 31 August, 
26 September, 1935; Lucas, FA W South Africa as She Might Be 
pp 2-3 
37. Quoted, Umsebenzi, 20 July 1935 
38. Report of a Majority of the Wage Board, Tea, Coffee, Chicory 
26 August 1933. An 144-1934 
compete on equal terms. He further complained that the system 
whereby unskilled wages were largely determined by African living 
standards meant that they monopolised unskilled work "as Europeans 
and, in many cases, Coloureds could not possibly exist on such 
wages .. " An increase in African wages in trades which were 
unlikely to provide white employment "would simply mean increasing 
the wages of .. ... unskilled Native employees to an amount in excess 
f th . . t 39 o e~r requl.remen s .. " It was for this latter reason that 
he could not support the majority recommendations. In other words 
van der Horst's difference did not lie in the ideal goal of regu-
lation, the security and extension of white employment, but rather 
in his interpretation whether the trade was suitable or not for white 
employment. It is also possible that he did not believe in the 
policy of increasing African wages to promote the development of 
an African consumer market either. He went further in his report 
on the tea trade when he unguardedly argued that 
Large profits cannot ... be regarded as the sale reason for 
laying down huge minimum wages . Other factors such as the 
amount of skill required, wages in operation in other 
industries for similar work or occupations, the race of the 
employee, as well as the cost of living, should be taken into 
a~ount when arrivin~at a minimum wage .. 40 
!... Enphasis added IP J 
The new Wage Board oppointed in 1935 did not depart from the 
39. Report of a Minority of the Wage Board, Native Trade 27 Sep-
tember 1933 . An 211-1934 
40. Report of a Minority of the Wage Board,Tea, Coffee, Chicory 
13 April 1933 An 176-1933 ii 
, 30e 
essential philosophy of the old Board . They argued that although 
there was "some substance" in the racist claim that "the average 
native does not appreciate finer distinctions in skill and respon-
sibility which are a feature of the psychology of more sophisti-
cated races I II more and more Africans were entering the Labour 
market as operatives. The Board had to take cognisance of the 
latter fact in preference to the subjective psychological claim 
for lower wages in order to protect white semi-skilled employment. 
The only options open to the Board were either to reduce wages to 
the labouring rate or increase wages to a semi-skilled rate. 41 
From an early stage of its e x istence the Wage Act was 
administered in such a way that the extended white employment 
policy, couched in the civilised labour terminology but not 
sacrificed to the interest of industrial development per se, 
proceeded apace in the private sector. A number of areas can be 
enumerated . The Board's reports are permeated, firstly, by 
statements about the possibilities for increased white employment . 
That policy was made possible through the extension of notices, ~ these 
groups had initially been excluded , to the Board to cover Africans 
or unskilled occupations and by the implementation of "supplementary 
41. Report of the Wage Board, Meat Trade, Durban, Rep No 392, 
22 December 1937, An 55-1938 ii 
investigations" J which were intended to underpin existing industrial 
council agreements . Secondly , the prescription of apprenticeship, 
training J ratio, wage rate scales and retrenchment requirements 
ensured bias in favour of white employees. It is to a considera-
tion of these factors that we now turn . 
From time to time the Board made explicit statements which 
indicated its support for the concept of increased white employ-
rnent. In the sweet and biscuit, dyeing and cleaning trades it 
argued that there was little scope for skilled white employment 
whilst wages were kept low and the division of labour which 
- 42 
favoured African and coloured employees continued. The Board 
urged that scope for apprentices and skilled labourers did exist 
in these trades. They argued that wages fixed at higher rates 
would alleviate the difficulties of getting white labour, a complaint 
43 
often made -by employers. Further, reasonable wage~ would 
encourage a "good type" of white employee. Low wages ensured that 
employees only remained in the job "merely to tide over some 
temporary embarrassment and in the hope of something better turning 
42. Report of the Wage Boar~ sweets,Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) September 1926, pp11,20; Report of the Wage 
Board,Biscuits,Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
September 1926, p11; Report of the Wage Board,Dyeing and 
Cleaning Trade, Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
1 June 1928 p 261 
43. Report of the Wage Board,Furniture,Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) December 1926 p 26-7 
44 
up." In the meat trade, for example, the Board reported that the 
long hours worked discouraged whites and that the wide wage gap 
provided no incentive to employers to employ apprentices. 45 
It appears that the Board supported apprenticeship in trades 
which could fitfully employ more whites and provide them with 
necessary training. The Board, approvingly, quoted the Board of 
Control set up under the Profiteering Act, 1920,in its report for 
1922 that if conditions improved in the meat trade, it would 
46 become sui table for;,hite anployment. 
stated that 
More definitely, the Board 
so long as the wages paid to the majority of the employees 
engaged in slaughtering continue at anything like their 
present low level, it will be idle to expect the trade to 
offer any materially increased scope for the employment 
of Europeans. 47 
L-Emphasis added. IP_7 
In 1934 the Board made the general comment that the increased 
mechanisation, the restructl)r;~ of the labour forces which involved 
a reduction in the numbers of "highly qualified specialists and an 
increasing number of machine minders" who could in many instances 
be called unskilled, and the consequent weakening of the old craft 
48 
union structure brought with them the prospect of lower wages. 
44. Report of the Wage Board,Dyeing and Cleaning, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 JUne 1928 p 261 
45. Report of the Wage Board,Meat Trade,21 December 1933 An 
307-1934 . All areas, except Port Elizabeth and Durban 
46. Report of Wage BoardJMeat Trade,Port Elizabeth 29 October 
1930 An 53-1931 
47. Report of Wage Board,Meat Trade, Durban, 9 June 1933 An 77-1934 
48. For discussion on trade union developments and politics, 
cf ch 1 pp \<>&R1 above. 
The problem lay in the fact that unskilled employees had only 
rarely been taken into consideration for membership and protection 
by white trade unions. Deskilling seriously affected white 
employees. There was a "grave danger of a large number of 
comparatively well paid Europeans being ousted from industry because 
of there being no call for their superior training .. II Their only 
protection lay in raising unskilled wages "to a level at which 
the European employee can maintain his standard of living,,1149 
The factor of the split labour force, whereby white, 'privileged' 
workers were ranged against African unskilled workers was marked 
by fierce competition between the different sectiorn. 
The provision of employment possibilities .for whi teB classed as 
'civilised labour' was most clearly indicated in the reports of 
the Wage Board which dealt with supplementary investigations. 
These investigations acted to supplement the Industrial Concilia-
tion Act in that they took into account employees excluded from the 
scope of that Act. These employees included pass-bearing Africans 
in the Transvaal and Natal. The Wage Act was thus u.sed to ensure 
49. Report of Wage BoardJEngineering Inudstry)30 April 1934 
An 914-1934. This report is also quoted in part in Department 
of Labour Annual Report for 1935. UC 11-1936, P 80 
that the wages of all employees in industries covered by industrial 
council agreements could be regulated. 
The first references ~ to the Board appear to'have been 
intended as supplementaries. During the course of the early 
investigations it became clear that industrial council agreements 
had led to the dismissal of certain classes of white employee. 
Employers had retrenched white workers who had to be paid the pre-
scribed wage and had employed Africans in their places as the 
latter were not covered by the industrial council agreements and 
thus did not have to be paid the prescribed wage. In order to 
circumvent employers from discriminating against more expensive 
white workers in the manner described, the Minister withdrew the 
early references and issued new ones which included packing, dis-
50 patching and the delivery of goodS, Notwithstanding the extension 
or amplification of these references, the practise of dismissing 
whites andthe employment of African workers at lower rates of pay 
continued. White worker unease and concomitant state concern 
prompted the Minister of Labour to urge the Wage Board to formulate 
a solution. The Board concluded that all employees excluded per 
definition from the ambit of the Indu.strial Conciliation Act 
formed a class of employee in terms of the Wage Act. This view, 
which cleared the way for the Board to investigate the wages of 
50. This was done in the sweets, biscuit, confectionary and hats, 
caps and clothing industries, cf references to the Board 
dated 26 February,S April,and 4 May 1926 as included in 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) September 1926. 
Glass Bevelling and Silvering ref 4 August 1926, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) December 1926 
, 
" , '3'3 
employees in industries covered by industrial council agreements, 
was endorsed later by the Supreme Court in 1927. 51 The Board 
was able to operate in this way until 1930. In that year the 
Industrial Conciliation Act was amended. The Minister was 
henceforward enabled to specify wages and hours for employees 
excluded by the Act's definition if an industrial councilor 
conciliation board reported that the exclusion of such employees 
would defeat the aims of agreements by creating the possibility 
of their employment at the expense of those groups covered by the 
52 
agreement. 
By June 1926, the Minister of Labour had issued references 
to the Board which covered packing, dispatching and the delivery 
of good. as well as the class of employees excluded from the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. The industries investigated in this 
way were the furniture making, leather and tanning, baking and 
b k '1' d 53 espo e ta1 or1ng tra es. In these industries, the investiga-
51. Rex vs Barene (1927 TPD 478) 
52. s 7(h), Act 24-1930 added sub-section (4) to s 9 of the 1924 
Act, as well as other minor amendments. 
53. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation under the South African Wage 
Act", p 107 includes clothing (Union) and hairdressing(Witwaters-
rand and Pretoria) in the list. The inclusion of clothing in 
his list is curious. No references to the Board suggest that it 
was a supplementary investigation (1929 Wage Board Report pp 48-55 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) September 1926, 
November 1927; December 1927; June 1928, An 161-1931) Furthermore, 
supplementary investigations mostly affected the Transvaal and 
Natal, but more so the former. The furniture trade was investi-
gated as a supplementary throughout the Union and is dealt with 
later. A clothing industry Industrial Council agreement was ' in 
operation with apparent success (1929 Wage Board Report p 49) 
The hairdressing trade is dealt with below as it forms a 
different type of supplementary investigation to that discussed 
here. 
tions were conducted with an eye to preventing the substitution of 
African for whi te labour. 54 Of these industries, the Wage Board 
specifically mentioned the baking and furniture trades as areas 
55 in which problems of white displacement were particularly acute. 
As the two trades illustrate different points about supplementary 
investigations, they have been chosen as case studies to emphasise 
this type of investigation. 
An industrial council was formed in September 1925 by the 
Joint Board of the Baking Trade . The agreement was between the 
Master Bakers ·'Association and the Witwatersrand Baking Employees 
56 Trade Union and was to operate from 1 November 1925. This 
agreement f?r the Witwatersrand and Pretoria areas sought to 
ensure that the number of Africans in any bakehouse did not exceed 
the number of employed whites. The wage for general helpers was 
set at 10/- a week and members of the Council argued that they 
"had in mind the employment of natives as such" at this level. 
Some three or four months later the implications of the definition of 
"employee II in the Industrial Conciliation Act was fully realised 
when Africans were employed in the place of whites. It was freely 
54. ~ll, ibid pp 107-8 is correct in this. Davies is mute on 
the topic of supplementary investigations, perhaps as a result 
of the choice of the sweet industry as his case-study. Such 
reliance is inadequate for a fuller idea of how the Board 
operated, as will be indicated below. Davies, R Capital, State 
and White Labour pp 210-224 
55. 1929 Wage Board Report p 23 
56. An 56-1938 ii, Report no 395, 22 December 1937. All references 
hereafter are to the Baking and Confectionery trades, unless 
otherwise stated. 
, 
, 
, 
admitted by the chairman of the Witwatersrand Master Bakers' 
Association that strict adherence to the agreement would have 
resulted in the employment of "at least one hundred more whites." 
This latter figure, the Board pronounced, was IIprobably a conserva-
tive one . " Clearly, the Master Bakers were employing Africans 
instead of whites and coloureds in order not to pay the agreed 
minimum wage. The agreement operated to restrict possioaities of 
employment to both whites and coloureds. ·'Unequal competi ticn" 
arose between two types of employer: those who relied on almost 
entirely white workers and those who depended on African workers, and 
57 the Board was therefore requested to investigate the trade. 
Prior to making its recommendations the Board co-operated with the 
Industrial Counc~l and secured amendments to rationalise the agree-
ment which became operative from December 1926. 58 In its "essential 
features" 59 the new determination corresponded to the agre·ement. 
Before the Determination was due to expire, the Board was issued 
60 
with new references. It is at this point that the operation of 
57 . Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) September 1925, 
Report dated 9 August 1925 . 'Witwatersrand ' in this context 
included the magisterial districts of Krugersdorp, Johannesburg, 
Germiston, Boksburg, Benoni and Springs. 
58. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 31 
59. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) September 1927, 
Report dated 12 July 1927 
50. The August determination had been declared ultra vires in 
November. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) May 1928 
Jrb 
the supplementary determination becomes interesting. Until the 
end of 1927, Pretoria and the Witwatersrand were covered by the 
same reference which covered non-Conciliation Act employees. The 
new references split the two areas and only covered Africans in 
h ' f 61 t e W~twatersrand re erence. During the Witwatersrand investiga-
tion the Board was urged to (educe the wages for occupations in which 
Africans mainly were employed to below the minima established by 
the Industrial Council Agreement. No such plea was urged in 
Pretoria. In the former case the Board, significantly, refused 
to accede to the request because "in the light of past experience, 
many employers would exclusively employ natives as table-hands at 
such lower wage. II A point which weighed heavily with them was 
that evidence was produced to indicate that many qualified table-
62 hands were unemployed. 
The question arises as to why the Pretoria reference of 
December 1927 was no longer a supplementary one and the Witwaters-
rand was. The Board stated that invalidations notwithstanding, 
the determinations had "exercised a marked effect upon the wages 
and other conditions of employees in this industry,"as the majority 
of employers endeavoured to abide by the provisions. 63 With 
specific reference to Pretoria, the Board remarked that separate 
61. Witwatersrand, Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
February 1928, report dated 7 February 1928. Pretoria, Social 
and Industrial Review (Special Edition)May 1928, report dated 
25 February 1928 
62. "Table-hand" was generally defined as "an employee (other 
than a Grade I employee, an apprentice, or a juvenile) who 
assists a baker in the mixing or making of dOugh by hand or 
machinery, or in the making or baking of bread .. II Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) '15 March 1929 p 433, 
Definitions of occupations were included in all Determinations. 
63. 1929 Wage Board Report p 31 
references were necessary as "conditions prevailing in Pretoria 
differed considerably from those existing on the Witwatersrand." 
It will be recalled that an initial motivation b>hind the 1925 
agreement was that Africans ought not to outnumber white employees 
"in all branches of the industry connected with L-aJ particular 
64 bakehouse." A comparison of the employment figures in racial 
terms up till 1927 indicate that Pretoria had succeeded in that task 
whilst the Witwatersrand had not. In Pretoria white employment rose 
22% to reach over 50% in September 1927. On the Witwatersrand in 
65 May of the same year, Africans numbered nearly 52% of the workforce. 
The Pretoria determination was declared invalid in March 1930 
because the Supreme Court found that the definition of table-hand, 
66 baker and grade I assistant were too vague . The Board was 
instructed to investigate in July and it reported in October. 67 
Unable to recommend civilised wages the Board was then instructed to 
issue a recommendation which it deemed fit. 68 It was whilst 
64. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
September 1926 
65. Table 1, P 4(lfbelow 
66. Rex vs Gerstuera 
(1930 AD 420) 
1930 TPD Upheld by Appellate Division, 
67. 1931 Wage Board Report p 12 An 122-1931 report dated 23 October 1930 
68. It will be recalled that if the Board could not recommend a 
'civilised' wage J the Minister could then either instruct it to 
issue a recommendation it deemed fit, or let the matter drop. 
engaged with this industry that the Board received a ministerial 
instruction that they were to suspend recommending wages for 
occupations in which Africans predominated pending the report of 
the Native Economic Commission. 69 The Board complied by amending 
h . d ' d' 1 70 t e1r recomrnen at10n accar 1ng y. In the event, notwithstanding 
the drop in white employment which occurred after 1927, due partly 
to the depressed state of industry, the Minister did not proceed 
to issue a determination under the Wage Act. An industrial council 
agreement was entered into by the employers and employees under the 
amended 1930 COnciliation Act by the time the Board reported. 
71 It operated from July 1930. 
The Witwatersrand Baking ~ developed differently. As 
already indicated , the Board and Labour Department clearly considered 
that the number of whites employed in 1927 did not fulfil the re-
quirements of the agreement. Thus the investigation had to remain 
a supplementary one to attempt to bring the Witwatersrand up to 
the standard of Pretoria. Constant problems beset the determina-
tioons which came into effect. In July 1928 the Board was 
requested to make a recommendation for a fresh determination to 
replace Determination 13 in operation at the time. The determina-
tion was declared ultra vires on a 'technicalityll in September. 
69. cf ch 6 pp 11-'0'" below 
70. An 122-1931, report dated 31 October 1930 
71. 1931 Wage Board Report pp 84-5 
The Board reported from time to time that it could not recommend 
72 
civilised wages. Eventually a new determination came into 
operation. was itself declared ultra vires, but because the 
Conciliation Act was amended there was no longer any need to request 
supplementary investigations as had occurred at every instance up 
till that time. 73 The industrial council agreements had been 
"applied with a varying degree of success during the years 
1927-1931 . " Agreements covered the industry under the new 
Act from 1934. In that year and again in June 1935 the operative 
agreements for the Witwatersrand were declared void. both times on 
technicalities arising out of defects in the constitutions of 
employers' and employees'organisations. The Wage Board wryly com-
men ted that "in this industry wage legislation has had a most 
unfortunate history in the courts, no fewer than five wage 
determinations and six agreements having been declared ultra vires 
between the years 1925 to 1935." Bickering within the employers' 
72. cf reports dated 11 October 1928, 15 January 1929, 28 January 
1929, in Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
15 March 1929, and reports dated 30 May and 6 June 1929 in 
Social and. Industrial Review (Special Edition) 12 July 1929 
1929 Wage Board Report and the 1931 Waga Board IEp:Irt refers to the last 
recommendation in 1929. 
73. 1931 Wage Board Report p 84 
74 
camp prevented the negotiation of a new agreement. The Wit-
watersrand Baking Employees Trade Union applied for an investigation 
uwith a view to re-establishing wages and conditions of employment 
on a satisfactory and stable basis. II Informal discussions were 
held between employers and employees and an informal agreement was 
passed on to the Board for ratification. It became evident that 
under the 1934 Agreement the stipulated wage for bakers had only 
been paid to whites. The Board refused to accept the informal 
agreement . Wages for bakers were then set at a slightly lower 
.level asked for by the white union, at a level satisfactory to 
employers, and a great deal higher than that proposed by Ballinger 
and Gordon who represented African employees. Ballinger and 
Gordon feared that a wage as high as that set by the Board, namely 
£5.0.0 per week, would cause dismissals among African employees 
"in view of the fact that the law prevented recognition of a native 
trade union and that no protection was afforded the Bantu by the 
'75 European Union. As will be seen below, African workers had organ-
ised themselves into a Native Bakers Union on the Witwatersrand in 
1928. It is possible that their activities in monitoring the deter-
mination, linked to threatened strike action, prevented employers on 
the Witwatersrand from replacing them by whites to the same degree 
74. The Price Protection Association wanted to introduce a system 
for the Master Bakers' Association whereby one firm would have 
one vote. The registered body permitte:ione firm to have me vote with CXle 
additional vote for every employee paid more than £4.10.0 per 
week. This prevented larger employers from being swamped. The 
conflict was based on the payment of wages: smaller firms 
were adversely affected by the status quo which favoured larger 
employers. Attempts to change the cons~tution in the favour of 
the former must be seen as amall firm opposition to wage 
increases and points to, or at least their fear of, their 
possible demise. An 56-1938ii Report no 394 22 December 1937 
75. An 56-1938 ii Rep 394 and rec 395. 22 December 1937 
h . ed 76 as happened in Pretoria were no union act10n was not a 
The Baking and Confectionery trade on the Witwatersrand 
and Pretoria had thus come full circle. Joint references in 
1926 did not take into consideration the class of employees 
excluded by the Conciliation Act . The reference was altered to 
attempt to promote employment of whites at the expense of blacks, 
but mainly Africans. Success in these efforts in Pretoria 
produced a separate ref~ for the area which apparently no longer 
needed a supplementary determination even before the 1930 amendment. 
The Witwatersrand still lagged behind although white employment did 
increase. After 1930 the need for supplementaries fell away and 
the industry there was regulated by industrial council agreements. 
The Board was asked to issue a recommendation by white trade 
unionists to re-establish so-called satisfactory conditions after 
the failure to negotiate a further council agreement. The Board's 
investigation and recommendation fell within the general style of 
Beard activity : the stipulation of wages at such a rate as to 
ensure white employment and job security without an explicit 
racial bias. 
The furniture industry was the other trade singled out by 
the Board as seriously affected by the exclusion of pass-bearing 
Africans from the Industrial Council Agreement. The agreement 
operated from August 1926 but was declared ultra vires in 
76. cf ch 6, pp f(b7 below 
77 
september of the same year. The agreements which followed 
78 lasred until October 1929 when they were not replaced. 
The Board received its first reference in June 1926 and this was 
a supplementary one for the area of the whole Union. The Board 
could not issue a recommendation similar to the terms laid down in 
the agreement "because of anomalies and inconsistencies in the 
agreement" and because serious dislocation would occur in certain 
branches of trade, dominated by African labour employed "at wages 
far below the minimum laid down in the agreement"J if they were 
paid the higher rates . The reasons for the Boardls failure to 
issue some recommendation were the same as those for other 
supplementary investigations. The Board feared that either 
"European and coloured people would be payed at rates of pay 
79 lower than those fixed by the Board ll for manual work "or that 
European and coloured people would not be employed . " Similarly, 
pass-bearers were excluded from wicker and basketware manufacturing 
and the Board could not recommend lower rates IIbecause the tendency 
would then be to confine this branch of the industry to natives 
80 
and Asiatics, to the exclusion of Europeans." 
77 . Rex vs Pattison, 6 September 1926, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) December 1926 
78 . An 592-1930 report dated 12 April 1930 
79. By manual work here is meant "persons solely employed in the handling 
of materials used for filling, such as coir and horsehair, before 
such materials are handled in the process of filling mattress-
covers. " An 592-1930 
80. Report dated 27 September 1926, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) December 1 926 
One employer was quoted by the Board to the effect that set wages would 
alleviate the difficulties of getting whites to enter the furniture 
81 trade. The Determination was to run from July to September 1927 
and thereafter until it was replaced. A feature of Wage Board 
activity in this industry was the extent of liaison between the 
industrial councils and the Board. The Board not only attempted to 
, 
lay down rates very similar to the agreements82 , it also actively 
assisted the industrial council when it negotiated the 1927-28 
agreement . When the industrial council failed to meet in 1929 and 
hence no new agreement was made, the Board was issued with 
references for different regions,83 all of which were supplementary. 
Supplementary determinations operated until October 1930 when they 
were replaced by normal determinations and, in the case of the Cape 
area, by an industrial council agreement. This latter lapsed in 
October 1932, only to be replaced by a new agreement which 
incorporated massive wage reductions. 84 The Witwatersrand/Pretoria 
85 
complex negotiated an agreement which operated from July 1931. 
81. Report dated 20 November 1926, ibid. 
82. Report dated 18 January 1928, Social and Industrial Review 
,(Special Edition) 17 February 1928, and An 592-1930 
83. Report dated 25 January 1930, An 113-1931 and ,An 592-1930 
i) Johannesburg, Germiston, Boksburg J Benoni, Springs, Krugersdorp; 
ii) Cape Town, Wynberg, Simonstown, Bellville; iii) Durban; 
iv) Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage; v) East London; vi) Pretoria, 
Pietermaritzburg, Kimberley and Bloemfontein 
84. An 247-1933 dated 15 December 1932; 1931 Wage Board Report 
85. An 249-1933, dated 3 January 1933; 1931 Wage Board Report 
No comparative figures are provided in the various Wage Board repcrts 
for the furniture industry, but those reproduced in official Union stat-
istics indicate an increase in the percentage of white employment which 
reaches 50\ between 1926-28, extended up to 54\ in 1934-5, and then dropped 
back, with the large increase in actual numbers in the next year, to 
52\. The number of whites employed, on the other hand, dropped during 
the depression but increased thereafter. 86 
The furniture trade, then, illustrates the straight-forward 
administration of supplementary determinations. Agreements were not 
merely reproduced as determinations in an effort to avoid unnecessary 
dismissals and overt disruption of industry. Further, industrial 
councils and the Wage Board co-operated with each other to avoid 
unnecessary confusion. It is clear that the Wage Board was used as 
sparingly as possible in areas covered by the Conciliation Act based 
. t 1 . . 1 87 as 1 was on vo untary pr1nc1p es. 
The above examination of the Board's activities demonstrates the 
raison d'etre of supplementary determinations. Most of these 
determinations acted as instruments for the protection of white 
jobs. Pursell incorrectly incorporated the determination for the 
86. Union Statistics for Sixty Years, p 9 - 11, cols 119,120 
87 . 
cf Table 2, p~( below. The only Wage Board report figures are 
for 1929 and are provided in Table 3 to provide an illustration 
of the regional distribution of the furniture industry at the time. 
This point is further developed 
hairdressing trade under the umbrella category of white job protection. 88 
A supplementary determination was issued in spite of the fact that 
whites completely dominated the trade. The Witwatersrand determination 
in this trade was promulgated to provide security of benefit and better 
working conditions for all employees in the trade but also were not 
covered by a determination. It provides an indication perhaps of the 
type of work the Board would have embarked upon in the ideal situation 
in the Union where the labour force was not fragmented. Uncomplicated 
by the absence of the huge gap between white and black wages, the Board 
was able to operate on the basis of its social democratic beliefs. 
The determinations which operated in the hairdressing trade outside 
89 the Witwatersrand do not concern us at this stage, and we need only 
deal with the Witwatersrand briefly here. An industrial council was 
formed in February 1926 and the first agreement operated from August 
1926 for just over a month when it was declared ultra vires. The 
Board was issued with a reference to re-investigate in January 1929. 
In terms of the definition of employer in the Conciliation Act, the 
agreement did not cover establishments where only one employee was 
engaged. No Africans were employed in any businesses which served white 
90 
customers, and the number of blacks (in this case, therefore coloureds 
88. Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulations under the South African Wage 
Act", pp 107-108, fn 32. The Pretoria hairdressing trade investi-
gation was also not a supplementary one as claimed by Pursell, 
cf above note 53,~ 31a 
89. The extension of determinations in Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Cape 
Town,Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage were meant to encourage the 
formation of industrial councils 
90. 1929 Wage Board Report, p 36 
and Indians) was uinsignificant u. 91 The Board's recommendation was 
not acted upon by the Minister as the Conciliation Act definition of 
employer was about to be amended. Determination 9, effective from 
January 1928, was cancelled in July 1931 as the wider definition of 
employer made a supplementary investigation of this nature redundant. 92 
To summarize. The supplementary work of the Wage Board between 1926 
and 1930 was pitched at two levels: explicitly providing employment 
opportunities for whites, and regulating wages generally. Sixteen of 
the thirty-four determinations made during the period were supplementary 
to industrial council agreements. In 1930 the Industrial Conciliation 
Act was amended in such a way to permit Industrial Councils to 
regulate the wages of employees not included in the definition of 
employee in the Act. Prior to the amendment the Wage Board had speci-
fically been instructed to determine wages for employees excluded from 
the Conciliation Act, because white workers covered by agreements had 
been dismissed employers could employ non-Conciliation Act 
employees at lower wages that those specified by industrial council 
agreements. The Wage Board's action curtailed the practice. In this 
way the Board was used directly to promote the employment possibilities 
91. Report dated 3 June 1929, ' Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition) 19 July 1929 
92. 1931 Wage Board Report pp 69-70; Report dated 14 February 1938, 
An 165-1938 ii. The 1924 Act defined "employer" as any person or 
group of people who employed two or more employees as defined 
(Act 11-1924, s 24). The 1930 amendment changed this to cover 
employment of uany person" who received remuneration whether in 
kind or in money, or both (Act 24-1930, s 12(a» 
J 
" 
of white workers at the expense of blacks, because the wage 
determinations were practically the same as the agreements and 
employers no longer had legal grounds for employing workers at rates 
lower than those specified in agreements and the supplementary 
determinations .. The racial discriminatory element of the Smuts 
government's Industrial Conciliation Act thus did not of itself 
operate as a promoter or protector of white labour. Its failure to do 
The Act only operated 
as a promoter of white employment when it was brought into the 
civilised labour policy system and was buttressed by the Wage Act. 
The Wage Act, operating on an equal work, equal wage basis in the 
context of South Africa ' s split labour market was used in part as a 
colour bar instrument. 
Davies'S failure to consider the specific role of supplementary 
determi.nations of the Wage Board produced a more r j,gid analysis 
which concentrated merely on the level of wages in the economy as such 
without considering the actual policy involved. Pursell on the other 
," 
hand considered that all supplementary determinations operated exclusively 
to provide jobs for whites in place of blacks. The second aspect of 
Wage Board supplementary activity identified above clearly overturns 
Pursell's notion . 
The experience of the hairdressing trade discussed above93 
indicates that white employment was not the sole, albeit the primary, 
93. cf pp 3J.1f.- 'U. above 
, 
, 
reason for supplementary determinations . The Board determined wages 
for employees who were excluded from the terms of the agreement for 
the indus try. These employees were white as the peculiar nature 
of the trade relegated black labour to cleaning occupations. The 
Board acted to raise the wages of the excluded whites and its action 
was not discriminatory as its reference only covered occupations done 
by whites in the trade . The Board justified its action on the 
grounds that all the employees were white, were ipso facto all drawn 
from the same 'civilised standard' and therefore entitled to a wage 
equal to that denied them by the terms of the industrial council agree-
ment for the trade. 
Supplementary determinations were not the only avenues explored 
by the Board to promote the interests and job opportunities of white 
employees. Before analysing the actual prescription of minimum wages 
by the Board, we turn to examine certain provisions of wage deterrnina-
tion which, when operative, were biased in favour of white employees 
against blacks in general but Africans in particular. The provisions 
included the ratio system, the regulation of apprenticeship and 
training, and the rules covering retrenchment. 
The Wage Board operated three types of ratio. The first controlled 
the number of employees in terms of skill and qualification or occupa-
tiona I wage rate. The second regulated the number of juveniles employed 
per adult employees. The third was a ratio of male to female employees. 
The first type operated in a number of ways. One way was to 
insist on the employment of one qualified employee at a wage of 
either £6 or £5 per week,to not more than three unqualified workers, 
or two unqualified employees and an apprentice, as was the case, for 
94 
example, in the hairdressing trade. A similar provision existed 
for barmen employed in the licensed victuallers' trade. 95 In the 
sweet trade the ratio was operated on the basis of skilled to Grade I 
95 
employees. These latter were predominantly white as 
Grade II employees were classified as largely African workers. 97 
In this way employment opportunities for white semi- and unskilled workers 
were opened up. The Witwatersrand baking trade which operated under a 
suplementary determination had a ratio provision which regulated the 
number of Grade II employees to qualified employees on a one to one 
b . 98 aS1S. 
The s~nd type regulated the number of adults to juveniles. In the 
tea, coffee and chicory trade where the ratio was one qualified employee 
to three unqualified, the system did not work to expectation. As it 
94. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition)6 July 1928; 26 October1928 
95. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 27 July 1928 
96. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 13 July 1928 
97. Acting-Secretary for Native Affairs - Wage Board 26 September 1930 
quoted in An 122-1931, report dated 31 October 1930 cf ch 6 
pp lI,o~fI below 
98. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 12 July 1929; 
27 September 1929 
was a trade which did not require much skill or experience, 
it appears that a number of juveniles were fired when increments 
for ~es were due or when the ratio was reached. 99 
The last type of ratio affected the sexual division of labour . 
Some industries were induced to enploy a specific number of women. 
The sweet trade had to have at least 33% of its labour force female . 
The clothing trade, on the other hand, had to employ at least 40% of 
100 its female labour force over £2.0.0 per week. The recommenda"tion 
for the commercial distributive trade, for example, was altered to 
ensure th . f 1 2 f . I d 101 at a rat10 0 to or women was 1mp emente . The 
Board bewailed the fact that Johannesburg Municipal regulations 
which"in the interests of proper public health control required all 
shops selling milk to conform to certain regulations " were 
invalid . If enacted, each shop would have been required to employ at 
least one white woman. . M,,-"j ~O"Ie..., would have found employment as 
1 02 the Board estimated that 250 shops would have been affected. 
99. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 7 September 1928; 
An 176-1933 ii report no 327 dated 13 April 1933 
100 . An 125-1931, report dated 25 August 1930, and An 469-1931 / 2, 
report dated 18 March 1932, respectively 
101. An 557-1931, report dated 17 March 1931 
102 . An 208-1934, Dairy Produce industry, Report no 343, 21 December 1933 
Although different types of ratio were implemented, they all 
served the same general purpose. By and large the ratio provided 
security for the skilled worker in industry at a time when semi-
skilled operatives were moving into areas formerly occupied or 
dominated by the skilled artisan. It was hoped that the ratio 
would "prevent the employment of learners at the low rates for the 
early stages of their learnership to the exclusion of trained 
employees." The Board wanted to stop or. impede the fairly common 
practice of retrenching workers who qualified for higher wages 
d · hId ' d . . 103 accor ~ng to t e sea es set own 1n eterrn1nat10ns. The Board 
conceded that the provision of higher wages could mean the 
dismissal of superfluous employees. But they discounted the matter 
by urging that most superfluous employees so dismissed by one firm 
would find employment in' other firms which were organised along 
different lines. Any hardship brought to bear in "some isolated 
instances I! was "regrettable" but would be "unavoidable until the 
- - 104 full advantages of wage regulation L was J obtained." 
The Board wanted to ensure that shop owners did not overstaff their 
establishments as the practice led to under-payment of workers, 
inefficiency and ~reated an artificial shortage of labour in other 
areas. The commercial distributive trade ratio was justified on the 
grounds that more women could receive the lower wage brought about 
103. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) November 1927, 
clothing; 1929 Wage Board Report, p 18; 1931 Wage Board Report 
pp 38-9 . Social and Industrial Review, Special El:tition /-By 1927, """"ts 
104. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 March 1929, 
shop assistants 
by the depression as they apparently did not need the higher wage 
105 paid to men. Ratios were needed to stem unfair competition not 
only between employers but also between employees . In the case of 
the former the issue was straight:forward as it was related to the 
wage bill itself. For the latter, provision had to be made for the 
. f h' h d b b d ' h . d 106 protect1on 0 learners W 0 W1S e to ecorne absor e 1n t e 1n ustry. 
In the Native trade the ratio was instituted to prevent women ousting 
men. Not only were women paid lower wages, but the "growth of the 
bazaar system and the gradual disappearance of wholesale firms which 
employed male labour almost exclusivelYJ were accelerating this process" 
h b d · I 107 were y men were 1SP aced. 
All these secondary reasons notwithstanding the main effect of 
the ratio was indicated by Ballinger and Gordon, representatives of 
African employees at the Wage Board investigation of the baking trade 
on the Witwatersrand in 1936 . They refused to entertain the thought 
of a ratio for they "feared that the effect ""'-1ld be a lirnitaticn of the 
number of natives employed." The Board countered with the argument 
that semi-skilled operatives were encroaching on the domain of skilled 
105. An 557-1931, 17 March 1931 cf pp~s.~below where the differences 
between 'civilised' wages for men and women are outlined 
106. Report on the ~t Trade, Durban, 22 December 1937 An 55-1938 ii 
107. Minority report on the Native Trade, no 338, 27 September 1933 
An 211-1934. The'Native trade' included all trade carried on in 
"Native" shops, including Butcheries, as defined by clause 2 of 
the 1923 Transvaal Shop Hours Ordinance. These were shops "in 
on or from which persons other than white persons" were served. 
Eating houses which catered for African needs} as defined in 
item 9 of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Licenses Consoli-
dation ActJ 1925, were also included, as were mining concession 
stores defined in terms of the Transvaal Precious and Base 
Metals Act, 1908 and the Transvaal Trading on Mining Ground 
Regulation Act 1910 cf Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition) 6 September 1929, and An 78-1934 
workers. The consequent insecurity had resulted in a drop in the 
number of apprenticeship contracts. The Board concluded with what 
must be seen as the crucial reason why the ratio system, when enacted, 
would have been racially exclusive: 
The primary object of a ratio is to protect the qualified 
employee and the necessity for such protection varies in 
accordance with the gap between his wage rate and that of 
the unqualified and where ... the gap is great ... the 
need for a ratio is also great. 108 
The racial division of labour, which of necessity pushed blacks down 
the wage scale and whites up in a relative relationship, the wide 
wage gap and the identification of skilled or qualified with white, 
clearly meant that the ratio was to be used to protect, in the 
final instanoe,white employees in general but white skilled employees 
in particular. 
The Wage Board approached the question of apprentices and juveniles 
from two angles. Apprenticeship and youth advancement could operate 
to provide employment for whites generally. Secondly, the employment 
of apprentices and juveniles was strictly controlled to prevent the 
proliferation of cheap, or younger labour at the expense of adult 
labour. The Board in effect attempted to encourage juvenile and 
apprentice labour when it functioned as training and the creation of 
108. Report on the Baking and Confectionary trade, Witwatersrand, 
22 December 1937 An 56-1938 ii 
better qualified workers, and to eliminate it when it functioned as 
cheap labour. 
From the time of its first investigations the Wage Board urged 
that lief forts should be made to introduce an apprenticeship system under 
which youths could be properly trained." They could then produce the 
k 'll d k f h f 'h 'If 1 09 s ~ e wor ers 0 t e uture ~n t e country ~tse . The Board 
constantly complained about the inattention paid to the proper training 
f t ' 110 o appren lces. Although the Board remarked that employees of 
different race groups ought to earn the same wage if they did the 
111 
same work" it was aware that the Apprenticeship Act itself was 
inherently discriminatory. The Act practically excluded everyone but 
whites and a few coloureds because of the education requirement in the 
Act which operated against people of colour. Even if coloureds and 
Indians did manage to attain standard six within the age limit required 
by the Act the Beard was not optimistic about their chances beyond 
school. Technical college facilities IIsuch as are required by 
Apprenticeship Committees" generally were lacking for members of 
109. 
11 O. 
111. 
Report on the Biscuit making trade, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) September 1926. cf ch 1 pp'4-~above for a 
general discussion of juvenile labour in the Union 
Reports on the Biscuit making trade, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) September 1926; Furniture trade, Social and Indus-
trial Review (Special Edition) December 1926, report dated 20 Novv-
ember 1926; Clothing trade, Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition) November 1927 
Report on the Clothing trade, Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) November 1927 
11 2 those groups. Attempts by the Board to encourage and facilitate 
the provision and regulation of juvenile/ apprenticed labour can thus 
be seen as consciously discriminatory action. 
The Board thought that there were teo many juveniles employed 
in the furniture trade . It urged that a limitation of their numbers 
. 1 113 
was "essent~a ". As the industrial council agreement for the 
trade did not cover those employees indentured under the Apprentice-
ship Act, a great many apprentices were employed as a source of cheap 
114 labour. A considerable reduction in the number of apprentices in 
the furniture trade occurred between 1930 and 1932 as a result of the 
W B d d t . . 115 age oar e erm1nat10n. Similar reductions took place in the 
t ff d h . k . d 11 6 ea, co ee an C 1cory pac 1ng tra e. Some industries like 
baking and confectionery, the meat . trade , clothing and bespoke 
tailoring were considered trades in which more apprentices could be 
117 
employed. Again , whether the numbers of apprentices increased or 
decreased according to the particular needs of different trades, it was 
112. 
113. 
114. 
11 5. 
116. 
117. 
Report on the Engineering trade, report dated 30 April 1934 
An 914-1934 
Report on the Furniture trade, dated 20 November 1926, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) December 1926 
1931 Wage Board Report, p 44, report dated 16 June 1930 An 113-1931 
Report dated 14 October 1932 , An 247-1933 
Report dated 6 April 1933 An 68-1933 ii; Minority report dated 
13 April 1933 An 176-1933 ii 
Reports on Baking and Confectionery trade, 22 December 1937 
An 56-1938 ii; Meat tradeJ 21 December 1933, An 307-1934; 
22 December 1937 An 55 - 1938 ii; Clothing trade Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) November 1927; Bespoke Tailoring trade , 
Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 22 June 1928 
o 
i 
recognised that the employees so employed would, by and large, be whites. 
The Board included a clause in the supplementary recommendations 
for the furniture trade which attempted to regulate retrenchment 
policies. The Board did not accept the normal policy of 'last 
, 
employed , first fired. In the event of necessary retrenchment due to 
slackness of trade , but not disciplinary reasons, the Board considered 
that the "last employees to be dismissed shall be those earning the 
118 higher rate of wages." Clearly, this policy would have affected 
Africans especially as they operated for the larg~part in the lower wage 
bracket. This appears to have only affected the furniture trade,.but 
a system related to the question of certificates of service affected 
all industries covered by scales of wages. A typical certificate of 
service had to be given to all juvenile and apprenticed employees, 
but not including Grade II employees who were, as noted, predominantly 
Africans, when they left their employment. The certificate had to 
show "the full name, address, age, occupation, rate of pay, and 
actual wage paid, together with the dates of the employees' entering 
and leaving his {-the employer'sJ service . " Juvenile applicants for work 
whether black or white, could be employed only in Grade II work if they 
did not have ei~ . · a certificate of service, or a special permit from 
119 
an inspector of labour . The purpose of the system was twofold: 
to protect the positions of employees other than GradeII employees, 
already engaged in the industry, and to enable juvenile whites to find 
118. cf Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) December 1926, 
May 1927 
119. Report on the Sweet trade, Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition) September, 1927 
employment in Grade II occupations which were predominantly filled 
by semi~or unskilled black workers. In this way they could then 
get a foothold in a particular industry ., 
The interes~of white employees were looked after in a number of 
ways. Supplementary determinations propped up industrial council 
agreements by preventing employers using labour excluded from the terms 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act at cheaper rates. This system 
lasted until 1930 when the Conciliation Act was amended . Three other 
methods were used throughout the period under review to promote white 
employment. Three ratio systems were used for the general purpose of 
protecting qualified or skilled workers' occupations from encroachment 
by semi-skilled or under-qualified operatives at lower rates ; . White 
skilled workers were also protected against white semi-skilled in this 
way, but the main thrust of the ratio was to provide places of employ-
ment for unskilled and semi-skilled white workers . Apprenticeship 
was encouraged for the training benefits which apprentices underwent 
but only where it did not involve the use of cheap labour to undercut 
higher paid workers . The provisions of the Apprenticeship Act which 
controlled the practice were themselves racially discriminatory and thus 
promotion of apprenticeship ensured further discrimination against 
blacks in general but Africans in particular . Ihat least one instance 
the lowest paid employees were to be retrenched before higher paid 
workers, regardless of the length of time they had been employed. 
Lastly, the entry of juveniles into occupations other than those. 
largely occupied by Africans was dependent on the production of a 
. 
• 
certificate of service which provided details of the applicant's 
name, age, rate of pay and the like. All of these measures, 
operating on a racially divided labour force with whites concentrated 
in the skilled positions and Africans dominant in unskilled work, 
served to accentuate and promote further the division along racial 
lines. 
We need, finally, to examine the actual determinations themselves, 
in order to ascertain the extent to which the regulation of wages itself 
acted in a discriminatory way, and to see in what form that discrimina-
tion occurred. 
Pursell per,functorily remarked that the establishment of "a rate 
for semi-skilled workers of say R7-00 L-E3.10.0?~ per week in 1929 
would probably effectively exclude the native from this position" 
b f ,. ( 'l) . d d" 1 20 ecause 0 the preva111ng raC1a customs an tra 1t10ns. Pursell 
did not examine the skilled/unskilled differential, nor the implement-
ation of regulated wages for the period 1926-1937. He specifically 
concentrated on the period 1937-1966 to show how the Board operated 
t l ' f Af' 121 o 'up 1 t' r1can wages. Rob Davies went further in his analysis 
of the sweet manufacturing industry to show, briefly, that the wage 
differentiation was based rather on functions within the labour 
120 . Pursell, D "Minimum Wage Regulation in South Africa" p 108 note 32 
1 21 . ibid, pp 11 0 -111 
process than on a racial division per se. He argued that this was 
done to penalise "those capitals employing production processes in 
which lower paid Africans ~orkedllJ especially semi-skilled occupa-
, f" h 'k 'II d 122 t10ns preferred or wh1tes 1e. t e sem1-S 1 e areas. A more 
detailed analysis is necessary to produce a more complete picture 
than that provided by Pursell and Davies. The actual process whereby 
Africans, for example male adults J were ousted in favour of white male 
juveniles and white female adults can be identified. Connected to 
this process is the division of labour between male and female employees 
or) in other words/of the sexual discrimination encouraged in the work 
place . A better idea of the actual economic position of South Africa's 
workers during the period can be obtained. It must further be 
remembered that determinations did not always provide 'civilised' wages 
for all workers. Thus more careful consideration ought to be given 
CP-(.I'\. o..J .... a....t.ec.t 
to the arguments J that wage determinations acted deleteriously on 
, d 123 l.n ustry. 
The Wage Board reported most often that it could not recommend a 
'civilised' wage for all employees included in the Minister's reference 
to it. In terms of the Wage Act the Board had to await further 
instructions from the Minister of Labour before it could act. In 
many instances the Minister simply dropped the matter but in others 
he instructed the Board to recommend wages which it IIdeemed fit." 
This type of reference enabled the Wage Board to recommend 'civilised' 
wages for some employees and to set 'uncivilised' wages for other 
122. Davies, R ~C;.;a"p:.;l.:.' t:.a:::.=l.!.,-.::So:t::a!.t=:e=-~a;!;n~d~Wh~l.!.' .!:t~e'-..!:L~a!.!b~o~u:!;r~, pp 219-220 
123. 
employees. Thus, workers who received higher wages were protected 
from undercutting by other workers and employers were not necessarily 
bound to accept large increases in their wage bill. Such regulation 
could and did ensure that the higher notches on the salary scale 
became more predominantly white preserves, and the lower reaches 
became predominantly African, with coloureds and Indians squeezed into 
the middle. The racial division of labour was better regulated, con-
trolled and entrenched. 
To see how this procedure was followed and the results obtained, 
we need first and foremost to identify what the Board meant when it 
spoke about wages upon which people could live at civilised standards 
of life. The first thing to note is that the Board decided upon two 
di£ferent standards of a civi.lisEd wage, one for men and one for women. 
In the case of an adult male it was defined as the wage which enabled 
him "to maintain himself and his wife and family with a reasonable degree 
of comfort according to European standards II. An adult woman's wage was 
classified as civilised if she could Ilmaintain herself according to 
. . d d hi' 124 European standards wl.thout bel.ng epen ent upon er re at1ves." 
In common with the norms of the day, then, the Board saw the male 
as the family breadwinner at all times, whilst women at best were 
independent uni ts of families whose wages were .'''' t!t.'\Y\(:- +" e"'SC'/~ 
The way was thus clear to entrench the practice of 
female discrimination in the work place. It appears that the Board 
did not alter its view significatly on this issue even during the 
Depression when women were supporting their families when the men were 
124. This is the most specific definition of what the Board considered 
to be 'civilised wages' to be found in the Wage Board Reports. 
Report on the Furniture Inudstry, 18 January 1928, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) February 1928 p 20. 
, " 
125 
unemployed . 
The 1928 investigation into the hairdressing trade in Pretoria 
provides the necessary data to determine what wage the Board thought 
" "1 " d 126 was a C1V1 1se one. Because the Board did not report to the 
contrary, it can be assumed that the wages it recommended were 'civi-
1 " d 127 1se 'wages. The Pretoria statements are important because they re-
present specific numerative comments about civilised wages in the 
Board's reports at hand. Employees with less than six years 
employment in the trade were classified as unqualified workers by 
the Board. It recommended a wage of £4.10.0 per week for 
unqualified males and £2 . 10.0 per week for female employees. Owing " 
to pressure from employers. and its own fears of causing trade dis-
location the Board suspended the top wage and permitted payment at 
lower rates, increased at intervals during the suspended period until 
the wage ceiling was reached. Under this latter scheme males would 
receive £3.10.0, rising to £4.0 . 0 or to the £4.10.0 minimum; females 
would rise from £1.15.0, through £2.2.6 until they reached their 
125. cf ch 1 pp f~ above 
126. 
127. 
Report dated 14 May 1928 Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition), 13 July 1928 
cf for, example,Report dated 19 December 1927 Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) January 1928 
" 
minimum of £2.10.0 . The Board specifically claimed that the wages 
' d ' d d 'd ' '1 ' d 128 pa~ dur1ng the suspen e per10 were not C1V1 1se wages. 
Other remarks made by the Board indicate further what it 
considered a civilised wage and what it did not . It remarked that 
males could not live in a civilised manner on £3.0.0 per week, but 
that the strictures of the conditions of the various trades concerned 
129 prevented them from raising the wage. The ICU claim on behalf of 
certain Durban municipal employees for £8 per month was not acted 
upon because it was "not sufficient" for civilised standards of 
1 " 1 30 l.V1ng. Furthermore, in one engineering establishment more 
whites were employed at an average of £3.6 . 0 to £3.8.0, not because 
that was a civilised wage but because of lithe insistence of the 
131 Department of Labour." Attempts by the Port Elizabeth Milling 
Employees' Union, a registered coloured union, for a minimum wage 
were thwarted because they fell below "civilised standards".132 
1 28. 
129. 
Report dated 14 May 1928 Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition) 13 July 1928 
Clothing trade, report,28 September 1927, Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition), November 1927; Furniture making, report) 
18 January 1928, Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
Feburary 1928; Catering trade, report) 12 September 1930, An 159-1931 
130. Report dated 13 May 1929, An 111-1929 11; 1931 Wage Board Report 
pp 100-101. cf ch 6, PP~I#~ below for a detailed discussion of the 
Wage Boardls leu investigation. 
131. Report dated 30 April 1934, An 914-1934 
132 . Report dated 6 August 1930, An 162-1931; 1931 Wage Board Report p103 
\ 
Unskilled employees in Bloemfontein received a minimum of 3/6 per day, 
later reduced to £1 per week, after "due regard!! had been taken of the 
civilised standards clause in the Act. 133 This in effect meant that 
because African unskilled workers supposedly lived below civilised 
standards they did not need a higher wage. But white workers were also 
determined wages below what the Board considered sufficient to live in 
a civilised manner. 
It is clear that during the Board's early years to 1933, wi th a 
possible exception during the depression discussed below, a fairly 
Eo 
definite idea of what constfbted civilised wages existed. To 
summarize: the civilised minimum for adult males was £4.10.0 per 
week and for adult females,£2.10.0. In their majority reports on 
the tea, coffee and chicory trades, Lucas and Roberts declared that 
the Board had "always held" that the female civilised minimum was £2 
134 per week. The evidence cited above would indicate that this was 
not quite the case. It is possible that such a statement was made to 
counteract Van der Horst's report which urged that a wage of £1.10.0 
135 
was sufficient to attract more white women to the trade. Whatever 
the case, the Board's more precise statements indicate the civilised 
wage as that set out above. 
Lucas's Wage Board was not re-appointed in 1935. When the Wage 
Act was amended in 1937, McGregor, Windsor and Botha were not immediately 
133. 
134. 
1 35 . 
Reports dated 30 May and 29 October 1928 in Social and Industrial 
Review (Special Edition) 29 June and 16 November 1928 respectively. 
Majority reports, no's 325 and 331, dated 13 April and 26 August 
1933, Ans 175-1933ii; 144-1934 respectively. 
Minority report no 327, 13 April 1933, An176-1933ii. 
136 
replaced. Their thoughts on what constituted a civilised wage are 
not contained in any of their pre-1937 reports, but only in reports 
issued under the new Act. The 1937 Act removed the civilised wage 
clause which stipulated that the Board had to await further instructions 
from the minister if it could not recommend civilised wages for all 
employees included in the initial reference. It was replaced by 
a section that required the Board merely to indicate in its reports 
which IIclass or classes of employees" received civilised wages according 
. . 1 d · 137 to ~t5 part~cu ar recommen at~ons. It is important to note that 
wages stipulated for the higher paid worker did not necessarily indicate 
the minimum civilised wage. The Board's recommendations provided 
for relative levels of civilised wages. For example, in the hair-
dressing trade both the £2.10.0 minimum for a manicurist and the 
£6.10.0 for a ~ied hairdresser in the ladies' trade were 
1 . f · d · · 1 . d 138 c aSS1 1e as C1V1 1se • Manicurists were overwhelmingly female, 
and the recommendation thus fell into line with the schema of the 
early Board. Female hairdressers in the ladies' trade would receive 
£4.0.0 per week, as opposed to £6.10.0 for males. The same wage of 
£6.5.0 for males and female hairdressers in the gentlemen's trade 
was also stipulated. The lowest wage classified as civilised in 
trades other than hairdressing was £3.0.0 for vehicle drivers and gut 
136. cf ch 3, ppn7-f above 
137 . Act 44-1937, s 6(b) 
138. Report No 398, recommendation 399, 10 March 1937 An 165-1938ii 
classifiers 139 in the meat trade. Whereas the previous Board 
140 had added the relative concept of II reasonable degrees of comfort", 
the later Board conce.cied in one instance that "the figure £3.17.6 per 
141 
week represents a bare living on the so-called civilised standard. 1I 
It would appear, therefore, that the rvtic:n of a civilised wage remained 
fairly constant during the whole period under review, except that it 
was easier to suggest wages at fractionally higher levels after the 
depression than before. This will become cl~ from the analysis of 
selected determinations to which we now turn. 
Before attempting to analyse the available statistics to determine 
how the civilised labour policy operated, a few cautionary comments 
need to be made. 
First we need to be clear on the difference between the dismissal 
and displacement of employees. The former refers to normal retrench-
ment, resultant from structural pressures, or the dismissal of employees, 
regardless of race per se. to effect cost saving or because of redun-
dancy through mechanisation. Displacement refers to the process where-
by one group of employees is displaced in favour of another group, 
either black or white, male or female, highly paid, lower paid. As 
139. 
140. 
141. 
Report no 392, recommendation 393, 22 December 1937, An 55-1938ii 
Report on the Furniture trade dated 18 January 1928, Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) February 1928 
Report no 373 dated 9 December 1936 Motor driving occupation, 
An 138-1937 
we are concerned here with the racial and sexual breakdown within 
industry, any consideration of the ratio between different groups of 
employees needs to be based on the racial breakdown of the industry 
as a whole. Thus, for example, if the number of white male juveniles 
employed in a particular wage bracket increases during the enforcement 
of a determination it is instructive to consider either at whose expense 
they are employed or the relative percentage increase in employment 
of the groups involved. 
Secondly, although it was argued above that wage determinations 
were structured to promote white employment, it needs now to be shown 
as far as possible the actual extent to which it occurred. A number 
of factors need to be taken into account. The wage prescribed did not 
necessarily equal the wage paid. Determinations were not consistently 
followed by employers: exemptions, evasions, the provision of inter-
mediate wage scales in certain instances, collusion between employers 
and employees, court invalidations of determinations and ineffective 
inspections, all operated against the aims of the civilised labour 
policy. Whereas it is possible to arrive at definite conclusions 
for some trades, at the general level only certain tendencies can be 
identified, which in the absence of contrary evidence, appear valid. 
Three trades have been selected as representative of three main 
types of investigation and determination. The baking and confectionery 
trade on the witwatersrand and in Pretoria represents supplementary 
determinations, because of the different results obtained in the two 
areas. It was noted above that the Pretoria trade succeeded in 
increasing the number of whites in the trade whereas the witwatersrand 
trade did not experience as remarkable an increase. The sweet 
industry illustrates the case of general determinations like the tea, 
coffee and chicory trade, or the baking trade in areas outside the 
Transvaal which were not covered by supplementary determinations. 
These various trades represent the group in which greater white 
employment was ensured through the operation of determinations. 
Lastly, the dyeing, cleaning and laundry trade represents trades in 
which no marked changes took place in the racial division of labour 
because they were not specifically ear-marked as suitable for white 
employmen t. The laundry trade illustrates the general tendency for 
determinations to increase the number of white workers employed at 
slightly higher wages during the period as a whole. 
The Wage Board set fairly uniform wages for labourers or 
unskilled workers. These tended to fluctuate between £1 and £1.4.0 
142 per week. It will be recalled that this wage bracket fell far 
below the civilised wage for white male adults. One result of the 
142. ego Det 50 Furni ture trade £1 .4. a 
Oet 48 Sweets £1.4. a 
Oet 45 Glass Bevelling & Silvering £1 .4. a 
Det 43 Laundry, Dyeing & Cleaning £1. 2.6 
Det 19 Tea , Coffee, Chicory £1 .2. a 
Oet 14 Leather £1 .2. a 
Det 25 Unskilled employees £1 . O. a 
Oet 46 Textiles £1 . O. a 
cf Minority Report, Native Trade, An 211-1934 
regulation of unskilled rates was to decrease the number of employees 
employed for less than the £1 per week and to increase thenumber who 
143 
received up to E2 per week. Within this general classification, 
a number of points can be stressed. The example of the baking trade is 
instructive . Whilst in both areas the number of African male adults 
decreased in the below £1 bracket, the number s increased in the next 
bracket on the Witwatersrand where the determination was not operating 
satisfactorily, whilst in Pretoria that number decreased. The latter 
trend was due to the fact that white male juveniles were used to 
displace African male adults in the wage bracket normally reserved for 
f ' lab 144 A r1can our. The actual divide in wage terms appears to have been 
£1.5.0 per week, with whites displacing blacks above this level in 
Pretoria and more whites as well as Africans being employed at this 
145 
rate on the Rand . In both areas the percentage of the workforce 
employed below E1 per week dropped by approximately half, and increased 
likewise above that limit. 146 
\ 
As alrea:ly 'noticed, the number of whites 
' employed in place of blacks rose more dramatically in Pretoria than on 
, 147 
the Rand. The area in which such displacement took place was in 
the wage bracket normally reserved for GradeII or African employees. 
Their places were taken by white male juveniles who were then given a 
foothold in the industry. It must be noted that this displacement was 
143. Table 4, p lfq below 
144. Table Si, p ~('r below 
145. Table Sii, p Y!' below 
146 . Table 5i p \'~r below 
14'7. Table 1 pll(1f below 
" 
not a natural phenomenon per s e : it depended to a large ex tent 
on employer co-operation, thus its relative success and failure in two 
areas covered by determinations. The available representative figures 
also indicate that the number of white males in higher wage bracke ts 
also increased. Pretoria numbers increased in the £5 - £5.19 . 11 
bracket most markedly. whilst on the Rand the bracket which showed the 
greatest increase was from £4 - £4 . 19 . 11 . Similarly the number 
declined in the £2 - £2.19.11 and £3 - £3 . 19.11 brackets on the Rand 
and in Pretoria respectively. Employees of other race groups rose 
1 , h 1 th 1 th d b d d ' ,1 48 ever so s 19 t Y up e sca e on e Ran ut roppe 1n Pretor1a. 
One other notable feature about the baking trade in these areas was the 
negligible number of women employed during the periood. 
The sweet determinations for the Union are more difficult to 
monitor. The Union was divided in t o four districts until 1933 and 
these were distinguished not by province or geographical prox imity but 
by the nature of the trade in the different centres. Thus the 
Witwatersrand and Pretoria formed one district , Uitenhage and Worcester 
th h ' 1 hI' k d ' 1 " 'b 1 49 ano er, W 1. st Gra amstown was 1.n e te, . l.nter a l.aJ . .. Pl.etermarl.tz urg. 
Recommended wage rates were higher in the Witwatersrand/ Pretoria complex, 
148. 
149. 
Table SUi, p~below 
The districts were : A: the municipal areas of Krugersdorp , Roode-
peart, Maraisburg, Johannesburg, Germiston, Brakpan, Benoni, 
Boksburg, Springs and Pretoria. B: municipal areas of Durban, East 
London, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, Simonstown, Kimberley and Bloem-
fontein. C: Pietermaritzburg, Kingwil Iiams town , Grahamstown, 
Wellington, Paarl, Stellenbosch. Pinetown Public Health Committee 
Area. (Pietermaritzburg was moved into category B in 1930). 
D: Uitenhage and Worcester. Table 6~ pp~'lbelow provides a break-
down of the approximate percentage of the total labour force of the 
sweet industry in the Union. 
and were lower elsewhere; the last two categories which represented 
the smallest section of the country'~ trade being the lowest. The 1932 
recommendations scrapped the district divisions and laid down uniform 
rates for the Union as a whole. The determination which followed was 
'1' ' t "f d' "A d t' 150 more ~n ~ne Wl h the provlsl0ns a lV1510n recommen a 10ns. 
Grade II employees were to receive between £1 . 0.0 and £1.4.0 per week 
depending on districts; sweetmakers from £5 . 10.0 to £6.10.0 and 
Grade I male employees, £2.8.0 - £3.0.0 and females £1 . 12.0 - £2.2.6, 
'd d' ,,151 agaln epen lng on the dlstrlcts.- The 1932 alteration involved a 
minimum of £1.4.0 for labourers, £1.10.0 for general workers, £3 for 
assistant sweetmakers and £6 per week for sweetmakers. This represented 
a fairly rigid demarcation of wages in the industry. Unfortunately 
the a \8ilable figures denoting wage ceilings arrl the rrari:ers employed do not 
indicate regional or district differences. Two main features never-
theless can be identified. First, white women dominated the labour 
. 152 
force, and second, the large percentage of coloured people, again 
mostly women, involved in the trade was due to the dominance of the 
Cape, and especially the Peninsula area, in the sweet trade itself. 153 
The number of skilled employees in the sweet trade did not alter 
dramatically during the period 1926-1932. On average, the wages of 
skilled employees rose quite substantially, the most dramatic increase 
150. cfSocial and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 13 July 1928; 
Recommendation dated 25 August 1930, An 125-1931 and Recommendation 
dated 15 December 1932 An 333-1933 
151. 
152. 
153. 
ibid 
Table 6ii, plj(.'l..below 
Table 6i, P below. The Cape Peninsula itself repr~ented 
51.62%; 43.20~; 42.29% and 38.05% of the labour force in 1926, 
1928, 1930 and 1932 respectively. The decline from 47.16% in 1926 
to 32.47% in 1932 in the total percentage of coloureds employed 
reflects the declining dominance of the Peninsula. An 112-1933 
being in the £6 - £6.19.11 bracket. The figures indicate that the 
£6 minimum did not become the maximum wage and that a fairly sub-
stantial number of skilled employees received weekly wages above that 
level. White adult males dominated the skilled ranks, although a 
few coloureds did rise in the ranks as well. It can be noted that no 
154 Africans or Indians were regarded as skilled employees. 
African was included in the skilled category in 1932. 155 
Only one 
In unskilled work, the number of people employed for less that £1 
per week decreased for all race groups, except that in 1930 the number 
of coloureds employed in this category had increased by 5%.156 This 
latter increase resulted from the employment of more coloured females, 
both adults and juveniles, at just less than £1 per week. Their wages 
157 
were set at a minimum of 18/ - in the district which included the Cape. 
Wages were generally pushed above the £1 minimum after 1926, but the 
number of whites employed above the level increased at a greater rate 
than 158 other race groups. The lower rates for juveniles, both male and 
female, were set between 16/- starting rate and a ceiling of £2.10.0. 
In the £1 to £1.19.11 br.acket, the most dramatic increase occurred 
among white female juveniles, coloured female adults and juveniles J 
and African male adults. This latter group represented mainly Grade II 
employees . By 1930 the white females took the lead whilst coloured 
154. Table 6iii p ft'3 below 
155. An 112-1933. The report does not split skilled workers into their 
respective wage categories. 
156. Table 6iv pllLlf below 
157. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 13 July 1928. 
Table 6v JOb'f below 
158. Table 6i v p Ii'I( below 
, 
) 
women dropped back slightly. It is clear that coloured women in 
general lost out to white women at a time when the group as a whole 
decreased in proportion to the 1928 figure and other brackets as a 
159 percentage of the whole. White adult women came to dominate the 
£2 - £2.14.11 bracket as well due to a policy of increased employ-
160 
mente In this industry as well we can conclude that displacement of 
black employees (in this case coloured) in favour of whites (in the 
form of women, both juveniles and adults) took place in the lower wage 
scales f scales which normally were considered to be labourers wages. 
The dyeing, cleaning and laundry trade can be commented on very 
briefly. The operation of the wage determination did not_ promote 
161 the employment of whites to any remarkable extent. Nevertheless 
white employment increased by 72% between 1926 and 1937 and black 
employment by 37% for the same period. 162 Determination 43 superseded 
the 1928 determination in July 1932 and lowered the minimum wages. 
Those wages remained in force right up until the end of the period. 
The average wage for white adult males was £4.8.8 per week, for 
white adult women £1.17.0 and between £1.7.7 and £1.13.6 for the other 
race groups. Seven percent of the workers received less than £1.2.6, 
the scheduled minimum, and the majority of Africans received less than 
159. Table 6v p 4'( below 
160. Table 6vi ~below 
161. Table 7i p~7below 
162. Report of the wage Board dated 23 July 1938 An 246-1938ii 
E1.S . 0. The vast majority of whites earned E1.10 . 0 and over. 
Even though the Board expressed surprise to discover that the number 
of whites increased, they were employed mostly in supervisory or 
clerical posts, whilst Africans and the majority of other blacks 
were employed as ironers, washers, mangle hands and labourers. The 
racial division of labour operated effectively in this trade even 
though wages all round were ~eagre. Whites tended to move into the 
higher wage brackets and blacks dominated the lower brackets, and in 
163 
some cases actually crept down the ladder. 
The analysis of the three representative industries above 
reveals a number of interesting points. Firstly, increased white 
employment did take place but its form differed in different 
trades. White male juveniles mostly replaced Africans in the 
baking trade in the Transvaal, white women, and to a lesser extent 
coloured women, encroached in the sweet trade and increased white 
employment occurred in the dyeing trade in supervisory posts as 
opposed to manual tasks. Regional variations are also detectable: 
the different success rates in the operation of determinations between 
Pretoria and the Reef, and the regional differences in the labour force's 
constituticn in the sweet industry, for example, are instructive. At 
the beginning of the civilised labour policy period, the employment of 
whites met with varying degrees of success. In the Transvaal it was 
reported that white employment was increasing apace, especially in 
163. Table 7ii ~below 
food industries. In the Western Cape, on the other hand, cheaper 
tlack labour was still preferred due to the influx of Africans into 
the area and the subsequent increased competition from lower paid 
workers. Developments were slower in the eastern Cape and were even 
164 
slower in Natal. In the years that followed, the Chief Inspector 
of Factories reported that industrial agreements and wage determinations 
were influencing the steady increase in white employment throughout the 
. 165 Un~on. No changes in the pattern were reported during the depression 
and the evidence suggests that displacement continued during 1932 and 
166 
after. White employment increased at the rate of nearly 60% in 
the sweet industry between 1926 and 1932. The increase was 68% and 
65% in the baking trade on the Reef and in Pretoria respectively, and 
135% in the clothing industry (other than Pretoria and the Reef) 
between 1926 and 1931. 167 The rate of growth in the white labour 
sector appears to have slackened after 1932. In the Baking trade on 
the Witwatersrand for the period 1926-1936 white employment increased 
by 41% as compared to blacks at 26%. Total employment had increased 
by 25% from 1928 and 26% from 1926_1936. 168 Similarly in the textile 
industry for the Union, white and black employment increased at 74.9% 
and 74% respectively between 1932 and 1936 although whites still 
164. Department of Labour, Factories Division, Report for 1924, 
UG 21-1926, p 501 
165. Department of Labour, Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories 
UG 31-1927 pp 7-8; UG 38-1928, pp7-8; UG 47-1929, P 6 
166. Department of Labcur, Factories Division, Reports of the Chief 
Inspector of Factories UG 33-1930 pp 9-10; UG 24-1931, P 8. 
Department of Labour Annual Reports for 1932 and 1933, UG 37-1933 
P 25 and UG 43-1934 P 13 respectively 
167. Figures derived from Table 8i pllJ,~ below 
168. Report dated 22 December 1937, An 56-1938ii, cf Table 8ii p~~below 
169 
commandeered 55\ of the total labour market . 
But having said this, we need to recall that the regulation of 
wages in particular industries was not the only factor which encouraged 
increased whi te arpl'¥T""flt. In the East Cape in particular, it was 
publicised policy of certain companies, including the motor manufacturers, 
" 170 
to employ whites exclus~vely. But the regulation of wages was also 
influential in that region. 171 Similarly the expansion of some trades 
such as the clothing trade in the Western Cape absorbed large numbers 
f h ' 172 o W l.te women~ As noted in chapter 1, better working conditions 
such as the provision of rest rooms, seating, better ventilation, 
holiday pay and the like, were factors which came to assume greater 
importance in the minds of employers during the period 1925-37. 
Those employers who wanted to employ whites as a matter of prejudice, 
policy, securing of government contracts or tariff protection, did not 
always succeed. opposition from African and Coloured employees com-
pelled at least two employers to abandon their attempts to employ whites 
in Durban and Johannesburg respectively. Again this type of opposi-
ticn was not always successful, as one employer was liable to overcome the 
resistance of his native employees and introduced Europeans into his 
173 factory . " Other aspects of worker reaction to the civilised 
169. 
170. 
171. 
172 • 
Wage Board Report dated ~ ~ 19~ An46-1937. cf Table 8ii 
p Ino below. 
Department of Labour, Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories, 
UG 31-1927, P 7; UG 38-1928, p7; UG 47-1929, P 6 
Department of Labour , Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories, 
UG 47-1929, P 6 
Department of Labour, Report of the Chief Inspector 
UG 38-1928, P 8, Department of Labour Annual Report 
UG 37-1933, pp 24-25 
of Factories, 
for 1932, 
173. Report by the Wage Board, Glass Bevelling and Silvering,dated 
16 April 1931. An 708- 1931 
labour policy were dealt with in chapter one. 
To summarize: the regulation of wages and the relative improve-
ment of working conditions encouraged whites to enter employment they 
had otherwise rejected and employers, for a number of reasons centred 
upon their own interests,were prepared to employ the more costly whites. 
The tendency for whites to replace blacks, especially Africans, was 
more marked before the depression than after. Wages were set at 
such levels that African adult males and females were brought into 
closer competition with white male and female juveniles. COmpeti-
tion was also intensified between adult whites entering the trades and 
black adults already employed in the trades. The reasons why whites 
won through were several: white unions had more bargaining muscle 
than black unions; the white labour movement was itself divided on 
the issue of the merits of industrial legislation and on the merits 
of the necessary organisation of black workers. It was only during 
the 1930s that the concept of a black consumer class took root and thus 
necessitated the greater employment of blacks. Not least the unequal 
competition for skills, and education between whites and blacks 
affected the trend. The benefits of a split labour market for economic 
stability and organisation, spiced with an adequate quantity of pre-
judice, ensured that white labour with its political voice won through. 
Underpinning this structure was the system of coercion. Those 
members of the working class who did not kow tow to the whims of the 
larger state, fell under the Riotous Assemblies Act, the strike 
prevention clauses of the Conciliation Act, the Masters and Servants 
A d th . d'" b f 174 ct an e NatI.ve A m.l.n.l.strat.l.on Act, to name ut a ew. To 
complete our picture, we turn in the next chapter to plot the direct 
application of the Wage Act to Africans. 
174. cf ch 1 above 
CHAPTER 6 'l11a direct application of tha Wag-a Act to Africans 
as unskilled workers 
We have from time to time throughout this study touched on the 
relation of the policies of the Wage Board to Africans in general. 
We come finally to a closer investigation of the problem . 
The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union gave qualified 
support to the Wage Act. In April 1925 at their fifth annual 
conference and the third African Labour Congress in Johannesburg 
delegates welcomed the Wage Bill in principle, but protested at the 
exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers who formed a large 
part of the ICU membership. 1 In 1927 Kadalie expressed the opinion 
that the Wage Board had made it difficult for white workers to 
claim that Africans were a danger because of their ability to under-
cut whites in the labour market. "If the Pact Government had done 
any good thing for the workers" he said, !lit was the institution of 
this Wage Board". 2 Kadalie's faith in the good offices of both the 
Board and the Pact Government does not appear to have been marred by 
the fact that the Select Committee on the Wage Bill refused to 
receive the ICU delegation. Instead they protested to W F Beyers, 
1. Kcdalie, C My Life p 75 . Wickins, P The Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union of S·outh Africa (hereafter The ICU) p 87 
2. Report of speech to Annual Conference, April 1927 . Workers'Herald 
17 May 1927. Wickins, ibid p 138 
Minister of Mines and Industries, about the proposed amendments to 
the 1911 Mines and Works Act and submitted a memorandum based on 
conference resolutions to the Committee. 3 Kadalie's 1927 address, 
based on the assumption of Government good faith, called on 
Provincial Secretaries to "stand out and demand a rise in wages in 
their different centres_,,4 The 1928 Economic and Political Programme 
of the ICU, though mainly concerned with agricultural issues, included 
the outline of a stra~ to fulfil the task of getting higher wages. 
The marketing of the Board was to be invoked only after all other 
approaches and negotiations with "employers, employers' organisation and 
farmers' associations II had failed. 5 
Kadalie's moderation was approved by interested liberals who 
operated largely within the new institutions formed in the 1920s . 
These bedies included the SAIRR, the joint councils and the liberal 
, 't ' 6 un~vers~ 1es. Their liberalism was an n'incorporationist' liberalism 
7 
conceived for controlling black workers. ~' The Johannnesburg Joint 
Council urged the Department of Labour and Native Affairs to encourage 
3. Workers' Herald 28 April 1926. Wickens ibid p 88 
4. Workers' Herald 17 May 1927, Wickins ibid p 133 
5. Workers' Herald 12 May 1928. Wickins ibid p 156 
6. Bozzoli J B (ed) The Political Nature of a Ruling Class p 189 
7. ibid, P 212 
and accede to applications to the Board "wherever possible." The 
Council stressed the necessity that "non-European workers", but 
particularly Africans, "should find hope of redress for their 
grievances in constitutional methods of wage adjustment." The 
Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts provided the machinery whereby 
the wage gap between black and white could be softened, "without any 
8 
upheaval" .. 9 Ethelreda Lewis, Kadalie's self-appointed mother hen, 
suggested to Hertzog that it was 
surely better to have Kadalie, with his undoubted power over 
fifty thousand natives, on the side of reasonable trade union 
ambitions for the black man than to leave him as a useful cats-
paw to men of the Moscow type, who within the last twelve years 
have done untold harm to South Afr ica by means of the Native. 10 
When Kadalie expelled communists from the ICU, an act which won wide 
approval from white liberals,11 she urged Hertzog to acknowledge the 
deed : 
Sir, such action would bear much fruit, not only for Africa 
but beyond it. It would be an acknowledgement of belief 
in and appreciation of the recent efforts to clean up the 
ICU and to keep a moderate course. 12 
8. Draft Memorandum. "The Native in Industry". 1928 paras 35-36. 
SAIRR Archives 71.4.5 
9. Lewis has been reported as saying that "since Kadalie would not 
come to the Joint Councils we took the Joint Councils to Mr Kadalie . " 
Mokone, S "Majority Rule : Some Notes, The ICU and Kadalie: Early 
Beginnings" Educational Journal XLIX (5) Jan-Feb 1978 
10. Lewis - Hertzog. 3 January 1927. ICU Papers Box 32 C2. 3- 7 
11. Simons and Simons, Class and colour in South Africa p 359 
12. Lewis - Hertzog,27 January 1927 ICU papers Box 32 C2.3.7 
Hertzog was not prepared to follow Lewis's suggestion. He did let 
out, though, that he was "glad to know" that Kadalie had turned to 
moderation and 'Was "evidently taking his stand against communism" 13 
Hertzog's pre-election "sincere desire" that the "faith and sympathy" 
which was to be engendered between the races of the Union should 
. t d t h' h d h Id t 11 h' . fl 14 eX1S an 0 w 1C en e weu exer a 18 1n uenee) was 
finally stripped of its facade. Hertzog further tarnished his blemished 
reputation when he removed the only 'sympathetic' Minister from the 
Cabinet, Walter Madeley. Pressure from Hertzog had forced Madeley to 
withdraw his invitation to the rcu to discuss with himself and Andrews, 
the General secretary of SATUC and a communist, the possibility of 
raising the wages of African postal workers in Johannesburg. The 
workers' demands followed in the wake of the refusal by the Minister 
of Agriculture, Gen Kemp, to increase the wages of African workers at 
the Onderstepoort Ve~ 15 Research Department. In the event, 
Ballinger, Kadalie and two others forced their way into Madeley's 
office and the meeting took place. Hertzog was not impressed by 
Madeley's argument that he had effectively ignored the rcu delegates. 
Hertzog reshuffled his cabinet when Madeley refused to resign. 16 
13. Private Secretary, on instruction - Lewis 3 February 1927 
lCU Papers Box 32 C2.3.7 
14. Hertzog - Kadalie)21 July 1921. Copy in rcu Papers Box 32 C2.3.7 
15. Workers Herald 31 December 1928. Wickins, P The rcu p 173 
16. Wickins, P The rcu p 173 
The National Council of the lCU congratulated Madeley for his 
"sacrifice {-of_I personal profit for principle" . 17 The lCU 
eulogy was somewhat misplaced. Although Madeley's insistence in 
1927-28 upon an 8s minimum wage for unskilled workers in the building 
d d f h . 18 tra e rew applause rom De Norman , t e reu Western Cape cha~rman , 
his motivation was not exactly unbiased. De Norman's attitude revealed 
the depth of confusion which existed within the lCU over policy con-
sideration . De Norman, a member of the Cape Town Committee of the 
19 Communist Party, argued that Madeley's proposal was not intended to 
establish a colour bar. 20 The African Workers' Club on the other 
hand argued that his policy was in effect "a subtle way of saying to 
1 7. Wickins, P liThe Industrial and Commer cial Workers Union of Sou th 
Africa" (hereafter PhD Thesis), p 527 footnote 2. Wickins, P 
The lCU pp 173-4 
18. Worke rs Herald 17 May 1927. Wickins, P Ph D Thesis, p 413 
19. Roux, E Time Longer than Rope, p 164. Lerumo, A Fifty Fighting 
Years p 47 
20. Workers Herald 17 May 1927. Wickins, PhD Thesis, p 371 
21 
contractors, I You shall not employ Black labour I. " De Norman' B 
analysis appeared not to have been completely out of character. 
Expelled from the ICU because of his Communist Party membership, he 
21 . Champion, A W G "The Truth about the lCU" pp 15-16 
Information on the African Workers' Club is scanty. The works of 
Simons and Simons, the Rouxs, Lerumo, Davenport, Karis and carter do not 
mention it. Kadalie and Wickins also tend to ignore it, the former more 
so than the latter. The most useful and detailed source about its history 
I have is contained in a letter from Prof MW Swanson of Miami University, 
Ohio, dated 16 January 1983. Margery Pe~ham, African Apprenticeship 
pp 191-201 provides a lively description of her visit to the ICU/AWC 
in January 1930. I am grateful to Professor Swanson for bringing this 
latter reference to my attention. It is from the above sources that 
the following brief account has been compiled. 
The Club was the first of its kind formed in Durban. Recreation, church. 
and social clubs for Africans had been formed on the Witwatersrand 
during the 1920s. Champion formed the club in late 1925 (Workers' Herald 
15 November 1925) at the time of the ICU's recruitment drive in the city. 
(Kadalie, My Life pp 95-6) Champion claimed thqt the clubs of the 
time were the chief means of attracting workers to the ICU (Swanson). 
Champion rented a vacant warehouse at 11 Leopold Street from an Indian 
merchant named M E Paruk and this bec"'1le the headquarters of both the 
ICU and the Workers Club. The premises were destroyed in 1929 by white 
gangsters and the ICU moved to the outer reaches of Durban (SWanson). 
Champion appears to have remained a trustee of the club until it 
collapsed when the ICU fell apart in 1930 (Wickins The ICU p 161, 149). 
It was revived under the name of Natal Workers' Club from late 1930 . after 
Champion's return from voluntary exile in Johannesburg and lasted 
until II cavalier behaviour" within the club and claims that he "lined his 
own pockets at the expense of the members." (Both Perham and Swanson 
would agree with this). The club had a constitution which was "consis-
tently flaunted." Unfortunately Wickins does not disclose what it laid 
down (ibid p 148) . 
Kadalie's account of the activities of the club tells less than half the 
story. Both times he mentions that the club's sole purpose was as a 
venue where modern dancing was taught, (ibid pp 95-6; 162-3). Perham's 
account reveals that entertainment was not the sale activity at the club. 
Politics was discussed and songs with political themes accompanied 
traditional dances. Modern dancing appears to have been the prerogative 
of the better educated members. Champion later said that the "absence of 
organisations run solely by Africans so that they may teach one another 
as we used to do in the ICU is a great hardship ... The Natal Workers' 
Club civilised the African people •.. ", (Swanson). Furthermore, the 
fact that the Workers' Club published at least one political pamphlet 
surely indicates a larger purpose than mere entertainment. More research 
is needed into the structure, membership and social role of the African 
clubs of the period. 
" 
refuted the latter and returned to the reformist fold of the ICu. 22 
Kadalie remained in the concili alionist camp even though he continued 
to oppose the Colour Bar Act and other elements of oppression like the 
pass laws and the civilised labour policy.23 The ICU soon put the Wage 
Act to the test in a number of centres. The most important investiga-
tion was into the position of unskilled workers at Bloemfontein. We 
deal first of all with the Bloemfontein investigation and the problems 
it presented to administrators and government alike before turning to the 
other applications which were made before the change of policy which took 
place in 1930. The developments of the 1930s are examined next in the 
light of the altered policy. 
The Bloemfontein investigation arose directly out of popular 
action in the African location of Waaihoek, the smallest of the three 
Bloemfontein locations, in April 1925. Wickinss description of the 
troubles as a "brief but bloody riot,,24 and the Native Affairs Depart-
ment's identification of them as an emeute 25 are misleading. The avail-
22. Roux, E Time Longer than Rope p 164 
23. cf, for eg, Workers' Herald 28 April 1926; wickins, P The ICU 
pp 82, 87-88, 91 
24 . Wickins, P, ibid, P 88 
25. Department of Native Affairs Report for 1922-26, UG 14-1927, P 19 
\ 
able evidence suggests that even though the outbreak lasted for only 
two days, the problems which gave rise to the disturbances were deep-
26 
rooted. The state's response was dictated by the realisation that the 
problem was deepseated and could not be solved easily. 
The physical side of the disturbance had at least three distinct 
aspects. The first demonstration of a challenge to authority occurred 
when several hundred women gathered on a square in the location with 
paraffin tins of beer, on Sunday 19 April 1925. They objected to "the 
manner in which the police enforced the kaffir-beer restrictions" in 
the town. These were restrictions on lithe brewing and selling of 
kaffir beer" which attempted to avoid the anti-social features of a 
perfectly ordinary African custom. 27 Part of the problem perhaps lay 
in the fact that Bloemfontein had acted promptly to bring the locations 
under the Urban Areas Act in November 1924. Thus the restrictions were 
26. The account that follows is based mainly on the "Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry - Native Riots at Bloemfontein U produced 
by AGE Pienaar, the Secretary for the Interior, in September 
1925. Wickins·s account was based on press reports and the 
Native Affairs Department report for 1922-26, dealt with the 
incident in eight sentences (UG 14-1927, pp 19-20). Schoeman, K 
Bloemfontein : Die Ontstaan van 'n Stad 1846-1946 depended to an extent 
on the Pienaar Report, but, for reasons outlined below, underplayed 
the struggle which took place to secure a determination. 
27. Davenport, T R H "The Triumph of Colonel Stallard" pp 78-9. The 1923 
rule affected buying and selling in three ways: "first, liquor other 
than kaffir beer was not permitted in locations; second, domestic 
brewing could be authorised or refused by the local authority, but 
brewing for sale was not allowedi and third, if domestic brewing 
proved unsatisfactory, the local authority could itself obtain 
permission from the Minister to set up a monopoly for manufacturing 
or sale." 
28 
new and location dwellers were not yet used to them. The Commission 
was of the opinion that some of the women were prepared to be arrested 
when the police arrived, which indicated that they regarded the gathering 
"as a sort of passive resistance movement tl whilst others were prepared to 
"defy and resist the police." The police were challenged, they fired 
warning shots, and the crowd fell back. Armed civilians entered the 
fray and one African, Simon Debe, was killed. A thurrler and hai I storm 
broke and the crowd dispersed. James Mpinda, a blackman and member of 
the Native Advisory Board, was accused of organising the strike which 
29 
occurred the next day. The strike, which involved withholding labcur, 
was also accompanied by "some sort of an attempt of a bcycott of the 
30 European shops". 
28. ibid, P 79 
The crowds who gathered in the location which abutted 
29 . The Pienaar Commission summarised the administrative . structure of the 
whole location in these terms: "The location is under an assistant 
superintendent and a staff of four Europeans with a native typist 
and interpreter and two native messengers . The location is divided 
into twelve blocks, containing approximately 250 huts each, and for 
each block a native blockman is elected by the popular vote of the 
natives in his block. In addition, three blockmen are nominated by 
Town Council, and the fifteen blockmen form a Native Advisory Board, 
with the superintendent of locations as chairman. Each block has its 
Block Committee of ten natives elected by the natives of the block, 
their function being to advise their blackman . The Native Advisory 
Board keeps in touch with the Native Affairs Committee of the Town 
Council through the superintendent, and the board is consulted by 
the Committee on all matters of policy affecting the location." 
Pienaar Commission p 479. The NAB was established in 1919 following 
the success of the Native Affairs Committee of the Council which had 
been established in 1913. The NAB, which comprised 12 popularly 
elected and 3 municipally nominated members who all together elected 
their own chairman, was intended to "'promote the welfare L-of_1 
(sic) and to advise the native residen~s in the Municipal locations, 
and to advise the Muncipality with regard to the control of the 
locations. ' " This body seems to have virtually collapsed by the 
time the crisis was reached, not least through Selby Msimang 's 
exposure of some members'receiving bribes from the Municipality. 
Schoeman, K Bloemfontein p 279-180 . cf Davenport T R H, "The 
Triumph of Colonel Stallard" pp 77-79 for a general summary of the 
provisions of the Urban Areas Act. 
30. The reason for the boycott of white traders is not alluded to in 
the Commission Report, but it is possibly related to the Urban Areas 
Act which also empowered local authorities to control location 
trading. cf Davenport T R H, ibid, p 79 
on the white area of Bloemfontein, were dispersed by a combined force of 
officially constituted special police and white civilian vigilantes who, 
according to the Commissioners, merely wanted to "'get at' the native and 
punish him" rather than to "protect the town". In all, the casualty 
figures were officially given as 5 Africans dead and 24 wounded, whilst 
- -
"one native policeman.!... was_I dangerously wounded, two European constables 
severely wounded and sixteen slightly wounded. ,,31 
The causes of the disturbances were several . The Commission 
reported that the only grievances put forward were against. "kaffir-beer 
32 
restrictions and ... the economic question of wages . II The Department 
of Native Affairs stressed the restrictions as the cause of the distur-
·bances and referred to the "alleged tl inadequacy of wages in Bloemfonein,33 
34 
even though the Commission reported that they were "undoubtedly low. II 
31. Wickins slightly underestimates the casualties. According to his 
analysis 4 died, 18 were injured and 2 whites were hurt by stones. 
(The ICU p 88). The Pienaar Commission suggests that "no doubt 
there were other minor injuries among them that were not reported." 
(p476). Lerumo, A Fifty Fighting Years p 47 estimated that, 
including deaths, there were about 60 casualties. This may not be 
as far off the mark as at first appears. The Pienaar Conunission's 
first term of reference, "The nature of the riot and the force 
used to quell it" is dealt with between pp 472-1177) 
32. Pienaar Commission, p 478. Wickins, The Ieu p 88 
33 . UG 14-1927, P 20 
34 . Pienaar Commission, p 478 
Besides these two, the Commission agreed that the Monday strike was due 
to the death of Simon Debe on the Sunday afternoon. His death 
gave the opportunity to native agitators to foment the 
disturbances for their own ends, so that the suggestion 
to refrain from going to work next day was more widely 
accepted and acted upon then would have otherwise 
been the case, and it strengthened the lawless element 
in their determination to cause trouble. 35 
The Commissionls conclusions need to be closely investigated. Under 
the Municipal by-laws, the amount of beer which a householder was allowed 
to have for purposes of family consumption was restricted to four gallons. 
"Beer-parties", ill-defined as a gathering of two or more "strange 
natives" and the householder on whose premises beer was consumed, were 
illegal unless a licence, costing £1 J was produced. Further, complaints 
were laid against the methods which police used in raids. These included 
their overbearing attitude and the ability to enter private premises with-
out search warrants. They frequently raided homes "long after the inhabi-
tants have gone to bed" and the raids were carried out livery roughly" and 
caused II grea t inconvenience to a possibly innocent householder." These 
complaints were enough to ensure that the police became the subject of 
the residents' challenge to authority. 
Wilfred Mati, a livery intelligent and well-educated native" ascribed 
the riots to radical political doctrines and propaganda. The Commission 
35. ibid P 477 
dismissed his evidence because it went "too far." The commissioners did 
not find that the ANC organised the strike and dismissed the notion that 
the ANC acted subversively on the strength of the fact that whites were 
invited to their meeting. The ANC's activities were "generally well known." 
The evidence before the Commission pointed to lCU organisation and influence, 
led in the main by the "notorious Clements Kadalie" . The Commission 
disapproved of ICU rhetoric but was not blinded to the fact that the 
economic squeeze placed on poorly paid workers was immense. In their 
opinion, there was no doubt that the "ostensible object" of the lCU was 
the fonnation of fla kind of trade union among the natives in order to 
endeavour to obtain better wages." The Commission concluded that 
undoubtedly the sense of grievance felt in connexion with 
wages, fomented and worked upon by the agents of the ICU, 
created a state of mind, an abocsphere of unrest and race 
antagonism, which made resistance to the police and other 
European authority more probable in the event of any dis-
turbance arising, and it must therefore be regarded as one 
of the indirect causes of the riots. 36 
In the light of actions taken both by the Town Council and the Wage 
Board after the riots, the Commission1s comments on the wage situation 
in Bloemfontein are revealing. The Commission did not see its way 
clear to pronounce on economic issues and as such did not investigate 
36. ibid, pp 477-78 
370 
the reasons for the low wages in Bloemfontein. It did 
however remark that at least one factor, namely the high unemployment 
which existed, contributed to the problem. It is clear that differ-
37 
ences of opinion existed over the desirability of the situation. 
The Native Affairs Department drew attention to the high incidence 
of unemployment but claimed that the population was "too great for 
the actual needs of the town . " Efforts to correct the situation 
would reap slow benefits because "so many natives have established 
a permanent residence" in the town .38 The town clerk, Logan, led the 
Pienaar Commission to believe that the Town Council itself en-
couraged this state of affairs in the location "so as to create a 
reservoir of surplus labour from which native labourers may be 
39 drawn." _ 
The Commission asserted that if a policy such as that described by 
Logan existed J it was "wholly wrong II • It went even further 
to suggest that notwithstanding the justification of the policy in 
those terms, it did not have the desired effect of making more 
labour available. Such a pclicy would only "lead to trouble." 
37. ibid, P 478. The causes of the disturbances, the second point 
of reference of the Commission,are covered between pp 477-9 
of the Report 
38. UG 14-1927 P 10 
39. Pienaar Commission, p 478 
The Commission stressed that only the criterion of useful employ-
ment, either in the service of whites or blacks like "shoemakers, 
building contractors, artisans, teachers, and 90 on", should be 
considered, and the rules "strictly applied." It pointed to 
the absence of administrative machinery to back up the Urban Areas 
Act and its regulations: 
There is no native hostel, such as is contemplated by 
the Act, through which natives coming to Bloemfontein 
for work can be passed and from where, if no employ-
ment is obtainable, they can be passed to other centres. 
There is no farm colony, such as has been established 
in the Pretoria District, to which idle and disorderly 
natives of the habitually unemployed class can be 
committed. And the superintendent of the location 
has an insufficient staff to enable him to keep a 
sufficient check on natives coming into the location . 40 
The wage situation in the Bloemfontein areas was, to say the least, 
explosive . The Commission recognised that the question of low wages 
was one of the "chief grievances" ···of the inhabitants. Two affected 
groups were identified by the Commission. The first were those in 
domestic service who in terms of the Urban Areas Act were provided 
with accommodation on their employers' property, and who occasionally 
also received food in addition to wages. This group was considered 
40 . ibid, P 480 
to be "comparatively well off. II The second group comprised 
those folk who owned houses in the location and who had to provide 
for their families' needs from their own or the combined parental 
wages, neither of which normally exceeded E5 a month. In terms of 
the Urban Areas Act, the location was supposed to house people use-
fully employed in Bloemfontein. 41 The Commissioners argued that the 
"underlying principle of the Native (Urban Areas) Act!! was lito compel 
employers to provide accommodation on their own premises for their 
native servants ... " That principle was necessary lito restrict the 
growth of the native locations." The Commissioners pointed out that 
a group of 'undesirables', namely "native prostitutes, brewers and 
sellers of intoxicating liquor and loafers," were "very largely 
responsible for the riots. II They numbered several hundred, and had 
been drawn to the town in recent years. From the recommendations 
of the Commission it can be inferred that the "undesirable class" 
was largely female . The "male native " did not cause any real diffi-
culty . as he could "be dealt with under the provisions of the 
{-Urban Areas (1923)_7 Act and the regulations." The African woman 
was singled out as the real cause of trouble. Where she was 
a woman 
not in permanent service or living with her husband, 
she usually does a small amount of washing or similar 
work, but her main occupation is immorality and 
liquor-selling . She cannot be suitably dealt with 
under section seventeen of the Act, and she may be in 
41. The Commission referred to sections 12 and 17 of the Act, 
ibid, p 480 
·i 
occupation of a stand granted to her on the 
strength of her former employment. 42 
For these reasons the Commission recommended amendments to the 
Act so that women not "wholly or substantially employed", whether in 
domestic or other services, or who were not married to lawful residents 
in the area, could be repatriated at the discretion of a magistrate 
. .. 43 
or nat1ve comm1SS1oner. The Commission recommended the removal 
of all Africans "not usefully employed." It also stated that the 
location should not be regarded by the municipality 
as a source of revenue, but as a place to shelter 
those natives who are necessary to the life of the 
whole =munity of Bloemfontein. 44 
The Commission remarked on a few socia-economic issues as well. 
The influx of people to Bloemfontein and the unintended establish-
ment of a "large native town .. ' . on the outskirts" of the city was 
caused largely by the 1913 Land Act which forced people off the land . 
Once in town, the operation of the civilised labour policy denied 
them entry into certain jobs, as a result of which the Urban Areas Act 
required their removal from urban areas. Caught within a vicious 
45 
circle, the Africans had "nowhere to go . " Whereas the removal of 
42. ibid, pp 480-82 
43. ibid, P 482 
44 . ibid, p 481 
45. ibid, P 479 
, 
people from the location might ease the situation, the Commission 
recognised that one way of alleviating the problem was the applica-
46 ticn of the "obvious remedy" of increasing wages. 
Attempts to get black wages increased in the past had "proved 
f . 1 47 rUlt ess." The war years had brought with them an exceptionally 
heavy burden on an already segregated Bloemfontein. 48 It was Selby 
Msimang, pioneer of ANC leadership in the Free State, who rose to the 
occasion and prepared to combat the situation. Msirnang claimed in 
1919 that the average wage for blaci<l in Bloemfontein was a mere 2s per 
day. On his own calculation he further claimed that a family of 
five needed a minlmum of 4s 6d per day to survive. His campaign took 
off in 1919 in the form of meetings and a press campaign. He told 
workers to urge upon their employers the necessity of granting an 
increase in wages to 45 6d per day J threatened strike action if they 
were not given a hearing and warned his followers of the possible 
repercussions which such action could invoke. The result was an 
average increase to all workers except railway employees, to 2s 6d. 
Msimang was arrested and violence broke out. The Municipality held 
its ground and stuck to the wage of 2s 6d per day. The Bloemfontein 
wage dispute aroused national interest and was one of the factors 
46. ibid, p 478 
47. ibid, p 478 
48. UG 14-1927 P 10 
which led to the formation of the ICU as a national body at the 
Conference in Bloemfontein in 1920. Msimang left Bloemfontein in 
1922 but the harsh conditions remained which finally blew up again in 
1925. 49 Kadalie told a meeting of between 1 500 and 2 000 people at 
Waaihoek that the April 1925 ICU Congress would calIon the Government to 
implement a mimimum wage covering the Union. He was also encouraged 
by the fact that the Bloemfontein Town Council had already been app-
50 
roached for an increase in wages. On 9 February Kadalie led an 
ICU delegation to meet the Council "to acquaint and interest the 
authorities in minimum wages for Native workers. II They argued 
that the basic wage of between 7s 6d and £1 per week was not adequate 
, 
as average expenditure per employee was £1.18s.11 / ,d per week. The 
seriousness of the situation was exemplified by the fact that 95% of 
the 20 000 location inhabitants were workers . 51 It appears that 
nothing came of the meeting until the aftermath of the disturbances 
in April. Even though the vicious crushing of the strike ended open 
resistance for the time being, dissatisfaction continued unabated. 52 
53 Schoeman noted that in 1926 demonstrators marched through 
h 1 . 54 . th b t e ocat10n Wl anners. Organised by Simon Elias of the 
49. Schoeman, K Bloemfontein pp 279-80 
50. Workers' Herald 20 February 1925 
51. Workers' Herald 2 April 1925 
52 . Schoeman, K Bloemfontein p 284 
53 . The month is not specified 
54. Whether the whole location or just Waaihoek was affected is not 
specified. 
ICu55 they demanded a minimum wage of 3s 6d. Elias was prosecuted 
for incitement to commit public violence~ His arrest aroused such 
anger that Bishop Carey entered the fray. He made a special trip 
to the location to attempt to settle the matter. Nine years after the 
initial agitation the workers were rewarded with a minimum wage of 3s 6d 
per day effective from 1 January 1929. This event Schoeman ascribed 
partly to the SATUC's support of the idea, and partly as a result of 
the 1925 disturbances. He recognised further, that the wage prescribed 
was weliswaar nog nie genoeg om swar·t "werkers van ~ 
behoorlike inkomste te verseker nie, maar dit het 
nogtans In gedeel telike oorwining vir die swartes 
en ~ duidelike stap vorentoe beteken, en bowendien 
was Bloemfontein die enigste stad in die Unie wat 
so 'n bepaling geken he t. 56 
The actual process wh~reby a minimum wage was set down for 
Bloemfontein is far more comp~ated than Schoeman suggests. Wickins 
too, appeared to miss the point when he stated that the minimum wage , 
57 determination as part of a larger package deal was granted because 
"white people seemed to have had an attack of conscience. ,,58 
After the April disturbances the Town Council set up a Native 
Wages Commission 
to inquire into and make recommendations on the 
question of a fair basic wage for unskilled native 
55. Schoeman mistakenly referred to the rcu (ICWU) throughout his 
account as the International Coloured Workers ' Union ibid, p 282-284 
56. ibid, P 284 
57. Another part of the deal was the grant to the ICU of a "lease 
on a site in the location for the erection of a hall and office." 
Wickins, The ICU p 89 
58. ibid, P 89 
'$77 
labour in Bloemfontein. 59 
Whether the Town Council acted on the statements made by the 
Pienaar Commission is not clear . Certainly, they had indicated that 
wages were an issue, even though they failed to analyse the economics 
60 
of the problem. The Native Wages Commission was made up of 8 
employers' representatives and an equal number of Africans. The 
latter comprised four representative of the ICU and another four 
f h . d ' d 61 o t e Nat1ve A v1sory Boar . The ICU delegates later withdrew 
62 because the NWC did not accept Kadalie himself as a member. 
A summary of the Commission's recommendations claimed that the 
ICU delegates had initially accepted 3s per day as the minimum wage 
but later reneged and claimed their original demand of 3s 6d per 
63 day. It is probable that the demonstration alluded to by Schoeman 
took place after the withdrawal of the ICU delegation from the 
Commission's proceedings. In any event, the Commission advised 
the Town Council to approach the Wage Board "with the object of giving 
64 this rate L-of 3s per dayJ force of law." The chronological 
59. Wage Board Report dated 2 May 1928. Social and Industrial Review 
(Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 
60. cf above, pp3bq·70Schoeman, K Bloemfontein p 284 is a little 
harsh on the Commission in this regard, with the result that he 
fails really to grasp the connections between 1925 and the 
eventual determination of the Wage Board. 
61. cf note 29 above; t 1(.1. 
62. The reasons for Kadalie's non~ecognition are not stated. It 
is possible that they refused to accept his membership because he 
was not a local representative. 
63. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 p449 
64. ibid 
sequence of events needs to be set out in detail despite certain 
ambiguities in the evidence. The swnmary provided by the Town 
Clerk to the Wage Board refers to two NWC recommendations, the 
first was the 3s per day proposal and the second the approach to the 
Wage Board. Immediately thereafter the summary noted that 
The four ICU representatives, although they supported this 
recommendation and promised to recommend their people 
to accept it, failed to implement their promise and went 
back to their former demand of a minimum of 3s 6d. 65 
One factor needs to be taken into consideration before we attempt to 
unravel the ambiguity. The summary went on to state that 
the Commissioners for their par.t had not found it necessary "to call 
e v idence as to the native cost of living in Bloemfontein" to reach 
their own conclusions. Faced with the prospect of the 3s minimum 
daily wage brunq made a statutory limitation and the blatant disregard 
for the actual cost of living in Bloemfontein, the ICU preferred,at 
that stage, to opt out of the proceedings. The Town Clerk urged the 
Wage Board to settle the matter "on a permanent basis." He mentioned 
the problem of the large number of unemployed in Bloemfontein and 
added that they wished 
to prevent any dissatisfaction taking root in the minds of 
natives through instigations from representations from 
native organisations that they are not being fairly treated. 66 
65. ibid 
66 . Town Clerk- Wage Board, 5 March 1926 , quoted in Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition ) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 
\ , 
The Workers' Herald reported later on in the same month that Africans 
were "looking to the Wage Board to act in the spirit of the WagesL-sicJ 
Act" and added that they trusted that "the Government itself ought to 
appreciate the attempts of the ICU to lead the bulk of the citizens" 
of the union. 67 T Keable 'Mote, the "turncoat of Bloemfontein,,68 
was reported in July to have compared the lot of black workers to 
the Israelites wandering in the desert for forty years "before they 
reached the promised land." He claimed that this was the 
second time the Bloemfontein Native workers of different 
occupations have made application to· the Wages Board 
to intervene in order to prevent the general strike which 
was almost inevitable after the February deadlock with 
the Wages Commission appointed by the Town Council. 
He referred to the dismissal of employees because of ICU affiliations. 
He went on to state that "the class struggle must be brought into the 
enemies I campI! by strike action if they did not achieve their 
minimum wage. "If the Wage Board will not move we shall have to 
embark upon direct action,u 69 urged 'Mote, the same man who also 
67. Workers' Herald 27 March 1926 
68. Wickins, The ICU p 99. 'Mote turned King's evidence against 
Simon Elias after the riots of 1925. Elias was acquitted and 
'Mote was expelled from the ICU but returned to the fold the 
next year. ibid, p 89. Workers' Herald 15 October 1925 
69. 'Mote I IlGetting Desperate: the Wages Board and the Natives" 
Umsebenzi 16 July 1926 
-y' 
") 
called for a passive resistance campaign to secure the minimum 
70 
wage. Such confusion in the minds of lCU spokesmen acted against 
them and proved to be a factor in their demise as an organisation: 
they had an idea about what goods had to be delivered, but did not know 
how to conduct the delivery. 
• 
The Wage Board's involvement with the wage dispute in Bloemfontein 
was to be long and tedious for two reasons. First, the government 
itself was unsure whether it wanted unskilled African wages investi-
71 gated by the Wage Board generally, and second, localised problems 
such as procedure and the actions of participants existed. The 
Board replied to the Town Clerk that it could not investigate the 
conditions of "native unskilled labOurers u as a whole. Such a 
racial classification was not permitted by the Wage Act and if it were 
to make a recommendation for Africans "as a class of employees II 
distinct from unskilled workers as a whole, it would in effect be 
70. Wickins, The lCU p 99. Wickins called Keable 'Mote a Gingerist. 
This term is drawn from the IIloose, but well-defined, groups" 
that appeared at the Colour Bar Bill conference in 1926. The 
Ginger groups, "composed of all the young bloods" whose IIpolicy 
was 'Direct Action'" were cQunterposed against the Moderates 
"whose policy was to face facts and to deliberate soberly and 
moderately on them" and the Die-hards "whose policy was that 
'Nay was Nay, and Yea was Yea' ."(p97). My own suspicion is that 
'Mote, turncoat and confused thinker that he was, could merit 
the full-blooded label of a Gingerist. 
71. This aspect is dealt with in detail below pp J'lq~~oo 
Jg-, 
singling them out "in the same way as it would if it dealt only 
72 
with red-haired or blue-eyed employees." Clearly, the Board 
was only prepared to operate on an each-industry-on-its-merits 
policy which in effect produced a divide and rule strategy. The 
delay in the operation of the Board also assisted in the successful 
drawing of the location working class movement's teeth. 
A number of applications from different industries were sent to the 
Board during the rest of 1926, most of which were refused,apparently 
for non-satisfaction of Wage Act requirments. One application made 
on behalf of the brick-making industry for a minimum of 3s 6d was 
accepted and the Board began its investigation into the industry in 
April 1927, two years after the outbreak. The Board 
reported that former members of the NWc73 requested the Board to refrain 
from proceeding until they had considered the position afresh. Their 
rationale was that an isolated determination would have a possibly 
~ effect on other occupations. The NWC was reconstituted with 
72. ~ocial . and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 
73. The Report does not state whether this call was representative 
of all the NWC members or only a few commissioners. 
the leu sending along four delegates as before. The Commission 
met twice in May and forwarded a resolution74 to the Minister of 
Labour who in turn instructed the Board to investigate. His 
75 instruction was dated February 1928. 
The Board found that a number of employers, including the 
municipality, had paid the 3s minimum as prescribed by the Native Wages 
. . 76 
Comm1SS10n. It also indicated, on the other hand, that many unskilled 
workers received less than that sum; same received as little as 158 
per month or 69 per week, "without board or lodging." It also 
found that there were some whites who received a wage of 309 per 
77 
week. The Board initially concentrated its attention on employees 
who received less than 30s per week. It estimated the total 
74 . The text of the resolution was as follows! 
"That the Bloemfontein Wages Conunission, consisting of members 
representing the following employers of unskilled labour in the 
Magisterial area of Bloemfontein, namely: Professional men; 
Merchants and Shopkeepers; Master Builders, embracing Brick-
layers, Plasterers, Carpenters, Joiners, Plumbers, ~nsrniths, 
Painters and Decorators; Municipality; Quarrymen; and members 
representing unskilled Native employees in the above trades and 
in addition those in the following employments, namely : Butchers; 
Bakers; Dairies; Boarding-Houses and Hotels; Bootmakers; Motor 
Engineers and Garages; Millers; Printing Industry; Mineral Water 
Manufacturers; Transport Workers : respectfully request the Minister 
of Labour to refer to the ~ge Board under section three (1 )(a) 
of the Wage Act the matter of a basic minimum wage for unskilled 
labour in the aforesaid employments or trades for investigation 
and report with a view to a determination by the Minister of 
Labour in terms of section seven of the Act. II Social and 
Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 p 450 
75. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 
1928 p 450-451 
76. ibid pp 451, 453 
77 . ibid p 451 
1. 
I 
78 thus affected at about 8 000 people, and defined the term 
'unskilled worker' as any employee "engaged in 'ordinary muscular 
wo.rk excluding domestic service I II?? A new instruction to the 
Board of September 1928 revised the terms of the investigation 
to apply to adults as defined in the Natives Taxation and Development 
Act,80 81 and all other males 18 years and over. The Board came to 
a compromise solution ~ the recommendation of a minimum wage. The 
NWC had, as noted, suggested 3s and the ICU 3s 6d per day, which they 
1 d l ' ' 82 ater argue was not a ~v~ng wage. In both May and October the 
Board reported that it could not recommend a civilised wage, and on 
both occasions the Minister referred the matter back to the Board. 
The minimum was set down as £1 per week or 3s 6d per day in terms of 
the proposed determination in May. The withdrawal of the original 
ministerial instruction laid the way open for the compromise recom-
mendation whereby a proviso was added that laid down that for the 
first 1/ 2 year of the determination wages not less that 18s per week 
and 3s per day should be paid and that for the next 6 months, not less 
that 19s per week or 3s 3d per day should be paid . 83 The number of 
78. 1929 WBR P 36 
79. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 1 (17) 29 June 1928 
80. Section 19, Natives Taxation and Development Act, Act 41-1925: 
lI'adult'means a native who has reached the age of eighteen years 
or, in case of doubt, who appears to the officer concerned to 
have reached that age and who does not adduce evidence to the 
contrary to the satisfaction of the officer. ~I 
81. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 11 (10) 16 November, 
1928, report dated 29 October 1928 
82. Social and ,I"!,!,u,!!!:!,,ial Revie~ (Special Edition) 1 (17) 19 June 1928 
83. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 11 (10) 16 November 
1928, report dated 2 November 1928 
84 
employees affected by this determination was given as 5 232. 
"A bomb has fallen into the BOBS Camp" proclaimed Umsebenzi 
before the compromise recommendation had been reached. The II ,whole 
tribe of exploiters generally" had been aroused. The annual wage 
bill they claimed would increase by £750 000 with the 3d per day 
increase. The paper referred to capitalist fears that, if accepted, 
the award would 
form a precedent and that the native workers of 
Johannesburg and elsewhere in the Union, together with 
the land workers L-sic_1 throughout the country, will 
demand equally favourable rates ... 85 
The SACP's optimism was to be short-lived and their analysis of 
capitalist fears vindicated for the refusal to grant further uplift-
ment did not stop with the amended Bloemfontein recommendations. 
How and why this occurred can only be ascertained after closer examina-
tion of African contacts with the Wage Board. 
84. Department of Labour Annual Report, 1932-1933, UG 43-1934,pp 67,68 
85. Umsebenzi "Hell Opened to Capitalists" 27 July 1928 
\, 
'I 
The successful attempt in Bloemfontein to obtain a minimum 
wage determination for unskilled workers is the most well known 
event of tha t sort. But two points need to be kept in mind. First, 
Bloemfontein was not the only town where attempts to attain minimum wage 
determinations for occupations monopolised by Africans were made. 
Second, a concentration on the Bloemfontein determination ignores 
African reactions to wage determinations in trades for which wages 
were laid down for a number of occupations, not only unskilled ones. 
We deal with these two points seriatim. 
A number of attempts were made between 1925 and 1937 to attain 
wage determinations for unskilled, largely African, workers. At 
least two different categories can be identified. First, a number 
of requests issued from Africans in the pre-Bloemfontein era which 
were prompted by a desire to utilise the 'colour blind' machinery of 
the Wage Act. Second, the fact that a determination was issued in 
Bloemfontein urged interested parties to attempt to secure further wage 
determinations for unskilled workers. The authorities considered 
these applications for determinations against the wider background of 
a debate which ensued over the practicability or otherwise of extending 
the 'benefits' of wage regulation to African workers. Whilst 
at first it was decided not to cover unskilled Africans, the changing 
circumstances of the 1930s forced the issue of African wages onto 
the state's agenda with the result that African wage earners were 
incorporated in the system. The industrial relations system itself 
T· 
; ' . 
,! 
had been transformed to enable African accommodation without 
necessarily upsetting the general order of things. 
The main organisation - with the exception of the Bloemfontein 
Town Council - which requested the Wage Board to investigate the 
wages of African workers between 1926 and 1928 was the ICU. The ICU's 
approaches to the Board were part of a general campaign which encouraged 
African workers countrywide to organise and demand higher wages . 86 
The Union's approach was encapsulated in Kadalie's 1928 statement 
on the economic and political programme for that year: 
A consistent and persistent agitation for improved wages 
for native workers must be conducted by all branches o~ 
the Union . The agitation must be Union-wide,and regard 
must always be had to local conditions and circumstances. 
Improvements, however smallin themselves, must be 
welcomed and made the basis on which to agitate for further 
advances. Every endeavour should be made to enter into 
friendly negotiations with farmers' associations, employers' 
organisationsL-sic_1 and individual employers in the towns, 
with a view to securing improvements . If no results are 
obtained branch secretaries should, wherever practicable, 
invoke the aid of the Wage Board. In this connection 
a study of the Wage Act, 1925, is urged. 87 
86. For further details of this campaign, cf Bradford, H lilA Taste 
of Freedom': Capitalist Development and Response to the ICU in 
the Transvaal Countryside", passim, in Bozzoli, B (ed) Town and 
Countryside in the Transvaal, and Wickins, P The leu ch 8. 
87. "Economic and Political Programme for 1928". Statement by 
Kadalie, reproduced as Document 49b-6, Karis and Carter, From 
Protest to Challenge vol 1, pp 331-332 
Although Kadalie suggested the above plan of action as a 
proposal for 1928, it is quite clear that that policy had already 
taken root prior to 1928. Besides the Bloemfontein wage demands, 
the ICU demanded a 2s per day increase in East London in 1925. The 
City Gbuncil initially agreed to the demand as long as private concerns 
went along with it. In the event, private businesses did not 
concur and Kadalie organised a strike which forced the Council to 
back down. Th d · 88 h th . I d e leu score a m1nor success w en e Counc1 rna e 
an offer of an extra 6d per day. The ICU accepted the paltry 
. 89 1ncrease. An incident at Cathcart in the Eastern Cape highlighted 
one of the problems which faced people who campaigned for higher 
wages .. An African, Lomani, was expelled from the Cathcart location 
by the Town Council because he applied for increased wages. - Only 
the intervention of ICU head office officials prevented his actual 
expulsion , but it would appear that the application was then dropped 
90 
or forgotten. 
The ICU made two applications to the Wage Board in Durban in 
1926 and 1927. Champion, who apparently earlier invoked the Board 
88. Davenport , T R H South Africa: A Modern History p 210 
89. Wickins, P The ICU p 89 
90. Workers' Herald 28 April 1926 
91 in Johannesburg as well, wanted the Board to investigate the wages 
and conditions of 50 firemen employed by Durban whaling companiea92 
and approximately 1 000 employees in stores and warehouses in Durban. 93 
This latter group, 700 of whom authorised Champion to make the 
application, comprised people "engaged in the cleaning of and in the 
delivery of goods from stores or shops of wholesalers, retailers, 
manufacturing agents, forwarding agents and warehouses. II Attendants 
and assistantsof delivery vehicles, but not the drivers of such 
vehicles, were also included . For these employees, Champion requested 
a wage of £8 per month plus accommodation, an 8 hour day and overtime 
for public holidays and Sundays. The Board noted that current wages 
fell far below Champion's proposed wage. The Board investigated the 
matter in 1927 but refrained from further action pending the outcome 
of the Bloemfontein investigation. That determination became 
effective at the end of 1928. The Board reported in May 1929 that, as the 
requested £8 a month minimum was "not sufficient .. for employees to 
94 live at civilised standards, it could not recommend a minimum wage. 
91. Swanson, M W in personal communication to author, 16 January 1983. 
The 1928 draft memorandum of the Johannesburg Joint Council 
entitled "The Natives in Industry" refers to a Johannesburg 
investigation, para 35 (SAIRR Archive B71.4 ; 5) I have not 
come ~ross any reference in wage Board reports, published and 
unpublished, to a Johannesburg unskilled workers' reference. 
92 . An 105-1929 ii. The application was made on 28 July 1926. The 
Board reported on 7 May 1929 
93 . An 111-1929 ii. The application was dated 17 February 1927. 
The Board reported on 13 May 1929 
94. An 111-1929 ii 
For the firemen on whaling boats, Champion requested a minimum of 
E12 per month and a 6 hour day. CUrrent wages averaged E5 a month 
plus food. The Wage Board again refrained from taking further 
action until after the Bloemfontein investigation was complete and 
again the Board could not recommend a civilised wage. 95 In both 
cases, the Board's work was clearly held up by its involvement in 
the Lucas Award affair as well as the Bloemfontein investigation . 
More important was the Board's departure from normal procedure in 
that it failed to request the firms involved in the investigations96 
to supply it with balance 'sheets to indicate whether or not they 
could afford the increases. It is unclear whether this action 
reflected Wage Board indifference to the claims of African workers. 
97 In any event, the Minister refused to act on the Board" s report. 
The unskilled workers in Bloemfontein had been granted an 'uncivilised' 
wage J but the Durban workers were denied even that. 
The Minister's action in 1930 with regard to at least three requests 
confirmed the state's policy decision not to entertain requests from) 
95. An 105-1929 ii 
96. The two whaling companies involved were Union Whaling CO Ltd., 
and Premier Whaling Co Ltd. 
97. 1931 WBR pp 100-101 
I , 
or on behalf o~ unskilled workers as a class of workers under the 
Wage Act. It is possible that the failure to achieve a wage 
determination in Durban was one of the causes of the violent 
demonstrations that broke out in June 1929. 98 In 1930 the Durban 
Borough Council applied to the government for a wage determination for 
. 99 
unskilled workers, partly as a result of the riots of 1929. Cape 
Town ' s City Council did likewise, possibly more out of concern for 
future unrest, given the lowering of wages generally brought about 
by the influx of Africans into the Cape Town area from the eastern 
100 Cape. Bolitho has indicated that municipalities generally were 
101 
concerned about the instability and insecurity caused by low wages. 
Attempts by City Councils to get their way came to naught. 
Notwi~~ the setbacks in Durban and the compromise low 
wage determination in Bloemfontein, some African trade unionists still 
retained faith in the Wage Board . Kadalie, as already noted, still 
urged Africans to resort to the Board, and in November 1928, the 
Weekly News reported that the ICU was prepared to use the Wage Board 
because in "our good South Africa, Boards with chairmen like Mr Lucas 
102 don I t live long". The death blow to those who still looked to the 
98. cf Wickins , P The ICU ch 12 
99. Native Economic Commission (Minority) Report UG22-1932, p 152 
100. ibid 
101. Bolitho, J "The South African Wage Board 1925-1945" pp 13-14 
102. Weekly News 21 November 1928. This publication was the 
ICU's weekly news letter; cf Wickins, P The ICU p 172 
Wage Board was dealt with the Kroonstad enquiry . 
State policy had clearly changed. The state was not prepared 
to extend wage regulation benefits to unskilled workers. That change 
in state policy is best illustrated by the Kroonstad investigation. 
A number of applications were made in different towns, and 
Wickins claimed that "the most hopeful appeared to be that at Kroon-
103 
stad" . It is not clear why Kroonstad appeared better situated, 
h . h d . 11 1 1 . 104 d th except t at 1t a an except10na y arge ICU popu at10n an at 
the ICU had previously involved itself in disputes in the town. One 
such dispute occurred in 1927 . The ICU had contested an increas'e in 
location rates in the courts . The residents in the interim J either 
through 'Mote's encouragement or on their own prompting, refused to pay 
their rates. The ICU lost the case and were unable to assist members 
and others financially to thwart the municipality's attempts to evict 
those people who were "unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the 
City Council. II To add to the plight of the inhabitants, houses from 
103 . Wickins, P The ICU p 183 
104. The number of ICU members in Kroonstad was put at 10 813.ibid,p 204 
105 
which people were evicted were pulled down. The rcv lost a 
great deal of rank and file support in Kroonstad as a result of the 
debacle, and even Champion was unable to assure the inhabitants of 
h ab · I . I k f h " t ts 1 06 t e leU's ]. 1ty to 00 a ter t e1r 1n eres . Whereas the 
Kroonstad enquiry could have reflected a desire on the rcv's part 
to regain local support, or, alternatively of rival factions of the 
rcv
107 to gain the upperhand in the town itself, it is quite clear 
from the evidence that poor conditions and general dissatisfaction 
among Kroonstad Africans was the main cause of the enquiry. 
rn July 1929, the Wage Board receive an application from 
Ballinger's rcv of Africa. 108 They requested a general minimum 
wage which covered all occupations, whether or not they were unskilled 
or skilled categories; an investigation into wage rates; the imple-
mentation of various scales lito meet special conditions and qualifi-
cations u ; the hours and conditions of work and "any other matter 
h d . h I b d h d" h f 109 w atever connecte W1t a our an t e con l.tl.ons t ereo ." 
105 . 
106. 
107 . 
108. 
109 . 
ibid, P 154 
ROM 8 July 1927 
cf chapter 1, pp 'Olf -!> above 
The application was received on 3 July 1929, not in August as 
stated by Wickins, PhD Thesis, p 558; cf "Report by the Wage 
Board ... Kroonstad" An 51 1930 P 1, and An 108-1933 P 101. 
The first public sitting of the Board in Kroonstad took place 
on 14 August at which the rcv presented the employees' case; 
cf An 51-1930 P 3. For splits in the rcv cf chapter 1 ppl~·~above. 
An 51-1930 P 1 
A public meeting, called in January 1929 by the Location Superintendent 
at Kroonstad to discuss the establishment of a location brewery, was 
attended by about 2 000 people. After the main topic was dealt with, 
leu officials took over the meeting and a resolution in favour of a 
Wage Board investigation was carried. The ICU itself claimed that of 
the 1 140 employees in the trades concerned, it represented 793. 110 
On this basis, and on the Location Superintendent's advice, the 
Board decided that the ICU was a representative body in terms of the 
t d th . d't' . . 111 Ac an us cont1nue 1 s 1nvest1gat10n. 
The public meeting in Kroonstad was attended by member of both 
BalLhger's ICU and Kadalie's Independent ICU, employees in the 
110. Industries investigated Total Employees ICU Represented 
Mineral Water 18 11 
Building 200 129 
Brickmaking and Clay 115 105 
Wagon Building 20 12 
Shops 422 259 
Milling 25 15 
Hotels and Boarding Houses 32 32 
Municipal Undertakings 308 230 
An 51-1930 p 2 
111. ibid . This procedure had to be followed as the lCU was not 
registered as a trade union under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 1924. 
industries concernedjas well as the Chamber of Commerce, the Kroonstad 
Joint Council of Europeans and Natives) and the Town Clerk . Ballinger ' s 
ICU laid out the details of the employees' demands. The minimum wage 
claims ranged from £6 to £8 per month and most called for a 48 hour working 
weekJ depending on the nature of the establishment .
112 As with the 
Bloemfontein application, the lCU submitted a budget which outlined the 
monthly cost of living of certain African employees in the Kroonstad 
location. A figure of E7.6s.11d per month for the maintenance of a 
family of five, was submitted and "was vouched for by some European 
members of the Joint Council ... 113 The Board found that rental formed 
a substantial part of ~nonthly expenditure and that on average most 
114 people lived "considerably below the standard indicated by the budget." 
11 2 . Trade Present Monthly Wage Weekly Hours 
Weekly Wage Applied for Applied for 
s. d. E. s. d. 
Mineral 
Water 12. 0 8. O. O. 48 
Building 1 2. 0 8. D. O. 48 
Brickmaking 
and Clay 12. 0 8. D. D. 48 
Wagon 
Building 1 2. 0 6. D. D. 46 
Shops 10. 0 6. 10. D. to 
10. D. O. 48 
Milling 1 O. 0 7. O. O. 48 
Hotels and 
Boarding 
Houses 7. 6 7. 10. O. None Specified 
Municipal 
Undertak:iIx:Js 1 2. 0 8. O. O. 48 
An 51-1930 p 4 
113. An 51-1930 p 4 
114. ibid, p 7 
, 
The Board also discovered that many employers were aware of the situation 
and recognised the need to raise wages but did nothing about it. 
Earlier objections that the application by the rcu was exorbitant 
persisted, with the Town Clerk leading the attack! 15 He argued that the 
E8 claim would raise the wage bill by E8 000 per annum. He further 
claimed that the cost of living in Kroonstad was lower than in Bloem-
fontein and that certain fringe benefits like certain local allowances 
for railway workers benefitted the local population. The Board indicated 
that amongst other things, the allowance was not granted to Africans. 
The Town Clerk pointed out that Council wages had been increased by 
3d per day in April and went on to propose a different scale of wages 
for Kroonstad: 
2s 9d a day for the first three months of employment; 3s a 
day for the next three months; 3s 3d for the following 
three months and thereafter 3s 6d a day, with the right to 
the Council on re-engaging such an employee to employ him 
at 2s 9d a -day, notwithstanding the wage he was receiving 
when he previously left the council's service. 116 
Potential threats to job security were clearly indicated in the 
Council propcsals. The representatives of the building, brickmaking 
and clay industries, and the Chamber of Commerce agreed with the 
Council proposals. The milling industry indicated it was prepared to 
115. ibid, P 3 
116. ibid, pp 8 - 9 
pay a wage of 35 6d, but asked for exemption from any determination on 
the grounds that it could not pass increased costs of production on to 
the consumer. The hoteliers argued that their industry was different 
and disagreed with the Council proposal. The Joint Council called for 
the same scale of wages as the Council, but did notS<lbscribe to the 
section which mentioned the right to pay re-engaged employees at the 
first notch on the scale. The Board, unfortunately, did not record 
11 7 the responses of the employees' representatives to the Council proposals. 
Figures provided by the employers indicated that roughly two-thirds of 
African employees earned between £2 and . £4 per month, and that the 
118 largest number in the lower bracket were employed in shops. The 
total inadequacy of the Council's proposals, disregarding their shame-
less escape hatch, were blatantly obvious. 
The Wage Board, almost by way of justification Or apology, reported 
on the situation of the location. It was "pleasantly situated about 
1 /' ·1 f "I "119 b t "ff 2/' " 1 2 m1 es rom the ra1 way statl.on" u was 1.n e eet "ml. es 
from the centre of town, which distance was recognised by the secretary 
of the Kroonstad Native Advisory Board a long way to go for the 
"smallest necessities of life.,,120 The failure to secure a determina-
117 . 
118. 
119. 
120. 
ibid, p 9 - 10 
ibid, p 12 
ibid, p 13 
Evidence to the Native Advisory Board, Kroonstad, on behalf of 
the inhabitants of the Kroonstad Municipal Locations. Written 
down upon the 25th August, 1932, and passed and approved by the 
NAB at a Special Meeting held at the Location Hall on Friday the 
26th August 1932. SAIRR PB 30 N 2. I am grateful to Professor 
T R H Davenport for this information. 
o 
,~ 
tion ensured that the average wagein Kroonstad in 1932 which was 
supposed to acquire the "smallest necessities of life ll remained a 
121 
meagre E2. 5s. 2d. per month as against E3. 10s in the Transvaal. 
The houses were 1I0f a good type" and appeared "to be well cared for 
122 by their owners", but the Board had also noted that most families 
had been forced to rent two 40 ft x 40 ft sites because one had proved 
. d 123 ~na equate . It is quite obvious that conditions in Kroonstad 
were not even remotely Elysian, and that the ICU demands were justified. 
Their satisfaction was not to become reality. 
The Board reported in September 1929 to the Minister of Labour 
that it was unable to recommend wages upon which people could support 
themselves according to civilised standards . The Minister failed to 
124 
respond. It remained for William Ballinger, as the Administrative 
Secretary of the ICU of Africa, to respond and, in part, to reveal his 
true colours. In an erratic. yet forceful memorandum he wrote that a 
121. 
122 . 
123. 
124. 
crisis of immense importance, pregnant with possibilities of 
forced extreme violence. on the part of non-European Indus-
trial organisations is foreshadowed by the failure of the 
Minister for Labour to give a 'determination' in respect of 
the ICU of Africa's request for a minimum wage. 125 
ibid 
An 51-1930 p 13 
ibid, p 7 
An 108-1933, pp 101-103,deals sketchily with the application and 
the outcome 
125. Ballinger, W G "Incitement or procrastination - which?" 
Ballinger papers, University of the Witwatersrand, A410, C1.1.4 p1 
At the meeting of 14 August, at which "a number of sharp exchanges of 
opinion, and some rather pertinent questions between the Employers 
and Employees L-sic_1 representatives" occurred, they were led to 
believe that Kroonstad would, in all probability, be granted a 
"Bloemfontein award 11.126 The lesson to be learnt, he stated, was 
contained in the quasi-biblical text that ought to have framed "the 
entrance to the Administrative Departments that deal with requests for 
the better treatment of their people": "Blessed are tTe:fL-sicJ that 
. "127 
expecteth noth1ng. Ballinger lamented the fact that the constitu-
tional, "peaceful way of adjusting Native Industrial workers L-sic_1 
economic disabilities" had been dashed to pieces and had in effect 
128 IIgiven 'the extremists' a valuable piece of propaganda. II This 
particular cry had, as already noted, been heard in liberal platitudes 
to Hertzog in the 19205. 
The underlying reasons why Bloemfontein succeeded and Kroonstad 
failed can now be traced. The evidence reveals that the results of 
each application were rooted in specific and general circumstances. 
Throughout the period the state took an active interest in the 
question of African unskilled wage regulation. 
126. ibid 
127. ibid, P - 2 
128. ibid, p 2 
In October 1927 an important conference, attended by the Native 
Affairs Commission, the Departments of Labour and Native Affairs and 
the Wage Board, was held to discuss lithe position of the African 
k . . d 129 war er ~n 1.n ustry.1I The conference in effect had to assess the 
position of the African worker in the industrial relations structure 
of the Union because the industrial laws had "in the main quite frankly 
framed with an eye to and emphasis upon the establishment 
of good conditions in industry for the white worker . " 130 The Bloem-
fontein troubles and the request for a Wage Board investigation had 
brought matters to a head: the government had to make a policy deci-
sian. The conference, wishing to avoid possible strike action and 
increased tension and discord in Bloemfontein , acceded to Lucas's 
suggestion that the Minister should instruct the Wage Board to 
investigate Bloemfontein's unskilled workers' wages. Once set in 
motion in Bloemfontein, it was clear that the Board could not ignore further 
references to it from unskilled workers . '31 It is obvious that the 
state was reluctant to provide Africans with the means to obtain 
minimum wages. The specific circumstances of riots and unrest in 
Bloemfontein, linked to the activities of that city's Native Wages 
Commission, rather than a desire to uplift African workers per se, 
brought about the wage determination. The conference was correct in 
129. 
130. 
131 . 
Bolitho, J "The South African Wage Board 1925-1945" p 11 
Conference on the Regulation of Native Interest in Industry, 
25 October 1927. Quoted in Bolitho , J "The South African Wage 
Board, 1925_1945", p 11 
Bolitho, J "The South African Wage Board , 1925-1945" pp 11-12 
'foo 
its prediction that further applications would be made to the Board 
after the precedent had been established. It was only in 1930, though, 
that the government formally pronounced its general policy after the 
Kroonstad investigation had been disposed of for specific reasons. 
William Ballinger referred to the phenomenon of "the Backveld 
farmers ! sicJ MLA' s . " He argued that farmers feared that their 
poorly paid workers would move to the cities if wages were increased 
132 there. . Similar arguments from urban whites that an influx of 
Africans into towns would occur had largely been disregarded by the 
Wage Board. Ballinger further suggested that "the minister for 
Labour' 5 Cabinet colleagues were not in favou · · or referring the 
133 
matter back to the Wage Board " It is possible that Ballinger's 
comments were not far off the mark. Orange Free Staters 
generally had very strong feelingj about Africans in 'white' urban areas . 
A statement by J H Cloete and F R Cronje, President and 
O'IeO'\ber" 
Executive committee/ respectivelY, of the Orange Free State 
Municipal Association captured the essence of Free State thought on the 
matter : 
The traditional conception of our Native Locations in the 
Free State, as distinguished from that of the Coastal 
Provinces, undoubtedly is that they are merely convenient 
reservoirs for the plrpose of supplying the legitimate 
132 . Ballinger, W G "Incitement or procrastination - which?" p 2 
Ballinger papers, University of the Witwatersrand, A410 C1.1. 4 
133. StabffiEnt by W G Ballinger to Native Economic Commission, 1930 
p 2. Ballinger papers, University of the Witwatersrand, 
A410C1.1.3 
labour requirements of our towns and villages . The 
genesis and subsequent slow development of the Free 
State Locations afford ample proof of this assertion. 134 
The Urban Areas Act was amended in 1930 to give the Minister power 
"to compel urban local authorities to grant trading rights to selected 
f ' I' 135 A r1can app 1can ts" , but the governrent was "reluctant . •. to use 
136 
such power . " The Free State strongly resisted the grant of trading 
, ht f ' ' I ' ' h' th If' 137 r~g B to A r1cans 1n ocat10ns r1g t 1nto e ear y I ort1es. 
That resistance was grounded in the belief that benefits in town 
would accelerate the migration from the countryside which would disrupt 
labour supplies in the rural areas. The grant of trading rights 
"would sooner or later be followed by the demand for complete autonomy 
or for a fuller measure of self-government, with the unavoidable 'corollary 
of the Municipal Franchise .. I I Furthermore, the transformation of 
locations into townships would lead to "a considerable reinforcement 
of our Urban Native population", a feature which had to be resisted 
138 
at all costs. These sentiments were echoed by the Kroonstad Town 
Council. The Council also noted that the grant of trading rights would 
operate against the white shopkeeper, whose source of taxable income 
134. 
135. 
"Statement to be submitted on Behalf of the Orange Free State 
Municipal Association by J H Cloete, President, and F R Cronje, 
a Member of the Executive Committee, at the En~iry t£ be held 
at Kroonstad on Monday the 5th September 1932,L into~ the 
Provisions of Section 22(a) of Act no 21 of 1923, as amended by 
Act 25 of 1930". SAIRR PB 30 N-Z. I am indebted to Professor 
T R H Davenport for access to this document. Part of the text 
is reproduced in Davenport and Hunt, The Right to the Land, p 76 
Davenport, T R H "The Triumph of Colonel Stallard" p 81 
136. Davenport and Hunt, The Right to the Land p 76 
137 . Davenport T R H "The Triumph of Colonel Stallard" pp 81-83 
138. "Statement submitted on Behalf of the Orange Free State Municipal 
Association " 5 September 1932. Davenport and Hunt, The Right 
to the Land p 76 
would be impaired and that Africans could find themselves operating as 
frontmen for white businessmen. Further, trading rights would lead 
Africans to ask for security of tenure. Africans were prohibited 
by law to own freehold land and leases would not be permitted. As the 
law stood, it was "a practical bar to Natives erecting shops of any 
dimension, and adds to the many practical difficulties when the 
possibility of granting trading facilities to Natives is investigated." 
Finally, the Council mentioned that a location was moved earlier on 
because it had become IIpractically merged with the town and Europeans 
and Natives were living cheek by jowl . II It was "probably unnecessary" 
to suggest that the move could not have taken place if Africans had 
had trading rights because"the compensation that would have been 
139 demanded would have been enormous." An atmosphere of insecurity 
permeated white 140 society in the Orange Free state. Although the 
sentiments quoted above were expressed in 1932 there is no reason to 
think that they were not prevalent in 1930 at the time of the Kroonstad 
enquiry, or earlier. The policy followed by the Bloemfontein Town 
Council in 1925,for example, encouraged the presence of unemployed 
Africans in the locations lito create a reservoir of surplus labour"} 
139 . "Statement to be submitted on behalf of the Town Council of 
Kroonstad by Councillor C J Fullard, Mayor of Kroonstad, and 
Councillor H Neubauer, Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee 
of the Town Council of Kroonstad, at the Enquiry to be held at 
Kroonstad on the 5th September 1932, I-into 7 the provisions 
of Section 22(a) of Act 21 of 1923 , as-amend;ct by Act 25, of 
1930". I am indebted to Professor T R H Davenport for this 
information. 
140. Davenport, T R H "African Townsmen?" pp 98-9 
141 
of cheap labour. In these circumstances, the provision of 
minimum wages for unskilled African workers could only have been seen 
as the provision of more suitable conditions in the locations which 
would lead to a more settled, permanent population. Although 
attempts to stem the growth of a permanent African population in the 
urban areas went against the trend as identified by the Holloway 
. . 142 h t t t th W B d Camm1s10n, t e pressure on governmen 0 5 op e age oar 
investigation must hav e been great. Other considerations, on the 
other hand, also played a part. 
Ballinger went on to question the prior~ties of parliamentarians. 
The Kroonstad debacle proved for Ballinger that Members of Parliament 
were guilty of procrastination in their ~ with African affairs. 
He thought that MFs operated "on the assumption that the Native has 
an inexhaustible fount of patience." He complained that the Kroonstad 
investigation had not received proper treatment in parliament. 143 
In fact the matter was only dealt with in the form of a question by 
DeneJ$ Reitz, MF for Barberton, in March 1930. Creswell, in his 
capacity as Minister of Labour, mentioned that he had not instructed 
141. 
142 . 
143. 
Pienaar Commission Report, p 478 cf pp '~~fabove 
Native Economic Commission Report UG 22-1932, pp 72-74 
Ballinger, W G "Incitement or procrastination - which?U "4-5 
Ballinger papers, University of the Witwaterand, A410 C1.1.4 
the Board to continue its investigation 
for the reason that the whole matter of the best method of 
procedure in cases such as this in which natives in 
urban areas are solely or almost solely concerned is at 
present under consideration by the Government. 144 
Ballinger claimed that the failure to pursue the matter in parliament 
was linked to the coincidence of other important policy considerations 
at the time. He pointed to the uproar over the Quota Bill 0 f 1930 
which proposed to restrict the entry of East European Jews into the 
country. Ballinger commented bitterly that 
Supporting Zionism and a horne in Palestine for the descen-
dants of the 'outcast tribes', which few of the South 
African sons and daughters of Israel want to see and far 
less live in - L-sic~ is more likely to gain applause 
for the Politician, either seeking to consolidate his 
seat, or even the fickle electorate. than championing the 
cause of the unenfranchised African Native Industrial 
Workers. 145 
The above passage is not as "curious" or as unworthy of further 
, , f 1't ld 146 exam1nat10n as one commentator's treatment 0 wou suggest. 
The question of Jewish immigration casts interesting light on the 
state's priorities. An examination of it reveals that the selfish-
ness of politicians or the fickleness of the electorate were not the 
only factors at play to force African affairs into the background as 
144. 
145. 
146. 
House of Assembly Debates, 1930 c 1587. Reitz's question is 
at c 1586 
Ballinger, W G "Incitement or procrastination - which?" pp 4-5 
Ballinger papers, University of the Witwatersrand, A410 C1.1. 4 
Wickins, P, PhD Thesis, referred to this as a II curious passage", 
but left it at that (p 558 note 2) . The passage and note were 
both excised from the publiShed version of his thesis. 
\ 
Ballinger suggested. Bradlow dealt with the problem of Jewish 
immigration into the Union but tended to ignore the implications of 
t · d " . f t d . d 1 be' 147 res rlcte lmmlgrat10n or ra e unlons an a ur lssues. Anti-
semitic feelings ran high after 1930, partly because white workers fel t 
threatened and partly because the state encouraged restrictions on 
trade unionists who were Jewish and held important positions of 
influence in the labour movements. 148 The Quota Act episode indicated 
that labour issues in general and not only African labour matters in 
particular were at the higher reaches of state priority lists. The 
incident must be seen as part of the broader issue of control, and one 
which was more sensitive in white political circles than the issue 
of Kroonstad's impoverished African labourers. 
Ballinger was also convinced that "a section of the Cabinet 
f... Pirow, for example?_I, backed by a considerable group in the country" 
actively supported a policy of procrastination to let the frustration 
build up and explode. In much the same way that Smuts allegedly 
'let the situation develop' in 1922) for the same reason Africans were 
encouraged by state inaction to react violently so that they could be 
149 
taught a lesson. Whether such cynical intent was the driving force 
behind official thinking is not known, but the turn to increased 
147. Bradlow, E 
Attitudes 
"Immigration into the Union 1910-1948: Policies and 
Part 2 
148 . cf Chapter 1, pp I",..,. above 
149. Statement by W G Ballinger to Native Economic Commission, 1930, 
pp 8-9. Ballinger papers, University of the Witwatersrand, 
A410 C1. 1 .3 
repression and naked force against African workers and their 
organisations during the "white terror" of the 1930s150 is perhaps 
instructive. The Bloemfontein riots preceded the harsher 1930 
Riotous Assemblies Act, for example, whilst Kroonstad and general 
policy were all in the melting pot and coincided with it. 
Specific problems and considerations affected the outcome of 
Wage Board investigations. The Board itself, in the person of Lucas, 
convinced the state that a minimum wage recommendation was the best 
way to settle the dispute in Bloemfontein. The determination 
only established a precedent which was soon acted upon by unskilled 
workers' representatives. The experiences of African workers in 
occupations other than unskilled work, in which they did not necessarily 
predominate were somewhat different. The following section outlines 
how African workers in industries generally reacted to wage determinations 
which covered a number of grades. Thereafter, the two-pronged state 
response to African participation in industrial regulation is considered. 
As noted in chapter one, the late 1920s witnessed the decline of 
th leu d th . f 11 . h' h d' 1 . . d 151 e an e r~se 0 sma er un~ons w ~c operate ma~n y ~n 1n ustry. 
A number of reasons were suggested for the development of the new 
unions, but the existence of the Wage Board influenced the creation of 
150. cf chapter 1, pp~1·~ above 
151. pp IO~-? above 
at least two of them. In early 1928, the Native Bakers' Union was 
in the process of formation on the Witwatersrand' 52 and a temporary 
committee of Africans in the furniture trade was formed in March 
153 
of the same year. This latter committee soon developed into the 
Native Mattress and Furniture Workers' Union. These two unions 
soon set themselves the task of investigating the operation of wage 
determinations in their respecti ve trades. 154 Evasions of the 
determination for the furniture trade spurred the Mattress and Furniture 
155 Workers' Union on to organise a membership drive. A strike was 
organised at the Transvaal Mattress Company in late September 1928 
when it became clear that the determination was not being applied to 
African employees. The strike succeeded when the employers capitu-
lated1~6 Another strike in the same factory just over a year later 
involved about 200 African workers whom downed tools over the same 
issue as the previous year. The strike failed to secure the workers' 
152. Umsebenzi 17 February 1928. Bolitho incorrectly cites the date 
as 17 August 1928, "The South African Wage Board, 1925-1945" 
P 22 note 2 
153. Umsebenzi 2 March 1928 Bolitho, ibid, P 12 
154. Umsebenzi 22 June 1928 
155. ibid, 22 August 1928 
156. ibid, 24 October 1928 
demands, this time partly because the white employees failed to 
honour a mutual aid agreement accepted by the two parallel unions in 
the trade, and partly because of police action . Strikers were arrested, 
the Coloureds and Indians among them released and the African employees 
were charged under the Master and Servants Act. The labour force 
was thus effectively split. 157 The Native Bakers' Union. for its 
part, fought hard to maintain the determined wages after the determina-
tion had been declared invalid. 158 Their efforts were not successful. 
Other unions involved in policing wage determinations were the 
Clothing Workers' Union159 and the Laundry Workers union. 160 Similarly, 
Indian laundry workers were organised in Johannesburg and Durban 
following wide-scale infringements of determinations for the trade. 
By the end of January 1929 Benoni and Krugersdorp boasted a paid-up 
membership of 250. 161 
The machinery of the Wage Board and its method of procedure 
made determinations of minimum wages more accessible to all classes 
of workers. Up until 1930 it was not fettered by the type of regis-
tration problem under the Industrial Conciliation Act, and neither was 
157. ibid, 30 November 1929. cf also Lewis J J "The New Unionism" in 
Webster, E Essays in Southern African Labour History pp 134-135 
158 . 
159. 
160. 
161. 
Umsebenzi 24 October 1928 
ibid, 31 January 1929; 30 January, 21 August and 13 November 1931. 
Lewis, J "The New Unionism" in Webster, E Essays in Southern 
African Labour History p 135 
Umsebenzi 31 October 1929; 31 October, 21 November, 28 November 
1930. Lewis, ibid, p 135 
Umsebenzi 31 January 1929 
it permitted to dictate minima in overtly racial terms. Because it 
was easier for African workers to work through the Board, they were 
encouraged to organise to draw up demands. Because employers were 
determined not to enforce determinations, Africans had to use unions to 
police determinations and secure their enforcement via any means at 
their disposal. Partly because the fears expressed in 1925 that 
minimum wage regulation would encourage unionisation with all its 
concanitant 'horrors' had come true, and partly because the state did 
not desire, for the reasons outlined above, the "upliftment" of 
African workers, some method had to be employed to halt the increased 
utilisation of the Wage Board and the increased organisation of 
African workers in general. This the state achieved in an essentially 
three pronged attack on African workers. The one, the increased use 
Ib/o.., 
of repression was discussed in chapter one. The other two methods 
by which Africans were essentially removed from the ambit of the Wage 
Act form the main concern here. 
Even before the fate of the Kroonstad investigation became known, 
the state took steps to prevent as far as possible further applications 
to the Wage Board on behalf of African unskilled workers. The regula-
tions of 1926 which outlined the procedure which applicants for Wage 
Board investigations had to follow were amended in 1929 and promulgated 
in January 1930. The new method of application required that 
supporters of an application which issued from a non-registered associa-
tion had to sign a memorandum which accompanied the applicatian. 162 
The introduction of the separate form of application successfully 
excluded the vast mass of unskilled workers, most of whom were 
illi terate. Thus, even though the Appeal Court ruled in March 1930 that 
163 the Wage Board could not discriminate at allan racial grounds, 
unskilled African workers as a class had effectively been removed from 
any protection under the Wage Act. Applications for unskilled workers 
of the type which had issued from Bloemfontein, Durban and Kroonstad 
effectively became a thing of the past. Lucas commented in 1932 that 
no applications from Africans had been received "since the promulgation 
f th d d l · 164 o e amen e regu atl.cns!' Once the state had settled the 
problem of African applications, it sought to remove the large body of 
African workers whose wages were covered by determinations in industries 
like furniture, baking, confectionary, leather and clothing. 
The Acting-Secretary for Native Affairs informed the Board in 
September 1930 that it ought to refrain from recommending wages for 
162. Reproduced as Appendix A, p ~~ below. cf ch 3, p ''1f above 
163 . R vs Lewin (1930 AD 344) at 350-1 cf ch 5, pp10t-3above 
164 . Lucas's addendum to Native Economic Commission Report, UG 22-1932 
P 223; also quoted in Industrial Legislation Commission Report, 
UG 6 2-1951, pp 196-7 
Africans, notwithstanding the difficulty such selective recommenda-
tion would entail. Grade II employees were the class of employee 
affected as they were "mainly, if not wholly, unskilled Natives".165 
In October the Board received a stronger notice from the Department of 
Labour. Its attention was drawn to the establishment of the Native 
Economic Commission, 
the scope of whose work will cover Native interest in 
industry and elsewhere. The investigation in question 
is of far-reaching importance, and it is not the wish of 
the Government to anticipate its finding by using in the 
meantime the machinery instituted under the Wage Act for 
the purpose of regulating the wages in occupations in 
which Natives mainly are employed. This being the case, 
it would be advisable for the Wage Board to consider 
whether, in making recommendation under any reference 
under the Wage Act, it should not reserve its recommenda-
tion in regard to. classes of employment in which Natives 
in considerable numbers are affected, and deal i n the 
meantime with other classes. of employment covered by 
references issued by the Minister. 166 
It will be noticed that the Government spokesmen were careful not 
to exclude Africans per se, but rather those classes of labour in which 
Africans predominated. Thus the Appeal Court ruling mentioned above 
165. Acting-Secretary for Native Affairs - Wage Board, letter received 
26 September 1930, guoted in the report of the Wage Board for the 
Baking and Confectionary trade, 31 October 1930, An 122-1931 
166. Secretary for Labour - Wage Board, letter received 24 October 1930, 
quoted in the report of the Wage Board for the Baking and Confec-
tionery trade , 31 October 1930, An 122-1931 . The Minister ' s 
instruction was mentioned briefly in the 1931 WBR P 50 
would not be challenged and the Board's own dictum that employers 
could not be "classified as natives or non-natives though they may 
be rightly classified / sicJ as skilled or unskilled . ,,167 came into 
play . The Board was instructed, in effect, to discriminate against 
Africans in terms acceptable under the Act. It was fully aware of 
the change in policy and the effects it would have. In its report 
on the baking and confectionery trade it stressed again that it could 
not discriminate. But it toed the line by amending its recommendation 
to exclude persons engaged in a variety of occupations, the vast 
.. f h f . 168 ma]Or1ty 0 w om were A r1cans. Africans were excluded in this 
manner from its recommendations for employees engaged in chemists, 
fresh produce and general dealers stores and premises licenced to sell 
bottled liquor. 169 IJo<ker5 . employed by shop keepers and newspaper 
publishers as motor transport drivers as well as employees involved in 
the transport of explosives and fuel were likewise excluded. 170 
The Board conceded that such exclusion could lead to their employment 
"under conditions less favourable than those now obtaining. 11171 
167. cf ch 5, pp kif- ff above 
168. An 122-1931 
169. Report of the Wage Board for the Commercial Distributive Trade, 
17 March 1931 An 557-1931. Also excluded were (white) 
apprentices under the Pharmacy Act, 1928, travellers, part-time 
bookkeepers, etc. 
170. Report of the Wage Board for Motor Driving Occupations, 9 December 
1936, An 138-1937 
171. An 122-1931 
, .. 
The state decided to forestall the further application of wage 
regulating apparatus to Africans in occupations in which they 
predominated. Its reluctance to regulate African wages was evidenced 
during the conference which finally agreed to ask the Minister to set 
the Wage Board in motion in Bloemfontein. The Holloway Commission was 
appointed in June 1930 to report on the general economic position of 
Africans in the Union. Pending its report, the state issued instructions 
that the Wage Board ought not to recommend wages for unskilled, largely 
African, labourers. The Commission reported in February 1932, but it 
was divided in its views. That division was rooted mainly in differences 
of opinion concerning the practicability or otherwise of the extension 
of wage regulation to African, unskilled, labour. 
The majority argued that wage regulation in urban areas would 
tend to increase the present rate of urbanisation and industrialisation 
of Africans which would lead in turn to increased unemployment in towns. 
The burden on local authorities to provide additional housing would be 
excessive. Migration to cities and towns furthermore would lead to a 
drain of farm labour which would cause the farming community hardship . 
The majority concluded that the African should be catered for in the 
reserves and that more stress should be laid on the development of those 
172 
areas. 
172. UG 22-1932, pp 147-148 
The minority contested the assumptions made by the " " 173 ma]Or1ty. 
The influx question was dealt with in some detail with regard to the 
Bloemfontein determination. The minority accepted that Africans 
naturally preferred jobs in industry as compared to mining and farming. 
especially if wages were better. No evidence could be adduced that the 
increase in wages in Bloemfontein had led to an influx of Africans from 
rural areas to the city. The Manager of the Bloemfontein Native 
Administration Department reported in August 1931 that "the figures 
point to a decrease during the past three months . " Furthermore, the 
minority claimed that Kroonstad, which did not have a determination, 
h d "d I t" It" t" th I f t" 174 a exper1ence a lire a l.ve y grea er" m1.gra 1.on an B oem on e1n. 
During the Wage Board's investigation at Bloemfontein the Ieu had stated 
that an influx "may easily happen II but reassured those concerned with 
the assertation that the Ieu would 
urge our people to consent to reasonable measures by the 
Municipality to prevent an influx when there is already a 
sufficiency of labour to do the work of the town. 175 
It is important to stress that the 1923 Urban Areas Act did not 
make provision for influx control as such. An amendment to the Act 
173. The minority consisted of R W Anderson, FA W Lucas and A W Roberts; 
the majority consisted of J E Holloway, HeM Fourie, A M Mostert, 
and P W Ie R van Niekerk. 
174. UG 22-1932, pp 154-155 
175. Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Bloemfontein 
30 April 1928. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
1 (17) June 1928 
in 1930 "laid down that the urban local authority could refuse entry 
to any 'female Native' if there was no accommodation in the urban area." 
It was only in 1937 under the Native Laws Amendment Act that a policy 
of influx control, linked to the urban labour requirements, was intro-
176 duced. One of the problems the majority of the commissioners were 
concerned with was the "intensive campaign of reclamation of Native 
slums" and the adverse effects an influx would have on it: 77The Johannes-
burg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, for example, had argued that 
an adjustment of wages was necessary to help alleviate the financial 
problems of local authorities, especially those connected with housing. 
Rentals were too high in proportion to the wages received and rnunicipa-
Ii ties operated uneconornically. The Joint Council concluded that 
"Industry and Commerce are benefitting at the expense of ·both the 
, , 1" d h ' k 178 munl.cl.pa l.tl.es an t e natl.ve war ers. II Anderson, Lucas and 
Roberts argued along similar lines but stressed that African efficiency 
would have to be increased to offset the increase in their wages. 179 
For the most part, the views of both groups of commissioners were 
based on claims and counterclaims. What is clear is that the whole 
question of whether African wages should be regulated was at the 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. 
Davenport and Hunt, The Right to the Land, p 72 docs 114 and 116 
UG 22-1932 P 148 
Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Bloemfontein, 
30 April 1928. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
UG 22-1932 P 151 
forefront of debates between policy makers. Linked to that question 
was the larger one of what machinery should be used to regulate their 
wages. 
The Wage Board submitted to the Minister's instruction not to 
recommend wages for unskilled labourers in certain trades. 180 The 
Board, following Lucas's opinion that the Wage Act should be applied 
to Africans, refused to entertain appeals to alter the Bloemfontein 
determination. The majority of the Holloway Commission did not find 
"any good ground for departing from the well-established maxim that 
more expensive things are used less freely." but the Board was not 
convinced by employers's arguments that they would employ more workers 
at lower rates of pay. It further discounted claims for a reduction 
based on the fall in the cost of living during the depression. It 
argued that although prices had fallen to a level which enabled some 
people to purchase goods in fairly large quantities, the same was not 
true for Africans. Africans were generally 
180. 
181. 
182. 
183. 
compelled by circumstances to make their purchases in 
very small quantities, which adds considerably to the 
price which they have to pay, and in fact goes far to 
neutralise any reduction that may generally have been 
made in the prices of goods. 183 
cf p !f'o,,, above 
UG 22-1932 P 148 
Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Bloemfontein 
27 April 1932. An 109-1933 
ibid 
The Board's actions in this regard finally indicated that the 
f ' ' k' db' 184 Bloem onte~n award as W~C 1ns state J was an a errat10n. 
One concern of the advocates of generalised wage regulation 
was to prevent the debasement of higher paid white workers to lower 
levels. The depression did not hit the Union's economic infrastructure 
as badly as it could have, had not the rationalisation of business 
and the mechanisation of industry, not least as a result of state 
intervention, occurred. The end of the depression, the formation 
of the Fusion Government, the rise of black trade unions and the crisis 
within white labour politics, all these factors contributed to changing 
the rationale which lay behind economic planning. Gradually, after 
the initial setback of the depression years, the 'advancement' school 
of thought, those people who adhered to notions of upgrading the 
wages of the lower class of employees gained the ascendancy. Their 
motives were somewhat different to those of their predecessors. 
A far greater concentration on questions like the importance of the 
African consumer market and the necessary containment of worker 
organisation and strike activity became prime factors behind economic 
, 185 plann~ng. The switch in policy was exemplified in the decline of 
the Wage Board as an instrument of so-called white labour or skilled 
labour advancement and the tendency to return to and extend the 
184. Wickins, P The reu p 183 
machinery of the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
The year 1935 represents, in many ways, a turning point in 
the development of wage regulation in the Union. The Van Reenen 
Commission investigating industrial legislation reported and Lucas 
resigned as Chairman of the Wage Board at the end of its second 
term of office. The Commission reported against a national minimum 
wage but strongly supported arguments for increased wages for 
unskilled workers. The report asserted that the sm~l, essentialiy 
white, home market, already an adverse factor on economic growth, 
was further hampered by racial discrimination. Cheap African labour 
had "a retarding effect upon the introduction of improvement in 
L-industrialJ organisation and technique." The commissioners 
disagreed with a Poor White Conference recommendation that the 
Wage Board should be empowered to fix ratics between "civilised" 
and lIuncivilised" labourers. They urged the repeal of the 
'civilised wage clause', section 3(3) of the Act, and concluded 
that the solution to the poor white problem lay, inter alia, in the 
improvement of "the general level of wages for workers in the lower-
paid occupations. It The prevalent idea of the depression years, 
that wage reduction was the means towards economic recovery, was 
declared dispelled by the commission. 186 These opinions were not 
new. The Unemployment Commission, for example, had reported in 
932 1 . . 1 l' 187 1 a ong S1m1 ar 1nes. The Durban Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in 1934 and 1935 respectively had also recommended "that 
serious consideration. be given to the question of increasing the 
186. UG37-1935 pp 46, 38,52, 113, 59, 60 
187. UG 36-1932 
" 
" 
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wages of Natives." The importance of the Van Reenen Commission 
report lay in its synthesis of the ideas of the 'advancement' school 
of thought in the Union at the time. The amendments to the Wage 
Act largely arose as a result of the Commission's findings. Against 
this background, the state's action vis-a-vis unskilled worke~ls 
wages after 1935 becomes more explicable. 
The Wage Board received two references in September 1936 
for two groups of unskilled workers in the Cape Town area. The 
first covered unskilled work on bridge building J excavation works, 
demolition sites and the prepartion of sites for new construction. 
It excluded people employed in those occupations in the building, 
quarrying and/or stone crushing, brickmaking and/or tilemaking and 
road making industries. Employees in the latter industries were 
189 
covered by the second reference. The references were issued after 
complaints from the Master Builders' Association that contractors 
operating in the field undercut the wage paid to employees not 
covered by determinations or agreements. H W Tindall, the Board's 
secretary stated in January 1937 that "the particularly heavy 
programme of work" it had on hand precluded it from beginning its 
't l' d t 190 enqu1ry a an ear 1er a e. In the event the Board reported in 
188. Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Durban 
An' 584-1939 
189. Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Cape Town, 
An 52-1938ii and Report of the Wage Board, Quarrying and/or 
Stonecrushing, Brickmaking and/or Tile-making, Road-making (Cape) 
An 82-1938ii. The references were dated 22 September 1936 
190. Tindall - Ballinger 20 January 1937. Ballinger Papers, University 
of the Witwatersrand, A410 C2.3.11 file 1 
January 1938 that a determination would be advantageous in both 
areas. In terms of the new Act of 1937 the Board further reported 
that no class of employee covered by a determination would receive 
191 
a 'civilised' wage. 
William Ballinger also returned to the fray in September 1936 . 
He asked the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, APJ Fourie,192 
to instruct the Board to investigate the wages of "semi-skilled" 
and "unskilled" workers in the Johannesburg magisterial district and 
th · d t " d . 1 193 e W1twatersran -Pre orla 1n ustrla area . A request was made 
on behalf of lIa number of Non-European Organisations"J which included 
the All African Convention J the African Dairy Workers' Union and the 
African Native I-sic 7 Building Industrial Union, for adults who 
191. Ans 52 and 82-1938 ii. The term "unskilled" was defined to 
include -"the whole or any portion of any of the following 
operations : - (i) loosening, taking out and removing stone 
and soil; (ii) cutting down, aestroying and removing trees 
and vegetation; (iii) shovelling materials into and removing 
them from mortar or cement mixing machines, and mixing mortar 
or concrete by hand with shovel~ ; (iv) loading and unloading 
materials; (v) carrying and moving mortar, bricks, stone, 
concrete or any other materials; (vi) dismantling, destroying 
and removing any portions of a building and other structure." 
An 52-1938 ii 
192. The Department of Labcur changed its name in 1935. As with the 
separation of Industry from the Department of Mines and .Industries 
and its allocation to a new Department of Commerce and Industry in 
1933, so the extension of the jurisdiction to Social Welfare was 
symptomatic of an alteration in South Africa's social framework. 
The expansion of industry, the acknowledgement of the necessity of 
trained, healthy personnel as a result of the relative shortage 
created by the intrusion of another labour market into the dual 
economics of mining and agriculture, can be seen on the macro 
level by the rationalisation of state organs of control . 
193. Ballinger-Fourie, 24 November 1936. Ballinger Papers, Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand, A410 C.2.3.6. file 1. Summaries of 
the contents of this letter can be found in UG 44-1937, 
pp 51-2, and in W G Ballinger, "Industrial Report October _ 
December 1936," Friends of Africa. Ballinger Papers, Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand A410 C.l .1.6. pp 4-5. 
. ' 
received £6.10 per month or less, whether in land or cash. 
Ballinger appealed for a minimum wage of £6.10s per month for males 
because that was the minimum amount IIproved by 'Family Budgets' on 
which the average African Native family can be maintained." He 
used the desperate plight of white girls who were paid well below 
that level in certain indus tries as the carrot with which to coax 
Fourie into action. He argued that the spirit of the times, as 
ev;~~~e~ by the Industrial Legislation and Holloway Commissions, 
favoured increasing unskilled wages. The SATLC, the Joint Councils 
and other organisations supported such moves. Ballinger further 
claimed that even Cabinet ministers had remarked in worried tones 
at the failure of industry and commerce to raise the wages of their 
lower-paid workers. The Ministers' concern, according to Ballinger, 
arose from 
their belief that the future of South African industry 
depends on the exclusion of existing markets and the 
opening of new markets I and "their conviction that this 
can only be done by increasing the spending capacity of 
the poorest section of the community 194 
Considerations other than the purely economic that Ballinger 
mentioned included the unhealthy growth of juvenile delinquency, 
IIgeneral criminal tendencies among the country I s urban population II j 
d d f ·· d' d t 1 . . 195 an "e l.cl.ency .lseases ue a rna nutrltl.On". These problems 
were "cancerous growths" which resulted from neglect because mothers 
had to find work to supplement the family's difient income; action 
194. ibid 
195 . ibid 
which in the long run proved fruitless. The Wage Board's attention 
had been drawn to the social problems of lower-paid workers during 
its Bloemfontein investigation. The Johannesburg Joint Council 
report on urban budgets, for example, revealed that "inadequate 
nutrition" had"a great deal to do" with the high infant mortality 
f . 196 rate among A r1cans. 
Whereas some employers had accepted the severity of the situation 
and ra i sed wages many had not, and Ballinger urged the Minister to 
bring the others into line. The matter received the Minister's 
"consideration,,197 but eventually was turned down. The refusal 
was couched in the familiar terms of previous applications. It 
was a general one and did not specify trades and industries. 
Furthermore, the Minister claimed that unskilled workers were covered 
by a number of determinations and industrial council agreements. 
The point was also stressed that with no specifications made, the 
call for a general minimum wage was impossible due to such considera-
tions as the ability of businesses to carryon their trade success-
fully. The point was made that 
the necessity for regulating the wages of unskilled workers 
has for a considerable period occupied the attention of 
this Department, which endeavours to ensure that all wage 
196 . Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Bloemfontein 
30 April 1928. Social and Industrial Review (Special Edition) 
1 (1 7) June 1928 
197. Walker - Ballinger, 28 November 1936, Ballinger Papers, 
University of the Witwatersrand, A410 C2.3.11 file 1 
regulating measures contain suitable provision for 
every grade of worker, and in certain instances 
the Honourable the Minister has refused to give 
legal effect to Industrial Council Agreements which 
contained inadequate provision for unskilled workers. 198 
The Minister's reasons were received with drappointment and 
justified scepticism. The reply contained, in effect, a licence 
for sweating labour and the Minister'.s concern for unskilled workers 
was clearly a transparent fabrication in favour of skilled workers. 199 
Ballinger once again warned the Government that their action played 
. h h d f th . d' 1 . 200 ~nto t e an 5 0 e "Nat~ve ra ~ca sect~on. II 
Ballinger's failure to get the Minister to issue a reference 
to the Board did not indicate that the government still operated 
on Kroonstad principles. The Minister's objections essentially were 
correct : the correct method of application would have been for 
Ballinger to present a memorandum which bore the signatures of 
those people on whose behalf he applied. Alternatively, the Minister 
could have taken heed of his concern and issued a reference anyhow, 
but the Minister chose to await the results to the Cape Town 
. . t. 201 ~nvest~ga ~on. 
198. Walker - Ballinger, 14 December, 1936, Ballinger Paper, 
University of the witwatersrand A410 C2.3.11 file 1 
199. Ballinger, Industrial Report, October-December 1936 to 
Friends of Africa, p 5. Ballinger Papers, University of Wit-
watersrand, A410 C1.1.6 
200. 
201 . 
Ballinger - Walker, 30 December 1936, Ballinger Papers, University 
of the Witwatersrand, A410 C2.3.11 file 1 
Department of Labour Annual Report, 1936, UG 44-1937, P 52 
Ivan Walker, secretary for labour, writing in the shadow of the new 
Act which removed, inter alia, the regulation which required non-
registered applicants to sign applications and the civlised wage 
clause, emphasised that 
the Department is alive to the necessity for taking active 
steps to raise the wage rated of the lower-paid workers in 
industry, as recommended by the Industrial Legislation 
Commission, and has for some time past directed its efforts 
to that end. 202 
The first investigations into unskilled wages after the passage 
of the new Wage Act in 1937 were the two in Cape Town, which have 
already been dealt with, and one in Durban. The Durban investigation, 
as with the Cape Town ones, had its origins in pre-1937 Wage Act 
accunences and it is thus ]:,eptinent to a discussion of the period 
under review .. 
It was noted above that the Durban Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry had recommended that "serious consideration be given to the 
. f' f . 203 questlon 0 lncreasing the wages 0 Natlves./I In 1937, the 
annual congress of Chambers of Commerce called for 
202. 
203. 
"the establishment of a minimum wage for Natives employed in 
urban areas ... through the medium of a representative confer-
ence convened by the MInisters of Labour and Native Affairs .. " 
Walker - Ballinger,S October 1937, Ballinger Papers, University 
of Witwatersrand, A410 C2.3.11 file 1 
cf pp tt t&' ~ abcve 
The 21st Annual Convention of the South African Federated Chambers 
of Industries resolved that a minimum wage ought to be l egislated 
for Africans "engaged in industrial and commercial undertakings, 
including local and provincial governments. It would appear 
that these calls were made out of a desire for stability and uniformity 
in the wage structure of the Union. In early 1937, the stevedores 
and dock-workers struck. Further trouble broke out in August. 
A large number of African workers gathered at the Bantu Social Centre 
in the town and addressed a resolution to the Native Commissioner, 
the City Council and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The 
resolution stated that "in spite of the general property of the 
country, the Native had not been affected and is still receiving the 
same wages as during the depression H and called for a Union-wide 
minimum wage . The City Council reacted in September 1937 by calling 
a round-table conference comprised of the Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, Master Builders, Forwarding Agents and "larger employers of 
labour. II The following resolution was passed and forwarded to the 
Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker: 
This meeting representing large employers of labour views 
with concern the growing unrest amongst Native labourers, mainly 
created by the absence of any wage controlled by law. The 
Government is, therefore, requested to appoint a Commission 
to go into the general question of Native wages and better-
ment of labour conditions on a national basis with the minimum 
of delay. 204 
204. Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Durban, 
An 584-1939. The trades included brick and/ or tilemaking; 
quarrying and/ or stonecrushingi roadmaki ngi timber; distilling; 
manufacturing cement and/ or cement products; bridgebuilding or 
concrete engineering; excavation and/or levelling of ground; 
preparation of sites for buildings or other structures; 
demolition of building; municipal undertakings; transportation 
of goods and/ or passengers; mineral water manufacturing; petrol 
and oil trade; printing and newspaper industry; the brewing 
industry, and stevedoring. 
, 
\: 
The request for a commission was turned down on the grounds that 
it was unnecessary) II in view of the machinery which exists for the 
determination of minimtun wages and conditions of employment. II 
The Minister considered that the amended legislation embodied 
the recommendatiornof the Van Reenen Commission. He suggested 
that "the problem which has arisen at Durban is one which would 
205 
most appropriately be dealt with by the Wage Board." The 
Minister instructed the Board to investigate the position of 
unskilled workers in 17 occupations. The reference covered 
f . 206 14 301 workers, 76% of whom were A r~cans. An investigation 
into the wages and conditions of unskilled labourers was thus 
inaugurated in Cape Town before the new Act came into force 
but were only completed after its promulgation. Further inves-
tigations were instituted in Cape Town. Durban, Port Elizabeth and 
East London shortly afterwards. In this way, the state conceded 
that the regulation of unskilled labourers was to lie with the 
Wage Board in terms of the new Act which had removed the essential 
impediments to the utilisation of the old Act by African unskilled 
workers: the 1930 regulation and section 3(3), the civilised wage 
clause.. The 1937 Wage Act was "used extensively to improve the 
wages and conditons of employment" of Africans. Down to 1948 
determinations covered "at least 198 324 II Africans. 207 
205. 
206. 
207. 
Walker - Ballinger, 5 October 1937, Ballinger Papers, Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand, A 410, C2.3.11 file 1 
Report of the Wage Board, Unskilled Employment, Durban 
An 584-1939, cf also An 13-1940 
Industrial Legislation Commission Report UG 62-1951, P 197 
The main features of the Wage Board's relation to African 
workers can now be traced. The leu gave its qualified support to 
the Wage Act when it was promulgated. A number of applications 
were made to the Board as part of a larger, country-wide leu 
campaign to obtain increased wages of workers generally . The 
state was reluctant to allow machinery, which it had ostensibly 
created for the 'benefit' and control of white labour, to be used 
by African unskilled workers. The state agreed to activate the 
Wage Board in Bloemfontein mainly because the conference on Africans 
in industry considered that the troubles there were caused largely 
by poor wages and working conditions. leu applications in Durban 
were delayed pending the results of the Bloemfontein investigation. 
When the Board reported that it could not recommend 'civilised', 
wages the Minister failed to instruct it to recommend wages it 
deemed fit. The apparent success unskilled workers achieved in 
Bloemfontein further encouraged organisations to apply for Wage 
Board investigations. State reluctance in general and Free State 
opposition in particular resulted in the failure of the most hope-
ful application, the Kroonstad unskilled reference, to achieve a 
determination, even along the lines of the Bloemfontein compromise . 
Applications from other centres were also not entertained. 
State authorities were reluctant to provide Africans with practically 
any semblance of rights in urban areas, or with means to encourage 
their urbanisation in a climate stimulated by African worker 
organisation. The depression added to the reasons to remove 
Africans from wage regulation for the prevalent economic thinking 
of the time was based on a belief that reductions in wages was the 
only way to get out of the economic morass. The peculiar nature 
of state organisation in South Africa, linked to the fact that 
African workers, formed the vast bulk of the unskilled labour force 
in the country, meant that Africans in general and workers in 
particular were more prejudiced by state policies than white 
workers. 
The removal of Africans from wage regulating instruments was 
effected in two ways. First, Champion-style applicatio~ appli-
cations on behalf of unskilled workers as a class of employee, were 
acted against. Amendments to the regulations which detailed the 
precise application procedure were put into effect in January 1930. 
It now became necessary for employees or employers who were not 
registered under the Industrial COnciliation Act to sign a suppor-
tive memorandum attached to any application made to the Board on 
their behalf. As Africans were mainly excluded from the scope 
of the Conciliation Act and because they were discriminated against 
educationally, they were largely illiterate. Thus applications 
to the Board on their behalf became phenomena of the past. But 
Africans were also covered by investigations and determinatiorein 
trades which employed large numbers of whites. These were trades, 
like sweet-making, furniture making, and baking, that were selected 
for increased white employment. One problem that was initially 
experienced with the Industrial Conciliation Act was that the 
exclusion of pass-bearing Africans from its ambit resulted in the 
displacement of whites for Africans. That Act was amended in 
1 , 
1930 to permit Industrial Councils to extend their agreements 
to cover non-employees in terms of the Act. The utilisation of 
the Wage Act to prevent employers from discrimination against 
more expensive white employees thus became redundant. The 
Supreme Court ruled in March 1930 that the Board could not 
discriminate against employees in terms of race. The Wage Board 
was instructed towards the end of 1930 not to recommend wages for 
grade II employees, who were, in the main. African workers. By 
the simple policy instruction from the Minister, a large number of 
Africans who were employed in trades for which new references 
were issued were excluded from the 'benefits' of any recommendation 
made by the Board. Africans in these trades had for their part 
to resort as in the past to strike action and trade union organisation 
to enforce determinations which affected them. But the effective 
removal of large numbers of African workers from the scope of 
new determinations operated against further trade union action 
because there was no longer anything to enforce as such. The 
combined use of the two measures mentioned here with increased 
repression meted out by the state partly explains the demise of 
African trade unions during the early 'thirties. 
Towards the end of the depression it became clear that policy ' 
makers were divided on the merits of economic doctrines that 
stipulated that wage reduction was a palliative to economic distress. 
By 1935 the 'advancement' school which argued that the wages 
of lower paid workers should be raised in the interests of 
economic expansion and the development of internal markets had 
won the day. state officials and interested parties in the country 
turned their attention back to the position of African unskilled 
workers. Against the background of changing economic thinking, 
renewed African union organisation and the co-option of white workers 
under the colour bar industrial council system, the system of wage 
regulation was altered. African unskilled workers after 1937 
were largely dealt with under the new Wage Act which did away with 
the 'civilised' wage clause and the 'literacy' regulation of 1930. 
White workers were encapsulated more under the new Industrial 
Conciliation Act which, unlike the Wage Act, institutionalised 
collective bargaining mechanisms and organised trade union adminis-
tration. In this way the workforce was more effectively split into 
its racial components and Africans were excluded from an institu-
tionalised trade union dominated industrial relations system. 
431 
CXlNCLUSION 
Modern South African history has been .analysed from a number of 
different perspectives. A major problem which scholars have 
attempted to unravel is the origins and role of the system of racial 
discrimination which permeates every aspect of the South African way 
of life. 
One group of commentators argued that the system arose and became 
entrenched as a result of the combined effects of the racial prejudices 
of white workers and state intervention in the operation of a free 
market economy. African subordination in particular and black 
retrogression in general were attributed to irrational constraints 
which were placed on the economy. This conservative view was 
modified by liberal analysts who argued that employers had reaped 
some benefits from the system of racial discrimination. Prejudice 
alone was therefore not seen as the sole cause of racism. They 
argued that the future development of the economic system was 
endangered by the entrenchment of a system whereby one group (whites) 
were artificially supported. Radical scholars challenged these early 
interpretations when they argued that a direct relationship existed 
between the peculiar nature of the South African situation and the 
course of economic development. They attempted to explain the 
racism of white workers, rather than describe it, and they outlined 
how employers adjusted themselves to demands from white labour . 
They discovered that racism and racial discrimination were entrenched 
and promoted by the way that capitalism operated in South Africa. 
Racial discrimination became a necessary element in the course of 
economic development in the Union. 
The arguments and debates about the role of racial discrimination 
in South African development revolved around issues like the colour 
bar in industry and state intervention in economic affairs. The 
Wage Act of 1925 was but one brick in the foundation of the South 
African industrial relations edifice. It formed part of the 
civilised labour apparatus which discriminated against blacks, and 
introduced into industry the concept of compulsory wage regulation. 
An analysis of the Act can shed light on the origins and the role 
of racial discrimination in South Africa. 
The Wage Act operated as an element of the civilised labour 
policy. This policy was adopted in the face of the social problem 
of poor whites. Although poor whites in towns were not a phenomenon 
unique to the 1920s,governments prior to 1924 had not really tackled 
the problem. They presented a threat to the general security and 
stability of the state. As voters they could and did influence the 
fortunes of ruling parties, as indigents they threatened to debase 
society 
ential strikers. 
and as unskilled workers they were seen as pot-
Earlier governments had relied. on providing a , 
limited number of poor whites with jobs in government service and the 
institution of afforestation schemes and relief works. The mining 
industry was loath to employ any more whites than it absolutely had to. 
Its peculiar cost structure and the high cost of white labour 
dictated that it depended on a host of cheaper African labour and 
a small number of highly paid white miners. 
South African industrial undertakings were given a tremendous 
boost by the First World War. Both prior to and after the war South 
African manufacturers had to compete on international and domestic 
markets with goods produced more cheaply by the highly capitalised 
countries of the capitalist world. A system of tariff protection 
was introduced to protect and encourage the growth of South African 
industries. The Smuts government was reluctant to pursue tariff 
protection policies vigorously because of mining house and commercial 
fears that prices would be raised to artificial heights. The 
local commercial, manufacturing and entrepreneurial farming communities 
urged the extension of tariffs. After the disastrous 1922 Rand 
Revolt, the voice of labour was joined by the other lobbies in de-
nunciation of Smuts's policies. Different and contradictory 
constituencies voted together and Smuts's government was replaced 
by a Nationalist-Labour Party Pact coalition in June 1924. 
Economic good fortune assisted the Hertzog government in its 
early years. The tariff was extended with the express provision 
that beneficiaries sInlld etploy rrore >.bites. '!he problan of the higher 
cost of white labour in the private sector was thus borne directly 
by secondary industry. 
The Wage Act formed the third leg of the civilised labour 
stool in the private sector . The Apprenticeship Act, which laid down 
a minimum educational qualification linked toa~ age-limit which 
favoured whites, and the Industrial Conciliation Act which excluded 
pass-bearing Africans and indentured Indians from its scope, were 
both taken over and administered unchanged by the new government . 
The Wage Act did not overtly discriminate against people of colour. 
It operated on an equal work, equal pay basis in the unorganised 
sections of industry. The Conciliation Act presupposed a degree 
of organisation of both employers and employees and operated on a 
voluntary agreement principal. The Conciliation Act was not 
suitable as an instrument to promote the employment of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers. It protected skilled workers who dominated 
trade unions from the encroachment of other classes of labour, whether 
black or white. The Wage Act, aimed primarily at the unorganised trades 
in which unskilled and semi~skilled operatives were contracted, became 
the vehicle for the advancement of white labour employment until after 
the Great Depression. 
The Wage Act made provision for the establishment of a national 
Wage Board which could be sub-divided if circumstances necessitated 
such action. It comprised at least three members, including a 
Chairman, appointed by the Minister of Labour. During its term of 
office the Board was staffed by civil servants like Roberts, van der 
Horst and Mc Gregor, or by people who were well acquainted with 
labour and trade union matters, like its first chairman, Lucas. 
The Wage Board was not permitted to discriminate in terms of race 
or colour, and its recommendations covered all employees except those 
included in specific categories. These included agricultural workers, 
employees in domestic service, gov ernment servants, convict labourers 
and certain employees whose terms of employment were governed by 
agreements under the Industrial conciliation Act. The Beard had to 
follow strict rules of procedure which proved more of a hindrance 
than a boon until they were simplified by an amendment in 1930. 
The Board had to take a number of factors into consideration when 
. . it made recommendations to the Minister. Two of the more important 
ones were : first, the Beard could not recommend wages without the 
Minister's instruction if it felt it could not recommend civilised 
wages to all employees in any trade. In terms of government 
policy, a civilised wa:J'! was interpreted as the wage upon which employees 
could enjoy white standards of living. Second, it had to be convinced 
that the trade or industry could carry the increased wage bill . 
The Beard was fully aware of the discriminatory effect wage 
regulation hal. inteIms of the l\ct. It was practically impossible for 
the Beard to ignore the incredibly wide gap between the wages of 
unskilled African workers and highly paid skilled white workers. The 
vast number of determinations issued on the basis of Wage Beard recom-
mendations raised intermediate wage levels to well above the unskilled 
rate with the effect that more whites were employed in those categories. 
In effect, adult African males were generally displaced by adult white 
females and white juveniles. White males dominated the higher range 
of the wage ladder. Furthe.r ... '~ , the Board pursued its white 
labour policy during its investigations . It continually made 
statements about the possibilities of increased white employment, 
and earmarked a number of trades as potential white reserves. 
The clearest indication that the board was used to promote 
white employment can be found in the administration of supplementary 
determinations. These were determinations which buttressed industrial 
council agreements . Shortly after the promulgation of industrial 
council agreements it was discovered that many employers discharged 
white workers who fell under the terms of the new agreements 
and replaced them with African workers who were excluded from the 
scope of the Act and hence the wage requirements of the agreements. 
Half of the Board's work prior to 1930 was devoted to issuing supp-
lernentary recommendations. The Board ruled t hat employees excluded 
from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act were a class 
of employee in terms of the Wage Act . It was thus able to issue 
recommendations which fell in line with the council agreements. 
Employers could no longer employ Africans at lower wages. White 
workers were thus protected from displacement by lower paid Africans . 
The Conciliation Act was amended in 1930 to enable industrial councils 
to extend the terms of agreements to cover employees excluded from 
the Act if they thought the objects of the agreements would be 
defeated. 
Not all supplementary investigations were meant to favour whites 
against Africans. One instance indicated that in the hairdressing 
trade where all the employees were white, the Board issued a 
supplementary determination to cover white employees who had been 
excluded from the terms of an industrial council agreement . 
Other means were also used to promote white employment. 
Different ratio systems were used to ensure that a certain number 
of whites had to be employed before a certain number of unskilled 
workers could be taken on. Adul ts were protect.ed by ratios which 
controlled the number of juveniles permitted in trades and higher 
paid males were protected from displacement by lower paid females 
through similar provisions. Apprenticeship was encouraged if it pro-
vided training opportunities for youngsters, but was frowned upon if 
it .encouraged the overt use of cheap labour. 
The manufacturing sector in the Union welcomed the institution 
of legislation which promised to bring economic stability and curb 
labour unrest. Once the first Board's membership was announced 
and it issued its first recommendation there were howls of outrage . 
and opposition. The Board's recommendations were high only 
when compared to going rates but it was forced to reconsider its 
awards. As the years passed the voices of opposition from employers 
quietened down, so that by the end of the depression their opposition 
had turned to support. 
of mood. 
A number of reasons exist for this change 
Employers manipulated the provisions of the Act, colluded with 
employees to get around,and evaded the terms of , determinations. 
They relied on the generally amenable courts of the land to serve in 
their interest. Evasion took a number of forms. Direct evasion 
was the most prevalent, but more subtle ways were also encountered. 
BOgus partnerships, fictitious loans and invalid reductions for 
board and 1cd;P.ng also occurred. Employers often reduced wages 
when agreements expired or tried to delay the publication of 
determinations. 
Detractors were very rarely brought to court. The Department 
followed a cautious policy of persuasion and leniency and tried as 
far as possible to settle matters out of court. Even when the odd 
recalcitrant employer was prosecuted the courts would normally impose 
ridiculously light sentences. Quite often it paid them to pay into 
the court rather than pay the employee the minimum wage. Besides 
that, the courts often ruled that determinations were ultra-vires. 
In most it\S~D.~'\ceS the cases were won on mere technicalities . The 
Department of Labour was infuriated by the court rulings, but they 
served to highlight loopholes in the Act which were closed in 1930. 
Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the courts, . the state refused to 
consider trade union calls for the establishment of special industrial 
courts to deal with industrial cases. 
In the majority of cases the Board reported that it could not 
recommend civilised wages to all employees. When instructed by the 
Minister to do so it would often set wages at levels it considered 
civilised - £2.10.0 per week for adult women and £4.10.0 per week for 
unqualified males ~ for occupations generally filled by whites 
or potentially filled by whites. Other occupations were 
normally recommended lower wages. In this way the Board 
satisfied employers by not recommending higher wages for Africans 
The mining industry was appalled at the idea of 
compulsory colour-blind wage regulation in the mines. The battle 
between the Chamber of Mines and the Labour Party in the government 
was the first really intense battle between mines and state since 
before the South African War. Creswell added fuel to the fire when 
he attempted to bulldoze his Mineworkers' (Minimum Rate of Pay) Bill 
through the 1925 parliamentary session. The question of wage increases 
for certain classes of whites en the mines was settled when the Lucas 
award was announced. The award was binding in terms of the Indus~ 
trial . Conciliation Act and was granted by the Wage Board. It pre-
sented the miners with an increase acceptable to the Chamber. The 
only reward the miners got was the return of the colour bar in 1926, 
at far less cost to the mines than the Creswell Bill would have been. 
The mining companies were henceforth never investigated by the Wage 
Board. Their greatest fear that the Board would be used to raise 
unskilled wages was wholly unfounded. 
The treatment of Africans under the Wage Act during the 
period 1926-1937 epitomised the general attitude of whites towards 
Africans in the Union. When the Act was passed, Kadalie ' s ICU 
gave it its qualified support. Their faith in the overtly colour-
blind nature of the Act was borne out when a number of applications 
were made to the Board from allover the country. . The state 
was reluctant to utilise the machinery of the Wage Board for the 
hlt1efit of African workers. The state's attitude indicated that the 
Act was not intended to uplift workers generally, but rather to 
enlist support from whites. The only application which had any 
success was one for unskilled workers in Bloemfontein. That 
determination was allowed because of local fears that unrest would 
erupt as had happened prior to the investigation. Their success 
in Bloemfontein promptEdICU supporters to obtain a determination 
for Kroonstad. The application was not entertained. Free 
state opposition in particular but general reluctance to grant any 
semblance of rights to Africans in urban areas,ot to promote 
African working class organisation, prevailed. M3ny African tr<rle unialS 
were formed with the specific intention of monitoring existing 
determinations or of achieving them in 'mixed' industries and trades. 
Africans were removed from the scope of the Wage Act 
in two ways. First, the method of application by unregistered 
organisations was altered: applicants rPI had to sign all 
applications from 1930. As the majority of Africans were illiterate, 
this amendment proved very effective and no applications were 
received from Africans until 1937. Second, the Wage Board was 
instructed to refrain from recommending wages for grade II employees 
by the Department of Labour in 1930. It was commonly acknowledged 
that grade II occupations were normally filled by African workers. 
These two changes ensured that the Board would not regulate wages in 
trades where Africans predominated, like the Bloemfontein unskilled 
occupations' investigation, or where they were employed in mixed 
trades like baking, clothing and the like. By regulating wages 
according to occupation and not by colour, the Wage Board ensured 
the employment of whites instead of blacks. 
The new policy lasted the duration of the depression. 
With the return of normal economic activity, policy makers began to 
consider ways and means of enlarging the domestic consumer market. 
By 1935, the ideologues of the advancement school who believed 
that the lowest paid workers' wages should be increased in the 
interests of industrial expansion won the day. Africans could 
not be incorporated in the machinery of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act because trade union rights would have been conferr.ed on them. 
A separate system was devised. White workers were brought under 
the Conciliation Act more and more. It was a far more extensive 
Act than the Wage Act and better suited to controlling labour. 
Africans were incorporated under a revamped Wage Act in 1937 
which removed the civilised standards clause and the offending 
application regulation. Coercive and repressive legislation like 
the Riotous Assemblies Act still operated to control African labour. 
It is difficult to assess the economic costs of Wage Board 
determinations. The increased efficiency which became a feature 
of the period was partly the result of determinations. 
The determinations do not appear to have increased pro-
duction costs to any great degree. The Board justified any re-
trenchment attributable to its determinations in terms of stopping 
the wasteful employment of labour. The regulation of wages 
went a long way to removing ",hu' ; 'e. employers and of 
rationalising competition . Whe,n , employers who employed policies 
approved by the Board were in difficulties ,they were granted 
exemptions. The wages the Board recommended were not excessive 
but were high enough to encourage mechanisation and the reorganisation 
of businesses. Naturally, the Board was not wholly responsible 
for the changes that took place, but it played a fairly important 
role in promoting the changes. With the onset of the depression' 
the board reduced wages to an extent, relaxed its exemption policy 
and acted leniently towards employers. The provision of minimum 
wages encouraged the growth of a consumer market within the country. 
Attention was focussed almost exclusively on whites before the de-
pression because they already formed a fairly privileged class. 
After the depression, the rapid expansion that followed absol oed 
many of the unemployed whites back into industry and the potentially 
huge African consumer market was nurtured. Whire labour acquiesced 
and threw in its lot with conciliation and reformism, whilst the 
vocal minority were steadily isolated from the mainstream of white 
labour politics. 
The Wage Act of 1925 promoted the employment of unskilled 
and semi-skilled whites from 1926 - 1935, but the bulk of its 
work in this regard was done between 1926 and 1930. It supplement e<£ 
agreements drawn up under the Industrial Conciliation Act to prevent 
the employment of Africans in the place of more expensive white 
operatives. When Africans attempted to secure benefits through 
wage determinations they were turned away. The Bloemfontein 
wage determination arose more as a practical solution than from 
a principled commitment . Even those whites whose conditions of 
labour were controlled by wage determinations did not secure the 
~its they initially thought they would get. The Wage Board's 
activity did not usher in the apocalypse, nor was it intended to. 
The general rationalisation of South Africa before and after the 
depression owed not a little to the operation of the Board. The 
Board and the Act became redundant after the depression as white 
labour interests were covered by the voluntary arrangements of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act. The Wage Act was altered in 1937 
to become the means to draw African labour into the industrial 
relations network of the Union. 
The Wage Act of 1925 operated to restrict the entry of 
blacks in general but Africans in particular into jobs at 
particular wage levels. As such it was used to promote the employ-
ment of whites. It did not act detrimentally on economic 
development and in some instances actually promoted growth. 
Employers initially refused to co-operate, but soon changed their 
minds when they saw the benefits that could accrue to them . In 
this manner they participated in racial discrimination. White 
workers sought to protect their positions and they too contributed 
to the perpetuation of a racist system. African workers were exclud 
ed but were later incorporated in an attempt to control African 
labour and not to provide benefits as such. 
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A Government Notice 346, 
17 February, 1926 
.l.l'PLICATION TO THE WAGE BOARn IX TERMS 01' 
SECTION ' TIIJIEJ-: . (I) (b) ~'O)l. AN IN\Tf,STIOATJON 
UNDER THl' ACT. . . 
'fo the ll.egistrnr, 
. 'Vage Board, 
Pretoria. 
I" p~'re~; :~~~f ;!~~~~;t{~~··t;.· ·~!~···\\~·~~~··n~~·;4··t~··i~~~;iig~~t~"i;} 
respect of (') ....................... .. ....•.........•.. ......... ..... .foe the nrea 0 
(.) •.•...........••.....•...••. .....•......... .. . ...... :. thft foltowinj1;, lnalttil.,;!-
(') (0) •... .. •••••••••••••..••••••... ••••.••.•.•.••••..•.•.•.•.•....• _ •••• .••.• •••..••• 
(1)) ••• ••• ••• •••••• , •••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••• •• ••••• ••••••••.••••••••••••••••••• 
(e) ••• ; ••••••••••••• ••••• •••. •..•••• ••••.• ••••••••.•..•••.•.•..• •..•••••••..•.•. .••• 
i~ ~. I{. ':~[r~'1~ C:~1~~ ~b:lt (I)·········l~~~·i~t;,~;~r~;;;i~r.·th;·i·~d~~t;~i;i 
ill not An '-.uociation of employersJ Concilin.tion Act, 19~.J. . 
3. (F~r ; ~ ani,. ~he;e tb~ a~!\wcr to para~r::\ph 2 'j,' in Ole 
nega ti 'Ie.) " . 
I' , ;"i h~reb3" certify that the number of eOl~loyers/cnl.Plo.Yee' 
concerned in the trade and a.ren allove stated IS appro::uruut.ely 
(.) .............•.........••...•.... ~ .............. , and thnt the .n~mbe~ of ~uch 
employers/employees on whose behalf I nm a~thor~ to mllkt! 
~hi~ Ap~lic::"t~ol1 is <-~~ ....... : ................. :...... . 
. 4:1 nnnex hereto :t memorandulll sett illJ;t forth th~ grounds UpOIl 
"'hich the Bdnrd 'is asked to mnke this investigation, nnd the wages, 
hOUri, aDd other conditions of labour which, in term.s of ~hia 
~pplica~ioQ, it is desired to be mnde the subiect of a c:!etermlDn. 
tion under the Wa.go Act. . 
(Signed) ....•. •.•..•..........••......•................... . ....•. 
Q~c!~l Desiglla~ion (~f n!ly) ............................. . 
D.te ............................................. ........ . 
Addres.o; ..... ..................... ; ......... .... .... ..... . 
4. Subject to the proyisions o( sub-section (1) of section thTC' 
of the ACt ihe R~gi$trar sh:i111 forthwith, .. ft.er the receipt by him 
of an ' application· for investigntion, C:lUSC nil acknowledgment of 
. fh~r te~~p.t o~ ·tucb" nt)p:~ieation · ~ be forw?,tded to the .~~g~~tory th.~reto:··lLnd·aha\1 as soon·~. may bo submit such 'npph~Qtloll to 
tfl"d ;Ctln'irmsn; :who-' . . .. . . 
. ,. (~l' may afi-'ect that' further infonnlltion sball be Iccured; 
(b lOuy advise tlie Minister ~hat a Division of the ~oa.rd shoult.l 
. be .ppoin~ to 'make ~he' inveatigntiol} applied for; 
-_: .. _ ._._ '----'-_ .. -.--. ~---.--.---_ .. _._. 
(I) B~re state name of trnds uuion or orellnizntioll, or descrip. 
tion of employees or em'ployers 'making nppliclltion. . ('l Here atate trade. industry.' occupation. 
(~ Here ,tate area concerned. . 
('. Hp.Te enumerate aeparnteiy each aubject for iDve6tiFation. 
... (') :a.no .tate '"]UDber. . 
B Government Notice .40, 
10 January, 1930 
APPLICATION TO THE WAGE BOAUD IN TEItMS OF 
SECTION THIIEE (1) (b) (i) FOR AN INVESTIGATION 
. UNDER THE ACT. 
To the Registrar and Secretary. 
\Vage Doard, 
Pretoria. 
1. On behalf 01 (I) .......•...... . ...•••...... ....•••...•.... .... ••...... ... 
a trnde uni.on/an employers' orgacization registered ·under 
the Ind1lst·rjal Conciliation Act) 1924, I hereb,! make applicn. 
tion to the 'Vage Board to Investigate an report to th~ 
Minister upon, nnd submit to him reccmmendations in respect 
of (2) ......................................................... for the nroo. of 
(S) ••• •• •...• •..• , .•••..• .•••.•••.• ..... •••• .••••• •.• •..•.•••••••••• .........•••••..••• 
~·~ .. ;;.;y·~;·i~·;·~~~~~~·i~d .. ;iih.:::·· .... ·· .. ···· .. · .. ····· .... · ........ . 
(4) {~i. ::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :~:::::::::: 
(d) •.....•.• •.. .. •....••.••• .. ••.•.•.•• .•.•••..•.•.• .•••• . ..•..... . •.•••...•.. 
I.~) .............. ... ..................................... ................... .. 
(f) . . .. •..••••.•..•...• .•.•• .•...............•....•..•.••.••••..•.. •....• •. .• 
(g) .. •••..•..•••.•••••.••••••••.••••••••• .•• ••••••• . •••• ••••••••••••••••..•.• • 
(I.) •• •• .• ••••.•...••.•••.••••• .•••.•• .•• ••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• 
g1 :::: :::: :::::::::::::::::.: ::: ::::: :::::::: ::: :::::::: .. :: ::::::: ::::::::::: 
2. I annex herelo a memor::muum sctting forth the ~round8 
upon which the Donrd is :\~kcd to make this invest.igation, 
and the wages, hours, and other conditions of ll\bour which, 
in terms of this npplication, it is desired to be made the 
subject of a determlUntion under the Wage Act. . 
(Signed) .......•.. .•. .. .......•.•.•.... : ...........•...•.... ...•... 
Official Designa.tion .... ............................... . ..... .. 
D .. te ............ ..... .....................•............. 
. Address .................. ............................. . 
............................... .. ... ......... 
.. ..... ................................ 
(11 Here state name of registered trade union or reglst;ered 
emp ayers' organization making aprlication . 
(2) Hert! ~tate trade or section 0 trade. 
(3) Here state areo. concerned. 
(4) Here enumerate sepnrately each subiect for investign.. 
tion. 
Non.-" Trade" means and includes any function . process 
industq', business, work, undertaking, occupation, p:ofession' 
or calling, performed, engaged ill or carried on by a~ 
employer or employee; and also inclurlea a group of trades. 
APPLICATION TO THE WAGE BOARD IN TERMS OF 
SECTION THm:E (1) (b) (ii) FOR AN INVESTIGATION 
UNDER THE ACT . 
To the Registrar and Secretar:y W.D.~e Doo.rd, ' 
Pretoria. 
I ~~r~by b~l~kl! :~pn~~ti~~··t~··tb~ .. W~g~·B·~~;d·tc;··i~·;;;;tig~t·~ 
And report to the Minister upon and submit to him recom. 
mendations in respect of (2) ..... ......................................... .. 
(~)' . : '::::.: '::.: : ':::::::.: .::::::: ':::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.~ ~~.: .:~~ .. ~ ~~.~ .. ~ ~ 
(4) (n) 
(b) 
(r) 
(d) 
«) 
(/) 
(!1) 
(10 ) 
(i) 
(j) 
............... .... ........................................................ 
.............................................................. ............. 
. ........................................................................ . 
.............................. ....... .. ............. ........................ 
.. ....... ..... ............................................................ . 
.. ..... .................. ................................................ . 
.. .. ............ ........................ .. ................................. . 
. , 
.. ......................... .. ......................................... ... . 
.. ........ .. ..................... .. ......................... .............. . 
...... : ........ ... ... .. .. .. .. ................. ................ .. ....... ... . 
2. :lUIlf'X hl'rt'to 11 mr.lll11r;llItlulU .. i..:ned h,\' . (;j) 
;~;; i;i~;:;~~ i ~;I; pi;):;~';~' '(;1' 'ti;~' t,:;;(i~';; ;I~i' '1~;:\:;; ' ;\'I;~~'~:' ~t:; (:~;i:' ~;;;:'I; 
lIIel.1l0ralldll~1l cont.;IIIIl.\\g III,\' :\uthunt.\· to lid. fur the Sigllll_ 
tor!C's til tillS lIPJl!u:atltlll and setLing furth tim grounds IIIHIII 
willch the Bonnl IS :l.lI:kct! t.o 11111l;:(> tl1i!l ill\'(!st.igatiull ant! the 
Wll~f'$, hours, lind ulhpr conditiuns of l;\hOlIl' which in tenus 
o f this.apJl.li(·;ILiulI, it is desired tu I,e il\ndt~ the su'hj(.(·t nf n 
dcteTllllllutlO1l under the Wnge }.d. 
.1 I t.erel.'~. cl'rtify tlmt. th(! 1t.lIl1lh'!I· nf el1lpl()Yt~rs/~mplf)~'('c.'; cOII('er~ed III tilt' trmle nnd III the nr('a nhcl\'e titntcd i~ 
lIPlu·oxlIllntt'I.\' (6) ............ .... .... ... ..................... ................. . . 
(SiJ;tlll"l) ......................................................... . 
J)nt('l ................. . ............................. . .. .. 
.. \c..IdrC'x ....................... .. ......... . ... ..... ...... . 
(\) 
(2) 
(:1) 
(4) 
tiun. 
.. .......................................... . 
Here 
HerC' 
Hel'e 
Here 
. .................................. ... . 
statu elllployees or . elllllloYl'l"Joi. 
stale trndo or seetlnn uf trade!. 
st.nte area concerned. .' 
CIlUII\Hrnto sepnratt.J.y t>nch 1i1lhjt!c!t (01' invc. .. tigu_ 
(5) Here ~tni.c nllluher of appli('nnt. ... 
(6) HNe stat<' lljlproxima tc Illllllh<lr of pC'rIWIl!'l ('oll('C'rnC'tl . 
. Non:.-" 'fr;uh' " mcans nnd illt'!ud"!:j 1\11,\' ftllH·tioll, pro('Cs. .. , 1nc1l1str.~·. hU.';IIIC'RII:, work, ulI(h!rt;\klll~. tl('ctlpatioll, prnf('l-isiUIl. 
or . c·ulllll~ •. llt'rformcti, engngcll ill. or ('unit.,t till hy lIll 
clllplll.\"('!r or ('mploY\'l: j Ilntl lllstl ill(-llI de.~ l\ ~rol1p of tr;Hl~ .. ,. 
APPENDIX B 
i) Schedule to 1925 Mineworkers' (Minimum Rates of Pay) Bill indicating 
the occupations of undergound workers covered by the Bill and the 
respective wage rates proposed. 
Group One: 
Machineman 
Harrunerman 
Timberman 
Group TWo: 
Platelayer 
Pipeman 
Truck repairer 
Pump chargeman 
Mason or stonewaller (.excluding waste-packer) 
Ropeman 
Group Three: 
Any mineworker, not being a learner, who is not included in group one or 
group two. 
Minimum Rates of Daily Pay for Underground Mineworkers 
For occupations in Group One: 
Twenty shillings plus twenty per cent, ie . , twenty-four shillings per shift 
if he has been employed for not less than two years in anyone or more 
occupations included in group one: or if he has been employed 1n one or more 
occupations included in groups one and two, for not less than three years, 
at least nine months of which shall have been in the particular occupa-
tion in which he is or is engaged to be employed . 
Sixteen shillings and eight pence plus twenty per cent, ie, twenty shillings 
per shift if he has had not less than fifteen months' experience in under-
ground work on any mine or mines, at least nine months of which have been 
in one or more occupations included in group one. 
For occupations in Group Two: 
Twenty shillings plus twenty per cent, ie, twenty-four shillings per 
shift if he has been employed for not less than two years in the particular 
occupation in which he is or is engaged to be employed : or if he, having 
been employed for not less than two years in any occupation included in 
group one, has been employed for at least nine months in the particular 
occupation in which he is or is engaged to be employed : or if he has 
been employed in one or more of the occupations included in groups one 
and two for not less than three years, at least nine months of which have 
been in the particular occupation in which he is or is engaged to be 
employed. 
sixteen shillings and eight pence plus twenty per cent, ie, twenty 
shillings per shift if he has been employed for not less than fifteen 
months in underground work on any mine or mines, at least nin~ months 
of which have been in the particular occupation in which he is or is 
engaged to be employed. 
For occupations in Group 'l'hree: 
Fifteen shillings plus twenty per · cent, ie, eighteen shillings per 
shift if he has had not less than fifteen months' experience in any 
underground occupation in any mine or mines. 
Twelve shillings and six pence plus twenty per cent, ie, fifteen 
shillings per shift in any other case. 
source: Union Gazette Extraordinary. 22nd April 1925 
ii) List of Occupations on the Mines in which employment of White Men is 
pres=ibed 
OCcupations 
Number 
employed 
Managers 
Sectional Managers 
Assistant Managers 
Underground Managers 
Mine Overseers 
Shift Bosses 
Underground Banksmen 
Onsetters 
Skipmen 
Trammers (10%) 
Foremen 
Electricians 
} 
Pumpmen 
wastepackers } 
Sand~filling (15%) 
Engine Drivers (winding) 
Winch Drivers 
Locomotive Drivers 
Inspectors (Underground) 
190 
577 
668 
117 
36 
50 
292 
80 
181 
66 
28 
20 
Occupations 
. Ventilation and Dust-
allaying men 
Surveyors 
Samplers 
Riggers, Rope and Wire 
Splicers 
Blasters 
Haulagemen 
Number 
employed 
38 
198 
257 
Native Supervisors (Under-
30 
12 
30 
28 
ground) 
Other Overseers 7 
Sanitary Men 74 
Miners, Reclaiming, Hand ] 582 Miners, Reclaiming, Machine 
Miners, machine-stoping 1,221 
Miners, Hand-stoping 1,471 
Miners, Machine-developing 570 
Miners, Hand-developing 30 
Miners, Shaft-sinking 101 
7,057 
List of OCcupations on the Mines in which employment of White Men is 
not pres=ibed 
Tranuners (90%) 1 ,050 Masons and Bricklayers 17 
Stope Timbermen } 1 ,480 Stablemen 3 Shaft Timbermen Drain and Track Cleaners 13 
Carpenters 14 Handymen 9 
Pipemen 406 Diamond Drillmen 21 
Platelayers 262 Track Repairers 44 
Fitters 113 Men Underground, not 
Drill Packers 48 classified above 54 
Drill Sharpeners 19 
Jumpermen 12 4,020 
Waste Packers } Sand-filling (85%) 455 
Source: Low Grade Mine COnmission Report, UG 34-1920, Annexure H, p 51 
APPENDIX C 
List of Wage Board Determinations with the number of employees 
affected, 1926-1937 
i. 1926-1932 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
H 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
2t) 
:10 
;11 
32 
:13 
34 
:15 
36 
:i7 
:IS 
3U 
4() 
4L 
4~ 
43 
44 
45 
40 
47 
48 
49 
50 
61 
Sweet Manufacturing .. .. .......• •... 
Clothing ........................ ,. 
IJumpm·cn .•.......... , .... . 
Baking antl Ct)nfl~ctiont1r,\" ..... ...•. . . 
Furniture )raking .... , .. .. . 
Baking and Conf(·r.tjonc ry. 
Sweet. ~lanu f(l.Cturillg •.............. . 
Lea.ther "Manufactnring .... ... . ..... . 
Ha.irdrc..c:.sing ••......... .. .. .•.. 
Motor Omnibus Dri\'('r:; anul'omiuctor.'I 
Hairdr(·sl;ing .•. ... .......... ..... .. ' 
Furniture ... . .... .. .•..... .. . .... . .. 
Baking and Cullfectioncry .... . 
Leather Manufacturing ........ . .... . . 
Clot.hing ........ .. . .. ............... . 
Glass Bevelling and Sih·erinl! .. ...... . 
Baking and Confectionery ........... . 
Haird.res.iing .. . . . . . .. . . . ..... . ..... . 
Tea. Coff<"c nnd Chicory ......... , ... . 
Baking and COnfectionory ..... , . .•. . . 
HairilicSI>ing ...... .. . .. .......... . . . 
Barmen ......................... • ... 
Laundry E~tnblishmcnt8 . .. , .. ". , .. . 
Bespoke Tailoring ....... , . ... ...... . 
Unskilled Employment . .. . . ...... ,.,. 
Shop Assistants ..... . . . . .. " ....... . 
Sweet .Manufa<"l uring •...... , .•. .... , . 
Baking and Conf~ctionery, ...... . • ... 
Furniture lranufo.cturing ... . ....... , ' 
Furniture Manufa.cturing ..... . ...... . 
Furniture Manufa.ct.uring ............ , 
Furniture Manufl1 cturing ......•...... 
Furniture )[n.nufacturing ....... .. ... . 
Sweet ~Iun\lfnct.uring .......... . . •... 
Baking and c.:unfcctiom·ry . .......... . 
Clothing Mallufacturi.llg ...•.... , ....• 
Cnt<-ring .. , •.. , ...... ... ......... , . . . 
Commercial J)istrilJlltivc ... _ ..• , . _ ... . 
Passenger Trausport., .......• • . ..... 
Hairclre:>. .. ;ng .................•...... 
Hair<ircSIIing •••... . ........ 
Clothing . .... . .................••... 
Laundry Estnblishments ... .. ....• , .. 
Bespoke Tailoring ...... : ........... . 
Gla~ Bcvt>lIing .. . . .. ....... .... .... . 
Textile Mllnufa('turing ......... • .... . . 
Hairdressing . . . ... ..... ... ... •. ..... 
~ ..... eet Mallufaduring .• •. . . . ... . • . • •... 
Hairdre~ing ..... . ......... . .• • . 
Furniture ].fauuf!~cturing ...... • . ..... 
PUSCl1gl:f Tmll~poft. . .........••..... 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
An'n. 
Prilll~ ipl1l [1ll1n!;tritl.i (A.'ntrell. ,. 
Principal Intlustrial ('l'lltn'1I ... 
K mg:l'rsdorp •.....•...•...... 
\\' il \'rnter"rand a.nd l'rt'toritl. ... 
f.'nion .... .. ....... ... .. . ... . 
\\-,itwa.tersr:lnd and Pretoria .. , 
Principal I mlustr iAl C,'utres . . . 
lJnit)Il ... .. ... ..... ... .....•. 
Wilwat~l'$rand ........... ... . 
Principal InthLStrinl Celltrps .. ' 
Prt:lurifl. •. .. . ...... . ......... 
Union .................. . 
Wit.Vt·a.t.t r~r;md, .... ..• .. .. ... 
Union ..... .. ... .......... , .. 
Principa.l Indust.rial Centrcs . . . 
Union . . .... ........ ..... , .. . 
. Pretoria. ........ . ....... . .. . . 
Port. Elizo.bcth nnd Uitenhagc. 
Principal Indust.rial Centres ... 
KimLerley, East London. IUUJ. 
Bloemfontein .......... ... . . 
Capeto\Vll, ... .. ..... ... ..... . 
llIocmfontein and Kimberlev., 
Principa.l InduSlrit\1 Centrc~· . . . 
I Xo. of J<:mplo'yrc~. 
Sf'C 1>('.\ . )Jo. 48. 
."'ee lh·t, ::\'"0. ·12. 
7. 
::i('r Drts, Nos. 17 
anu ~iL 
Sec Het .. Xu. 50. 
See Drti;. No:;. 17 
nnd 28. 
Sec Det. ;\0. 4S. 
Seo Dct.. ~o. 14. 
HO. 
107. 
:)C'e n et .. Xo. 41. 
St'C ])l't. N"o. 50. 
SeC' Vet .. No, 2M. 
630. 
See n ct. No. 4:L 
Sce Oct. No. 45. 
21R. 
Sec Det. No. 47. 
7ll3· 
291. 
S(·c Det. Xo. 40. 
57. 
Principlll Industrial Ccntr~8 ... 1 
l3Ioemfontein ....... . ... , . . . .. . 
S('e Det. No. 43. 
See Det. No. 44. 
52:12*. 
Princillo.l Industrial C{'ntrcs .. . 
l'rincipll.l Industrial CAmtrcs . . . 
Witwaf.cn;rand .. ............ . 
Witwatersrand ........... , .. . 
Durba.n . .... . ..... . .....•.... 
Port Elizaheth and llitrnhage. 
En.st London ....... ....... .. . 
Pretoria, Piekrma.ri t7.bul"g, 
K imbcrl(')", l3loemfontein ... . 
l'rineipal ImhUJtrinl Cl'ntrrs .. . 
Durban Illtd l'idermurit.zlJurg. 
Na.tlll (certai n ureas) ......... . 
Principnl l udustrial l\·n lrCfI .. . 
l'riueipnl Intl u!'il rial C~·lItrc14, .. 
Capetown .......•.......... 
Vll lx'i..oWll . ..... . , .•...... . .•• 
l'r(.'loria . .•.. •...• , ....... . . . 
Prindpnl Indu>ltril\l l~ntrl~~ .. . 
Principa.l Imlust.rinl Ccntres .. , 
l'rincipal IIlli.Ul.trial C('.Iltre!:l ... 
Union ... . .•.•••.•..•••.... . . 
Union . .. ..... .. ............ , 
Port Elizn.het.h and {iitcnhfl.gc. 
11rineipal Industrial Centres .. , 
llI()('mfontein ........ . . . ... .. . 
Principal Industrial Centres . . . 
Capetown ........ , ......... . . 
Sec Drt. No. 3ft 
Sre Dl't. Xo. -tS. 
0;,0. 
See Det. ~o. 50. 
; Se(' Dt.'f·. Xo. 50, I SC'(: DC't .. No. flO. 
. Sec Det. No. ;jU. 
.seC' Det. XO, .'iO. 
~('(' IlI, t. Xo. 4$. 
illS· . 
;);j I. 
mil· . 
,;11,000 
~(.t) Ih't. Xo. 51 
40!l* . 
li;j. 
U.:W:J. 
2,011*, 
1,504 . 
136*. 
1,481* . 
41* . 
2,008· . 
32. 
l,G5;*. 
1,063· . 
-------------,----- -
Source: UG 43-1934 
ii. 1933-1937 
No. Industry Area No of employees 
52 Baking Confectionery Durban/Pietermaritzburg 768 
53 Native Trade Witwatersrand 763 
54 Building Port Elizabeth 1 476 
55 Textile Industry Union 2 668 
56 Motor Transport Driving Witwatersrand 2 619 
57 Liquor and Catering Witwatersrand 931 
58 Furniture Oudtshoorn 86 
APPENDIX D 
CUstoms Tariff 
i ) Tariff Protection 1921-1924 
Chicory Crown Corks 
Starch Blankets and rugs 
Calcium Carbide Confectionery 
Matches Condensed Milk 
Wrapping Paper Footwear 
Plywood Asbestos: Cement manufactures 
Metal Sheets , printed, lithoed Paints and Colours 
and embossed 
Tooth-powder, pastes and washes 
Sodium Carbonate 
ii) Tariff Protection granted to industries either for the first time, or 
extended, 1925 
Bacon and Ham Blankets and Rugs 
Cardboard Boxes Baking Powder 
Cheese Broom and Brushware 
Clothing, Bespoke Earthenware Pipes 
Confectionery Shirts, Collars and Pyjamas of Silk 
Fish Cream of Tartar 
Buckets, Household and Sanitary Furniture, Wooden 
Jams and Jellies Ink and Ink-powder 
Mica Manufactures Meal Pastes 
Varnishes Condensed Milk 
Printed Matter Wrought Iron and Cast Iron Pipes 
Coir Mats Rubber Hose and Rubber Soles, Tips and Heels 
Salt 
Source : Board of Trade and Industries, Report No 282, P 1 02 
E Arrear Wages and Underpayment, 1931-37 
1931 £10 196. 7 . 10 No. of employees not available 
1932 £ 7 495. 9. 4 No. of employees not available 
1933 £ 8 734.11. 0 No. of employees not available 
1934 £ 7 305 . 13. 7 No. of employees not available 
1935 Not available No. of employees not available 
1936 £10 339. 5. 3 2 008 employees involved 
1937 £14447.14. 9 2 173 employees involved 
F Prosecutions and Convictions 1931-37 
Year Prosecutions Convictions 
1931 67 54 
1932 72 66 
1933 96 76 
1934 109 90 
1935 56 43 
1936 83 71 
1937 216 191 
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AREA 
YEAR 
._. 
PR.ETORIA MA'i 191.'=> 
Se:PT 19n 
J"UL.V 1'130 
AREA 
YEAR 
--
.-. 
WI TWATER.5RANJ)_ 
MA'f 192.1:, 
Mp.'I 1'127 
Mt>,y 192.~ 
1. Baking and Confectionary Trade: Pretoria and Witwatersrand - racial 
breakdown of employees 1926-1930 "n j>ercentage 
WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC 
29 -so 'b' \2. O-SS' 
S 1· 13, 45'- 40 -
4-6- 33 So- '12 
-
WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC 
31:,- 4-0 b \ -18 D- S& 
4b- 14 51 - ~& 0-1:,7 
43-'B ~4 - ~ O-bS 
COLOURED 
3 - 23 
2· 'n 
2 -75' 
COLOURED 
1 - 24-
1- 2.6 
I - Ob 
TOTAL. NO. 
E t'\ PI-O Y E E'S . 
114-
-ro,.",- No_ 
r,MP\..OYEf5. 
1034-
10SO 
1010 
SOURCE: 1929 WBR pp 32-33 
1931 WBR P 82 
2 . Furniture Trade: table indicating total employment of whites in 
percentage 1918/19-1936/37 
Year Total Percentage White 
1918-9 3 197 37 
1919-20 3 619 40 
1920-21 3 507 38 
1921-22 3 094 38 
1922-23 3 346 41 
1923-24 4 113 44 
1924-25 4 900 46 
1925-26 5 546 46 
1926-27 5 737 50 
1927-28 5 929 50 
1928-29 6 511 52 
1929-30 6 383 53 
1930-31 No Census 
1931-32 
-
No Census 
1932-33 4 136 54 
1933-34 5 427 54 
1934-35 6 519 54 
1935-36 7 679 52 
1936-37 8 579 52 
SOURCE: Union statistics for Sixty Years, G-11 cols 119-120 
3. Furniture Trade: table indicating racial breakdown in regions, 1929 in percentage 
I TOTI\\.... ,",0 . AREA WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC COLOURED EMPLO~EE!) 
I. WlrINI\T€~RA""j) 1,1 · 00 .l !l . S;O 1 . sS"" q·lb I gSb 
2. . CI'lPI< Bf1 EPr 36·lj.2- S- · 6b o · gq 51 · 0,+ 1 '125" 
3. DURe,/l>-l/ P 'MII'?lf2.BUR.'l 30·3S lb· aS 50 . s;.s 3 · 0& 14-1 
4 . Po~:r E"I..'4A1% i'll I,g . "1"\ , l b · 31 I· 4-2- IS·4-7 2Sz. 
U 11"""'H<\~" 
b . fAST L'>Jj,o>,J bl · bb 32..· os; - 0·050 337 
b. PIZETO/1.IA 7{'·41 .;l I . S;7 - 1 ·96 5"1 
7. BLOEM~ONTe'N 710 ·09 1'1 ·S7 - 4· ~s 4{' 
q. K., Me,.:: 1Z1..6)' 40 · co 40· 00 - .;10· DC S 
TOTF\~ 534-9 
SOURCE: An 113-1931 and 1931 WBR, P 93 
WA<; £" TRAlIe: / AREA WHITE AFRICAN 
YEAR 
._. 
Its,,> I IljlG, - O'Ss: 
Eoh,,-V\ 
1'1:17 
- -10 " r· ... · 
~ . Iq.u, - O·bll 
IQ,lR 
- -
3 IlIU, O·Ob O·llj 
Ilj2.g 
-
-
-
'+ 1'12.1 0·04 ;l . 3b 
1'l31 - _ 0 · 04-
I IljU, 0 · 5:<;: 3" Ib 
10/- -It, 1'127 - I/ ' b I 
''11/1 f'."'" 2 142.b 3-'7 30 -37 
I'H.g ,S , b4 13 ' /1 
.s J'Il.b , . 'I g .{,3. 
1'12..1' 2 · 1,3 I· 4-0 
't- Ilj2.7 ' . <\ &' .23· 13-
I 'I ~ I 0',2- $'.qg 
/:/.0. 0. I 1'I2l> ). · 73 :2f, - n 
1. 1'127 1'1'04- .J-l . S"9 
il . /'1 . /I . 2 192(, 4 ' '31, :)'1·19 
I'IU " . S't- 39· 7'2. 
.3 1921> I S · 09 "k;-"j 
I 'f2 g :lb' IS 14-·'H 
4- /'127 b· 4-0 2. 2,. 4-S' 
I 'HI , . Sf: 34'01 
ASIATIC 
-
-
-
-
o· 13 
-
, . g 2-
-
-
-
-
-
o· 2.~ 
-
4 ' 710 
0'12-
-
-
-
-
o , o/:, 
0·0& 
II'OS 
15'22-
4. Unskilled wages: percentage of workers receiving less than f2.0.0. per 
week in selected trades, 1926 
COLOURED 
-
-
, . 2. 0 
-
0 · 52-
-
0'b9 
0 ' 08 
-
-
o . 1'1 
-
37-10 
10 ' 4-S:-
q ' bl 
' . S'S' 
-
-
0 · 10 
o · '37 
I s- IS' 
.2'\ ·310 
g · $'O 
IS-· b 1 
Baking Pretoria 
2 . Baking Witwatersrand 
3 Sweets Union 
4 Dyeing, Laundering, Cleaning Major Centres 
-------
-- . 
TOT"\". NO . 
'T~"bE I P,1I.e.A VEAi<. EMl'\.o~E.£~ 
I 
2-
3 
4· 
1'I2-b 123 
1'12-1 17/t-
1'121, 1034-
1'12.& 105'0 
Iq2b 15'3'1 
I"iH 1 302-
1'\2/ 2.750 
1'131 2(,62. 
SOURCES: 
} 
1929 Wage Board Report, pp 32-33 
2 
3 An 125-1931 
4 1931 Wage Board Report, p 82 
(All figures are approx i mations) 
5. Baking and Confectionary Trade. Pretoria and Witwatersrand 
5.i. White male juvenile displacement of African adult males earning less 
than £1 . 0.0. per week 
I-JITC1 ~ Ae~t'\- YePdZ Wt<1A wn:r AM4 ~~ b to,AL 
less 
(:1.,11.,\ 
P(.so TO.e., "I 1'124 ~ - o.SS o . s:s-
IDs p. "' . l'I l l - - - -
hi ,TIo..I l'\T€ctS~I'\"'.l> 1'12.1, - - 0 · 5"2 o · gil 
I'hi 
-
- - -
10/- 1b PtEToot, i/\ I'IU, - 0 ' 50; 5, · 1(' 31·1.1 
I";" p.w. 
1'127 - - "·bl ' ... ·bl 
W,TNATe ItS ~A""J) ('1u, - 3 ' 17 2"1 ·'12 34·33 
1'I2.i - 3'~S" I> ' 0& lb · ~ 2.. 
tl . O.O P~~"To.e,,,, J~u, ( . 09 1· bl+ .lb-S4 .:l <OJ . 3 2-
j. 
1'12.7 1· 10 IS · 31+ .;l, .5"'1 38 · 1,3 
1..1 . 1'1 . II. 
fN. ~'T"J'IT€~ RAN.b J92k 0·(,1t 3· 2.~ 2'1 .1'1 34 ' 2't-
1'12.& O · 2~ f'. '18 3'1 · b 3, l.;.b· b4-
(All figures are approx imations) 
WMA White male adult 
WMJ White male juvenile 
AMA African male adult 
SOURCE: 1929 WBR pp 32-33 
5. ii. Unskilled wages: racial breakdown at wages leveil £1. 0 .0. - £1. 19.11. in f ercentage 
1 
WAqE: MEA Y<'-ftR. hlMA Nt--\.J' Af.·H\ % ICfTAL- ~ 
~J . o . o P"-HOI{,,,,, l'1u, 
- - 1'1 · b 1 19·('7 
"'" I'lZ 7 0'57 "1.1,1" 1 i·75 ;J"I. S-<;;; 
1:. t. ..... " 
p ....... i-J,.,. .... o'\.,.~~ eAo-lj) l'lu, C> . 1"1 .:l . ""/ 1 .).1' gh .24-'''1 .''-
I'h·e o .oq 2· 4-:), :27·2.0 2"1''10 
/""".0 PI{ETo~'A 1'l2h I· 09 I b 4- ""/ . to 10·92-
-It, 
1'l27 
i.. 1. 1'\. 11 
I· 1 If- $". (,& 2·24- "l'bh 
p .. W, ''''''''' E: r<.S eA>-l.i) 1'12b O·Lj.~ O'S"8 ""/. -73 "1·22 
1'12.g O·Jq 3·s-s 1':<43 1(, · "12. 
(All figures are approximations) 
WMA White male adult 
WMJ White male juvenile 
AMA African male adult 
SOURCE: 1929 WBR pp 32-33 
S.iii. Wage Levels: racial breakdown in percentage 
WAGE CEILING WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC COLOURED 
YEAR 
{:J .o . o. ~c 112(, 3 · 5(' I · o~ - -
.:l . 1'1 . // . ~ ...... . 1927 4· 5 S 3·"Ia I· 14-
-
/'3 . 0 . 0 . ~. 192b {"Ol O·S'S - -
3 . 1<1 . 11 . p . ...,. l't2.7 3'4-1 - - -
TOT ..... Nc. 
AeE~ y"PtR. I<MPI.o'f£e5 
i. 4,. . 0 . O . ~o 1926 4 ' 3, - - - P~ETOR.IA 192(" IS5 
",.1'1. 11. ~ ..... . 1927 4 . 55 
- -
-
\"121 I7b 
I..s .o . o . -to I'll{, 3 ·n 0 ' 55 - -
S' . 1'1. Ii. ".w. 192.1 1.2 ' 50 
- -
-
i6 .0.0 . lINt> 192.6 ~ . \llf. - - -
OV£~ . ~ . w . 1927 ~ ' (,b - - -
t. :J . O . o . ~. 192.6 3'00 - - o · 10 
':> . 1'1 . 11 . p.w. 
'92\1 2 · 2.6 O·'S - 0 · 2l! 
'I. 3 . 0 . 0. -!" "hi, o · i7 - - 0 · 10 
3 . 1'1 . 11. p.w. 1~2g , '1~ 0·28 
-
0 · 09 ~EP, TOTAL ""0. '1Ef\R, £111''-'''££5 
i ", . 0 . o. ~. 1"2k l ' Ob - 0 · 10 - Wl'f\oJ~TeRSR""'.b 19z" 103 4 
4. 1'1 . . 11 . p.w. 192.8 2. ' 43 o· glf. - o· '9 19a 1010 
is .o .o. t. I "Ill, , . q4- - - -
EO .1'1 . I, .p.w. 192.l! I· 40 - - -
L b.o.O . .. .. !) 192.6 .:15 · 1\ - o· 19 0 · /0 
CNE~ p.w. 192~ 1 "'·70 
-
0·37 0·'9 
(All figures are approximations) SOURCE: 1929 WBR pp 32-33 
6. sweet Trade 
6.i. Regional breakdown of sweet trade 
AREA 'lEAR To't"AL. % 
~£TOR"~ "'Nt) Iq2b 20 · bl 
\.!'TWATERSRI\Nb 1'12 ~ 2. 4. • Ob 
1'130 20 · 01 
I'H2- 22.· 7b 
DURB~!J. £I'IST LONbo"'. 1~2.b 74'4-'1 
'If:.'" R. 
TOTA,L- No. 
eMP\.O'fEE$ 
K'MBER \.EY Po~, 1'\ 2ll 72· \:.b 
• IGl2.(:, .203~ 
E"'7.ASlLTH. SLoE'" PO'" • 1930 71:>. E,b 192.& 171 1 
ie ..... , C. P,,"'N~UL.I'I 1'132- ; 3·21 
1930 2173 
~ RAHI\MSTO>vo-J. 1921:. 2·'\0 lC\32. 20Cg 
)( ''''~'''' \.L.I IIMS"O'" N 192.8 2 · 20 
1"130 2. . 12.. 
1932- 2. · I,S 
\J ITt: ""H\ <; e . 1<J2b I·' '+ 
\JO~Ee.'TER 1'I2'a I · 13 
1"130 O·la 
I~ll. O· IS' 
(All figures are approximations) SOURCE : AN 125-1931 
An 112-1933 
6.ii. Regional breakdown: race, sex, age in percentage 
WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC OTHER COLOURED 
AREA 
M F M F M F Ii F 
YEAR A J A J A J A J A J A J A J A J 
P~E;TOR.t\ ""'!) 1'12." ;a,ob 1'03 2o.S" !>·oo j·2b 0 , '0 - - - - - - 0·2-0 0"0 - 0 ·2.'1 
'""T .... .,.TfIl.S ~A"'.t>. ,'Ia 2'5"4- 2·1.0 N1 '\. ~2 Ij.' R~ 0'1<0 - - - - - - o· " O'Ob I - -
I'I~O 2'~2 oz · ... '+- 2.~'I !' · Il(' 1j. -93 0 · ,8 - - - - - - 0·09 - - -
I~ 3l. 3·5 ... I · .,.'1 'f.' Sa 7·47 ~' 92 O' IS" - - - - I - - i 0·3~ - I - -, Yfl'rf<' TOT~c..- NO. r ",Pt..,.., £ 10'" 
lloRS'I>i, EllS,. L..o""DotJ. '''lob 1·11. I · ~l. .... ·4' 7·" IO·7S o · 3'1 - - 0· ... '1 0'29 o · :>~ " , 2.0 1,'2.11 1·23 !z".O& 1., · !iT i 
B\..O£,",I'O>.I""'" • PORT 1'12. ~ (' ,!;S I· If , If' '2. '1· ... 3 '0 '22 0·73 O·Ob - 0 ' 73 0·'16 - - S;'S"3 '·30 113.38 ,;. /8 I , 
EL' ~ AS,(-n.. l<''''.a£,~7, ,'l30 7·!io I . " 1 !>·20 12.·".3 " . ~ .. 0·23 0'28 "- 0·32. I 0·0'1 ! - - I S'lS '·33 1' ... ·31 'b· !S1f. ! , 
P!!N,,"suLI\ • 1~32. {,. S:l. ','Ii Gj.'jb "'01.1 '1·Ii{' 0·20 0 ' 10 i 1 S ·33 I "I. Ill, ! CAPE - 0· ... 0 0'4-0 I - - o .8'r;- I '1,· .. 3 
192.h 2038 
1928 1711 
I C\ 30 211 "3 
Iq"lb O · 2-S 0 ' 2.'1 o· ,-'" C ' IS" •• '11, 0"0 - - - - i - 1 - - -, - -
11132- 2008 
~'L1qw \\...l..IAfoIltTO h)1J I 1'12.8 0·28 0'" o· '7 O 'Ob "2<>- o· lit- - - - - , - - I - - - -
1'130 I 0'12 0'0. 0·g7 . I 0·0" 1 ~~A 1111 M STO...,"" . o dOl 0'4' - - - - 0 ' 0, - -
1432. o ·qo c'1S" 0·21> 0· ... 0 O .... $" - - - - ! i I - - - L - I - -
-=----.J 
1'12.1, o· IS' 0'10 o· 'S' O'b't - - - - - - - I 0'10 1 - - -, 
V.T"N>I~'( , I'lLt 0·" "." O·S". - - 10 . , . 
, I 0'2 '3 - - - - - - i - o· 0 1. -
," '30 
, 
- ! 0 ·09 ! WOeCE<TE;R. • - - 0 · 0'1 - - - - - ! , - - -- - - I 
1'13 <- - - 0",0 - - - - - I - 1 - 1 0 '0. I - I I I - - -
SOURCE: AN 125-1931 and An 112-1933 
WAGE CEILING WHITE AFRICAN ASIATIC COLOURED 6. iii. Skilled employees: racial breakdown of wage levels in percentage 
YEAR 
-- -
id.·c.o. I"\2..'=> - - - - 3 . 4-9 to 
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11:,.0.0. I'll'=- q · 30 -
~ 
-~o 
, .. lQ. I' . 1~2.g 2.lj.' b~ - - g'bLj-
1'130 21 '3,b - - 'I ," 
1.7 .0.0 
\qu, 19 ,18 
- -
-
-+. 
1 . 1'1. II . 
1'l2.g Il·2.~ 
-
- -
1'130 Ib'SO -
-
e·Cjl 
I~2b g. 1 It 
- - I· 'b 
is.o. c. ~o III2.g II ·" - - -8. Iq. 1\. 
Iq~o 14- · ,sb - - -
1~2~ 10 '4-1 - - -i.. "I. o . c. SOURCE: AN 125-1931 
I q 2.S 12.· 3S' - - -A"'» 0 .... E. R 
1'130 S '7tt - - - (All figures are approximations) 
6.iv. Unskilled employees: racial breakdown of wage levels in percentage 
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6.v. Coloured and white female employees: comparative table 
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6.vi. Percentage female employees to total percentage of wage bracket 
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7. Dyeing. Cleaning and Laundering 
7.i. Racial breakdown of workforce 
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8. Labour Force Racial Breakdown in Percentage 
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9. EXEMPTIONS 
Exemptions granted to 11 November 1929 : 
No. of employees Determination Exemptions Exemptions 
affected by Issued CUrrent 
Determination 
80 Hairdressing (9 ) 1 0 
1657 Furniture (12 ) 34 33 
6263 Clothing (15 ) 18 14 
703 Tea, Coffee. 
Chicory (19) 1 
291 Baking and 
Confectionary 
(20) 
406 Hairdressing(21 ) 6 4 
2611 Dyeing. Cleaning, 
Laundering (23) 8 7 
1504 Bespoke Tailor-
ing (24) 48 48 
5232 Unskilled (25) 2 2 
50000 (? ) Shop Assis-
tants (26) 159 133 
69397 279 243 
lf7f 
Exemptions granted to 30 June 1932: 
No. of employees Determination Exemptions Exemptions 
affected, by Issued Current 
Determination 
1657 Furniture 
(30 - 33) 141 27 
6263 Clothing (42) 224 224 
630 Leather ( 14) 1 0 
768 Baking and 
Confectionary 
(35 ) 8 4 
136 Glass Bevelling 
Silvering (16) 25 0 
703 Tea, Coffee. 
Chicory (19) 5 2 
41 Hairdressing 
(18) 10 2 
65 (41) 0 0 
406 (40 ) 3 3 
22 Barmen (22) 1 0 
2611 Laundries (23) 62 37 
1504 Bespoke Tailor-
ing (24) 133 41 
5232 Unskilled (25) 25 5 
50000 (?) Commercial Dis-
tributive (38) 351 275 
991 Catering (37 ) 343 144 
2008 Sweets (34 ) 9 1 
72737 1341 765 
---
SOURCE: Cousins - Under Secretary for Labour. 16 November. 1929 
Department of Labour Archive. 1427/Lc/1069/2 Part 1 
10. Minimum Wage Determinations 1927-1931, 1931-1934. 
The table below is reproduced from Pursell, D "Minimum Wage 
Regulation under the South African Wage Act" pp239-240. The wage rates 
are in Rand (Pursell's conversion), and the percentage in the right-
hand column represents the positive/negative relation between the earlier 
and the later period. 
Industry 1927-31 1931-34 % + or -
Sweet Industry 
Sweet maker 13.00 - 11 .00 12.00 +9.1 to -7.9 
General worker 6.00 - 4.80 3.00 -50 to -20.8 
Grade 1 2.40 - 2.00 2.40 +20 to 0 
Baking and Confectionary 
(Durban/Pietermaritzburg) 
Baker 10.00 6.00 -40 
Packer, Vanman,storeman 8.00 6.00 -25 
Grade 1 2.25 2.40 +6.7 
Furniture 
Skilled worker 10.80 10.80 0 
Driver, storeman 
Timekeeper 8.00 6.00 -25 
Labourers 2.40 2.40 0 
Hairdressing (Pretoria) 
Gents trade: 
Qualified Male 12.00 10.00 -16.6 
Ladies trade: 
Qualified male 14.00 11 .00 -21 .4 
Qualified female 8.10 6.00 -25.9 
Commercial Distributive 
~ 
Qualified male clerk 10.00 8.30 -17 
Qualified female clerk 5.50 4.38 -20.3 
Laundries 
Dyer, Cleaner 12.00 12.00 0 
Examiner, Sorter, 
Checker 5.00 3 . 00 -40 
Grade 1 2.25 2.25 0 
Industry 1927-31 1931-34 % + or -
Hairdressing (CaEe Town) 
Gents trade: 
Qualified male 11. 00 9.00 -18.2 
Ladies trade: 
Qualified male 12.00 9.00 -25 
Qualified female 8.00 5.00 -36.5 
Hairdressing (Port Elizabeth) 
Gents trade: 
Qualified male 11 .00 10.00 -9 
Ladies trade: 
Qualified male 12.00 11 .00 -8.3 
Qualified female 8.00 7.25 -9.4 
Hairdressing (Uitenhage) 
Gents trade: 
Qualified male 10.00 9.00 -10 
Ladies trade: 
Qualified male 10.00 9.00 -10 
Qualified female 6.00 5.50 -8 
Glass Bevelling and Silvering 
Glass Bevellers7Silverers 10.00 1s.3d.per 
hour or 
6.00 -40 
Passenger Undertakings 
(caEe Town) 
Drivers 10.00 8.80 -12 
Conductors 8.00 6.20 -22.5 
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1930 Riotous Assemclies Bill 
1930 Wage Amendment Bill 
SC 8-1930 
SC 9-1930 
1937 Wage Bill and Industrial Conciliation Eill SC5-1937 
i v) Senate Debates 
cf section A2 
1924-1936 
v) Votes and Proceedings of Parliament 
1912 1920 
1913 1930 
1914 1935 
f. Provincial Ordinances 
Shop Hours Ordinances 
Cape 
Natal 
14-1930 
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journal, Social and Industrial Review, until the end of 1930. 
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unpublished in the form of Annexures to the Votes and Proceedings 
of Parliament. An extended visit to the Library of Parliament 
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